github-featured/hmbown--codewhale
2
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Actions 13 Deployments Models Agent Notes Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity
Files
debug/win-python
hmbown--codewhale/docs/RUNTIME_API.md
T
Hmbown 99e17540fb docs(runtime-api): document the provider and model-selection routes 
GET /v1/providers, GET /v1/providers/{id}/models, and
POST /v1/providers/{id}/switch have shipped since 2026-07-20 (ebc567dec) and
were documented nowhere. The cost was concrete: a desktop integration probing
for model choice on 2026-08-04 tried /v1/models, /v1/runtime/models, and
/v1/runtime/providers, got 404s from all three, and filed 'no way to read the
catalog' and 'no way to know which model values are valid' as runtime gaps —
against a binary where the real route was already live. The API was fine; the
map was blank.

Documents the exact response shapes, the deepseek-cn alias rejection, that an
empty models array means 'not configured here' rather than 'no models', that
the returned ids are what POST /v1/threads accepts, and — most usefully — that
the switch route exists precisely so a GUI does not simulate a provider change
with repeated POST /v1/config writes plus a reload. Also records why there is
no credential-presence field yet and the one-request-per-provider workaround.

No code change. Authored with agent assistance (Claude).
2026-08-04 14:10:19 -07:00

1067 lines
50 KiB
Markdown
Raw Permalink Blame History

This file contains ambiguous Unicode characters
This file contains Unicode characters that might be confused with other characters. If you think that this is intentional, you can safely ignore this warning. Use the Escape button to reveal them.
# Runtime API & Integration Contract
`codewhale app-server` is the canonical local runtime API and control plane.
Local SDKs, mobile/remote-control clients, and editor integrations talk to it
instead of screen-scraping terminal output. It serves the full HTTP/SSE runtime
API (`/v1/*`), a JSON-RPC control transport over stdio, and the phone-friendly
mobile page. `codewhale doctor --json` provides machine-readable health, and
`codewhale serve --acp` speaks the Agent Client Protocol over stdio for editors
such as Zed.
`codewhale serve --http` / `serve --mobile` remain as **compatibility aliases**
for `codewhale app-server --http` / `--mobile`; both launch the identical
server. New integrations should target `app-server`.
`codewhale exec` is the separate one-shot headless worker path (stream-json,
fleet worker subprocess, CI primitive). It is not part of this API, but it
shares the same runtime, provider/model resolution, permission profiles, and
event vocabulary.
This document is the stable integration contract for native workbench
applications (and other local supervisors) that embed the DeepSeek engine.
## Architecture
```
local supervisor / SDK / automation harness
│
├─ codewhale app-server --http → HTTP/SSE runtime API (/v1/*) [canonical]
├─ codewhale app-server --mobile → runtime API + mobile control page
├─ codewhale app-server --stdio → JSON-RPC control transport over stdio
├─ codewhale doctor --json → machine-readable health & capability
├─ codewhale serve --acp → ACP stdio agent for editors such as Zed
├─ codewhale serve --mcp → MCP stdio server
├─ codewhale serve --http/--mobile → legacy aliases for `app-server --http/--mobile`
└─ codewhale exec [args] → one-shot headless worker (stream-json)
```
The engine runs as a local-only process. All APIs bind to `localhost` by
default. No hosted relay, no provider-token custody, no secret leakage.
For a proposed read-only audit export over completed turns, see
[`docs/RECEIPTS.md`](RECEIPTS.md). That document is a protocol note; the receipt
CLI/API surfaces are not implemented yet.
## Runtime API entrypoints
| Entry | Transport | Use |
|---|---|---|
| `codewhale web [--port 7878]` | HTTP/SSE on `127.0.0.1:7878` + embedded client | First-class loopback-only browser client; opens the default browser |
| `codewhale app-server --http` | HTTP/SSE on `127.0.0.1:7878` | Full `/v1/*` runtime API (canonical) |
| `codewhale app-server --mobile` | HTTP/SSE on `0.0.0.0:7878` + `/mobile` | Runtime API + phone control page |
| `codewhale app-server --stdio` | JSON-RPC 2.0 over stdio | Local SDK / control probe (no listener) |
| `codewhale app-server` | HTTP on `127.0.0.1:8787` | Legacy in-process app-server (`/healthz`, `/thread`, `/app`, `/prompt`, `/tool`, `/jobs`) |
| `codewhale serve --http` / `--mobile` | same server as `app-server --http`/`--mobile` | Compatibility aliases |
`app-server --http` and `--mobile` launch the same mature runtime API server
historically reached through `serve --http` — no routes or behavior changed, so
every endpoint documented below is identical across both entrypoints. The
runtime API token is read from `--auth-token`, then `CODEWHALE_RUNTIME_TOKEN`,
then `DEEPSEEK_RUNTIME_TOKEN`; use `--insecure-no-auth` only with a loopback
bind. The `serve` compatibility aliases keep their `--insecure` flag.
The legacy in-process `codewhale app-server` also requires an explicit
`--auth-token` or `CODEWHALE_APP_SERVER_TOKEN` before binding a non-loopback
host; its generated one-time `cwapp_*` token is loopback-only.
### Runtime and account identity
`GET /v1/runtime/info` reports `codewhale_version` plus the full 40-character
`codewhale_commit` embedded by the shared CLI/TUI build. A source archive that
cannot provide an exact commit reports `unknown`, allowing compatibility
clients to fail closed rather than accepting an ambiguous binary pair.
The same response advertises `capabilities.account_session: true` and a
token-free account receipt:
```json
{
"account": {
"schema_version": 1,
"state": "authenticated",
"api_base": "https://api.codewhale.net",
"account_id": "acct_...",
"session_id": "session_...",
"scopes": [],
"expires_at": "2026-08-01T20:00:00Z"
}
}
```
The Runtime reads this receipt from the exact profile- and API-origin-scoped
secure record written by `codewhale account login`; it does not run a second
login flow. States are `signed_out`, `authenticated`, `offline_cached`,
`expired`, or `revoked`. Scopes are copied only from explicit stored session
grants and are never inferred from account identity. Access/refresh tokens,
email, provider profile, and provider credentials are never returned.
`account_id` and `session_id` are included only for a request authorized with
the Runtime token (or an explicitly insecure loopback server); the public
bootstrap response remains usable but reports `signed_out`. Signed-out local
Work remains supported and never allocates cloud compute implicitly.
The `--stdio` control transport is newline-delimited JSON-RPC 2.0. Probe it
without spending model tokens:
```bash
printf '%s\n' \
'{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"healthz"}' \
'{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"capabilities"}' \
'{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":3,"method":"shutdown"}' \
| codewhale app-server --stdio
```
`capabilities` returns the advertised method families (`thread/*`, `app/*`,
`prompt/*`) and the full method list; `thread/capabilities`,
`app/capabilities`, and `prompt/capabilities` scope it per family. The method
set is pinned by a drift test in `crates/app-server/src/lib.rs`, so SDK and
local integration clients can rely on it not changing silently.
### Interrupting a turn
`thread/message` streams until the turn reaches a terminal state, which can
take minutes. The read loop keeps polling stdin while a turn streams, so a
client can send:
```json
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":9,"method":"thread/interrupt","params":{"thread_id":"thr_..."}}
```
and the runtime is asked to interrupt that turn
(`POST /v1/threads/{id}/turns/{turn_id}/interrupt`). The reply carries
`interrupted: false` when no turn is streaming for that thread — this is not
an error, just nothing to stop. The interrupted `thread/message` then fails
with a `turn interrupted` error, and its reply is written before the
interrupt's own reply, since the turn owns the writer until it unwinds.
`shutdown` sent during a live turn also interrupts first: it needs the same
bridge that the turn holds, so without that it would wait for the very turn
it was meant to stop. Other requests that arrive mid-turn are queued and run
in order once the turn finishes.
## SDK contract
The app-server exists so an external SDK can answer — without scraping TUI
output — *what route ran, which provider/model/reasoning/permission profile was
effective, what events happened, how many tokens were used, and how the run
finished.* The durable Thread/Turn/Item data model already carries most of
this; the table maps each integration need to where a local client reads it.
| Integration need | Where it comes from | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Route / effective model / billing surface | `TurnRecord` + thread `model`; per-run `--provider`/`--model` overrides | available |
| Permission / sandbox / approval profile | thread `auto_approve`, sandbox + approval policy | available |
| Run / thread / turn IDs | `thread_id`, `turn_id`, SSE event envelope | available |
| Event stream | `GET /v1/threads/{id}/events` (replay + live SSE) | available |
| Turn status / terminal classification | `TurnRecord.status` + error summary | available |
| Token usage | `TurnRecord.usage`; aggregate via `GET /v1/usage` | available |
| Single-read run receipt (route + usage + cost) | `GET /v1/threads/{id}/turns/{turn_id}/receipt` | proposed ([RECEIPTS.md](RECEIPTS.md)) |
For one-shot/headless automation, prefer `codewhale exec` with explicit
`--provider <id> --model <id>` so a failure identifies the exact provider/model
pair. Use `app-server` when a local integration needs to start, resume, steer,
or interrupt turns, list models/capabilities, follow the event stream, or read
usage. Both paths share the same runtime, so route-effective model resolution
and the event vocabulary match.
### Release smoke
`scripts/release/app-server-smoke.sh` is the committed pre-release check:
```bash
scripts/release/app-server-smoke.sh # stdio health/capabilities probe (no tokens)
scripts/release/app-server-smoke.sh --matrix # + print the configured provider/model matrix
scripts/release/app-server-smoke.sh --matrix --real # + exec a cheap sentinel per provider
```
The stdio probe runs against a throwaway config, so it never reads real keys.
The matrix discovers configured providers from `codewhale auth list`, skips
unconfigured providers, and maps a provider to a cheap sentinel model only when
it has a built-in cheap default. That built-in set is deliberately conservative
(currently `deepseek`, `zai`, `moonshot`, and `openai`); every other provider —
including `arcee`, `openrouter`, `xiaomi-mimo`, and `openai-codex` — is left
unmapped on purpose and must be given a model per run via `SMOKE_MODEL_<SLUG>`
rather than a guessed default (#3205). Any configured-but-unmapped provider
fails loudly in `--real` mode. `auth list` reports presence flags only and exec
output is passed through a redactor, so secrets are never printed. The parser is
covered by `scripts/release/app-server-smoke.test.sh` against a fake `codewhale`
binary.
## ACP stdio adapter: `codewhale serve --acp`
`codewhale serve --acp` speaks JSON-RPC 2.0 over newline-delimited stdio for
ACP-compatible editor clients. The initial adapter implements the ACP baseline:
- `initialize`
- `session/new`
- `session/prompt`
- `session/cancel`
Prompt requests are routed through the configured DeepSeek client and current
default model. Responses are emitted as `session/update` agent message chunks
followed by a `session/prompt` response with `stopReason: "end_turn"`.
The adapter is intentionally conservative: it does not yet expose shell tools,
file-write tools, checkpoint replay, or session loading through ACP. Use
`codewhale serve --http` for the full local runtime API and `codewhale serve --mcp`
when another client needs DeepSeek's tools as MCP tools.
## Capability endpoint: `codewhale doctor --json`
Returns a JSON object describing the current installation's readiness state.
Suitable for health-check polling from a macOS workbench. This command is
strictly structural and offline: it does not load workspace credential
`.env` files, inspect credential environment values, open secret/OAuth files,
probe an OS keyring, contact providers, or start MCP processes.
```bash
codewhale doctor --json
```
### Response schema (key fields)
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `version` | string | Installed version (e.g. `"0.8.9"`) |
| `config_path` | string | Resolved config file path |
| `config_present` | bool | Whether the config file exists |
| `paths` | object | Canonical config, settings, state, sessions, logs, automations, and secrets paths |
| `secret_backend` | object | Metadata-only file-store shape, or literal `unknown` / `not_probed` for system and unsupported backends |
| `workspace` | string | Default workspace directory |
| `legacy_state.primary_root` | string | Primary Codewhale state root inspected for known state paths |
| `legacy_state.legacy_root` | string | Legacy `.deepseek` state root inspected for known state paths |
| `legacy_state.needs_attention` | bool | Whether known `~/.deepseek` state paths need review or the read-only session recovery diagnostic found missing destination filenames / could not complete |
| `legacy_state.legacy_only_count` | number | Count of known state paths present only under the legacy root |
| `legacy_state.dual_present_count` | number | Count of known state paths present under both primary and legacy roots |
| `legacy_state.entries` | array | Per-path migration status: `{name, primary_present, legacy_present, status}` |
| `legacy_state.session_recovery.status` | string | `isolated`, `no_legacy_sessions`, `migration_pending`, `migration_incomplete`, `migration_complete`, or `scan_failed` |
| `legacy_state.session_recovery.read_only` | bool | Always true; doctor never invokes session migration or modifies either session directory |
| `legacy_state.session_recovery.chat_contents_read` | bool | Always false; comparison is based only on top-level `.json` filenames and filesystem metadata |
| `legacy_state.session_recovery.checkpoint_internals_scanned` | bool | Always false; `sessions/checkpoints/` and all other directories are skipped |
| `legacy_state.session_recovery.recoverable_files` | array | Bounded sample of up to 100 missing destination filenames with source and destination paths; no chat payloads |
| `legacy_state.session_recovery.recoverable_file_count` | number | Total missing destination filename count, including entries beyond the bounded sample |
| `legacy_state.session_recovery.recoverable_files_truncated` | bool | Whether more than 100 recoverable filenames were found |
| `legacy_state.session_recovery.recovery_command` | string or null | `codewhale sessions` when additive automatic recovery is available; null for isolated, complete, empty, or failed scans |
| `api_key.source` | string | Structural source state: `config_declared`, `env_declared`, `external_auth_declared`, `secret_store_unprobed`, `secret_store_unavailable`, `oauth_unprobed`, `external_consent`, `none`, `local_runtime`, or `unknown`; declarations are not availability proof |
| `api_key.availability` | string | Literal `present`, `not_required`, `not_probed`, `unavailable`, or `unknown`; only `present` and `not_required` certify structural Setup/Fleet credential readiness |
| `base_url` | string | Provider URL authority only (`scheme://host[:explicit-port]`); userinfo, path, query, and fragment are omitted |
| `default_text_model` | string | Default model |
| `memory.enabled` | bool | Whether the memory feature is on |
| `memory.path` | string | Path to memory file |
| `memory.file_present` | bool | Whether memory file exists |
| `mcp.config_path` | string | MCP config file path |
| `mcp.present` | bool | Whether MCP config exists |
| `mcp.probe_scope` | string | `configuration`; doctor does not start MCP servers |
| `mcp.live_health_checked` | bool | Always false for doctor JSON |
| `mcp.servers` | array | Per-server structural result and counts plus separate `checks`; URL userinfo/path/query/fragment and command argv, environment, header, and token values are never emitted, and all live stages are `not_checked` |
| `skills.selected` | string | Resolved skills directory |
| `skills.global.path` / `.present` / `.count` | — | Codewhale global skills dir (`~/.codewhale/skills`, with legacy `~/.deepseek/skills` support) |
| `skills.agents.path` / `.present` / `.count` | — | Workspace `.agents/skills/` dir |
| `skills.agents_global.path` / `.present` / `.count` | — | agentskills.io global skills dir (`~/.agents/skills`) |
| `skills.local.path` / `.present` / `.count` | — | `skills/` dir |
| `skills.opencode.path` / `.present` / `.count` | — | `.opencode/skills/` dir |
| `skills.claude.path` / `.present` / `.count` | — | `.claude/skills/` dir |
| `tools.path` / `.present` / `.count` | — | Global tools directory |
| `plugins.path` / `.present` / `.count` | — | Global plugins directory |
| `sandbox.available` | bool | Whether sandbox is supported on this OS |
| `sandbox.kind` | string or null | Sandbox kind (e.g. `"macos_seatbelt"`) |
| `storage.spillover.path` / `.present` / `.count` | — | Tool output spillover dir |
| `storage.stash.path` / `.present` / `.count` | — | Composer stash |
### Example
```json
{
"version": "0.8.9",
"config_path": "/Users/you/.codewhale/config.toml",
"config_present": true,
"workspace": "/Users/you/projects/codewhale-tui",
"api_key": {
"source": "secret_store_unprobed",
"availability": "not_probed"
},
"base_url": "https://api.deepseek.com",
"default_text_model": "deepseek-v4-pro",
"memory": {
"enabled": false,
"path": "/Users/you/.codewhale/memory.md",
"file_present": true
},
"mcp": {
"config_path": "/Users/you/.codewhale/mcp.json",
"present": true,
"servers": [
{"name": "filesystem", "enabled": true, "transport": "stdio", "args_count": 2, "env_count": 0, "status": "ok"}
]
},
"sandbox": {
"available": true,
"kind": "macos_seatbelt"
}
}
```
## HTTP/SSE runtime API: `codewhale app-server --http`
```bash
codewhale app-server --http [--host 127.0.0.1] [--port 7878] [--workers 2] [--auth-token TOKEN] [--insecure-no-auth]
codewhale app-server --mobile [--host 0.0.0.0] [--port 7878] [--auth-token TOKEN]
codewhale app-server --mobile --host 127.0.0.1 [--port 7878] [--insecure-no-auth]
codewhale web [--port 7878]
# Compatibility aliases — identical server, serve flag names:
codewhale serve --http [...] [--insecure]
codewhale serve --mobile [...] [--insecure]
```
Defaults: host `127.0.0.1`, port `7878`, 2 workers (clamped 1–8).
The server binds to `localhost` by default. Configuration is via CLI flags —
there is no `[app_server]` config section.
`/v1/*` routes require a bearer token unless `codewhale app-server` is started
with `--insecure-no-auth` on a loopback bind such as `127.0.0.1`. Do not combine
no-auth mode with the `--mobile` default host `0.0.0.0`; use a token for LAN
mobile access, or add `--host 127.0.0.1` for local-only no-auth testing. The
`codewhale serve` compatibility aliases use `--insecure` for the same loopback
escape hatch.
Pass `--auth-token TOKEN` or set `CODEWHALE_RUNTIME_TOKEN=TOKEN` before starting
the server; `DEEPSEEK_RUNTIME_TOKEN` remains a compatibility alias. If neither
is set, the process generates a Runtime token for that process and does **not**
print it. `/health`, `/v1/runtime/info`, and an enabled static client shell
remain public; Runtime mutations and thread data stay behind `/v1/*`
authentication. `/mobile` returns 404 when mobile mode is disabled and serves
the unchanged static shell when it is enabled.
Authenticated clients can provide the token as `Authorization: Bearer TOKEN`,
`X-Codewhale-Runtime-Token: TOKEN`, the legacy
`X-DeepSeek-Runtime-Token: TOKEN`, or the `codewhale_runtime_token` cookie.
Query-string authentication is not supported.
### Local browser client
`codewhale web` starts the canonical Runtime API on `127.0.0.1`, serves
dependency-free assets embedded in the binary, and opens the default browser.
It cannot bind to a non-loopback host and cannot run with Runtime auth disabled.
The browser-launch URL contains a random, short-lived, one-time bootstrap
capability, never the Runtime token. A loopback request exchanges that
capability for a
`codewhale_web_session=…; HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict; Path=/` cookie backed by a
single process-local server session that expires 12 hours after the server
process starts, consumes the capability immediately, and redirects to `/`.
Reused, expired, malformed, or
non-loopback bootstrap attempts fail closed. The Runtime bearer token is not
placed in rendered HTML, browser storage, logs, URL queries/fragments, or
browser-launch arguments. The one-time bootstrap capability does transit the
OS browser launcher's argument list for a sub-second window; a same-user
process scraping the process table in that window could race the browser to
the exchange, which is why the capability is single-use, loopback-only, and
expiring — and why a same-user attacker has strictly easier local avenues
than this race.
Existing bearer/header/cookie authorization for `/v1/*` is unchanged outside
web mode. In web mode, cookie-authenticated unsafe requests must also carry the
exact local web origin, and Fetch Metadata identifying a cross-origin cookie
request is rejected. Explicit bearer and Runtime-token header clients keep
their existing behavior.
The v0.9.1 client provides a responsive thread/search rail, Runtime-owned
session facts, transcript and tool receipts, and a bottom composer. It can
create, select, rename, and archive threads; start or steer turns; interrupt
work; resolve approvals; and answer Runtime user-input requests. Selection
loads `GET /v1/threads/{id}` first, then opens the replayable event stream with
`since_seq=latest_seq`; reconnection advances from the newest accepted sequence
and drops duplicates or events from a stale selection. The thread detail
snapshot includes `pending_approvals`, `pending_user_inputs`, and
`pending_dynamic_tool_calls`; clients must hydrate those fields before
subscribing so a reload cannot strand work whose request event is at or before
`latest_seq`. Resolution is also published as `approval.decided`,
`user_input.answered`, `user_input.canceled`, `tool_call.resolved`,
`tool_call.canceled`, or `tool_call.timeout` for already-connected clients.
Model, mode, permission posture, workspace, and branch are display-only in this
client. Files/Changes, PTY/terminal, preview, artifacts, provider login/model
selection, Fleet creation, and undo/retry/restore controls are intentionally
absent until the Runtime publishes explicit contracts for them.
### Mobile control page
`codewhale serve --mobile` starts the same HTTP/SSE runtime API and serves a
phone-friendly control page at `/mobile`. When the bind host is left at the
default, mobile mode binds to `0.0.0.0`, prints a warning, and prints local/LAN
URLs. Pass `--host 127.0.0.1` to keep the mobile page loopback-only. The static
HTML page contains no secrets and is not itself token-gated. Its calls to
`/v1/*` are authenticated: for LAN use, start with an explicit Runtime token
and enter it in the page. Generated Runtime tokens are deliberately unprinted,
so they cannot be copied into another device.
The mobile page can list/create threads, send prompts, follow live SSE events,
steer or interrupt an active turn, and resolve normal tool approvals through
`POST /v1/approvals/{approval_id}`. It is still a local/LAN convenience surface:
do not expose it directly to the public internet without TLS and a trusted
fronting layer.
### Endpoints
**Health**
- `GET /health`
**Sessions** (durable session manager)
- `GET /v1/sessions?limit=50&search=<fuzzy>&include_archived=false&archived_only=false&workspace=<path>&sort=recent|name|size`
- `GET /v1/sessions/summary?…` (same query params; projected row shape)
- `GET /v1/sessions/{id}` (add `?peek=true&entries=12` for a bounded, redacted
read-only peek instead of the full transcript)
- `PATCH /v1/sessions/{id}` (`{ "title"?: string, "archived"?: bool }`)
- `DELETE /v1/sessions/{id}`
- `POST /v1/sessions/{id}/resume-thread`
Sessions and threads answer the same `include_archived` / `archived_only` pair
with the same meaning, and `search` is the same fuzzy match (title, id,
workspace — substring, then subsequence) the TUI session picker and the sidebar
Sessions rail use. All three surfaces run one projection
(`crates/tui/src/session_projection.rs`), so a listing cannot differ between
the terminal and the dashboard.
`GET /v1/sessions/summary` returns rows that are field-compatible with
`GET /v1/threads/summary` — `id`, `title`, `preview`, `model`, `mode`,
`workspace`, `archived`, `updated_at` — plus `message_count`, `total_tokens`,
`created_at`, `parent_session_id`, and `is_current`. One caveat stated plainly:
`preview` is the session's recorded **title**, not its last message. Session
metadata does not store a last message, and reading every transcript to
synthesise one would make a list view an unbounded read. Full transcript
preview lives in the TUI session picker, which reads one selected session.
`PATCH /v1/sessions/{id}` renames and/or archives a saved session and returns a
lifecycle receipt shaped like the thread patch receipt:
```json
{
"session": { "id": "…", "title": "Renamed", "archived": true, "…": "…" },
"changes": { "title": "Renamed", "archived": true }
}
```
`changes` lists only what actually moved, so a no-op patch is distinguishable
from an applied one. Archiving is durable and reversible: an archived session
stays on disk and stays loadable, disappears from default listings, and is
never chosen by `--continue` or by auto-resume. The route is the same writer
the TUI picker (`e`) and `/sessions archive <id>` use — there is no second
archive notion.
While a session is open in an interactive Codewhale process, that process holds
the authoritative copy in memory and rewrites the whole document on its next
autosave. `PATCH` therefore fails closed on it with `409 Conflict` rather than
writing something that would be silently reverted. Change it in the terminal
instead. A standalone `codewhale web` holds nothing open and is never blocked.
`GET /v1/sessions/{id}?peek=true` returns a bounded, redacted, read-only view
instead of the transcript: at most 12 entries of at most 400 characters each
(`&entries=N` lowers the budget, never raises it past the cap), tool calls and
results summarised to a name and a size rather than inlined, and
credential-shaped substrings masked. `omitted_before` reports how many earlier
messages were dropped. The payload carries `"live": false` and deliberately has
no turn status, `running`, or `active` field — a saved session is a recording,
and live state comes only from a resumed thread's SSE stream.
**Threads** (durable runtime data model)
- `GET /v1/threads?limit=50&include_archived=false&archived_only=false`
- `GET /v1/threads/summary?limit=50&search=<optional>&include_archived=false&archived_only=false`
- `POST /v1/threads`
- `GET /v1/threads/{id}`
- `PATCH /v1/threads/{id}` (see body shape below)
- `POST /v1/threads/{id}/resume`
- `POST /v1/threads/{id}/fork`
`GET /v1/threads/summary` is the read-only summary surface used by the VS Code
Agent View. Each item includes `id`, `title`, `preview`, `model`, `mode`,
`archived`, `updated_at`, `latest_turn_id`, `latest_turn_status`, plus
workspace metadata:
```json
{
"id": "thread_...",
"title": "Implement MCP status count",
"preview": "The TUI footer should count project MCP servers...",
"model": "deepseek-v4-pro",
"mode": "agent",
"branch": "feature/runtime-api",
"head": "abc1234",
"dirty": false,
"workspace": "/Users/you/projects/codewhale",
"archived": false,
"updated_at": "2026-06-06T05:43:00Z",
"latest_turn_id": "turn_...",
"latest_turn_status": "completed"
}
```
`branch` is resolved from the thread workspace at request time and may be
`null` when the workspace is not a Git repository or the branch cannot be read.
`head` is the current short Git commit for that workspace when available.
`dirty` is true when the workspace has staged, unstaged, or untracked changes.
`workspace` is included so editor clients can show when an agent lane is working
outside the current VS Code folder.
Thread forks are sibling runtime threads, not an in-place tree projection.
`thread.forked` events include `source_thread_id`; internal backtrack-aware
forks may also include `backtrack_depth_from_tail` and `dropped_turn_id`.
Thread list and summary responses remain flat in v0.8.40, so clients that need
a graph should reconstruct it from events instead of assuming list order is a
complete tree.
`archived_only=true` returns archived threads only (mutually overrides
`include_archived`). Default behavior is unchanged: `include_archived=false`
and `archived_only=false` returns active threads. Added in v0.8.10 (#563).
`PATCH /v1/threads/{id}` body — every field is optional, missing means
"no change". At least one field must be present. `title` and `system_prompt`
accept an empty string to clear a previously-set value. Added in v0.8.10 (#562):
```json
{
"archived": true,
"allow_shell": false,
"trust_mode": false,
"auto_approve": false,
"model": "deepseek-v4-pro",
"mode": "agent",
"title": "User-set thread title",
"system_prompt": "You are a useful assistant."
}
```
**Turns** (within a thread)
- `POST /v1/threads/{id}/turns`
- `POST /v1/threads/{id}/turns/{turn_id}/steer`
- `POST /v1/threads/{id}/turns/{turn_id}/interrupt`
- `POST /v1/threads/{id}/compact` (manual compaction)
**Approvals**
- `POST /v1/approvals/{approval_id}` with body
`{ "decision": "allow" | "deny", "remember": false }`
**User input**
- `POST /v1/user-input/{thread_id}/{input_id}` with body
`{ "answers": [{ "id": "question-id", "label": "Choice", "value": "Choice" }] }`
Submitted values are delivered to the active model turn but are deliberately
excluded from durable Runtime items and events. The settled tool item contains
only a neutral receipt and a machine-readable `response_redacted` marker. The
Runtime accepts only an exact pending `(thread_id, input_id)` request; an
unknown, concurrently settling, or already settled id returns 404 and is never
placed in the engine mailbox. It commits the secret-free
`user_input.answered` receipt before removing the snapshot-authoritative prompt
or delivering the answer to the engine. That settlement runs independently of
the HTTP connection, so disconnecting after submission cannot leave a prompt
half accepted. Terminal-turn cancellation follows the same receipt-before-
removal ordering through `user_input.canceled`.
**Client-executed dynamic tools**
- `POST /v1/threads/{thread_id}/turns/{turn_id}/tool-calls/{call_id}/result`
The thread and turn in the result route must match the pending call. A call is
settled at most once; wrong-route and duplicate results return 404. Terminal
lifecycle events carry identifiers and status only, never tool result content.
The Runtime commits the terminal lifecycle event before making a submitted
result available to the model. Result delivery, timeout, and terminal-turn
cancellation race through one settlement owner, so exactly one of these events
is durable for a call:
- `tool_call.requested` — the typed client-executed call became pending;
- `tool_call.resolved` — a result was durably accepted by the Runtime
(`result_accepted: true`; `success` is result metadata, but result content is
excluded);
- `tool_call.timeout` — no result won before the bounded wait expired;
- `tool_call.canceled` — the turn terminated before a submitted result won.
HTTP `202 Accepted` and `tool_call.resolved` share that durable-acceptance
meaning. Neither claims that the model consumed the result: a concurrent turn
shutdown may close the model receiver after acceptance. Once the Runtime has
accepted the result, that call is terminal and a duplicate result returns 404.
**Events** (SSE replay + live stream)
- `GET /v1/threads/{id}/events?since_seq=<u64>`
Durable history parsing runs off the async server workers and reaches SSE in
bounded batches of at most 256 events through a backpressured channel. Broadcast
delivery is only a wake-up optimization: a lagged receiver opens the same
bounded durable replay from its last accepted cursor. Optional `replay_limit`
returns the newest requested tail and may not exceed 4096; `previous_seq` on
the first returned event advances past exactly the omitted history.
**Snapshots** (read-only side-git restore point listing)
- `GET /v1/snapshots?limit=20`
`/v1/snapshots` lists recent side-git restore points for the runtime workspace.
It is read-only and does not restore files. `limit` defaults to `20` and must be
between `1` and `100`.
```json
[
{
"id": "snap_...",
"label": "post-turn:1",
"timestamp": 1780730580
}
]
```
Runtime API restore/retry/undo/editor-apply mutation endpoints are intentionally
deferred. GUI clients should treat thread summaries and snapshots as inspection
surfaces until atomic filesystem + conversation-state mutation semantics are
specified and tested.
**Receipts** (future read-only audit export)
- Proposed only: `GET /v1/threads/{thread_id}/turns/{turn_id}/receipt`
**Compatibility stream** (one-shot, backwards-compatible)
- `POST /v1/stream`
**Tasks** (durable background work)
- `GET /v1/tasks`
- `POST /v1/tasks`
- `GET /v1/tasks/{id}`
- `POST /v1/tasks/{id}/cancel`
**Automations** (scheduled recurring work)
- `GET /v1/automations`
- `POST /v1/automations`
- `GET /v1/automations/{id}`
- `PATCH /v1/automations/{id}`
- `DELETE /v1/automations/{id}`
- `POST /v1/automations/{id}/run`
- `POST /v1/automations/{id}/pause`
- `POST /v1/automations/{id}/resume`
- `GET /v1/automations/{id}/runs?limit=20`
**Introspection**
- `GET /v1/workspace/status`
- `GET /v1/skills`
- `GET /v1/apps/mcp/servers`
- `GET /v1/apps/mcp/tools?server=<optional>`
Skill activation toggles are persisted under a cross-process transaction lock.
Each mutation reloads and merges the latest exact-name state before an atomic
write, and `GET /v1/skills` refreshes that shared state so another Codewhale
process's successful toggle is visible without restarting the Runtime API.
**Usage** (token/cost aggregation across threads)
- `GET /v1/usage?since=<rfc3339>&until=<rfc3339>&group_by=<day|model|provider|thread>`
`since` / `until` are inclusive RFC 3339 timestamps and may be omitted (no
bound). `group_by` defaults to `day`. Buckets are sorted by ascending key.
Empty time ranges produce empty `buckets` (never a 404). Cost is computed via
the model→pricing map; turns whose model has no pricing entry contribute
tokens but `0.0` cost. Added in v0.8.10 (#564).
```json
{
"since": "2026-04-01T00:00:00Z",
"until": "2026-04-30T23:59:59Z",
"group_by": "day",
"totals": {
"input_tokens": 12345,
"output_tokens": 6789,
"cached_tokens": 0,
"reasoning_tokens": 0,
"cost_usd": 0.012,
"turns": 42
},
"buckets": [
{
"key": "2026-04-30",
"input_tokens": 1234,
"output_tokens": 678,
"cached_tokens": 0,
"reasoning_tokens": 0,
"cost_usd": 0.001,
"turns": 3
}
]
}
```
## Provider and model selection
These three routes are how a GUI renders a model picker whose contents are true
for *this* runtime instead of guessed from a version snapshot. They were
undocumented until 2026-08-04, which cost a desktop integration a day: the
client probed `/v1/models`, `/v1/runtime/models`, and `/v1/runtime/providers`
(all correctly 404) and concluded the capability did not exist.
### `GET /v1/providers`
```json
{
"current": "modelstudio-token-plan",
"providers": [
{
"id": "modelstudio-token-plan",
"display_name": "Alibaba Cloud Model Studio",
"default_base_url": "https://…/compatible-mode/v1",
"default_model": "qwen3.8-max",
"has_model_catalog": true,
"env_vars": ["MODELSTUDIO_API_KEY", "DASHSCOPE_API_KEY"]
}
]
}
```
`current` is the active provider id. Treat `default_base_url` and `env_vars` as
runtime-local detail: they are endpoint and credential *names*, and a browser
layer has no use for either. Project only `id`, `display_name`,
`default_model`, and `has_model_catalog` across a UI bridge.
There is deliberately no credential-presence field yet — this route reports what
the runtime can *represent*, not what it can currently serve. A client that
needs "is this route usable here" can call the models route below and treat an
empty list as unusable, at the cost of one request per provider.
### `GET /v1/providers/{id}/models`
```json
{ "provider": "modelstudio-token-plan", "models": [{ "id": "qwen3.8-max" }] }
```
The catalog for one provider. Returns `400` for an unknown id, and for the
legacy `deepseek-cn` alias, which has no provider metadata — use `deepseek`.
An empty `models` array means the provider is not configured on this machine
(no credential), not that the provider has no models.
The ids returned here are exactly the values accepted by `POST /v1/threads`'s
`model` field and by the switch route below.
### `POST /v1/providers/{id}/switch`
```json
// request (model is optional; omit to take the provider default)
{ "model": "qwen3.8-max" }
// response
{ "provider": "modelstudio-token-plan", "model": "qwen3.8-max",
"message": "…", "persisted": true }
```
**Use this rather than simulating a switch with repeated `POST /v1/config`
writes plus a reload.** Provider and model move together here, the change is
validated against the provider's catalog before it is applied, and `persisted`
reports whether it was written to config or applied to the live session only.
Rejects an unknown provider id and the `deepseek-cn` alias with `400`.
## Runtime data model
The runtime uses a durable Thread/Turn/Item lifecycle.
- **ThreadRecord** — `id`, `created_at`, `updated_at`, `model`, `workspace`,
`mode`, `task_id`, `system_prompt`, `latest_turn_id`,
`latest_response_bookmark`, `archived`
- **TurnRecord** — `id`, `thread_id`, `status` (`queued|in_progress|completed|
failed|interrupted|canceled`), `effective_provider`, `effective_model`,
`effective_billing_surface`, timestamps, duration, usage, error summary
- **TurnItemRecord** — `id`, `turn_id`, `kind` (`user_message|agent_message|
tool_call|file_change|command_execution|context_compaction|status|error`),
lifecycle `status`, `metadata`
Events are append-only with a global monotonic `seq` for replay/resume.
`effective_billing_surface` is a non-secret classification derived from the
endpoint that served the turn. Recognized StepFun routes use `stepfun-payg` or
`stepfun-plan`; unknown and custom endpoints leave it unset. The raw base URL is
not persisted in `TurnRecord`.
### Restart semantics
- If the process restarts while a turn or item is `queued` or `in_progress`,
the recovered record is marked `interrupted` with an `"Interrupted by
process restart"` error.
- The trailing newline is an event append's commit marker. On startup, a final
JSONL fragment without that delimiter is truncated and fsynced even when its
bytes form valid JSON; it is an uncommitted append, and its already-reserved
sequence number is not reused. Newline-terminated malformed records are not
identifiable crash debris and continue to fail closed during replay.
- If a terminal turn record reached disk but its terminal event sequence did
not, the first async read reconciles any unresolved dynamic calls as
`tool_call.canceled` and then emits one `turn.completed`. Existing terminal
call and turn receipts are detected and never duplicated.
- Task execution performs its own recovery on top of the same persisted
thread/turn store.
### Approval model
- The `auto_approve` flag applies to the runtime approval bridge and engine
tool context. When enabled for a thread/turn/task, approval-required tools
are auto-approved in the non-interactive runtime path, shell safety checks
run in auto-approved mode, and spawned sub-agents inherit that setting.
- When omitted, `auto_approve` defaults to `false`.
- [Authorization order](AUTHORIZATION_ORDER.md) describes where typed rules,
registered tool requirements, safety floors, repository law, approval
transport, and sandbox enforcement sit relative to one another.
### SSE event stream
The SSE event payload shape for `/v1/threads/{id}/events`:
```json
{
"schema_version": 1,
"seq": 42,
"previous_seq": 38,
"event": "item.delta",
"kind": "item.delta",
"thread_id": "thr_1234abcd",
"turn_id": "turn_5678efgh",
"item_id": "item_90ab12cd",
"timestamp": "2026-02-11T20:18:49.123Z",
"created_at": "2026-02-11T20:18:49.123Z",
"payload": {
"delta": "partial output",
"kind": "agent_message"
}
}
```
Compatibility notes:
- `schema_version` is the HTTP/SSE envelope schema version. It is independent of
the runtime store schema used for persisted thread/turn/event records.
- `event` remains the SSE event name in existing clients; it is preserved as-is.
- `kind` mirrors `event` in the stable envelope for typed clients.
- `seq` is allocated globally across all Runtime threads. Consequently, gaps
between a thread's events are normal when other threads interleave. On this
per-thread SSE stream, `previous_seq` is the sequence of the last event
delivered for this thread (or the requested replay cursor for the first
event); clients detect loss by comparing it with their accepted per-thread
cursor, not by requiring `seq == previous_seq + 1`. Sequence allocation is
also not rewound after an append is transactionally rolled back, so a retry
can intentionally skip an unused value without implying a missing event.
- `thread.started`, `turn.started`, and `turn.completed` are emitted as SSE event
names exactly as before.
- `timestamp` remains the canonical event time for schema version 1. `created_at`
is an equivalent alias for clients that use `created_at` naming elsewhere; do
not require both fields to be present.
Common event names: `thread.started`, `thread.forked`, `turn.started`,
`turn.lifecycle`, `turn.steered`, `turn.interrupt_requested`,
`turn.completed`, `item.started`, `item.delta`, `item.completed`,
`item.failed`, `item.interrupted`, `approval.required`, `approval.decided`,
`approval.timeout`, `user_input.required`, `user_input.answered`,
`user_input.canceled`, `tool_call.requested`, `tool_call.resolved`,
`tool_call.timeout`, `tool_call.canceled`, `sandbox.denied`.
Agent-message and reasoning deltas are materialized into the item projection
before their corresponding `item.delta` event is sequenced. To avoid an fsync
for every provider fragment, adjacent deltas are coalesced to configured bounds
of at most 32 ms or approximately 16 KiB before publication (an indivisible
upstream chunk can itself exceed the byte target). A process crash inside that
unpublished window can lose the recent suffix; no durable event claims that
suffix existed. Once an `item.delta` is durable, snapshots at or beyond its
cursor include the same materialized prefix.
`approval.required` events may include a `matched_rule` string when an
execution-policy rule caused the prompt. This field is explanatory metadata for
clients and does not grant or persist permissions.
## Security boundary
- **Localhost by default**. The server binds to `127.0.0.1` by default.
`--mobile` binds to `0.0.0.0` when no host is supplied so phones on the same
LAN can reach it, and the CLI prints a warning for that rebind. Pass
`--host 127.0.0.1` for a loopback-only mobile page. Set a non-loopback host
only when you trust the network path or have a reverse-proxy / VPN that
authenticates. The runtime does not provide user isolation or TLS.
- **Optional token guard**. `--auth-token` or `DEEPSEEK_RUNTIME_TOKEN`
requires a matching bearer token for `/v1/*` routes. This is a local
convenience guard, not a replacement for TLS, VPN, or a trusted reverse
proxy on public networks.
- **No provider-token custody**. The server never returns the API key. The
`api_key.source` capability field reports `env`, `config`, or `missing` —
never the key itself.
- **No hosted relay**. The app-server is a local process under the user's
control. There is no cloud component.
- **Capability responses** never leak secrets, file contents, or session
message bodies. They report *metadata*: presence, counts, status flags.
### CORS allow-list
The runtime API ships with a built-in dev-origin allow-list:
`http://localhost:3000`, `http://127.0.0.1:3000`, `http://localhost:1420`,
`http://127.0.0.1:1420`, `tauri://localhost`. To add additional origins (e.g.
when developing a UI on Vite's default `:5173`), use any of:
- CLI flag (repeatable): `codewhale serve --http --cors-origin http://localhost:5173`
- Env var (comma-separated): `DEEPSEEK_CORS_ORIGINS="http://localhost:5173,http://localhost:8080"`
- Config (`~/.codewhale/config.toml`):
```toml
[runtime_api]
cors_origins = ["http://localhost:5173"]
```
User-supplied origins **stack on top of** the built-in defaults; they do not
replace them. Wildcard origins are not supported — the explicit allow-list
model is preserved. Cross-origin preflights advertise only `Authorization`,
`Content-Type`, `Accept`, `X-Codewhale-Runtime-Token`, and the compatibility
`X-DeepSeek-Runtime-Token` request header; custom request headers are not
allowed. Added in v0.8.10 (#561), tightened in v0.9.1 (#4454).
## Managed Fleet Runtime and SDK helpers
The Runtime SDK lives in `npm/runtime-sdk` and is exposed as
the `@codewhale/runtime-sdk` workspace package. It is deliberately thin: every
helper calls the local Rust Runtime API and therefore cannot bypass Codewhale's
sandbox, approval prompts, provider configuration, or fleet ledger authority.
```js
import { createRuntimeClient } from "@codewhale/runtime-sdk";
const client = createRuntimeClient({
baseUrl: "http://127.0.0.1:7878",
token: process.env.CODEWHALE_RUNTIME_TOKEN,
});
const created = await client.createFleetRun({
target: "this_computer",
roles: [{ name: "reviewer" }, { name: "verifier" }],
workflow: {
id: "release-check",
kind: "parallel",
tasks: [
{ id: "review", name: "Review", instructions: "Review locally.", worker: { role: "reviewer" } },
{ id: "verify", name: "Verify", instructions: "Verify locally.", worker: { role: "verifier" } },
],
},
});
// POST /runs only prepares durable work. This call crosses the launch gate.
await client.startFleetRun(created.run.id);
let cursor;
for await (const event of client.fleetEvents(created.run.id, { after: cursor })) {
if (event.cursor) cursor = event.cursor;
if (event.event === "fleet.replay.cursor_unavailable") {
// Reload getFleetRun(created.run.id), then reconnect without the old cursor.
}
}
```
The managed path is deliberately two-step. `POST /v1/fleet/runs` validates and
persists the run and queue without starting a worker. A separate authenticated
`POST /start` activates it and schedules the executor driver; its `202` response
reports `leased: 0` because the driver performs all leasing after it owns the
run. Creation requires named roles, one task owner per role, a `parallel`
Workflow, and an explicit Runtime target. v0.9.4 executes
only `this_computer`; `another_computer` and `cloud` return `501` rather than
silently executing locally. Worker IDs are generated per run; caller-assigned
`worker_specs` return `501` until custom workers can be given collision-free
managed identities. Parallel tasks with overlapping effective write roots are
rejected before the run is journaled. Managed `security_policy` overrides also
fail closed until that document can be enforced end to end; executable
authority comes from each named role's tool posture and bounded task workspace
scope.
Fleet helpers cover this HTTP surface:
| Helper | Runtime API route |
|---|---|
| `createFleetRun(spec)` | `POST /v1/fleet/runs` |
| `startFleetRun(runId)` | `POST /v1/fleet/runs/{run_id}/start` |
| `listFleetRuns()` | `GET /v1/fleet/runs` |
| `getFleetRun(runId)` | `GET /v1/fleet/runs/{run_id}` |
| `listFleetWorkers(runId)` | `GET /v1/fleet/runs/{run_id}/workers` |
| `getFleetWorker(workerId)` | `GET /v1/fleet/workers/{worker_id}` |
| `interruptWorker(workerId)` | `POST /v1/fleet/workers/{worker_id}/interrupt` |
| `stopWorker(workerId)` | `POST /v1/fleet/workers/{worker_id}/stop` |
| `restartWorker(workerId)` | `POST /v1/fleet/workers/{worker_id}/restart` |
| `stopFleetRun(runId)` | `POST /v1/fleet/runs/{run_id}/stop` |
| `replayFleetEvents(runId, options)` | `GET /v1/fleet/runs/{run_id}/events/replay` |
| `fleetEvents(runId, options)` | `GET /v1/fleet/runs/{run_id}/events` (SSE) |
`stopWorker` durably cancels that worker's active task and leaves the rest of
the Fleet running. `interruptWorker` is the compatibility name for the same
attempt-fenced cancellation transition. `stopFleetRun` cancels every queued or
active task and marks the whole run cancelled.
Replay covers aggregate run/task transitions and privacy-bounded individual
worker transitions. Event bodies omit prompts, tool call IDs, completion text,
artifact paths/checksums, and cancellation identities; bounded failure reasons
pass through secret redaction. `cursor` is opaque and stable across ordinary
appends and Runtime restarts. Clients reconnect with `after=<cursor>`. A fresh
request returns a bounded newest tail and marks `history_truncated` when older
history exists. Ledger compaction can remove an old cursor; the JSON endpoint
then returns `409`, while the SSE endpoint emits
`fleet.replay.cursor_unavailable`, so the client reloads the current run
projection instead of accepting a silent gap.
`GET /v1/runtime/info` advertises `fleet_run_create`, `fleet_run_start`,
`fleet_event_replay`, `fleet_event_stream`, and `fleet_local_target`. Older
runtimes without a requested route still produce a typed SDK
`RuntimeCapabilityError`.
Verification:
```bash
npm test --workspace @codewhale/runtime-sdk
```
## Agent Run Receipts
Sub-agent lanes persist compact run receipts in
`.codewhale/state/subagents.v1.json`. The Runtime API exposes those receipts as
a read-only inspection surface:
| Operation | Endpoint |
|---|---|
| List persisted agent runs | `GET /v1/agent-runs` |
| Inspect one run | `GET /v1/agent-runs/{run_id}` |
The response is the same worker-record shape surfaced by `agent` receipts:
`spec.run_id`, `actor_kind`, lifecycle `status`, bounded `events`,
`follow_up`, `takeover`, `artifacts`, `usage`, and `verification`. `run_id`
falls back to the worker id for older records, and `{run_id}` may be either the
run id or the worker id.
These endpoints do not start, cancel, or steer sub-agents. The API surface
exists so app/editor/headless clients can inspect the same handoff receipts that
the TUI and parent model see.
## Session lifecycle (native UI supervision)
| Operation | Endpoint |
|---|---|
| List sessions | `GET /v1/sessions` |
| List session summaries | `GET /v1/sessions/summary` |
| Get session | `GET /v1/sessions/{id}` |
| Rename / archive session | `PATCH /v1/sessions/{id}` |
| Delete session | `DELETE /v1/sessions/{id}` |
| Resume into thread | `POST /v1/sessions/{id}/resume-thread` |
| Create thread | `POST /v1/threads` |
| List threads | `GET /v1/threads` |
| Attach to events | `GET /v1/threads/{id}/events?since_seq=0` |
| Send message | `POST /v1/threads/{id}/turns` |
| Steer | `POST /v1/threads/{id}/turns/{turn_id}/steer` |
| Interrupt | `POST /v1/threads/{id}/turns/{turn_id}/interrupt` |
| Compact | `POST /v1/threads/{id}/compact` |
## Compatibility tests
Contract snapshots live in `crates/protocol/tests/`. Run:
```bash
cargo test -p codewhale-protocol --test parity_protocol --locked
```
This validates that the app-server's event schema hasn't drifted from the
documented contract. CI runs this on every push to `main` and on release tags.
The app-server stdio control surface has its own drift guard — the advertised
`capabilities` method set is pinned in `crates/app-server/src/lib.rs`:
```bash
cargo test -p codewhale-app-server capabilities
```
Before a release, run the headless smoke (stdio probe + optional provider
matrix, no secrets leaked):
```bash
scripts/release/app-server-smoke.sh --matrix # dry-run plan
bash scripts/release/app-server-smoke.test.sh # parser self-test (fake binary)
```
Reference in New Issue View Git Blame Copy Permalink