## Summary
Follow-up to #3420. PATs (public access tokens) minted before an API key
rotation 401'd immediately on the realtime stream endpoints, even though
the rotation flow advertises a 24h overlap. This fixes the gap.
## Root cause
PATs are JWTs signed with the env's `apiKey` at mint time. When that
secret is rotated, `validatePublicJwtKey`
(`apps/webapp/app/services/realtime/jwtAuth.server.ts`) only verifies
the signature against `environment.parentEnvironment?.apiKey ??
environment.apiKey` — i.e. the env's *current* canonical key. Any PAT in
the wild signed with the previous key fails signature verification →
401, even within the grace window.
#3420 wired up the grace-window fallback in two places —
`findEnvironmentByApiKey` (raw secret-key auth) and `api.v1.auth.jwt.ts`
(signs new JWTs with the canonical key when minting from an old one) —
but the *verify* path for already-issued PATs was never updated.
In a typical app, `POST /api/v1/tasks/.../trigger` (Bearer secret) keeps
working through rotation because that path has the fallback, but `GET
/realtime/v1/streams/run_*/...` and `POST
/realtime/v1/streams/run_*/input/...` 401 for runs that were already in
flight when the rotation happened.
## Fix
After the primary `validateJWT` against the env's current `apiKey`, fall
back to non-expired `RevokedApiKey` rows for the signing env (parent env
when the request is against a child) — but **only on the failure path**,
so the hot success path is unchanged. Uses `$replica` to match the rest
of the auth path.
Symmetrical to the `findEnvironmentByApiKey` two-step from #3420.
## Changes
- `apps/webapp/app/services/realtime/jwtAuth.server.ts` —
`validateAgainstRevokedApiKeys` helper invoked only on `!result.ok`
- `apps/webapp/app/models/runtimeEnvironment.server.ts` —
`findEnvironmentById` also selects `parentEnvironment.id` so we can
scope the revoked-keys lookup to the correct env
## Test plan
E2E verified locally via curl against `GET /realtime/v1/runs/{runId}`
(PAT-authenticated):
- [x] Pre-rotation, PAT signed with K1 → **200** with run body
- [x] Simulate rotation (insert `RevokedApiKey` row + flip env `apiKey`
to K2 in a single transaction, mirroring `regenerateApiKey`)
- [x] Same PAT (K1) within grace window → **200** with run body —
fallback hits
- [x] Fresh PAT signed with K2 → **200** — current key still works
- [x] Set `RevokedApiKey.expiresAt` to past → **401** — fallback finds
no live row
- [x] Bogus signature (no rotation) → **401**
- [x] Cleanup verified: env `apiKey` restored, `RevokedApiKey` row
deleted
- [x] `pnpm run typecheck --filter webapp` passes
Eric Allam
99dfee3a57