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triggerdotdev--trigger.dev/apps/webapp/test/apiRateLimitJwtActor.test.ts
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Katia Bulatova 4569657923 feat(webapp): dashboard agent — chat, reports, investigate (#4418)
## What & why

This is the system behind the Dashboard Agent — an assistant that
answers questions about a project's runs, errors, queues, deploys and
health, and can investigate failures end to end.

The agent runs as a chat.agent task in its own Trigger project. It has
no access to the main database or ClickHouse; all platform data is read
through the public API using a delegated, read-only user token.

Everything here is behind `canAccessDashboardAgent` and inert with the
flag off. The UI that mounts the panel lands in #4529.

## Stack

`#4418` (this, base) ← `#4529` UI ← `#4525` Watch ← `#4516` storybook
gallery. The scenario/contract reference for the whole stack is
`internal-packages/dashboard-agent/GUIDEBOOK.md` (it lands on the Watch
branch): it states, per feature, what makes each thing happen and where
that is decided.

## What's inside

**Agent runtime and tools** — `internal-packages/dashboard-agent`:
prompt, tool set (API reads, TRQL query, docs, navigation,
evidence/investigations, repo source), conversation compaction, a
prompt-prefix token budget pinned by snapshot test, and sampled
LLM-judged turn evals. The package cannot import webapp server code,
which is what makes the "no DB access" claim structural rather than a
convention.

**Contracts** — `internal-packages/dashboard-agent-contracts`:
`trigger://` URIs, intents, and the block envelope every rendered card
travels in.

**Conversation store** — `internal-packages/dashboard-agent-db`: drizzle
over postgres-js in its own `trigger_dashboard_agent` Postgres schema,
plus one additive migration.

**Auth boundary** — the user-actor token gains an optional environment
claim; one guard (`userActorEnvironment.server.ts`) enforces it so
routes don't each re-derive the rule. Token minting, cap ceiling, and
the RBAC fallback path for self-hosted.

**Transport** — webapp resource routes that mint the token and proxy
each turn, and SDK-side mid-turn reconnect.

**Public API the agent reads through** — orgs, projects, environments,
runs, queue metrics, workers, a run's commit metadata, repo snapshot,
reports, and `POST /api/v1/query`.

**Reports** — the health report's layout is declared once and shared by
the card, the markdown surface and the JSON/MCP surface, so the same
report reads the same in the dashboard, the terminal and an editor.

**Block renderers** — the report and investigation cards the flows above
already emit (`app/components/dashboard-agent/`). The panel that hosts
them, and the rest of the chat UI, is #4529.

**Query safety and CSP** — see below.

## Key decisions

- **The agent is a separate Trigger project, not webapp code.** It reads
platform data over the public API with a delegated user-actor token
whose `cap` ceilings it to read scopes. No Prisma, no ClickHouse, no
webapp imports.
- **The PAT-only auth helper now refuses user-actor tokens.** This is an
intentional behavioral change: its callers consume only a bare userId
and do not enforce delegated-token capabilities. Actor-aware routes
continue through the scoped route builders instead.
- **RBAC fallback builds a delegated token's ability from its own cap**,
never the blanket ability a PAT gets (read-only when the token declares
none). Without this, the agent's read-only cap would buy a write JWT on
self-hosted.
- **Org creation checks RBAC only for user-actor tokens, and only after
the env gate**, so an install with `ORG_CREATION_API_ENABLED` off
returns 404 rather than 403, and an ordinary PAT never consults an
ability the route has no org to scope. Both orderings are pinned by
test.
- **The query path is read-only in depth.** TRQL rejects write
statements at the grammar level (they don't parse, rather than being
filtered), ClickHouse runs with `readonly=1`, and the org/project/env
filters are injected server-side from the credential — the request body
cannot widen scope. An unparseable query denies instead of falling
through to the permissive resource.
- **Document-wide img-src CSP.** Remote images are an
outbound-request/exfiltration surface, so the policy permits only
own-origin/data/blob, the required SSO avatar hosts, and the favicon
endpoint. Operators can add exact origins through CSP_IMG_SRC_ALLOWLIST;
wildcard hosts and bare schemes are intentionally not allowed.
- **The chat transport reconnects on a mid-turn EOF**
(`@trigger.dev/sdk`). A body that ends without a turn-complete is
terminal only when the server says `X-Session-Settled: true`; otherwise
the transport resubscribes from `lastEventId` with bounded backoff, and
any record re-earns the budget. Previously a closed long-poll window or
a proxy restart left the reply stuck as if still generating.
- **Conversations live in their own datastore**, schema-scoped and
foreign-key-free (it references `organizationId`/`userId` by id, because
in cloud it is a different database). It is a display read-model for the
History tab and transport resume; `chat.agent`'s object-store snapshot
remains the model's source of truth.
- **Deterministic first.** Reports and health checks contain no LLM —
they are computed from the same data the dashboard shows, and the model
only narrates and links them. That is what makes a number in an answer
auditable.

## Testing

- 63 new test files, run with `pnpm run test --filter webapp` and
per-package vitest. Heaviest coverage on the auth boundary
(`userActorPatOnlyBoundary`, `userActorTokenClaimsAndScopes`,
`contextlessPatRoutes`, `rbacFallbackBranch`), TRQL read-only, the
report layout, and the SDK reconnect.
- The agent package has a separate eval lane (`pnpm run test:evals`,
`vitest.eval.config.ts`) that hits the real model, so it never runs in
`pnpm test`.
- Live-tested against a local stack scenario by scenario; the GUIDEBOOK
lists the condition each behaviour is expected under, which is what
those runs were checked against.

## Changelog

`.server-changes/dashboard-agent.md`, plus changesets for
`@trigger.dev/core` (report schemas), `@trigger.dev/sdk` (chat
reconnect) and the CLI's `mint-token` help text.
2026-08-11 18:56:14 +02:00

105 lines
3.9 KiB
TypeScript

import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
/**
* A delegated (agent/PAT-minted) env JWT rotates its token value every turn. Keying the
* rate limiter on the token would hand each turn a fresh bucket, so the limiter keys on
* env+acting-user instead — stable across turns, namespaced away from PRIVATE-key buckets.
*/
const mocks = vi.hoisted(() => ({
authenticateAuthorizationHeader: vi.fn<(...args: any[]) => Promise<any>>(),
resolvePrivateApiKeyRateLimitScope: vi.fn<(...args: any[]) => Promise<any>>(),
}));
// Importing the module constructs the real middleware at load; stub the constructor and env
// so the test doesn't reach for redis or the env contract.
vi.mock("~/services/authorizationRateLimitMiddleware.server", () => ({
authorizationRateLimitMiddleware: () => (_req: any, _res: any, next: any) => next(),
}));
vi.mock("~/env.server", () => ({
env: { API_RATE_LIMIT_JWT_WINDOW: "1m", API_RATE_LIMIT_JWT_TOKENS: 100 },
}));
vi.mock("~/models/runtimeEnvironment.server", () => ({
resolvePrivateApiKeyRateLimitScope: mocks.resolvePrivateApiKeyRateLimitScope,
}));
vi.mock("~/runEngine/concerns/batchStreamGrantsInstance.server", () => ({
batchStreamGrants: { spend: vi.fn() },
}));
vi.mock("~/services/apiAuth.server", () => ({
authenticateAuthorizationHeader: mocks.authenticateAuthorizationHeader,
}));
import {
jwtActorRateLimitIdentifier,
resolveApiRateLimitOverride,
} from "~/services/apiRateLimit.server";
describe("jwtActorRateLimitIdentifier", () => {
it("is stable across token value — depends only on env + acting user", () => {
// Two turns of the same agent: different JWTs, same env + act.sub.
const first = jwtActorRateLimitIdentifier("env_123", "usr_abc");
const second = jwtActorRateLimitIdentifier("env_123", "usr_abc");
expect(first).toBe(second);
expect(first).toBe("jwt-actor:env_123:usr_abc");
});
it("is namespaced so it can't collide with a PRIVATE-key bucket (bare env id)", () => {
const identifier = jwtActorRateLimitIdentifier("env_123", "usr_abc");
expect(identifier.startsWith("jwt-actor:")).toBe(true);
expect(identifier).not.toBe("env_123");
});
it("is compound: a different user in the same env gets a different bucket", () => {
expect(jwtActorRateLimitIdentifier("env_123", "usr_abc")).not.toBe(
jwtActorRateLimitIdentifier("env_123", "usr_xyz")
);
expect(jwtActorRateLimitIdentifier("env_123", "usr_abc")).not.toBe(
jwtActorRateLimitIdentifier("env_999", "usr_abc")
);
});
});
/**
* The PUBLIC_JWT branch of the real override. These exercise the `actor?.sub` guard itself —
* they fail if the guard is deleted or the (environmentId, actor.sub) args are swapped.
*/
describe("resolveApiRateLimitOverride — PUBLIC_JWT branch", () => {
// A JWT bearer isn't `tr_`-prefixed, so it skips the private-key branch and hits auth.
const JWT_BEARER = "Bearer eyJ.delegated.jwt";
beforeEach(() => {
mocks.authenticateAuthorizationHeader.mockReset();
mocks.resolvePrivateApiKeyRateLimitScope.mockReset();
});
it("keys a delegated JWT (act.sub present) on jwt-actor:${env}:${sub}", async () => {
mocks.authenticateAuthorizationHeader.mockResolvedValue({
ok: true,
type: "PUBLIC_JWT",
environment: { id: "env_777" },
actor: { sub: "usr_555" },
});
const override = await resolveApiRateLimitOverride(JWT_BEARER);
expect(override?.identifier).toBe("jwt-actor:env_777:usr_555");
expect(override?.config).toBeDefined();
});
it("leaves a realtime JWT (no act) on the hashed-token fallback (no identifier)", async () => {
mocks.authenticateAuthorizationHeader.mockResolvedValue({
ok: true,
type: "PUBLIC_JWT",
environment: { id: "env_777" },
// no `actor`
});
const override = await resolveApiRateLimitOverride(JWT_BEARER);
expect(override?.identifier).toBeUndefined();
expect(override?.config).toBeDefined();
});
});