## Summary
Environment API keys backed by the additional-key table can authenticate
API requests using their stored effective scopes. Revoked and expired
keys are rejected, branch environments retain their existing routing
behavior, and last-used timestamps are updated on a throttled
best-effort basis.
## Design
API route builders receive the resolved ability and reject restricted
keys on routes without an authorization declaration. Existing
deployment, environment variable, queue, run, task, batch, session, and
waitpoint routes declare the resources they access.
Trigger and batch responses return server-signed public access tokens,
so additional keys never need access to the environment signing secret.
Root-key rotation also keeps public tokens valid for the existing grace
window.
## Feature notes
- Root environment keys remain unrestricted for backward compatibility.
Additional keys enforce their persisted scopes and fail closed on routes
without an authorization declaration.
- Machine-key requests never exchange one credential for another.
Additional keys cannot retrieve the root key, and rotated root keys are
not upgraded
during their grace window.
- Public JWT validation remains host-owned, while installed RBAC plugins
continue to supply root-key abilities.
- Unfiltered session and run listings preserve existing broad task-read
behavior. Filtered requests enforce the supplied task identifiers.
- Related-run summaries remain embedded in run retrieval for API
compatibility. Retrieving or mutating a related run independently still
requires
permission for that run.
- Queue management authorizes at collection scope, matching the queue
permissions currently issued.
- Batch responses deliberately include server-signed public access
tokens for all clients. Selected-task credentials continue using their
original
credential for per-item authorization.
- Two-phase batches authorize declared task identifiers before creation
and authorize every streamed item. Streaming paths that cannot declare
the
complete task set remain fail closed.
- Authentication telemetry records successful credential resolution
separately from subsequent resource-authorization failures.
- API keys are high-entropy random tokens. SHA-256 is intentionally used
for deterministic indexed lookup, not password hashing.
## Deployment notes
The schema migration must be present before this code is deployed.
Because bearer resolution runs on every authenticated request, deploy
the resolver with additional-key lookup disabled, verify root-key and
public-token parity, then enable lookup before any additional keys can
be issued.
The multi-task authorization tightening changes the result for narrowly
scoped tokens that request tasks outside their grants. Observe
would-deny results before enforcing that check. Request-idempotency keys
are also newly isolated by environment and task, so a retry crossing the
deployment boundary may execute once more before old cache entries
expire.
## Follow-ups
- [x] Add a system-wide kill switch for additional-key lookup, defaulted
off for the initial deployment.
- [x] Add authentication observability by credential kind, result,
latency, and lookup path without recording credential values.
- [ ] ~Add would-deny observability and an independent enforcement
switch for multi-task authorization.~
- [ ] ~Add an independent switch for server-issued batch tokens while
root-key parity is verified.~
- [ ] Confirm every API route reachable by a restricted key has an
explicit authorization declaration or intentionally fails closed.
- [x] Verify root-key rotation, revoked-key grace, and public-token
validation through each bearer resolver path.
Chris Arderne
763b5dc582