Matt Aitken
3ed48516df
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## Summary PRs opened by the claude GitHub app fail both the agent instructions audit and the REVIEW.md drift audit before Claude gets a chance to run. `claude-code-action` refuses any actor whose account type is not `User` unless the actor is listed in `allowed_bots`: ``` Workflow initiated by non-human actor: claude (type: Bot). Add bot to allowed_bots list or use '*' to allow all bots. ``` So those PRs land with two permanently red checks and no audit coverage at all. Both workflows already allowlist Devin; this adds the claude app alongside it. ## Why this does not open the workflows up to outside contributors `allowed_bots` is only consulted for non-`User` actors. Humans, contributor or maintainer, take the separate write-permission path and are unaffected by what is in the list. Beyond that, both jobs are guarded by `github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == github.repository`, so a fork PR skips the job entirely, and they trigger on `pull_request` rather than `pull_request_target`, so a fork-triggered run would get no API key and a read-only token anyway. The bot is named explicitly instead of using `"*"`, which would let every bot trigger these audits, dependabot's PR stream included.