4569657923
## What & why This is the system behind the Dashboard Agent — an assistant that answers questions about a project's runs, errors, queues, deploys and health, and can investigate failures end to end. The agent runs as a chat.agent task in its own Trigger project. It has no access to the main database or ClickHouse; all platform data is read through the public API using a delegated, read-only user token. Everything here is behind `canAccessDashboardAgent` and inert with the flag off. The UI that mounts the panel lands in #4529. ## Stack `#4418` (this, base) ← `#4529` UI ← `#4525` Watch ← `#4516` storybook gallery. The scenario/contract reference for the whole stack is `internal-packages/dashboard-agent/GUIDEBOOK.md` (it lands on the Watch branch): it states, per feature, what makes each thing happen and where that is decided. ## What's inside **Agent runtime and tools** — `internal-packages/dashboard-agent`: prompt, tool set (API reads, TRQL query, docs, navigation, evidence/investigations, repo source), conversation compaction, a prompt-prefix token budget pinned by snapshot test, and sampled LLM-judged turn evals. The package cannot import webapp server code, which is what makes the "no DB access" claim structural rather than a convention. **Contracts** — `internal-packages/dashboard-agent-contracts`: `trigger://` URIs, intents, and the block envelope every rendered card travels in. **Conversation store** — `internal-packages/dashboard-agent-db`: drizzle over postgres-js in its own `trigger_dashboard_agent` Postgres schema, plus one additive migration. **Auth boundary** — the user-actor token gains an optional environment claim; one guard (`userActorEnvironment.server.ts`) enforces it so routes don't each re-derive the rule. Token minting, cap ceiling, and the RBAC fallback path for self-hosted. **Transport** — webapp resource routes that mint the token and proxy each turn, and SDK-side mid-turn reconnect. **Public API the agent reads through** — orgs, projects, environments, runs, queue metrics, workers, a run's commit metadata, repo snapshot, reports, and `POST /api/v1/query`. **Reports** — the health report's layout is declared once and shared by the card, the markdown surface and the JSON/MCP surface, so the same report reads the same in the dashboard, the terminal and an editor. **Block renderers** — the report and investigation cards the flows above already emit (`app/components/dashboard-agent/`). The panel that hosts them, and the rest of the chat UI, is #4529. **Query safety and CSP** — see below. ## Key decisions - **The agent is a separate Trigger project, not webapp code.** It reads platform data over the public API with a delegated user-actor token whose `cap` ceilings it to read scopes. No Prisma, no ClickHouse, no webapp imports. - **The PAT-only auth helper now refuses user-actor tokens.** This is an intentional behavioral change: its callers consume only a bare userId and do not enforce delegated-token capabilities. Actor-aware routes continue through the scoped route builders instead. - **RBAC fallback builds a delegated token's ability from its own cap**, never the blanket ability a PAT gets (read-only when the token declares none). Without this, the agent's read-only cap would buy a write JWT on self-hosted. - **Org creation checks RBAC only for user-actor tokens, and only after the env gate**, so an install with `ORG_CREATION_API_ENABLED` off returns 404 rather than 403, and an ordinary PAT never consults an ability the route has no org to scope. Both orderings are pinned by test. - **The query path is read-only in depth.** TRQL rejects write statements at the grammar level (they don't parse, rather than being filtered), ClickHouse runs with `readonly=1`, and the org/project/env filters are injected server-side from the credential — the request body cannot widen scope. An unparseable query denies instead of falling through to the permissive resource. - **Document-wide img-src CSP.** Remote images are an outbound-request/exfiltration surface, so the policy permits only own-origin/data/blob, the required SSO avatar hosts, and the favicon endpoint. Operators can add exact origins through CSP_IMG_SRC_ALLOWLIST; wildcard hosts and bare schemes are intentionally not allowed. - **The chat transport reconnects on a mid-turn EOF** (`@trigger.dev/sdk`). A body that ends without a turn-complete is terminal only when the server says `X-Session-Settled: true`; otherwise the transport resubscribes from `lastEventId` with bounded backoff, and any record re-earns the budget. Previously a closed long-poll window or a proxy restart left the reply stuck as if still generating. - **Conversations live in their own datastore**, schema-scoped and foreign-key-free (it references `organizationId`/`userId` by id, because in cloud it is a different database). It is a display read-model for the History tab and transport resume; `chat.agent`'s object-store snapshot remains the model's source of truth. - **Deterministic first.** Reports and health checks contain no LLM — they are computed from the same data the dashboard shows, and the model only narrates and links them. That is what makes a number in an answer auditable. ## Testing - 63 new test files, run with `pnpm run test --filter webapp` and per-package vitest. Heaviest coverage on the auth boundary (`userActorPatOnlyBoundary`, `userActorTokenClaimsAndScopes`, `contextlessPatRoutes`, `rbacFallbackBranch`), TRQL read-only, the report layout, and the SDK reconnect. - The agent package has a separate eval lane (`pnpm run test:evals`, `vitest.eval.config.ts`) that hits the real model, so it never runs in `pnpm test`. - Live-tested against a local stack scenario by scenario; the GUIDEBOOK lists the condition each behaviour is expected under, which is what those runs were checked against. ## Changelog `.server-changes/dashboard-agent.md`, plus changesets for `@trigger.dev/core` (report schemas), `@trigger.dev/sdk` (chat reconnect) and the CLI's `mint-token` help text.
117 lines
4.3 KiB
TypeScript
117 lines
4.3 KiB
TypeScript
import {
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parseTSQLSelect,
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SyntaxError as TSQLSyntaxError,
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type Field,
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type JoinExpr,
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type SelectQuery,
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type SelectSetQuery,
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} from "@internal/tsql";
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/**
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* Extract every known table a TRQL query reads — the FROM table, every JOIN in
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* the chain, and any subqueries — for per-table JWT-scope authorization.
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*
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* `allowedTableNames` is the set of recognised table names (matched
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* case-insensitively); anything not in it is ignored. Injected so this stays
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* dependency-free (the caller derives it from the query schemas).
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*
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* Returns `null` when the query can't be parsed; callers MUST treat `null` as
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* deny-by-default.
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*/
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export function detectQueryTables(query: string, allowedTableNames: Set<string>): string[] | null {
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let ast: SelectQuery | SelectSetQuery;
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try {
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ast = parseTSQLSelect(query);
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} catch (err) {
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if (err instanceof TSQLSyntaxError) return null;
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throw err;
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}
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const allowed = new Map(Array.from(allowedTableNames, (n) => [n.toLowerCase(), n]));
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const seen = new Set<string>();
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const scanned = new WeakSet<object>();
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function visitSelect(q: SelectQuery): void {
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// CTE bodies: `WITH r AS (SELECT ... FROM <table>) ...` — the table is
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// read by the CTE even when the outer query only references the CTE alias.
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if (q.ctes) {
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for (const cte of Object.values(q.ctes)) {
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scanForSubqueries(cte.expr);
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}
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}
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// FROM / JOIN chain (tables + FROM-position subqueries).
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if (q.select_from) visitJoin(q.select_from);
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// Subqueries anywhere else (WHERE, SELECT list, GROUP BY, ORDER BY, etc.)
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// can each embed a SELECT that reads a real table, e.g.
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// `WHERE id IN (SELECT … FROM runs)`.
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scanForSubqueries(q.select);
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scanForSubqueries(q.where);
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scanForSubqueries(q.prewhere);
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scanForSubqueries(q.having);
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scanForSubqueries(q.group_by);
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scanForSubqueries(q.array_join_list);
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scanForSubqueries(q.order_by);
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scanForSubqueries(q.limit);
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scanForSubqueries(q.offset);
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scanForSubqueries(q.limit_by);
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scanForSubqueries(q.window_exprs);
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}
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// Shape-agnostic walk of an expression subtree: descends every nested
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// object/array and hands any embedded SELECT to the query visitors, so a new
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// node shape can't silently reintroduce a detection gap. The WeakSet guards
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// against back-reference cycles the AST might carry.
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function scanForSubqueries(node: unknown): void {
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if (node === null || typeof node !== "object") return;
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if (scanned.has(node)) return;
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scanned.add(node);
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if (Array.isArray(node)) {
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for (const item of node) scanForSubqueries(item);
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return;
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}
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const expressionType = (node as { expression_type?: string }).expression_type;
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if (expressionType === "select_query") {
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visitSelect(node as SelectQuery);
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return;
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}
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if (expressionType === "select_set_query") {
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visitSelectSet(node as SelectSetQuery);
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return;
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}
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for (const value of Object.values(node)) scanForSubqueries(value);
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}
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function visitSelectSet(q: SelectSetQuery): void {
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visitAny(q.initial_select_query);
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for (const node of q.subsequent_select_queries ?? []) {
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visitAny(node.select_query);
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}
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}
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function visitAny(q: SelectQuery | SelectSetQuery): void {
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if (q.expression_type === "select_query") visitSelect(q);
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else visitSelectSet(q);
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}
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function visitJoin(node: JoinExpr): void {
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const tableExpr = node.table;
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if (tableExpr) {
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if ((tableExpr as Field).expression_type === "field") {
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const name = (tableExpr as Field).chain[0];
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const canonicalName =
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typeof name === "string" ? allowed.get(name.toLowerCase()) : undefined;
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if (canonicalName) seen.add(canonicalName);
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} else if ((tableExpr as SelectQuery).expression_type === "select_query") {
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visitSelect(tableExpr as SelectQuery);
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} else if ((tableExpr as SelectSetQuery).expression_type === "select_set_query") {
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visitSelectSet(tableExpr as SelectSetQuery);
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}
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}
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// The `ON expr` can embed a SELECT that reads a real table, e.g.
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// `JOIN x ON id IN (SELECT … FROM runs)`.
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scanForSubqueries(node.constraint);
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if (node.next_join) visitJoin(node.next_join);
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}
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if (ast.expression_type === "select_set_query") visitSelectSet(ast);
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else visitSelect(ast);
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return Array.from(seen);
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}
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