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Katia Bulatova 4569657923 feat(webapp): dashboard agent — chat, reports, investigate (#4418)
## What & why

This is the system behind the Dashboard Agent — an assistant that
answers questions about a project's runs, errors, queues, deploys and
health, and can investigate failures end to end.

The agent runs as a chat.agent task in its own Trigger project. It has
no access to the main database or ClickHouse; all platform data is read
through the public API using a delegated, read-only user token.

Everything here is behind `canAccessDashboardAgent` and inert with the
flag off. The UI that mounts the panel lands in #4529.

## Stack

`#4418` (this, base) ← `#4529` UI ← `#4525` Watch ← `#4516` storybook
gallery. The scenario/contract reference for the whole stack is
`internal-packages/dashboard-agent/GUIDEBOOK.md` (it lands on the Watch
branch): it states, per feature, what makes each thing happen and where
that is decided.

## What's inside

**Agent runtime and tools** — `internal-packages/dashboard-agent`:
prompt, tool set (API reads, TRQL query, docs, navigation,
evidence/investigations, repo source), conversation compaction, a
prompt-prefix token budget pinned by snapshot test, and sampled
LLM-judged turn evals. The package cannot import webapp server code,
which is what makes the "no DB access" claim structural rather than a
convention.

**Contracts** — `internal-packages/dashboard-agent-contracts`:
`trigger://` URIs, intents, and the block envelope every rendered card
travels in.

**Conversation store** — `internal-packages/dashboard-agent-db`: drizzle
over postgres-js in its own `trigger_dashboard_agent` Postgres schema,
plus one additive migration.

**Auth boundary** — the user-actor token gains an optional environment
claim; one guard (`userActorEnvironment.server.ts`) enforces it so
routes don't each re-derive the rule. Token minting, cap ceiling, and
the RBAC fallback path for self-hosted.

**Transport** — webapp resource routes that mint the token and proxy
each turn, and SDK-side mid-turn reconnect.

**Public API the agent reads through** — orgs, projects, environments,
runs, queue metrics, workers, a run's commit metadata, repo snapshot,
reports, and `POST /api/v1/query`.

**Reports** — the health report's layout is declared once and shared by
the card, the markdown surface and the JSON/MCP surface, so the same
report reads the same in the dashboard, the terminal and an editor.

**Block renderers** — the report and investigation cards the flows above
already emit (`app/components/dashboard-agent/`). The panel that hosts
them, and the rest of the chat UI, is #4529.

**Query safety and CSP** — see below.

## Key decisions

- **The agent is a separate Trigger project, not webapp code.** It reads
platform data over the public API with a delegated user-actor token
whose `cap` ceilings it to read scopes. No Prisma, no ClickHouse, no
webapp imports.
- **The PAT-only auth helper now refuses user-actor tokens.** This is an
intentional behavioral change: its callers consume only a bare userId
and do not enforce delegated-token capabilities. Actor-aware routes
continue through the scoped route builders instead.
- **RBAC fallback builds a delegated token's ability from its own cap**,
never the blanket ability a PAT gets (read-only when the token declares
none). Without this, the agent's read-only cap would buy a write JWT on
self-hosted.
- **Org creation checks RBAC only for user-actor tokens, and only after
the env gate**, so an install with `ORG_CREATION_API_ENABLED` off
returns 404 rather than 403, and an ordinary PAT never consults an
ability the route has no org to scope. Both orderings are pinned by
test.
- **The query path is read-only in depth.** TRQL rejects write
statements at the grammar level (they don't parse, rather than being
filtered), ClickHouse runs with `readonly=1`, and the org/project/env
filters are injected server-side from the credential — the request body
cannot widen scope. An unparseable query denies instead of falling
through to the permissive resource.
- **Document-wide img-src CSP.** Remote images are an
outbound-request/exfiltration surface, so the policy permits only
own-origin/data/blob, the required SSO avatar hosts, and the favicon
endpoint. Operators can add exact origins through CSP_IMG_SRC_ALLOWLIST;
wildcard hosts and bare schemes are intentionally not allowed.
- **The chat transport reconnects on a mid-turn EOF**
(`@trigger.dev/sdk`). A body that ends without a turn-complete is
terminal only when the server says `X-Session-Settled: true`; otherwise
the transport resubscribes from `lastEventId` with bounded backoff, and
any record re-earns the budget. Previously a closed long-poll window or
a proxy restart left the reply stuck as if still generating.
- **Conversations live in their own datastore**, schema-scoped and
foreign-key-free (it references `organizationId`/`userId` by id, because
in cloud it is a different database). It is a display read-model for the
History tab and transport resume; `chat.agent`'s object-store snapshot
remains the model's source of truth.
- **Deterministic first.** Reports and health checks contain no LLM —
they are computed from the same data the dashboard shows, and the model
only narrates and links them. That is what makes a number in an answer
auditable.

## Testing

- 63 new test files, run with `pnpm run test --filter webapp` and
per-package vitest. Heaviest coverage on the auth boundary
(`userActorPatOnlyBoundary`, `userActorTokenClaimsAndScopes`,
`contextlessPatRoutes`, `rbacFallbackBranch`), TRQL read-only, the
report layout, and the SDK reconnect.
- The agent package has a separate eval lane (`pnpm run test:evals`,
`vitest.eval.config.ts`) that hits the real model, so it never runs in
`pnpm test`.
- Live-tested against a local stack scenario by scenario; the GUIDEBOOK
lists the condition each behaviour is expected under, which is what
those runs were checked against.

## Changelog

`.server-changes/dashboard-agent.md`, plus changesets for
`@trigger.dev/core` (report schemas), `@trigger.dev/sdk` (chat
reconnect) and the CLI's `mint-token` help text.
2026-08-11 18:56:14 +02:00

167 lines
6.5 KiB
TypeScript

import { tryCatch } from "@trigger.dev/core/v3";
import { env } from "~/env.server";
import { resolvePrivateApiKeyRateLimitScope } from "~/models/runtimeEnvironment.server";
import { batchStreamGrants } from "~/runEngine/concerns/batchStreamGrantsInstance.server";
import { authenticateAuthorizationHeader } from "./apiAuth.server";
import { authorizationRateLimitMiddleware } from "./authorizationRateLimitMiddleware.server";
import { deploymentApiPaths } from "./deploymentApiPaths.server";
import type { Duration } from "./rateLimiter.server";
const BATCH_STREAM_ITEMS_PATH = /^\/api\/v3\/batches\/([^/]+)\/items$/;
// Rate-limit key for a delegated (agent/PAT-minted) JWT. Its token value rotates every
// turn, so keying on the token would hand each turn a fresh bucket. Key on env+acting-user
// so the agent's traffic shares one bucket across turns. The `jwt-actor:` prefix keeps it
// off PRIVATE-key buckets, which key on the bare environment id.
export function jwtActorRateLimitIdentifier(environmentId: string, actorSub: string): string {
return `jwt-actor:${environmentId}:${actorSub}`;
}
// The per-request bucket decision for the API limiter. Exported so the branch below
// (a delegated JWT keys on env+acting-user, everything else keeps its prior key) is
// testable without standing up the middleware and its Redis.
export async function resolveApiRateLimitOverride(
authorizationValue: string
): Promise<{ config?: unknown; identifier?: string } | undefined> {
const rawApiKey = authorizationValue.replace(/^Bearer /, "");
if (rawApiKey.startsWith("tr_")) {
const scope = await resolvePrivateApiKeyRateLimitScope(rawApiKey);
if (!scope) {
return;
}
return {
config: scope.apiRateLimiterConfig,
identifier: scope.environmentId,
};
}
const authenticatedEnv = await authenticateAuthorizationHeader(authorizationValue, {
allowPublicKey: true,
allowJWT: true,
});
if (!authenticatedEnv || !authenticatedEnv.ok) {
return;
}
if (authenticatedEnv.type === "PUBLIC_JWT") {
const config = {
type: "fixedWindow",
window: env.API_RATE_LIMIT_JWT_WINDOW,
tokens: env.API_RATE_LIMIT_JWT_TOKENS,
} as const;
// A delegated JWT (agent/PAT-minted) shares one bucket per env+acting-user across turns.
// A browser realtime JWT carries no `act`, so it keeps the hashed-token fallback.
if (authenticatedEnv.actor?.sub) {
return {
config,
identifier: jwtActorRateLimitIdentifier(
authenticatedEnv.environment.id,
authenticatedEnv.actor.sub
),
};
}
return { config };
}
return {
config: authenticatedEnv.environment.organization.apiRateLimiterConfig,
// Public keys are browser-distributed, so keep them on per-key buckets.
identifier: authenticatedEnv.type === "PRIVATE" ? authenticatedEnv.environment.id : undefined,
};
}
export const apiRateLimiter = authorizationRateLimitMiddleware({
redis: {
port: env.RATE_LIMIT_REDIS_PORT,
host: env.RATE_LIMIT_REDIS_HOST,
username: env.RATE_LIMIT_REDIS_USERNAME,
password: env.RATE_LIMIT_REDIS_PASSWORD,
tlsDisabled: env.RATE_LIMIT_REDIS_TLS_DISABLED === "true",
clusterMode: env.RATE_LIMIT_REDIS_CLUSTER_MODE_ENABLED === "1",
},
keyPrefix: "api",
defaultLimiter: {
type: "tokenBucket",
refillRate: env.API_RATE_LIMIT_REFILL_RATE,
interval: env.API_RATE_LIMIT_REFILL_INTERVAL as Duration,
maxTokens: env.API_RATE_LIMIT_MAX,
},
limiterCache: {
fresh: 60_000 * 10, // Data is fresh for 10 minutes
stale: 60_000 * 20, // Date is stale after 20 minutes
maxItems: 1000,
},
limiterConfigOverride: resolveApiRateLimitOverride,
pathMatchers: [/^\/api/],
// Allow /api/v1/tasks/:id/callback/:secret
pathWhiteList: [
"/api/internal/stripe_webhooks",
// Keep allowlisted: these CLI endpoints are intentionally unauthenticated,
// so this Authorization-header-keyed limiter would 401 them. They are
// throttled separately by authCodeRateLimiter.server.ts.
"/api/v1/authorization-code",
"/api/v1/token",
"/api/v1/usage/ingest",
"/api/v1/plain/customer-cards",
/^\/api\/v1\/tasks\/[^/]+\/callback\/[^/]+$/, // /api/v1/tasks/$id/callback/$secret
/^\/api\/v1\/runs\/[^/]+\/tasks\/[^/]+\/callback\/[^/]+$/, // /api/v1/runs/$runId/tasks/$id/callback/$secret
/^\/api\/v1\/http-endpoints\/[^/]+\/env\/[^/]+\/[^/]+$/, // /api/v1/http-endpoints/$httpEndpointId/env/$envType/$shortcode
/^\/api\/v1\/sources\/http\/[^/]+$/, // /api/v1/sources/http/$id
/^\/api\/v1\/endpoints\/[^/]+\/[^/]+\/index\/[^/]+$/, // /api/v1/endpoints/$environmentId/$endpointSlug/index/$indexHookIdentifier
"/api/v1/timezones",
"/api/v1/usage/ingest",
"/api/v1/auth/jwt/claims",
/^\/api\/v1\/runs\/[^/]+\/attempts$/, // /api/v1/runs/$runFriendlyId/attempts
/^\/api\/v1\/waitpoints\/tokens\/[^/]+\/callback\/[^/]+$/, // /api/v1/waitpoints/tokens/$waitpointFriendlyId/callback/$hash
...deploymentApiPaths, // rate limited separately by deploymentRateLimiter
/^\/api\/v\d+\/deployments\/current$/, // runtime SDK surface, exempt as before the deploy budget split
// Internal SDK plumbing — packets are presigned-URL handshakes for
// payload uploads (v2 PUT) and downloads (v1 GET), authenticated via
// run-scoped JWT, called once per task/turn boundary by the runtime.
// Same shape as `/api/v1/runs/$runFriendlyId/attempts` above; not a
// customer-facing surface so customer rate limits shouldn't apply.
/^\/api\/v1\/packets\//,
/^\/api\/v2\/packets\//,
/^\/api\/v1\/sessions\/[^/]+\/snapshot-url$/,
],
bypass: async (req) => {
const match = BATCH_STREAM_ITEMS_PATH.exec(req.path);
if (!match) {
return false;
}
const batchFriendlyId = match[1];
const authorizationValue = req.headers.authorization;
if (!batchFriendlyId || !authorizationValue) {
return false;
}
const [authError, authenticated] = await tryCatch(
authenticateAuthorizationHeader(authorizationValue, {
allowPublicKey: true,
})
);
if (authError || !authenticated || !authenticated.ok) {
return false;
}
return batchStreamGrants.spend(authenticated.environment.id, batchFriendlyId);
},
log: {
rejections: env.API_RATE_LIMIT_REJECTION_LOGS_ENABLED === "1",
requests: env.API_RATE_LIMIT_REQUEST_LOGS_ENABLED === "1",
limiter: env.API_RATE_LIMIT_LIMITER_LOGS_ENABLED === "1",
},
});
export type RateLimitMiddleware = ReturnType<typeof authorizationRateLimitMiddleware>;