Files
triggerdotdev--trigger.dev/apps/webapp/app/services/apiAuth.server.ts
Chris Arderne 763b5dc582 feat(webapp): enforce scopes for environment API keys (#4389)
## Summary

Environment API keys backed by the additional-key table can authenticate
API requests using their stored effective scopes. Revoked and expired
keys are rejected, branch environments retain their existing routing
behavior, and last-used timestamps are updated on a throttled
best-effort basis.

## Design

API route builders receive the resolved ability and reject restricted
keys on routes without an authorization declaration. Existing
deployment, environment variable, queue, run, task, batch, session, and
waitpoint routes declare the resources they access.

Trigger and batch responses return server-signed public access tokens,
so additional keys never need access to the environment signing secret.
Root-key rotation also keeps public tokens valid for the existing grace
window.

## Feature notes
- Root environment keys remain unrestricted for backward compatibility.
Additional keys enforce their persisted scopes and fail closed on routes
   without an authorization declaration.
- Machine-key requests never exchange one credential for another.
Additional keys cannot retrieve the root key, and rotated root keys are
not upgraded
   during their grace window.
- Public JWT validation remains host-owned, while installed RBAC plugins
continue to supply root-key abilities.
- Unfiltered session and run listings preserve existing broad task-read
behavior. Filtered requests enforce the supplied task identifiers.
- Related-run summaries remain embedded in run retrieval for API
compatibility. Retrieving or mutating a related run independently still
requires
   permission for that run.
- Queue management authorizes at collection scope, matching the queue
permissions currently issued.
- Batch responses deliberately include server-signed public access
tokens for all clients. Selected-task credentials continue using their
original
   credential for per-item authorization.
- Two-phase batches authorize declared task identifiers before creation
and authorize every streamed item. Streaming paths that cannot declare
the
   complete task set remain fail closed.
- Authentication telemetry records successful credential resolution
separately from subsequent resource-authorization failures.
- API keys are high-entropy random tokens. SHA-256 is intentionally used
for deterministic indexed lookup, not password hashing.

## Deployment notes

The schema migration must be present before this code is deployed.
Because bearer resolution runs on every authenticated request, deploy
the resolver with additional-key lookup disabled, verify root-key and
public-token parity, then enable lookup before any additional keys can
be issued.

The multi-task authorization tightening changes the result for narrowly
scoped tokens that request tasks outside their grants. Observe
would-deny results before enforcing that check. Request-idempotency keys
are also newly isolated by environment and task, so a retry crossing the
deployment boundary may execute once more before old cache entries
expire.

## Follow-ups

- [x] Add a system-wide kill switch for additional-key lookup, defaulted
off for the initial deployment.
- [x] Add authentication observability by credential kind, result,
latency, and lookup path without recording credential values.
- [ ] ~Add would-deny observability and an independent enforcement
switch for multi-task authorization.~
- [ ] ~Add an independent switch for server-issued batch tokens while
root-key parity is verified.~
- [ ] Confirm every API route reachable by a restricted key has an
explicit authorization declaration or intentionally fails closed.
- [x] Verify root-key rotation, revoked-key grace, and public-token
validation through each bearer resolver path.
2026-08-03 14:00:29 +01:00

868 lines
24 KiB
TypeScript

import { json } from "@remix-run/server-runtime";
import { SignJWT, errors, jwtVerify } from "jose";
import { z } from "zod";
import { $replica } from "~/db.server";
import { env } from "~/env.server";
import { findProjectByRef } from "~/models/project.server";
import {
authIncludeBase,
authIncludeWithParent,
findEnvironmentByApiKey,
findEnvironmentByApiKeyWithResolution,
findEnvironmentByPublicApiKey,
toAuthenticated,
} from "~/models/runtimeEnvironment.server";
import type { RbacAbility, RbacResource } from "@trigger.dev/rbac";
import { type RuntimeEnvironmentForEnvRepo } from "~/v3/environmentVariables/environmentVariablesRepository.server";
import { logger } from "./logger.server";
import { safeEnvironmentLogFields } from "./safeEnvironmentLog";
import { missingJwtLogContext } from "./safeRequestLogContext";
import {
type PersonalAccessTokenAuthenticationResult,
authenticateApiRequestWithPersonalAccessToken,
isPersonalAccessToken,
} from "./personalAccessToken.server";
import {
type OrganizationAccessTokenAuthenticationResult,
authenticateApiRequestWithOrganizationAccessToken,
isOrganizationAccessToken,
} from "./organizationAccessToken.server";
import { isPublicJWT, validatePublicJwtKey } from "./realtime/jwtAuth.server";
import { isDefaultDevBranch, sanitizeBranchName } from "@trigger.dev/core/v3/utils/gitBranch";
import {
authenticateAuthorizeBearerWithTelemetry,
observeLegacyBearerAuthentication,
} from "~/services/authTelemetry.server";
const ClaimsSchema = z.object({
scopes: z.array(z.string()).optional(),
// One-time use token
otu: z.boolean().optional(),
realtime: z
.object({
skipColumns: z.array(z.string()).optional(),
})
.optional(),
});
// Re-export the slim shape defined in @trigger.dev/core. Single source of
// truth across the auth boundary (RBAC plugin contract → webapp handlers).
export type { AuthenticatedEnvironment } from "@trigger.dev/core/v3/auth/environment";
import type { AuthenticatedEnvironment } from "@trigger.dev/core/v3/auth/environment";
export type ApiAuthenticationResult =
| ApiAuthenticationResultSuccess
| ApiAuthenticationResultFailure;
export type ApiAuthenticationResultSuccess = {
ok: true;
apiKey: string;
type: "PUBLIC" | "PRIVATE" | "PUBLIC_JWT";
environment: AuthenticatedEnvironment;
oneTimeUse?: boolean;
realtime?: {
skipColumns?: string[];
};
// Present when authentication went through the RBAC bearer controller.
// Legacy direct authentication intentionally omits it and remains fail-closed
// for restricted additional keys.
ability?: RbacAbility;
// Present when the request used a public JWT minted from a PAT/UAT exchange
// that stamped an `act` delegation claim. `actor.sub` is the acting user id,
// used for attribution (e.g. who resolved an error). Absent for plain env
// API keys (no user) and JWTs minted without delegation.
actor?: {
sub: string;
};
};
export type ApiAuthenticationResultFailure = {
ok: false;
error: string;
};
/**
* @deprecated Use `authenticateApiRequestWithFailure` instead.
*/
export async function authenticateApiRequest(
request: Request,
options: { allowPublicKey?: boolean; allowJWT?: boolean } = {}
): Promise<ApiAuthenticationResultSuccess | undefined> {
const { apiKey, branchName } = getApiKeyFromRequest(request);
if (!apiKey) {
return;
}
return observeLegacyBearerAuthentication(request, () =>
authenticateApiKey(apiKey, { ...options, branchName })
);
}
/**
* This method is the same as `authenticateApiRequest` but it returns a failure result instead of undefined.
* It should be used from now on to ensure that the API key is always validated and provide a failure result.
*/
export async function authenticateApiRequestWithFailure(
request: Request,
options: { allowPublicKey?: boolean; allowJWT?: boolean } = {}
): Promise<ApiAuthenticationResult> {
const { apiKey, branchName } = getApiKeyFromRequest(request);
if (!apiKey) {
return {
ok: false,
error: "Invalid API Key",
};
}
return observeLegacyBearerAuthentication(request, () =>
authenticateApiKeyWithFailure(apiKey, { ...options, branchName })
);
}
/**
* @deprecated Use `authenticateApiKeyWithFailure` instead.
*/
export async function authenticateApiKey(
apiKey: string,
options: {
allowPublicKey?: boolean;
allowJWT?: boolean;
branchName?: string;
} = {}
): Promise<ApiAuthenticationResultSuccess | undefined> {
const result = getApiKeyResult(apiKey);
if (!result) {
return;
}
if (!options.allowPublicKey && result.type === "PUBLIC") {
return;
}
if (!options.allowJWT && result.type === "PUBLIC_JWT") {
return;
}
switch (result.type) {
case "PUBLIC": {
const environment = await findEnvironmentByPublicApiKey(result.apiKey, options.branchName);
if (!environment) {
return;
}
return {
ok: true,
...result,
environment,
};
}
case "PRIVATE": {
const environment = await findEnvironmentByApiKey(result.apiKey, options.branchName);
if (!environment) {
return;
}
return {
ok: true,
...result,
environment,
};
}
case "PUBLIC_JWT": {
const validationResults = await validatePublicJwtKey(result.apiKey);
if (!validationResults.ok) {
return;
}
const parsedClaims = ClaimsSchema.safeParse(validationResults.claims);
return {
ok: true,
...result,
environment: validationResults.environment,
oneTimeUse: parsedClaims.success ? parsedClaims.data.otu : false,
realtime: parsedClaims.success ? parsedClaims.data.realtime : undefined,
};
}
}
}
/**
* This method is the same as `authenticateApiKey` but it returns a failure result instead of undefined.
* It should be used from now on to ensure that the API key is always validated and provide a failure result.
*/
async function authenticateApiKeyWithFailure(
apiKey: string,
options: {
allowPublicKey?: boolean;
allowJWT?: boolean;
branchName?: string;
} = {}
): Promise<ApiAuthenticationResult> {
const result = getApiKeyResult(apiKey);
if (!result) {
return {
ok: false,
error: "Invalid API Key",
};
}
if (!options.allowPublicKey && result.type === "PUBLIC") {
return {
ok: false,
error: "Public API keys are not allowed for this request",
};
}
if (!options.allowJWT && result.type === "PUBLIC_JWT") {
return {
ok: false,
error: "Public JWT API keys are not allowed for this request",
};
}
switch (result.type) {
case "PUBLIC": {
const environment = await findEnvironmentByPublicApiKey(result.apiKey, options.branchName);
if (!environment) {
return {
ok: false,
error: "Invalid API Key",
};
}
return {
ok: true,
...result,
environment,
};
}
case "PRIVATE": {
const resolution = await findEnvironmentByApiKeyWithResolution(
result.apiKey,
options.branchName
);
if (!resolution.ok) {
return {
ok: false,
error:
resolution.reason === "restricted"
? "This endpoint does not support restricted API keys. Use an API key with full environment access."
: "Invalid API Key",
};
}
return {
ok: true,
...result,
environment: resolution.environment,
};
}
case "PUBLIC_JWT": {
const validationResults = await validatePublicJwtKey(result.apiKey);
if (!validationResults.ok) {
return validationResults;
}
const parsedClaims = ClaimsSchema.safeParse(validationResults.claims);
return {
ok: true,
...result,
environment: validationResults.environment,
oneTimeUse: parsedClaims.success ? parsedClaims.data.otu : false,
realtime: parsedClaims.success ? parsedClaims.data.realtime : undefined,
};
}
}
}
/**
* Authenticate an API-key request for a legacy (non-apiBuilder) route that
* needs to accept granular additional keys, then enforce that the key's ability
* authorizes `action` on `resource`. Root keys (and grace-window root keys)
* carry the unrestricted `admin` ability, preserving pre-granular behavior.
*
* Only apiKey credentials are accepted (no PAT / org token / public key). Use
* this for routes previously guarded by a bare `authenticateApiRequest` call.
*/
export async function authenticateApiKeyWithScope(
request: Request,
{
action,
resource,
allowJWT = false,
}: { action: string; resource: RbacResource; allowJWT?: boolean }
): Promise<
| { ok: true; authentication: ApiAuthenticationResultSuccess }
| { ok: false; status: 401 | 403; error: string }
> {
const apiKey = getApiKeyFromHeader(request.headers.get("Authorization"));
if (!apiKey) {
return { ok: false, status: 401, error: "Invalid or Missing API key" };
}
const result = await authenticateAuthorizeBearerWithTelemetry(
request,
{ action, resource },
{ allowJWT }
);
if (!result.ok) {
return result;
}
return {
ok: true,
authentication: {
ok: true,
apiKey,
type: "PRIVATE",
environment: result.environment,
ability: result.ability,
},
};
}
export async function authenticateAuthorizationHeader(
authorization: string,
{
allowPublicKey = false,
allowJWT = false,
}: { allowPublicKey?: boolean; allowJWT?: boolean } = {}
): Promise<ApiAuthenticationResult | undefined> {
const apiKey = getApiKeyFromHeader(authorization);
if (!apiKey) {
return;
}
return authenticateApiKey(apiKey, { allowPublicKey, allowJWT });
}
function isPublicApiKey(key: string) {
return key.startsWith("pk_");
}
function isSecretApiKey(key: string) {
return key.startsWith("tr_");
}
/**
* Reads the branch off the `x-trigger-branch` header and sanitizes it.
* Every server-side reader should go through here so sanitization is applied uniformly.
* The dev `"default"` sentinel is intentionally NOT resolved here:
* that translation is environment type-dependent.
*/
export function branchNameFromRequest(request: Request): string | undefined {
return sanitizeBranchName(request.headers.get("x-trigger-branch")) ?? undefined;
}
function getApiKeyFromRequest(request: Request): {
apiKey: string | undefined;
branchName: string | undefined;
} {
const apiKey = getApiKeyFromHeader(request.headers.get("Authorization"));
const branchName = branchNameFromRequest(request);
return { apiKey, branchName };
}
function getApiKeyFromHeader(authorization?: string | null) {
if (typeof authorization !== "string" || !authorization) {
return;
}
const apiKey = authorization.replace(/^Bearer /, "");
return apiKey;
}
function getApiKeyResult(apiKey: string): {
apiKey: string;
type: "PUBLIC" | "PRIVATE" | "PUBLIC_JWT";
} {
const type = isPublicApiKey(apiKey)
? "PUBLIC"
: isSecretApiKey(apiKey)
? "PRIVATE"
: isPublicJWT(apiKey)
? "PUBLIC_JWT"
: "PRIVATE"; // Fallback to private key
return { apiKey, type };
}
export type AuthenticationResult =
| {
type: "personalAccessToken";
result: PersonalAccessTokenAuthenticationResult;
}
| {
type: "organizationAccessToken";
result: OrganizationAccessTokenAuthenticationResult;
}
| {
type: "apiKey";
result: ApiAuthenticationResult;
};
type AuthenticationMethod = "personalAccessToken" | "organizationAccessToken" | "apiKey";
type AllowedAuthenticationMethods = Record<AuthenticationMethod, boolean> &
({ personalAccessToken: true } | { organizationAccessToken: true } | { apiKey: true });
const defaultAllowedAuthenticationMethods: AllowedAuthenticationMethods = {
personalAccessToken: true,
organizationAccessToken: true,
apiKey: true,
};
type FilteredAuthenticationResult<
T extends AllowedAuthenticationMethods = AllowedAuthenticationMethods,
> =
| (T["personalAccessToken"] extends true
? Extract<AuthenticationResult, { type: "personalAccessToken" }>
: never)
| (T["organizationAccessToken"] extends true
? Extract<AuthenticationResult, { type: "organizationAccessToken" }>
: never)
| (T["apiKey"] extends true ? Extract<AuthenticationResult, { type: "apiKey" }> : never);
/**
* Authenticates an incoming request by checking for various token types.
*
* Supports personal access tokens, organization access tokens, and API keys.
* Returns the appropriate authentication result based on the token type found.
*
* This method currently only allows private keys for the `apiKey` authentication method.
*
* @template T - The allowed authentication methods configuration type
* @param request - The incoming HTTP request containing authentication headers
* @param allowedAuthenticationMethods - Configuration object specifying which authentication methods are allowed.
* At least one method must be set to `true`. Defaults to allowing all methods.
* @returns Authentication result with only the enabled auth method types, or undefined if no valid token found
*
* @example
* ```typescript
* // Only allow personal access tokens
* const result = await authenticateRequest(request, {
* personalAccessToken: true,
* organizationAccessToken: false,
* apiKey: false,
* });
* // result type: { type: "personalAccessToken"; result: PersonalAccessTokenAuthenticationResult } | undefined
* ```
*/
export async function authenticateRequest<
T extends AllowedAuthenticationMethods = AllowedAuthenticationMethods,
>(
request: Request,
allowedAuthenticationMethods?: T
): Promise<FilteredAuthenticationResult<T> | undefined> {
const allowedMethods = allowedAuthenticationMethods ?? defaultAllowedAuthenticationMethods;
const { apiKey, branchName } = getApiKeyFromRequest(request);
if (!apiKey) {
return;
}
if (allowedMethods.personalAccessToken && isPersonalAccessToken(apiKey)) {
const result = await authenticateApiRequestWithPersonalAccessToken(request);
if (!result) {
return;
}
return {
type: "personalAccessToken",
result,
} satisfies Extract<
AuthenticationResult,
{ type: "personalAccessToken" }
> as FilteredAuthenticationResult<T>;
}
if (allowedMethods.organizationAccessToken && isOrganizationAccessToken(apiKey)) {
const result = await authenticateApiRequestWithOrganizationAccessToken(request);
if (!result) {
return;
}
return {
type: "organizationAccessToken",
result,
} satisfies Extract<
AuthenticationResult,
{ type: "organizationAccessToken" }
> as FilteredAuthenticationResult<T>;
}
if (allowedMethods.apiKey) {
const result = await authenticateApiKey(apiKey, {
allowPublicKey: false,
branchName,
});
if (!result) {
return;
}
return {
type: "apiKey",
result,
} satisfies Extract<
AuthenticationResult,
{ type: "apiKey" }
> as FilteredAuthenticationResult<T>;
}
return;
}
export async function authenticatedEnvironmentForAuthentication(
auth: AuthenticationResult,
projectRef: string,
slug: string,
branch?: string
): Promise<AuthenticatedEnvironment> {
if (slug === "staging") {
slug = "stg";
}
// Normalize the requested branch once: sanitize it, then collapse the dev
// `"default"` sentinel to "no branch" so it resolves to the root dev env
// rather than a (non-existent) branch literally named "default".
// TODO this slug check is brittle
const sanitizedBranch = sanitizeBranchName(branch);
const resolvedBranch =
slug === "dev" && isDefaultDevBranch(sanitizedBranch) ? null : sanitizedBranch;
switch (auth.type) {
case "apiKey": {
if (!auth.result.ok) {
throw json({ error: auth.result.error }, { status: 401 });
}
if (auth.result.environment.project.externalRef !== projectRef) {
throw json(
{
error:
"Invalid project ref for this API key. Make sure you are using an API key associated with that project.",
},
{ status: 400 }
);
}
if (
auth.result.environment.slug !== slug &&
auth.result.environment.branchName !== resolvedBranch
) {
throw json(
{
error:
"Invalid environment slug for this API key. Make sure you are using an API key associated with that environment.",
},
{ status: 400 }
);
}
return auth.result.environment;
}
case "personalAccessToken": {
const user = await $replica.user.findUnique({
where: {
id: auth.result.userId,
},
});
if (!user) {
throw json({ error: "Invalid or missing personal access token" }, { status: 401 });
}
const project = await findProjectByRef(projectRef, user.id);
if (!project) {
throw json({ error: "Project not found" }, { status: 404 });
}
if (!resolvedBranch) {
const environment = await $replica.runtimeEnvironment.findFirst({
where: {
projectId: project.id,
slug: slug,
...(slug === "dev"
? {
orgMember: {
userId: user.id,
},
}
: {}),
},
include: authIncludeBase,
});
if (!environment) {
throw json({ error: "Environment not found" }, { status: 404 });
}
return toAuthenticated(environment);
}
const environment = await $replica.runtimeEnvironment.findFirst({
where: {
projectId: project.id,
type: slug === "dev" ? "DEVELOPMENT" : "PREVIEW",
branchName: resolvedBranch,
...(slug === "dev"
? {
orgMember: {
userId: user.id,
},
}
: {}),
archivedAt: null,
},
include: authIncludeWithParent,
});
if (!environment) {
throw json({ error: "Branch not found" }, { status: 404 });
}
if (!environment.parentEnvironment) {
throw json({ error: "Branch not associated with a parent environment" }, { status: 400 });
}
// PREVIEW envs (and DEVELOPMENT branches) reuse the parent's apiKey for downstream auth flows
// (signed JWTs, internal-fetch helpers). Override before mapping so
// the slim shape carries the parent's key.
return toAuthenticated({
...environment,
apiKey: environment.parentEnvironment.apiKey,
});
}
case "organizationAccessToken": {
const organization = await $replica.organization.findUnique({
where: {
id: auth.result.organizationId,
},
});
if (!organization) {
throw json({ error: "Invalid or missing organization access token" }, { status: 401 });
}
const project = await $replica.project.findFirst({
where: {
organizationId: organization.id,
externalRef: projectRef,
},
});
if (!project) {
throw json({ error: "Project not found" }, { status: 404 });
}
if (!resolvedBranch) {
const environment = await $replica.runtimeEnvironment.findFirst({
where: {
projectId: project.id,
slug: slug,
},
include: authIncludeBase,
});
if (!environment) {
throw json({ error: "Environment not found" }, { status: 404 });
}
return toAuthenticated(environment);
}
const environment = await $replica.runtimeEnvironment.findFirst({
where: {
projectId: project.id,
// No Development branches for OAT
type: "PREVIEW",
branchName: resolvedBranch,
archivedAt: null,
},
include: authIncludeWithParent,
});
if (!environment) {
throw json({ error: "Branch not found" }, { status: 404 });
}
if (!environment.parentEnvironment) {
throw json({ error: "Branch not associated with a preview environment" }, { status: 400 });
}
return toAuthenticated({
...environment,
apiKey: environment.parentEnvironment.apiKey,
});
}
default: {
auth satisfies never;
throw json({ error: "Invalid authentication result" }, { status: 401 });
}
}
}
const JWT_SECRET = new TextEncoder().encode(env.SESSION_SECRET);
const JWT_ALGORITHM = "HS256";
const DEFAULT_JWT_EXPIRATION_IN_MS = 1000 * 60 * 60; // 1 hour
export async function generateJWTTokenForEnvironment(
environment: RuntimeEnvironmentForEnvRepo,
payload: Record<string, string>
) {
const jwt = await new SignJWT({
environment_id: environment.id,
org_id: environment.organizationId,
project_id: environment.projectId,
...payload,
})
.setProtectedHeader({ alg: JWT_ALGORITHM })
.setIssuedAt()
.setIssuer("https://id.trigger.dev")
.setAudience("https://api.trigger.dev")
.setExpirationTime(calculateJWTExpiration())
.sign(JWT_SECRET);
return jwt;
}
export async function validateJWTTokenAndRenew<T extends z.ZodTypeAny>(
request: Request,
payloadSchema: T
): Promise<{ payload: z.infer<T>; jwt: string } | undefined> {
try {
const jwt = request.headers.get("x-trigger-jwt");
if (!jwt) {
// Log a safe breadcrumb, not the raw headers (which carry the
// caller's Authorization credential).
logger.debug("Missing JWT token in request", missingJwtLogContext(request));
return;
}
const { payload: rawPayload } = await jwtVerify(jwt, JWT_SECRET, {
issuer: "https://id.trigger.dev",
audience: "https://api.trigger.dev",
});
const payload = payloadSchema.safeParse(rawPayload);
if (!payload.success) {
logger.error("Failed to validate JWT", { payload: rawPayload, issues: payload.error.issues });
return;
}
const renewedJwt = await renewJWTToken(payload.data);
return {
payload: payload.data,
jwt: renewedJwt,
};
} catch (error) {
if (error instanceof errors.JWTExpired) {
// Now we need to try and renew the token using the API key auth
const authenticatedEnv = await authenticateApiRequest(request);
if (!authenticatedEnv) {
logger.error("Failed to renew JWT token, missing or invalid Authorization header", {
error: error.message,
});
return;
}
if (!authenticatedEnv.ok) {
logger.error("Failed to renew JWT token, invalid API key", {
error: error.message,
});
return;
}
const payload = payloadSchema.safeParse(error.payload);
if (!payload.success) {
logger.error("Failed to parse jwt payload after expired", {
payload: error.payload,
issues: payload.error.issues,
});
return;
}
const renewedJwt = await generateJWTTokenForEnvironment(authenticatedEnv.environment, {
...payload.data,
});
// The environment carries secret material; log only non-secret fields.
logger.debug("Renewed JWT token from Authorization header API Key", {
environment: safeEnvironmentLogFields(authenticatedEnv.environment),
payload: payload.data,
});
return {
payload: payload.data,
jwt: renewedJwt,
};
}
logger.error("Failed to validate JWT token", { error });
}
}
async function renewJWTToken(payload: Record<string, string>) {
const jwt = await new SignJWT(payload)
.setProtectedHeader({ alg: JWT_ALGORITHM })
.setIssuedAt()
.setIssuer("https://id.trigger.dev")
.setAudience("https://api.trigger.dev")
.setExpirationTime(calculateJWTExpiration())
.sign(JWT_SECRET);
return jwt;
}
function calculateJWTExpiration() {
if (env.PROD_USAGE_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS) {
return (
(Date.now() + Math.max(DEFAULT_JWT_EXPIRATION_IN_MS, env.PROD_USAGE_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS)) /
1000
);
}
return (Date.now() + DEFAULT_JWT_EXPIRATION_IN_MS) / 1000;
}
export async function getOneTimeUseToken(
auth: ApiAuthenticationResultSuccess
): Promise<string | undefined> {
if (auth.type !== "PUBLIC_JWT") {
return;
}
if (!auth.oneTimeUse) {
return;
}
// Hash the API key to make it unique
const hash = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", new TextEncoder().encode(auth.apiKey));
return Buffer.from(hash).toString("hex");
}