v.docker.4.5.11
17 Commits
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7b390e5984 | feat(cli,webapp): allow deploys with environment API keys (#4561) | ||
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4569657923 |
feat(webapp): dashboard agent — chat, reports, investigate (#4418)
## What & why This is the system behind the Dashboard Agent — an assistant that answers questions about a project's runs, errors, queues, deploys and health, and can investigate failures end to end. The agent runs as a chat.agent task in its own Trigger project. It has no access to the main database or ClickHouse; all platform data is read through the public API using a delegated, read-only user token. Everything here is behind `canAccessDashboardAgent` and inert with the flag off. The UI that mounts the panel lands in #4529. ## Stack `#4418` (this, base) ← `#4529` UI ← `#4525` Watch ← `#4516` storybook gallery. The scenario/contract reference for the whole stack is `internal-packages/dashboard-agent/GUIDEBOOK.md` (it lands on the Watch branch): it states, per feature, what makes each thing happen and where that is decided. ## What's inside **Agent runtime and tools** — `internal-packages/dashboard-agent`: prompt, tool set (API reads, TRQL query, docs, navigation, evidence/investigations, repo source), conversation compaction, a prompt-prefix token budget pinned by snapshot test, and sampled LLM-judged turn evals. The package cannot import webapp server code, which is what makes the "no DB access" claim structural rather than a convention. **Contracts** — `internal-packages/dashboard-agent-contracts`: `trigger://` URIs, intents, and the block envelope every rendered card travels in. **Conversation store** — `internal-packages/dashboard-agent-db`: drizzle over postgres-js in its own `trigger_dashboard_agent` Postgres schema, plus one additive migration. **Auth boundary** — the user-actor token gains an optional environment claim; one guard (`userActorEnvironment.server.ts`) enforces it so routes don't each re-derive the rule. Token minting, cap ceiling, and the RBAC fallback path for self-hosted. **Transport** — webapp resource routes that mint the token and proxy each turn, and SDK-side mid-turn reconnect. **Public API the agent reads through** — orgs, projects, environments, runs, queue metrics, workers, a run's commit metadata, repo snapshot, reports, and `POST /api/v1/query`. **Reports** — the health report's layout is declared once and shared by the card, the markdown surface and the JSON/MCP surface, so the same report reads the same in the dashboard, the terminal and an editor. **Block renderers** — the report and investigation cards the flows above already emit (`app/components/dashboard-agent/`). The panel that hosts them, and the rest of the chat UI, is #4529. **Query safety and CSP** — see below. ## Key decisions - **The agent is a separate Trigger project, not webapp code.** It reads platform data over the public API with a delegated user-actor token whose `cap` ceilings it to read scopes. No Prisma, no ClickHouse, no webapp imports. - **The PAT-only auth helper now refuses user-actor tokens.** This is an intentional behavioral change: its callers consume only a bare userId and do not enforce delegated-token capabilities. Actor-aware routes continue through the scoped route builders instead. - **RBAC fallback builds a delegated token's ability from its own cap**, never the blanket ability a PAT gets (read-only when the token declares none). Without this, the agent's read-only cap would buy a write JWT on self-hosted. - **Org creation checks RBAC only for user-actor tokens, and only after the env gate**, so an install with `ORG_CREATION_API_ENABLED` off returns 404 rather than 403, and an ordinary PAT never consults an ability the route has no org to scope. Both orderings are pinned by test. - **The query path is read-only in depth.** TRQL rejects write statements at the grammar level (they don't parse, rather than being filtered), ClickHouse runs with `readonly=1`, and the org/project/env filters are injected server-side from the credential — the request body cannot widen scope. An unparseable query denies instead of falling through to the permissive resource. - **Document-wide img-src CSP.** Remote images are an outbound-request/exfiltration surface, so the policy permits only own-origin/data/blob, the required SSO avatar hosts, and the favicon endpoint. Operators can add exact origins through CSP_IMG_SRC_ALLOWLIST; wildcard hosts and bare schemes are intentionally not allowed. - **The chat transport reconnects on a mid-turn EOF** (`@trigger.dev/sdk`). A body that ends without a turn-complete is terminal only when the server says `X-Session-Settled: true`; otherwise the transport resubscribes from `lastEventId` with bounded backoff, and any record re-earns the budget. Previously a closed long-poll window or a proxy restart left the reply stuck as if still generating. - **Conversations live in their own datastore**, schema-scoped and foreign-key-free (it references `organizationId`/`userId` by id, because in cloud it is a different database). It is a display read-model for the History tab and transport resume; `chat.agent`'s object-store snapshot remains the model's source of truth. - **Deterministic first.** Reports and health checks contain no LLM — they are computed from the same data the dashboard shows, and the model only narrates and links them. That is what makes a number in an answer auditable. ## Testing - 63 new test files, run with `pnpm run test --filter webapp` and per-package vitest. Heaviest coverage on the auth boundary (`userActorPatOnlyBoundary`, `userActorTokenClaimsAndScopes`, `contextlessPatRoutes`, `rbacFallbackBranch`), TRQL read-only, the report layout, and the SDK reconnect. - The agent package has a separate eval lane (`pnpm run test:evals`, `vitest.eval.config.ts`) that hits the real model, so it never runs in `pnpm test`. - Live-tested against a local stack scenario by scenario; the GUIDEBOOK lists the condition each behaviour is expected under, which is what those runs were checked against. ## Changelog `.server-changes/dashboard-agent.md`, plus changesets for `@trigger.dev/core` (report schemas), `@trigger.dev/sdk` (chat reconnect) and the CLI's `mint-token` help text. |
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0a44b88b39 | fix: security release 2026-07-21 (#4528) | ||
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763b5dc582 |
feat(webapp): enforce scopes for environment API keys (#4389)
## Summary Environment API keys backed by the additional-key table can authenticate API requests using their stored effective scopes. Revoked and expired keys are rejected, branch environments retain their existing routing behavior, and last-used timestamps are updated on a throttled best-effort basis. ## Design API route builders receive the resolved ability and reject restricted keys on routes without an authorization declaration. Existing deployment, environment variable, queue, run, task, batch, session, and waitpoint routes declare the resources they access. Trigger and batch responses return server-signed public access tokens, so additional keys never need access to the environment signing secret. Root-key rotation also keeps public tokens valid for the existing grace window. ## Feature notes - Root environment keys remain unrestricted for backward compatibility. Additional keys enforce their persisted scopes and fail closed on routes without an authorization declaration. - Machine-key requests never exchange one credential for another. Additional keys cannot retrieve the root key, and rotated root keys are not upgraded during their grace window. - Public JWT validation remains host-owned, while installed RBAC plugins continue to supply root-key abilities. - Unfiltered session and run listings preserve existing broad task-read behavior. Filtered requests enforce the supplied task identifiers. - Related-run summaries remain embedded in run retrieval for API compatibility. Retrieving or mutating a related run independently still requires permission for that run. - Queue management authorizes at collection scope, matching the queue permissions currently issued. - Batch responses deliberately include server-signed public access tokens for all clients. Selected-task credentials continue using their original credential for per-item authorization. - Two-phase batches authorize declared task identifiers before creation and authorize every streamed item. Streaming paths that cannot declare the complete task set remain fail closed. - Authentication telemetry records successful credential resolution separately from subsequent resource-authorization failures. - API keys are high-entropy random tokens. SHA-256 is intentionally used for deterministic indexed lookup, not password hashing. ## Deployment notes The schema migration must be present before this code is deployed. Because bearer resolution runs on every authenticated request, deploy the resolver with additional-key lookup disabled, verify root-key and public-token parity, then enable lookup before any additional keys can be issued. The multi-task authorization tightening changes the result for narrowly scoped tokens that request tasks outside their grants. Observe would-deny results before enforcing that check. Request-idempotency keys are also newly isolated by environment and task, so a retry crossing the deployment boundary may execute once more before old cache entries expire. ## Follow-ups - [x] Add a system-wide kill switch for additional-key lookup, defaulted off for the initial deployment. - [x] Add authentication observability by credential kind, result, latency, and lookup path without recording credential values. - [ ] ~Add would-deny observability and an independent enforcement switch for multi-task authorization.~ - [ ] ~Add an independent switch for server-issued batch tokens while root-key parity is verified.~ - [ ] Confirm every API route reachable by a restricted key has an explicit authorization declaration or intentionally fails closed. - [x] Verify root-key rotation, revoked-key grace, and public-token validation through each bearer resolver path. |
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a81ad4949c |
feat(database,rbac): add multiple environment API key foundations (#4388)
Adds the storage model and authorization contracts needed for multiple environment API keys. Credentials are represented by hashed values, revocation and expiration state, and persisted effective scopes. The built-in authorization fallback exposes full-access policy preparation, while optional authorization extensions can supply additional presets and task-aware scope generation. This change does not create, display, or authenticate additional keys. |
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d05f1a7398 |
chore(webapp): migrate from Remix compiler to Vite (#4188)
Replaces Remix compiler with the Vite plugin. The Express server (cluster, socket.io, ws) and the Docker image contract are unchanged. |
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dc87b884e7 |
chore: upgrade to typescript 6 (#4310)
## Summary Upgrades the workspace to TypeScript 6.0.3 and applies the compiler, type, and build configuration changes required to preserve package layouts and existing runtime behavior, apart from correcting the HTTP status field used for deployment connection errors. ## Compatibility - Centralizes TypeScript 6.0.3 through the pnpm workspace catalog. - Replaces compiler options and module resolution modes that TypeScript 6 no longer accepts. - Restores explicit Node types where TypeScript 6 no longer includes them transitively. - Adds explicit declaration build roots that preserve each package's existing output layout. - Patches tsup to stop injecting the removed `baseUrl` option during declaration builds. - Uses type-only assertions for stricter typed-array and stream definitions without changing runtime behavior. - Reads the EventSource v3 HTTP status from `code`, so deployment connection errors include it correctly. - Keeps standalone CLI compatibility fixtures pinned to their existing TypeScript version and lockfiles. `turbo run typecheck` and the complete PR test suite are green. |
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b902e65dfb |
chore: standardise internal node on 24.18.0 (#4254)
## Summary Updates the internal development, CI, and runtime-image Node version to 24.18.0. SDK compatibility coverage continues to include Node 20, 22, 24, and 26. The Node type definitions and the package-manager lockfiles now resolve against Node 24 types. |
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b64b54c74e |
feat(webapp): pass database writer and reader config to auth plugins (#4229)
## Summary The RBAC and SSO auth plugins can own their own database client, but they could only read `DATABASE_URL`, so every connection they opened landed on the primary. The host webapp now resolves writer and read-replica URLs from its env (the same fallback chain its own Prisma clients use: control-plane URL first, then the default) and passes them to the plugins at create time via a shared `PluginDatabaseConfig`, along with separate connection limits for writes (default 2) and reads (default 5, tunable via `RBAC_DATABASE_*_CONNECTION_LIMIT` and `SSO_DATABASE_*_CONNECTION_LIMIT`). A plugin can then route hot-path reads (per-request auth checks, login routing) to the read replica and keep only rare mutations on the primary. With no replica configured, or no plugin installed, nothing changes: the OSS fallback ignores the new option and keeps reading through the Prisma clients it is already given. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) |
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448443a024 |
chore: bump internal node to 22 and standardise (#4084)
Bumps the internal/toolchain Node version to the latest 22.x LTS (`22.23.1`) and standardises it across the repo. Scope is the **platform toolchain + the repo's own runtime images** (all `20 → 22` *upgrades*, off the now-EOL node 20). ### Main changes - Node `20.20.2 → 22.23.1` across all CI workflows, `.nvmrc`, `CONTRIBUTING.md`, and the OSS `docker/Dockerfile` (digest-pinned). - `@types/node → 22.20.0` (root dep + pnpm `overrides`, so the whole workspace resolves to it); lockfile regenerated. - `sdk-compat` matrix: adds Node 24 + 26 (keeps 20, still in `engines`). - **App runtime images → node 22** (were on EOL node 20): `apps/coordinator` → `node:22.23.1-bookworm-slim`; `apps/docker-provider` + `apps/kubernetes-provider` → `node:22-alpine` (reusing the exact digest `apps/supervisor` already runs, so all four worker images are now identical). Stage aliases renamed off `node-20`. ### Possible issues / test notes - `@types/node` 22.x can surface new TS errors — typecheck (now on 22) is the gate. - **Smoke-test the v3 worker path** — `coordinator` (`crictl`/CRI calls) and the docker/kubernetes providers (talking to their daemons) now run on node 22 (alpine/musl for the providers). Upgrade off EOL so low-risk, but it's deployed runtime code with its own `publish-worker.yml` pipeline. |
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b54201f986 | chore: switch to oxfmt, oxlint - add ci checks (#3977) | ||
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df78ef96d9 |
feat: multi dev branches (#4023)
Closes this feature request: [https://triggerdev.featurebase.app/p/isolated-dev-sessions-for-multiple-local-trigger-dev-instances](https://triggerdev.featurebase.app/p/isolated-dev-sessions-for-multiple-local-trigger-dev-instances) ### Feature notes: - CLI `trigger dev` works as before - `trigger dev --branch my-branch` to create a new branch and run against it. - `trigger dev archive --branch my-branch` to archive (or in webapp). - New webapp page to manage and archive dev branches, currently feature flagged. ### Implementation details: - No changes to data model, no backfill. `isBranchableEnvironment` column is ignored for dev branches, we use `parentEnvironmentId IS NULL` instead. - `x-trigger-branch` overloaded for preview and dev branches - New `TRIGGER_DEV_BRANCH` env var available locally. `TRIGGER_PREVIEW_BRANCH` overloaded for child runs. - Lots of new glue code to sanitise the branch checks. ### Rollout - Deploy webapp/API changes (all backwards compatible) - Manual tests on some orgs - Deploy docs, release CLI, flip feature flag for webapp feature ### NB - `api.v1.projects.$projectRef.environments.ts` will return `isBranchableEnvironment: true` for all dev environments. ### Prerequisites - [x] Typecheck will not pass until we make a new release of `@trigger.dev/platform` and bump it here |
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5052d895b3 |
feat(webapp,core): add a public HTTP API for errors (#4005)
## Summary
Adds an environment-scoped HTTP API over the Errors feature, mirroring
the runs API. Task-run failures are grouped by a fingerprint into "error
groups," and this exposes everything you can do with them in the
dashboard:
- `GET /api/v1/errors` lists error groups, with
`filter[taskIdentifier]`, `filter[version]`, `filter[status]`
(`unresolved`/`resolved`/`ignored`), `filter[search]`, a time range, and
cursor pagination.
- `GET /api/v1/errors/{errorId}` retrieves a single group (summary,
lifecycle state, affected versions).
- `POST /api/v1/errors/{errorId}/{resolve,ignore,unresolve}` changes its
state.
- `GET /api/v1/runs?filter[error]={errorId}` lists the runs behind a
group.
Request and response schemas are exported from `@trigger.dev/core/v3` so
the SDK can reuse them, and all endpoints are documented in the API
reference (OpenAPI). `errorId` is the `error_<fingerprint>` friendly id.
## Attribution
State changes record who made them. A plain environment API key has no
user, so `resolvedBy`/`ignoredByUserId` stay null. When the caller uses
an environment JWT obtained by exchanging a personal access token or a
delegated user token at `POST /api/v1/projects/:ref/:env/jwt`, that
exchange now stamps an `act` delegation claim, and the write endpoints
read `act.sub` to attribute the change to the acting user. This is the
first endpoint to consume the `act` claim, so two small pieces of
plumbing ride along: the exchange stamps `act` for personal-access-token
subjects too (it was delegated-token-only), and the public-JWT
bearer-auth path surfaces `act.sub` to the handler.
Built on the delegated-token work in #3997.
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06969b254a |
feat(cli,webapp): mint short-lived delegated tokens that act as a user (#3997)
## Summary Adds a short-lived, delegated token (`tr_uat_...`) that authenticates against the API as a user without handing out a long-lived personal access token. You mint one from a PAT, optionally narrow it to a set of scopes, and give it a lifetime; the API then treats requests as that user, subject to their role. `trigger.dev mint-token` is the entry point (it uses your stored PAT): ```bash UAT=$(trigger.dev mint-token --ttl 3600 --cap read:runs) ``` The token works anywhere a PAT does for user-level endpoints, and can be exchanged for an environment JWT at `POST /api/v1/projects/:ref/:env/jwt` to reach environment-scoped data (the same exchange a PAT supports). ## How it works A user-actor token is a short-lived JWT verified by a new first-class `authenticateUserActor` method on the RBAC plugin. Self-hosters get a built-in fallback; role-aware enforcement comes from the plugin. Effective permissions are the intersection of the user's role and the token's optional scope cap, so a token is only ever narrower than the user, never broader. Minting is restricted to personal access tokens (a token can't mint another one, and an environment key can't mint one). Tokens default to a 1 hour lifetime (max 365 days). When exchanged for an environment JWT, the user is stamped on it for attribution and the scope cap is carried through. |
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5d6ea33166 |
refactor: share the public-token JWT scope decoder; make @trigger.dev/plugins internal (#3919)
## What `buildJwtAbility` — the decoder for public-token scope strings (`read:tags:…`, `read:runs:run_abc`, `admin`, …) — now lives in `@trigger.dev/plugins` as the single source of truth. `@trigger.dev/rbac` re-exports it, so the built-in fallback and any auth plugin interpret a token identically. Scope strings are split on only the first **two** colons (`action:type:id`), so a resource id that itself contains colons — e.g. a tag like `user:123` — is matched in full rather than truncated to its first segment. (The fallback already did this; this makes it the one shared implementation.) `@trigger.dev/plugins` is now **private (unpublished)** and gains a `@triggerdotdev/source` export condition, so consumers bundle it from source per-commit like `@trigger.dev/core` instead of resolving a published version — no cross-version coordination. ## Why Two hand-maintained copies of the scope grammar drift, and the difference silently changes what a token grants. One shared decoder removes that class of bug. ## Notes - No changeset: `@trigger.dev/plugins` is now private and `@trigger.dev/rbac` is internal — neither is published. - Unit coverage for the colon-id path lives in `internal-packages/rbac/src/ability.test.ts` (now exercising the shared function). |
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6bcd369ea1 |
feat(webapp,rbac): REQUIRE_PLUGINS=1 fail-fast for required plugin loads [TRI-9852] (#3734)
## Summary - `internal-packages/rbac/src/index.ts` — in `LazyController.load()`'s catch block, throw an Error when `process.env.REQUIRE_PLUGINS === "1"` instead of silently falling back. The throw is captured into the lazy controller's init promise, so it surfaces on the first method call. - `apps/webapp/app/routes/healthcheck.tsx` — `await rbac.isUsingPlugin()` after the DB ping. With `REQUIRE_PLUGINS=1` and a failed plugin load, the throw surfaces here and the healthcheck returns 500 → readiness probe fails → rollout is rolled back. Noop for self-hosters. - `.server-changes/require-plugins-fail-fast.md` — server-changes entry. - `internal-packages/rbac/src/require-plugins.test.ts` — 4 unit tests covering loader branching: unset → fallback, `=1` → throw, `forceFallback: true` wins, only exactly `"1"` enforces. - `internal-packages/testcontainers/src/webapp.ts` — adds `requirePlugins?: boolean` to `StartWebappOptions`. Implies `forceRbacFallback: false`. - `apps/webapp/test/healthcheck-require-plugins.e2e.test.ts` — e2e closes the loop: spawns a real webapp, hits `/healthcheck` via HTTP, asserts 500 with `REQUIRE_PLUGINS=1` and 200 without. ## Motivation Today the RBAC plugin loader catches any plugin-load failure (missing module, broken transitive dep, init throw) and silently returns the default fallback implementation. This is the correct behaviour for self-hosters who don't ship the plugin — but it's dangerous in deployments where the plugin is expected to load: an accidentally-missing or broken plugin would silently disable enforcement. `REQUIRE_PLUGINS=1` makes the loader fail loudly in those deployments. The variable name is intentionally plural and generic — future plugin contracts (audit logs, SSO) can read the same flag without renaming. Closes [TRI-9852](https://linear.app/triggerdotdev/issue/TRI-9852/require-plugins1-fail-fast-for-required-plugin-loads). ## Test plan - [x] `pnpm run test --filter @trigger.dev/rbac` — 38/38 tests pass, including the 4 new loader tests - [x] `pnpm run typecheck --filter webapp` — passes - [x] `pnpm run typecheck --filter @trigger.dev/rbac --filter @internal/testcontainers` — passes - [x] e2e test added (`healthcheck-require-plugins.e2e.test.ts`) — CI runs it via `e2e-webapp.yml`. Couldn't run locally (no Docker daemon up); CI has Docker provisioned. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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e4981d1b11 |
feat(webapp): consolidate auth path + add comprehensive auth tests (#3499)
## Summary
Consolidates the webapp's authentication and authorization into a small
set of route helpers, replacing the ad-hoc `requireUser` /
`requireUserId` / `authenticatedEnvironmentForAuthentication` calls
scattered across routes. Same security model, but the per-request flow
(authenticate → authorize → load) now lives in one place per route
family.
Introduces a plugin seam (`@trigger.dev/plugins`) that lets the cloud
build install a richer RBAC implementation without touching webapp code.
The OSS fallback keeps the pre-RBAC permissive behaviour intact, so
self-hosted deployments work unchanged.
Adds a comprehensive end-to-end auth test suite that didn't exist before
— 193 `it()` blocks (vitest reports ~199 after `it.each` expansion)
covering API key, PAT and JWT auth across the public API surface, plus
dashboard session auth for admin pages.
## Changes
### Plugin contract — `@trigger.dev/plugins`
`RoleBaseAccessController` interface authoritative for both OSS
(fallback) and cloud (enterprise plugin):
- `authenticateBearer(request, { allowJWT? })` — API-key / public-JWT
auth, returns env + ability
- `authenticateSession(request, { userId, organizationId?, projectId?
})` — dashboard auth, caller resolves `userId` from the session cookie
and passes it in (no `helpers.getSessionUserId` callback — decouples the
plugin host from session-cookie code)
- `authenticatePat(request, { organizationId?, projectId? })` — PAT
auth, returns identity + `lastAccessedAt` so the host can throttle the
per-request update
- `authenticateAuthorize*` variants for the auth-and-check-in-one-call
cases
- `isUsingPlugin(): Promise<boolean>` — capability flag for UI /
branching where plugin-present-ness matters; replaces the
sentinel-string coupling that had `personalAccessToken.server` matching
`"RBAC plugin not installed"` literally
### Dashboard auth (started, partial rollout)
Admin and settings pages migrated to a unified `dashboardLoader` /
`dashboardAction` helper that authenticates the session, runs an
authorization check, and exposes the result to the route. Other
dashboard routes still on the old pattern; remaining migration tracked
in TRI-8730.
Migrated routes:
- `admin.*` (14 admin / back-office / feature-flags / LLM-models /
notifications / orgs / concurrency pages)
- `_app.orgs.$organizationSlug.settings.team`
- `_app.orgs.$organizationSlug.settings.roles`
### API / realtime / engine auth (complete for the migrated families)
71 routes migrated to a unified `apiBuilder` that centralizes Bearer /
PAT / Public-JWT authentication and applies the per-route authorization
check before the handler runs. Includes:
- `api.v1.*` and `api.v2.*` and `api.v3.*` — tasks, runs, batches,
queues, prompts, deployments, query, sessions, waitpoints, packets,
workers, idempotency keys
- `realtime.v1.*` — runs, batches, sessions, streams
- `engine.v1.*` — dev / worker-action protocols
29 routes still on the legacy `authenticateApiRequest*` helpers —
tracked as a post-deploy follow-up in TRI-9228.
Multi-resource auth direction is now explicit at the call site via
`anyResource(...)` (OR) and `everyResource(...)` (AND). Bare arrays no
longer typecheck — fixes a class of bug where a JWT scoped to one
resource could implicitly access others under OR semantics.
PAT auth path consolidated: was three DB queries per request (legacy
`authenticateApiRequestWithPersonalAccessToken` findFirst +
`rbac.authenticatePat` join + `lastAccessedAt` update). Now one query in
the steady state — plugin returns `lastAccessedAt`, host smart-skips the
update via JS-side throttle when fresh.
Side effect: action aliases preserved historic JWT scope semantics where
the new model is stricter (e.g. a `write:tasks` JWT now also satisfies
`trigger` / `batchTrigger` / `update` actions on the same resource —
matched at the auth boundary, not in the route handler).
### Backwards-compat fixes
The strict-match model regressed several real-world JWT shapes. Each
preserved via explicit `anyResource(...)` entries in the route's authz
block:
- **Batch retrieve routes** (`api.v1.batches.$batchId`, `api.v2.*`,
`realtime.v1.batches.*`) accept `read:runs` JWTs again (pre-RBAC
literal-match superScope behaviour)
- **Runs list routes** (`api.v1.runs`, `realtime.v1.runs`) accept
type-level `read:tasks` / `read:tags` on unfiltered queries (matched the
legacy `Object.keys` iteration semantic)
- **PAT/OAT auth shape** normalized through `toAuthenticated` so all
auth methods return the same slim `AuthenticatedEnvironment` (was:
API-key returned the slim shape but PAT/OAT returned raw Prisma
`Decimal` / no `orgMember`)
- **Scope `:` preservation** in resource ids — `read:tags:env:staging`
now correctly identifies the tag id as `env:staging`, not `env`
### Slim `AuthenticatedEnvironment`
Extracted to `@trigger.dev/core/v3/auth/environment` — a structural
shape independent of `@trigger.dev/database`. The plugin contract
returns this; webapp consumers import from there; the cloud plugin
(Drizzle) returns the same shape without Prisma's `Decimal` class
leaking into the public surface. Lets internal-packages (run-engine,
etc.) refer to `AuthenticatedEnvironment` without pulling Prisma in.
### Auth test suite (new — `*.e2e.full.test.ts`)
193 e2e tests run against a real spawned webapp + Postgres (no mocks).
Coverage matrix:
- **API key auth** — read / write / trigger / batchTrigger / deploy
actions across runs, batches, deployments, prompts, queues, query,
sessions, input-streams, waitpoints, tasks, idempotency keys; multi-key
resources (a run carries batch / tag / task identifiers — auth must
accept any matching scope)
- **Personal Access Token auth** — comprehensive matrix: scope match,
scope mismatch, missing scope, expired token, malformed token
- **Public JWT auth** — sub-vs-URL environment resolution, expired JWTs,
signature verification, scope checking, otu (one-time-use) token
semantics, branch-environment signing-key fallback
- **Dashboard session auth** — admin-only pages reject non-admins;
per-action gating
- **Cross-cutting edge cases** — revoked API key grace window, JWT
cross-environment isolation, MissingResource branch behaviour
### Hygiene cleanups
- Deleted dead `app/services/authorization.server.ts` (legacy
`checkAuthorization` + types — no live consumers post-migration) and its
orphaned test
- Dropped the never-populated `scopes` field from
`ApiAuthenticationResultSuccess`
- `scheduleEmail` moved out of `email.server.ts` into its own module —
breaks a `commonWorker → marqs/V1` import chain that was poisoning the
auth test graph
- OSS Roles page shows a deployment-aware empty state ("Roles aren't
available in this self-hosted deployment" vs the plan-upsell copy) via
`rbac.isUsingPlugin()`
- Team action handler: explicit per-intent ability gates
(`manage:billing` for purchase-seats, `manage:members` for set-role +
remove-member with self-leave carve-out)
### Cross-repo coordination
All public-package contract changes paired in `triggerdotdev/cloud#763`
(rbac-packages branch) — the enterprise plugin implements the same
`RoleBaseAccessController` interface against Drizzle.
## Test plan
- [x] `pnpm run typecheck --filter webapp` clean
- [x] `pnpm --filter webapp exec vitest run --config
vitest.e2e.full.config.ts` — 193/193 pass (requires Docker for
testcontainers)
- [x] Spot-check an authed API endpoint with a valid + invalid API key
against a local stack
- [x] Spot-check the migrated admin pages render and gate non-admins
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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