main
361 Commits
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1eda438a41 |
feat(webapp): put the admin dashboard behind an env var flag (#4774)
Adds an `ADMIN_DASHBOARD_ENABLED` env var (default: enabled) that turns the admin dashboard and user impersonation off for an entire instance. When disabled: - every admin dashboard page redirects away, and the admin navigation isn't rendered - existing impersonation cookies are ignored, and any lingering session is actively terminated with an audit record - every flow that could start an impersonation responds 404, and no impersonation tokens are minted Stopping an impersonation always works regardless of the flag, so nothing gets stuck. Machine-to-machine admin API endpoints are not affected. The variable is documented for self-hosters; instances that don't set it are unaffected. |
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4c5237ca4a |
feat(webapp): themes refinement, new black & white themes, 2 accessibility toggles (#4547)
## What this does Rounds out the theme work behind the existing `hasThemeSwitcher` flag. **Two new themes.** Black and White sit alongside Dark and Light. They inherit their neighbour's whole token set and only pin their surfaces flat, so sections are separated by grid lines rather than layered fills. **`System` is now configurable at both ends.** You choose which theme the OS light setting lands on (Light or White) and which the dark setting lands on (Dark or Black). **Two accessibility toggles.** - *Stronger colors* — swaps tinted status chips for solid fills, drops decorative icon accents to monochrome, and darkens chart series that didn't clear 3:1 on a white plot. - *Underline links* — underlines body-text links, so an underline always means the preference is on rather than being a hover style. **Contrast slider.** Stores a 0–100 position within the active theme's own range rather than a shared scale, so 35% stays 35% when you switch themes. Each theme maps it in CSS, which keeps `system` working before hydration. **Appearance in the account popover.** A submenu listing the themes with a check against the current one, plus a link through to the full set on your profile. Picking one applies immediately rather than waiting for the write to round-trip. **Profile page.** Each row now saves on its own — no submit button. Name and email show their value inline with an edit button; the email row is read-only when an identity provider owns the address. **A `/storybook/colors` audit page.** Renders every colour-carrying pattern in the app once per theme plus once under Stronger colors, and measures contrast ratios off the live DOM rather than a hard-coded table, so it can't go stale. --- ## Demo https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d56cd4d8-719f-4ec5-a990-e04cdb98def1 --- ## Compatibility The stored preference shape is unchanged (`version: "1"`), and the four new fields are all optional. The retired `classic` theme falls back to Dark, whose palette at contrast 0 is what Classic shipped. One deliberate change worth knowing: the default contrast moves from 50 to 0, so existing users who never touched the slider will see slightly less contrast than before. That's what makes 0 mean "the base palette". --- ## Testing Switched between every theme from both the account popover and the profile page, in the expanded and collapsed rail, checking `data-theme` follows and survives a reload. Dragged the contrast slider in each theme and confirmed the percentage label tracks the handle and resnaps if a save fails. Checked both accessibility toggles across the `/storybook/colors` page, which is also where the contrast ratios were read from. Confirmed the Appearance entry stays hidden for a non-admin while the flag is off. <!-- conductor-workspace-link --> --- [Open workspace in Conductor](https://app.conductor.build/workspace/fee50611-7623-4422-bada-ed1cba317ed1) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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910011d44e |
feat(vercel): automatic version skew protection at connect + atomic deployments deprecation (#4741)
Connecting a Vercel project now writes TRIGGER_AUTOMATIC_SKEW_VERSION_PROTECTION=1 (plain, create-if-absent only - an existing value, including "0", is never touched; presence is target-containment aware, branch-scoped records do not count, a truncated env listing skips the write). The onboarding wizard no longer offers automatic atomic deployments (default off); the settings row is labelled Deprecated and enabling it requires confirming a dialog that points to task version skew protection and the docs (TRI-13001). |
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06f99aeb31 | fix: security release 2026-08-12 (#4735) | ||
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b33197691b | chore: enforce no unused deps or code in ci (#4654) | ||
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99f0787148 | feat(cli,webapp): default new projects to node-24 (#4649) | ||
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c526528d8f |
feat(webapp,database): bound Prisma list filter arity (#4480)
⚒️ Publish Worker (v4) / build (supervisor) (push) Has been cancelled
## Summary Prisma expands `in` / `notIn` into one bind parameter per element, so every distinct list length is a separate prepared statement. Where the length tracks data volume (a batch size, a run-graph fan-out, a prior query's id set) one call site can mint hundreds of them. Each is used about once, but inserting it evicts an entry that was being reused, so the cost lands on unrelated queries sharing the pooler's statement cache. An unbounded list also risks the 65535 bind-parameter ceiling. `boundedIn()` pads a filter list to the next power of two by repeating its last element. `IN` and `NOT IN` ignore duplicates, so results are unchanged, and a call site drops from one statement per length to at most `log2(cap)`. Applied to all existing sites. ## Enforcement Two oxlint rules require the helper: a list filter must be an inline array literal or a `boundedIn()` call. - The first covers filters reached through `where` / `having` / `cursor`, and deliberately never descends into `data`, `create`, `update`, `set` or `equals`. A key named `in` in those positions is user data, not a predicate, and rewriting it would corrupt what gets stored or compared. - The second covers bare filter objects passed to where-building helpers, which the first cannot see. It found five sites in the run-graph batch loaders that were otherwise invisible. Both rules follow filters through the shapes they are actually written in: conditional expressions, logical-and objects, spread-conditional properties, computed keys, and call arguments. An array literal only counts as fixed-arity when nothing spreads into it, since `[...new Set(ids)]` has a runtime length. Twelve sites were hidden behind those shapes until the rules handled them. Scoped to `in` and `notIn`. The scalar-list filters `hasSome` and `hasEvery` compile to `&& $1` and `@> $1`, passing the whole array as a single bind parameter, so their arity never reaches the statement text and there is nothing to bound. Both rules are `error`, so new call sites fail CI. That ratchet has already caught four sites added by other PRs while this one was in review. ## Notes `boundedIn` pads by repeating rather than with null: `x NOT IN (a, b, NULL)` is never true, so null-padding a `notIn` filter would silently return no rows. Lists above 32768 are returned unchanged so padding can never push a query past the parameter limit. Route modules reach the helper through `~/db.server` rather than importing the database barrel directly, since a value import of that barrel into a module that also exports a React component is only safe while dead-code elimination prunes it. Measured on a local rig: 300 distinct list lengths produce 300 prepared statements unpadded, 10 padded. Verified end-to-end against a local stack with the full task-suite sweep, which surfaced no regressions. |
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0a44b88b39 | fix: security release 2026-07-21 (#4528) | ||
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088f68b373 |
feat(webapp): share rate limit bucket across additional API keys per environment (#4508)
## What
Rate-limit the API by **environment** rather than per API key.
Previously the limiter keyed its bucket on the hash of the full
`Authorization` header — one bucket per key. With additional environment
API keys (`tr_*_sk_*`), an environment can mint many keys and each got
its own full bucket, so more keys = higher effective rate limit. This
collapses all of an environment's keys onto a single shared
per-environment bucket, so the ceiling is exactly the configured limit
regardless of key mix.
## How
- `authorizationRateLimitMiddleware` now lets the override return `{
config?, identifier? }`. `identifier`, when present, is the rate limit
bucket key; otherwise it falls back to the hashed `Authorization` header
(unchanged legacy behavior, still used by `engineRateLimiter` and any
unauthenticated fallthrough).
- `apiRateLimiter`'s override resolves the environment id and uses it as
the identifier:
- **Additional keys** (`isAdditionalApiKey`) resolve via a new
`resolveAdditionalApiKeyRateLimitScope()` — a **scope-agnostic** keyHash
→ (environmentId, org limiter config) lookup. It is deliberately
permissive (restricted keys resolve too) because it's used **only for
bucketing, never as an auth decision** — request auth still goes through
the RBAC bearer controller, which enforces scopes. Revoked/expired keys
are excluded so they can't hold a bucket warm.
- **Root/legacy keys** reuse the environment already resolved by
`authenticateAuthorizationHeader` and key on `environment.id` too.
- The identifier is always the stable environment id, never the secret
key (which can rotate and would split the bucket).
- The whole override result is cached per key by the existing SWR cache,
so **no extra per-request lookup and no separate Redis mapping** is
added.
## Behavior notes
- Root + additional keys of the same environment now share one bucket
(ceiling = configured limit, not a multiple of it). Restricted
additional keys are included — they were the biggest gap, since they
authenticate via the RBAC controller and previously fell back to per-key
buckets.
- **Public JWTs** keep their existing fixed-window, per-token bucketing.
- One-time bucket reset on deploy (bucket keys change); harmless.
## Tests
- New: two tokens resolving to the same identifier share one bucket.
- New: with no identifier, bucketing stays per-key (legacy behavior
preserved).
- Updated existing override tests to the new `{ config }` return shape.
Base: `feat/multi-keys-surface`. Closes TRI-12888.
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9409ddf9bc |
feat(webapp): add multiple environment API key management (#4390)
## Summary Projects can create, inspect, expire, and revoke multiple API keys for each environment. Plaintext values are shown only at creation; stored credentials are hashed and the API keys page displays only an obfuscated suffix afterward. Self-hosted installations support full-access additional keys by default. Authorization extensions can provide additional access presets and optional task selection. Additional keys can also mint scoped public access tokens through the Trigger.dev API without receiving the environment signing key. ## Feature notes - Only admin+ can create API keys (Developer can make in Development branch). - JWT self-signing will be a server call when used with new `_ak_` keys. - JWTs with long expiry can keep working even with api key deleted (gets priveleges from api key, signed with root key) - Unfiltered session listings intentionally preserve the existing broad task-read behavior. Filtered listings enforce task-level scopes for every requested task. - Buffered runs without a task identifier are not safely authorizable, so cancel/replay requests fail closed rather than resolving an unscoped run. - Batch and waitpoint endpoints intentionally return server-minted, narrowly scoped public tokens to all callers. These tokens have bounded lifetimes and may remain valid until expiry after API-key revocation. ## Deployment notes Deploy the management UI and public-token endpoint with new key creation disabled. Enable creation for selected organizations after the authentication path and released SDK have been verified, then expand availability gradually. Revoking an API key prevents new bearer requests and new token minting. Public tokens already minted by that key remain valid until their own expiration because they are signed by the environment signing key. ## TODO - [x] Add "Created by" to the key table - [x] Document that streamed batch ingestion is non-atomic and may partially accept items before a validation or authorization error. ## Follow-ups - [x] Add an organization-level feature flag for the API key management UI and creation action. - [x] Document rollout ordering: enable additional-key lookup before enabling issuance. - [x] Add a system-wide gate that can stop new key issuance without disabling authentication for existing keys. - [x] Replace the generic SDK compatibility warning with the first published compatible version. Old SDK will mint an unusable token if given an `_ak_` key. - [x] Add public documentation covering creation, storage, expiration, revocation, SDK compatibility, and public-token lifetime behavior. - [x] Add observability for key creation, revocation, policy preparation failures, and public-token mint failures. - [ ] Exercise create, copy-once display, authenticate, mint, expire, and revoke flows end to end before broad enablement. |
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763b5dc582 |
feat(webapp): enforce scopes for environment API keys (#4389)
## Summary Environment API keys backed by the additional-key table can authenticate API requests using their stored effective scopes. Revoked and expired keys are rejected, branch environments retain their existing routing behavior, and last-used timestamps are updated on a throttled best-effort basis. ## Design API route builders receive the resolved ability and reject restricted keys on routes without an authorization declaration. Existing deployment, environment variable, queue, run, task, batch, session, and waitpoint routes declare the resources they access. Trigger and batch responses return server-signed public access tokens, so additional keys never need access to the environment signing secret. Root-key rotation also keeps public tokens valid for the existing grace window. ## Feature notes - Root environment keys remain unrestricted for backward compatibility. Additional keys enforce their persisted scopes and fail closed on routes without an authorization declaration. - Machine-key requests never exchange one credential for another. Additional keys cannot retrieve the root key, and rotated root keys are not upgraded during their grace window. - Public JWT validation remains host-owned, while installed RBAC plugins continue to supply root-key abilities. - Unfiltered session and run listings preserve existing broad task-read behavior. Filtered requests enforce the supplied task identifiers. - Related-run summaries remain embedded in run retrieval for API compatibility. Retrieving or mutating a related run independently still requires permission for that run. - Queue management authorizes at collection scope, matching the queue permissions currently issued. - Batch responses deliberately include server-signed public access tokens for all clients. Selected-task credentials continue using their original credential for per-item authorization. - Two-phase batches authorize declared task identifiers before creation and authorize every streamed item. Streaming paths that cannot declare the complete task set remain fail closed. - Authentication telemetry records successful credential resolution separately from subsequent resource-authorization failures. - API keys are high-entropy random tokens. SHA-256 is intentionally used for deterministic indexed lookup, not password hashing. ## Deployment notes The schema migration must be present before this code is deployed. Because bearer resolution runs on every authenticated request, deploy the resolver with additional-key lookup disabled, verify root-key and public-token parity, then enable lookup before any additional keys can be issued. The multi-task authorization tightening changes the result for narrowly scoped tokens that request tasks outside their grants. Observe would-deny results before enforcing that check. Request-idempotency keys are also newly isolated by environment and task, so a retry crossing the deployment boundary may execute once more before old cache entries expire. ## Follow-ups - [x] Add a system-wide kill switch for additional-key lookup, defaulted off for the initial deployment. - [x] Add authentication observability by credential kind, result, latency, and lookup path without recording credential values. - [ ] ~Add would-deny observability and an independent enforcement switch for multi-task authorization.~ - [ ] ~Add an independent switch for server-issued batch tokens while root-key parity is verified.~ - [ ] Confirm every API route reachable by a restricted key has an explicit authorization declaration or intentionally fails closed. - [x] Verify root-key rotation, revoked-key grace, and public-token validation through each bearer resolver path. |
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debfa2b733 | feat(webapp): impersonation consent page and a view-as-user toggle (#4421) | ||
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4efe0a07c4 |
fix(webapp): create dev environments for SSO and Directory Sync members (#4426)
Members added by SSO just-in-time provisioning or Directory Sync never got their per-member DEVELOPMENT environments - only invite acceptance and project creation created them. `trigger dev` returned "Environment not found" for those members and the dashboard had no dev view. ensureOrgMember now queues provisioning for every membership it settles, so both paths are covered and members missing environments are repaired on their next sync. Provisioning runs as a common-worker job to keep sign-in and directory webhooks off the per-project write loop. A failed enqueue surfaces for Directory Sync, whose worker retries the idempotent effect, and is swallowed for sign-in, where the next login enqueues again. Environment creation now tolerates a concurrent creator so the project-creation loop and the job cannot collide on the unique index. Also fixes environment resolution ignoring dev-environment ownership: a member without their own dev environment could be handed a colleague's and have it persisted as their dashboard preference. |
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4eb9292cbe |
feat(webapp,run-engine): queue metrics and health dashboard (#4131)
## Summary
Three related changes, each independently gated:
**Queue metrics and health.** Per-queue depth, throughput (enqueued,
started, completed), concurrency, whether a queue is throttled, and
scheduling delay (how long a run waits between becoming eligible and
actually starting), plus a per concurrency-key breakdown for keyed
queues. Collected from inside the run queue itself, stored in
ClickHouse, and surfaced on the Queues list, a new per-queue detail
page, the task pages, and the run inspector. The question it answers is
"does this queue have enough concurrency to keep up, and if not, which
key or which limit is the constraint".
**Percent-based queue concurrency limits.** A queue's concurrency
override can now be expressed as a percentage of the environment limit,
stored as the source of truth and re-materialized whenever the
environment limit changes. Absolute overrides above the environment
limit are now **rejected with a 400** instead of being silently capped,
which is a behavior change on `POST
/api/v1/queues/:queue/concurrency/override`.
**The `health` report.** A server-computed verdict on whether work is
flowing, whether the runs that do start are healthy, and whether
telemetry is fresh, rendered as text with sparklines. Available as `GET
/api/v1/reports/:key`, `trigger report`, and the `get_report` MCP tool
(plus a `report` MCP prompt, which shows up as a slash command in hosts
that support prompts).
With the flags off, the Queues page renders the pre-metrics component
verbatim, nothing is emitted, and nothing is written to ClickHouse.
## Configuration
Two independent gates, on purpose. Emission is global so data accrues
for everyone before anyone can look at it; the view is per organization
so it can be turned on for one org at a time without a deploy.
**Runtime flags (no restart)**
| Flag | Store | Gates |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `queue_metrics:enabled` | run-queue Redis key (`"1"`/`"0"`, off by
default) | All emission, gauges and counters. Cached in-process for 10s
with stale-while-revalidate, warmed eagerly at boot so the first op
after a deploy is not dropped. |
| `queue_metrics:gauge_sample_rate` | run-queue Redis key, `0..1` |
Fraction of queue ops that emit a gauge. Counters are never sampled, so
throughput stays exact at any rate. |
| `queueMetricsUiEnabled` | feature-flag catalog: global `FeatureFlag`
row, per-org `Organization.featureFlags` override wins | Whether an org
sees the metrics view at all: the Queues list variant, the queue detail
route, the built-in Queues dashboard, the concurrency-keys endpoint, and
the metrics blocks on task pages and the run inspector. Off by default;
a gated org gets a 404 on the detail route rather than an empty page. |
Both Redis keys are readable and writable from `/admin/queue-metrics`
(super-admin UI, with a live per-shard stream-health table) and
`GET`/`POST /admin/api/v1/queue-metrics` (admin PAT). The admin surface
uses its own Redis client, so it works on any instance regardless of
whether that instance runs the emitter or the consumer.
**Environment variables (boot time)**
| Variable | Default | Notes |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `QUEUE_METRICS_EMIT_ENABLED` | `0` | Constructs the emitter and
injects it into the run engine. Without it the run queue has no emitter
at all. |
| `QUEUE_METRICS_CONSUMER_ENABLED` | `0` | Boots the stream consumer on
this instance. Independent of emission, so consumers can be sized
separately from the API. |
| `QUEUE_METRICS_STREAM_SHARD_COUNT` | `4` | Stream shards, hashed per
queue. |
| `QUEUE_METRICS_CONSUMER_BATCH_SIZE` | `1000` | Poll batch equals
insert batch, so an ack can never outrun a write. |
| `QUEUE_METRICS_REDIS_{HOST,PORT,USERNAME,PASSWORD,TLS_DISABLED}` |
falls back to the run-queue Redis | Set `HOST` to move the metrics
stream onto a dedicated instance so a metrics backlog cannot compete
with the run queue for memory. Self-hosters can leave it unset and get a
single-Redis deployment. |
| `QUEUE_METRICS_COUNTER_STREAM_MAXLEN` | `2000000` shared, `8000000`
dedicated | Bound on how much a stalled consumer can hold. The default
is deliberately lower when the stream shares the queue-critical Redis. |
| `QUEUE_METRICS_COUNTER_ODOMETER_TTL_SECONDS` | `604800` | TTL on the
per-queue cumulative counter key, refreshed on every write, so only
queues idle for the whole window are purged. |
| `QUEUE_METRICS_MAX_QUEUE_NAMES_PER_ENV` | `1000` | Distinct queue
names tracked per environment; overflow collapses into `__overflow__`. |
| `QUEUE_METRICS_MAX_CONCURRENCY_KEYS_PER_QUEUE` | `10000` | Same idea
one level down, per queue. |
| `QUEUE_METRICS_GAUGE_SAMPLE_RATE` | `1` | Default for the live
sample-rate key above. |
| `QUEUE_METRICS_QUERY_TABLES_VISIBLE` | `0` | Lists the queue-metrics
tables in the Query page, its schema docs, the schema API and the AI
query context. Off keeps them unlisted while the feature is dark; a
query naming them still runs either way. |
| `QUEUE_METRICS_CLICKHOUSE_URL` | falls back to the shared wiring |
Runs queue metrics on their own ClickHouse service: the consumer's
inserts and every queue-metrics read go through it, so a metrics-heavy
chart refresh never competes with runs-list or trace reads. Unset
reproduces the previous split exactly (inserts on `CLICKHOUSE_URL`,
reads on the query pool). |
| `QUEUE_METRICS_CLICKHOUSE_READER_URL` | the write URL | Reader split,
so the consumer's inserts can never land on a read endpoint. |
|
`QUEUE_METRICS_CLICKHOUSE_{KEEP_ALIVE_ENABLED,KEEP_ALIVE_IDLE_SOCKET_TTL_MS,MAX_OPEN_CONNECTIONS,LOG_LEVEL,COMPRESSION_REQUEST}`
| `1`, unset, `10`, `info`, `1` | Pool tuning, matching the other
per-workload ClickHouse clients. |
Migrations to apply: ClickHouse `036_create_queue_metrics_v1.sql`, and a
Postgres migration adding the nullable
`TaskQueue.concurrencyLimitOverridePercent`. Both are additive.
## How collection works
Queue operations produce two kinds of signal, and they have opposite
failure modes, so they are handled differently.
**Gauges** (queued, running, queue limit, env queued, env running, env
limit, throttled, plus keys-with-backlog and worst-key wait on keyed
queues) are read *inside* the same Redis script that performs the
enqueue or dequeue, so the reading is atomic with the operation it
describes rather than a racy follow-up read. The script returns them on
its reply and the app forwards them to the stream. Gauges are sampled
and drop-tolerant: they are aggregated with `max`, so a lost reading
costs resolution, never correctness.
**Counters** (enqueued, started, completed, plus nack and dead-lettered)
are cumulative odometers. Each event increments a per-queue key on the
metrics Redis and emits the absolute total, and ClickHouse takes the
difference across buckets at read time. This is the important property
of the design: a summed-delta counter undercounts permanently on any
lost event, while a cumulative one self-heals, because the next
surviving reading restates the whole total. Only bucket granularity can
be lost, never the total. A queue returning after its odometer TTL
expired restarts at 1 and reset detection handles it, which is safe
precisely because expiry only spans a window with no activity.
Both land on one sharded Redis stream. A consumer reads it with a
consumer group, reclaims stale pending entries on a 15s interval rather
than on every poll, maps one entry to one or two ClickHouse rows
(whole-queue and, for keyed queues, per-key), and acks only after the
insert lands. Each batch carries a dedup token derived from its
stream-entry ids, and the target tables set
`non_replicated_deduplication_window`, so a retried batch cannot
double-count either the raw rows or the aggregates that hang off them.
Consumer and emitter both emit OTel metrics
(`queue_metrics.emitter.emitted`,
`queue_metrics.consumer.{entries,rows_inserted,insert_errors,insert_duration,stream_depth,group_lag,pending,lag_unknown}`);
stream depth and group lag are the two worth alerting on, and
`lag_unknown` exists because Redis can report a null lag after a trim,
which must not be read as zero.
## Storage and read path
`queue_metrics_raw_v1` is a short landing table with a 6 hour TTL. Four
aggregate tiers are materialized straight from raw, never cascaded off
each other, each with a 30 day TTL:
- `queue_metrics_v1`, 10 second buckets per queue, the default read path
- `queue_metrics_5m_v1`, 5 minute buckets per queue, for wide ranges and
cross-queue ranking
- `env_metrics_v1`, 10 second buckets per environment, queue-independent
so it stays cheap at any range
- `queue_metrics_ck_v1`, 10 second buckets per concurrency key
Every tier is an MV from raw because the counter states do not survive a
cascade: their merge is order sensitive, so a `-MergeState` chain off
the 10s table inflates the result, and the same property means an
aggregate state may only be merged inside one queue. That constraint is
now enforced by the query engine rather than by reviewer discipline: a
column can declare a `mergeGroupKey`, and any query that references it
without grouping by, or pinning to a single value of, every named key
fails to compile with an actionable message.
On the read side, TRQL gains three tables (`queue_metrics`,
`env_metrics`, and a `queue_metrics_by_key` that is hidden from the
editor, schema docs and schema API but still queryable, so per-key rows
can never silently merge into a plain per-queue query), plus
`deltaSumTimestampMerge` and `quantilesTDigestMerge`. Two schema-level
optimizations ride along: a table can declare coarser rollups, so a
query whose bucket interval is 5 minutes or wider is routed to the 5m
table with no change to the query itself, and it can opt into the
ClickHouse query cache with time bounds floored to a fixed grid, so the
auto-refreshing dashboards actually share cache entries instead of
missing on every tick. Both are caller-side substitutions, so the
printer stays unaware of physical layout.
All of this can also live on its own ClickHouse service. A table
declares the pool its reads run on, the three queue-metrics tables name
the dedicated one, and the ingestion consumer writes through the same
client, so both directions move together with one env var and nothing
else routes differently.
The other engine change is opt-in gap filling: charts can request rows
for empty buckets, where counters zero-fill and gauges carry forward.
Grouped gauge series are densified per group and carried inside a
partition, so a quiet queue's line holds its last value without bleeding
another queue's value into it.
## Queue concurrency limits
`concurrencyLimitOverridePercent` on `TaskQueue` is the source of truth
when an override is set as a percentage; the absolute `concurrencyLimit`
is materialized from it (floored, clamped to at least 1 so a percentage
can never act as a pause, and never above the environment limit). Every
path that changes an environment limit now recalculates the
environment's percent-based overrides afterwards, outside the
transaction, and pushes changed limits to the engine. The push is
attempted even when the stored value did not change, so a previously
failed sync self-heals rather than leaving the database and the engine
diverged; paused queues are skipped so a recalculation cannot
effectively unpause one.
The API accepts exactly one of `concurrencyLimit` or `percent`, and the
reject-instead-of-clamp change above means a request asking for more
than the environment allows now fails loudly. The percent bound (greater
than 0, at most 100) is defined once and shared by the zod schema, the
dashboard mutation handler and the service, so the three cannot drift.
The concurrency-keys table on a queue is now paginated against the
ClickHouse per-key tier, ranked by peak backlog with the total on every
row from a single scan, and only the keys on the current page are
enriched with live counts from Redis. That replaces a hard top-50 cap
with something whose cost is a function of page size rather than key
cardinality.
## The health report
`GET /api/v1/reports/:key?period=&format=markdown|ansi|json`. The
verdict is computed on the server and is deterministic, not
model-generated. Three independent analyzers run over one input
snapshot: flow (is work moving, and if not, is the cause a limit,
throttling, one bad queue, or dead-lettering), execution (are the runs
that start succeeding, and at what latency), and liveness (how fresh is
the telemetry). When telemetry is genuinely stale, the first two are
forced to unknown and every actionable field is stripped, so no surface
ever advises action off stale data.
Authorization is per query table rather than a blanket query grant: a
JWT must be scoped to every table the report reads (`runs`,
`env_metrics`, `queue_metrics`), so a narrowly scoped token cannot pull
a report that reads more than it was granted. `period` is validated as a
shorthand with a 90 day ceiling at the edge. The report catalog is a
registry of `{ load, interpret }` entries, so the next report is a new
entry and no change to the route, the view model, the renderers, the CLI
or the MCP tool.
`trigger mcp` no longer launches the install wizard when stdout is a
TTY, which fixed a real failure: hosts spawn the server over a PTY, so
the wizard would open and the client would time out waiting for a server
that never started. The wizard now needs `trigger mcp --install`.
## The part that is live regardless of every flag
The enqueue and dequeue scripts now return a 2-tuple so a gauge reading
can ride back on the reply. Every return site in the eight affected
scripts is wrapped, and a `nil` original is converted to `false` on the
way out, because a raw `nil` in the first slot would make Lua truncate
the multi-bulk reply and silently drop the gauge on the throttled and
empty-queue paths. The reply shape and the destructuring on the app side
are exercised on every queue operation whether or not metrics are
enabled, so that is the part of `run-engine` worth the closest review.
One behavior fix in the same area: the scheduling-delay anchor is set
only on a run's first entry into the queue. Anchoring it to trigger time
on re-enqueues made waitpoint and checkpoint resumes report the entire
wait as scheduling delay. Queue ordering is untouched, so a re-enqueued
run keeps its position, and nacks deliberately keep the original anchor
because a rolled-back dequeue is the same continuous wait.
A pending-version promotion still anchors to trigger time, on purpose:
that promotion is the run's first real entry into the queue, since the
trigger deliberately held it back waiting for a worker version, and the
TTL is armed at the same point for the same reason. The consequence is
worth naming, because it is a judgement call: a run that waits on a
deployment reports that wait as scheduling delay on its queue, which is
time unrelated to queue capacity.
## Verification
Unit and integration suites across the new package, the run queue, the
mapping layer, the query engine and ClickHouse (including a test that
applies migration 036 through the same splitter CI uses, and a
regression test that inserts the same batch three times to prove the
aggregates do not inflate). Beyond that, the whole path was driven end
to end against a live stack with real runs: emitter to Redis stream to
consumer to ClickHouse to the dashboards, for both the local dev path
and the deployed path where a supervisor drives the dequeue, with
assertions on exact counter reconstruction per queue and per concurrency
key, throttling, environment saturation, scheduling delay, and a
deliberate mid-stream reading drop to confirm the cumulative counters
still reconstruct the correct total. The gated-off state was checked on
every touched surface.
The dedicated ClickHouse service was verified against a second,
separately-schema'd instance: with it configured, the driven counters
reconstruct exactly on the dedicated instance, the shared instance gains
no rows for that window, a read through the query API returns the value
that exists only on the dedicated instance, and a `runs` query still
succeeds (it would fail outright if it were mis-routed to a service
without that table). With the variable unset, the full suite passes
unchanged.
---------
Co-authored-by: Katia Bulatova <katia@trigger.dev>
Co-authored-by: Katia Bulatova <katherine.bulatova@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: James Ritchie <james@trigger.dev>
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639eaf6e82 |
fix(webapp): don't apply an invite's role to an existing org member (#4409)
<!-- ccr-slack-attribution --> _Requested via [Slack thread](https://triggerdotdev.slack.com/archives/C097ZHVKZFA/p1785249693523749)_ ## Summary Accepting an old invitation could change the role of someone who was already in the organization. A long-pending invite can carry a lower role than the member has since been promoted to, so accepting it was a silent demotion. When the accepting user was the organization's only Owner, the role layer refused that demotion, and the refusal (an expected, protective outcome) was logged as an error. An invitation now only sets a role on a membership the accept actually created, and people who are already in an organization are skipped when invitations are sent. ## How `acceptInvite` already skipped the `OrgMember` create when it found an existing membership, but the `rbac.setUserRole` call below it was gated only on `invite.rbacRoleId`. It now also tracks whether this accept created the membership. A create that loses the unique-constraint race counts as pre-existing, since whichever flow won it owns that membership's role. Skipping existing members outright would regress one case: a member with no RBAC role at all would never receive the invitation's role. `ensureOrgMember` handles that with `healMissingRoleAssignment`, which fills in a null role but never overwrites a real one, so `assignInviteRbacRole` takes the same gate. An established role is never touched; an absent one is filled in. `assignInviteRbacRole` branches on the result's machine-readable `code` instead of logging every refusal at `error`. `last_owner` goes to `logger.info`, matching the two directory-sync role paths; everything else, including a refusal that carries no code, goes to `logger.warn`. The helper is best-effort and never throws, so no outcome it produces warrants `error`. No string matching on the error text is involved. `inviteMembers` resolves the organization's members by email and skips those addresses before creating invites. The invite table's `@@unique([organizationId, email])` only dedupes *pending invites*, so it could never catch this. ## Invite surfaces Skipping addresses means a batch can now come back empty, and neither caller handled that: - The dashboard action built its redirect from `invites[0].organization`, so a batch where every address was skipped threw a `TypeError` that reached the admin as a raw error string. It also reported the submitted count rather than the created one. It now names what it skipped ("No invitations sent: 1 already a member of this organization") and counts what it actually created. - The invites API derived `alreadyInvited` as "everything not created", so an existing member was reported as though they had already been invited. `inviteMembers` now returns the two groups separately and the endpoint reports `alreadyMembers` alongside `alreadyInvited`. ## Testing `apps/webapp/test/member.server.test.ts` passes 16/16 locally, up from 12. Getting there needed a harness fix. The `~/db.server` mock did not export `Prisma`, so any code reaching `PrismaNamespace.PrismaClientKnownRequestError` threw before it could branch, leaving every duplicate-key path in `member.server.ts` unreachable from tests. The mock now re-exports the real `Prisma`, and there is a case covering the pending-invite skip. New cases: the invite role is applied when the accept creates the membership; it is not applied when the member already has a role; it is applied when an existing member has no role assigned; the organization is still joined when the assignment is refused with `last_owner`; and `inviteMembers` reports members separately from pending invites. Forcing the gate off fails exactly the "already has a role" case, so the coverage is load-bearing. `pnpm run typecheck --filter webapp` and `oxfmt --check` both pass. ## Changelog Accepting an old invitation could change the role of someone who was already in the organization. An invitation now leaves an existing member's role untouched, people who are already in an organization are no longer sent invitations to it, and the invite form says which addresses it skipped instead of failing with an unhelpful error. --- ## ✅ Checklist - [x] I have followed every step in the [contributing guide](https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md) - [x] The PR title follows the convention. - [x] I ran and tested the code works. ## Screenshots No visual changes. The invite form's toast copy changes, as described above. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Matt Aitken <matt@mattaitken.com> |
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23d5771d56 |
feat(webapp): unconfigured billing limit UX and default billing alerts (#4328)
## Default billing alerts + billing limit page UX - New orgs get default billing alerts: $5, $100, $500, $1000, $2500. Existing orgs are backfilled by a billing-side data migration (companion [PR](https://github.com/triggerdotdev/cloud/pull/1657)). - The billing limit form starts with nothing selected for orgs that never set a limit — the save button appears once an option is picked. - The yellow banner now also shows on the billing limits page itself, asking to configure a limit. Hidden everywhere for members who can't manage billing. - Also fixes billing limit alert preview. Tests - `apps/webapp/test/billingLimitsRoute.test.ts` — dirty logic for empty/selected mode - `apps/webapp/test/billingAlertsDefaults.test.ts` — default values - `apps/webapp/test/billingAlertsFormat.test.ts` — preview after a limit change |
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6997aeb05e |
fix: security release 2026-07-08 (#4316)
⚒️ Publish Worker (v4) / build (supervisor) (push) Has been cancelled
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ae96b6c175 |
fix: read-your-writes + global-scope idempotency correctness under the run-ops split (#4284)
## What & why
Two related correctness fixes for the run-ops DB split. Under the split,
run-store reads can route to a **lagging read replica**; a just-written
run/waitpoint/batch can then be missed, causing a wrong decision.
**1. Read-your-writes → owning primary.** Surfaced first as an
intermittent `wait.until({ idempotencyKey })` re-wait on retry. Auditing
the run-store read surface found the same class at sibling sites (some
gating mutations or returning spurious 404s, others
tolerable/self-healing). Reads that must observe their own writes now
route to the owning **primary**
(`findRun`/`findWaitpoint`/`findBatchTaskRunByFriendlyId` →
`*OnPrimary`, a primary re-read on a miss, or a retryable 404 where the
SDK polls). Read-view reads stay on the replica. All additive — the
happy path is unchanged.
**2. Global-scope idempotency across the split.** A `global`-scope key
carries no per-run salt, so the same `(env, task, key)` triggered
concurrently from parents resident on **different** run-ops DBs could
dedup-miss on each DB and create a duplicate (the per-DB unique index
can't enforce cross-DB uniqueness). Such triggers (global scope, or
scope-absent, while split is active) are serialized through the existing
Redis idempotency claim, the loser resolves the winner by id across both
DBs, and the claim is reacquired on the expired/failed
clear-and-recreate path. `run`/`attempt` scope embed the run id and
never contend.
## Stacked for review
This is the **base** of a 2-PR stack, split so review is easier:
- **This PR** — production code only (34 files).
- **Stacked tests PR →
https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/pull/4285** — the
caller-driven guards (55 test files) on top of this branch.
## Validation
Local run-ops split, **both 2-DB and 3-DB**, fresh boot on this branch:
SDK canary 64/71 (only the known concurrency/input-streams/s3 failures),
quarantine sweep **0 unexpected** (340 pass / 16 known / 4 local) in
each topology, dashboard e2e 0 failed. No product regressions.
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821972176d |
fix(run-store,webapp): correct split-database read routing, write residency, and batches list ordering (#4272)
## Summary Correctness and performance fixes for deployments that split run data across more than one database. Single-database / self-hosted deployments are unaffected (they collapse to a single read/write path). - **Batches list (dashboard):** for some organizations the Batches list could hide older batches or show them out of order. It now orders and paginates by creation time (with the id as a stable tiebreak), so every batch appears exactly once, newest first. The pagination cursor format changes; older in-flight cursors simply restart from the first page. - **Reads:** waitpoint and snapshot lookups that are keyed by a single run now read only the database that holds that run instead of querying both, removing redundant queries on hot paths (unblock, snapshot reads). - **Writes:** environment-scoped writes with no owning run (standalone wait tokens, waitpoint tags, idempotency-key resets) now land in the same database as that environment's runs, rather than defaulting to the other one. An idempotency-key reset also falls back to the other database when it matches nothing, so a reset still clears the key wherever the run actually lives. ## Notes Verified end-to-end against multi-database setups: run-keyed reads and env-scoped writes land on the correct database with no cross-database writes, and the batches list surfaces every batch in creation order. New tests cover the batches ordering/reachability and the write-residency routing. |
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976171ea16 |
feat(webapp): management API for orgs, projects, members, and settings (#4146)
## Summary
Adds a set of PAT-authenticated management API endpoints so orgs,
projects, members/invites, environment variables, and a few
project/environment settings can be managed programmatically (scripting,
automation) rather than only through the dashboard. Each route is a thin
wrapper over the **existing** service the dashboard already uses, with
the same authorization applied at the route layer - no new business
logic.
## Endpoints
**Organizations**
- `POST /api/v1/orgs` - create an org (`createOrganization`)
- `PATCH /api/v1/orgs/:orgParam` - rename (title)
- `DELETE /api/v1/orgs/:orgParam` - soft-delete
(`DeleteOrganizationService`; keeps the active-subscription guard)
**Members & invites**
- `GET /api/v1/orgs/:orgParam/members` - list members + pending invites
- `DELETE /api/v1/orgs/:orgParam/members/:memberId` - remove a member
(last-member guarded)
- `POST /api/v1/orgs/:orgParam/invites` - invite by email
(`inviteMembers`, sends the invite email)
- `DELETE /api/v1/orgs/:orgParam/invites/:inviteId` - revoke an invite
**Projects**
- `PATCH /api/v1/projects/:projectRef` - rename
(`ProjectSettingsService`)
- `DELETE /api/v1/projects/:projectRef` - soft-delete
(`DeleteProjectService`)
- `PUT /api/v1/projects/:projectRef/default-region` - set the default
region by worker-group name (`SetDefaultRegionService`)
- project GET/list now return `defaultRegion` (worker-group name, or
null when unset)
**Environments**
- `POST /api/v1/projects/:projectRef/:env/pause` and `/resume`
(`PauseEnvironmentService`)
- `POST /api/v1/projects/:projectRef/:env/regenerate-api-key` - rotate
the env secret key (`regenerateApiKey`, RBAC `write:apiKeys`)
- env var create now accepts an optional `isSecret` flag
## Auth & authorization
- All routes authenticate with a **Personal Access Token**
(`Authorization: Bearer tr_pat_...`).
- Org/project routes are built on the PAT route builders in
`apiBuilder.server.ts`: `createLoaderPATApiRoute` (already existed) and
**`createActionPATApiRoute`** (added here - the loader builder had no
mutation counterpart). The builder runs auth, resolves the org/project
role-floor via `context`, and enforces a declarative `authorization`
block using the same RBAC actions the dashboard applies
(`manage:organization` / `read:members` / `manage:members` /
`manage:project`). Handlers keep a membership-scoped query as the floor,
so a non-member gets a 404. This also gives these routes `tenantContext`
user attribution (Sentry) and `ServiceValidationError`-to-status mapping
for free.
- **Membership floor (important).** The OSS RBAC fallback grants a
permissive ability, so `ability.can(...)` can't reject a non-member on
self-hosted. Every handler therefore resolves the target scoped to the
caller's membership (`members: { some: { userId } }`) → 404 for
non-members. `authorization` is the *role* gate; this is the *tenant*
gate. `resolveOrganizationForApiUser`
(`organizationApiAccess.server.ts`) is the org-tier version of the
existing `findProjectByRef` - org-addressed PAT routes are new, so no
such helper existed before.
- Env-tier routes reuse the existing `authorizePatEnvironmentAccess`
(`write:apiKeys`).
### What `createActionPATApiRoute` gives you
A route is pure declaration - the builder handles auth, RBAC,
validation, tracing, and error mapping:
```ts
export const action = createActionPATApiRoute(
{
method: "PUT", // one verb, or ["PATCH", "DELETE"] for multi-verb routes
params: ParamsSchema,
body: SetDefaultRegionRequestBody, // zod-validated
context: async ({ projectRef }) => { // resolve the org for the RBAC role-floor
const project = await prisma.project.findFirst({
where: { externalRef: projectRef, deletedAt: null },
select: { organizationId: true },
});
return project ? { organizationId: project.organizationId } : {};
},
authorization: { action: "manage", resource: () => ({ type: "project" }) },
},
async ({ params, body, authentication, ability }) => {
// auth + authz already enforced. Just do the work.
// `throw new ServiceValidationError("Region not found", 400)` → mapped to that status.
return json({ ok: true });
}
);
```
Handled for you, so handlers stay thin:
- **Method allowlist** - `method` accepts a verb or an array; any other
verb → `405` with an `Allow` header, *before* auth runs:
```ts
const allowedMethods = method ? (Array.isArray(method) ? method :
[method]) : undefined;
if (allowedMethods && !(allowedMethods as
string[]).includes(request.method.toUpperCase())) {
return json({ error: "Method not allowed" }, { status: 405, headers: {
Allow: allowedMethods.join(", ") } });
}
```
- **PAT / user-actor auth** in a single roundtrip → `401` on
missing/invalid/revoked token.
- **RBAC** - `context` computes the caller's role-floor for the target
org/project; `authorization` gates it → `403` with a structured error
body.
- **Sentry attribution** - `tenantContext.enrich({ userId })` so events
from the handler carry the acting user.
- **Typed errors** - a thrown `ServiceValidationError` is mapped to its
`.status` (default 400); anything else → `500`, and expected boundary
errors are logged as `warn` (kept out of Sentry).
- **Validation** - params / query / headers / body are all zod-checked →
`400` with details.
## Notes for reviewers
- Everything wraps an existing service; the intent is API parity for
things that are currently dashboard-only, not new behaviour.
- `createActionPATApiRoute` is new shared infra (the PAT + RBAC mutation
builder that didn't exist). It's self-contained - the loader builder and
existing routes are untouched.
- `@trigger.dev/core` gets one additive field (`defaultRegion` on the
project response, optional/nullable for client-server version skew) -
changeset included, patch.
- `removeTeamMember`'s last-member guard is now atomic (Serializable
transaction via the `$transaction` helper, with retry), so the dashboard
and API both get it server-side. Added a `## Transactions` rule to
`apps/webapp/CLAUDE.md` (always use the `$transaction` helper);
migrating the remaining direct usages is tracked in TRI-11698.
## Open questions
- ~~Is PAT the right auth (vs OAT for automation)?~~ **Resolved: PAT.**
Organization Access Tokens are currently internal-only (used by the
image builder) and not user-accessible, so they can't back this yet.
- Should any of these be gated behind a flag or scope?
- Naming/shape of the routes.
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bea7e2be90 |
feat(webapp,run-store): route run-graph reads and writes through the run-store router (#4237)
## Summary Run-graph data (runs, batches, waitpoints, and their related tables) can now live in a database separate from the control plane, with every read and write routed to the correct database by each run's residency. This makes reading and writing run data more reliable once the two are split, and is a no-op for single-database installs. ## Design - Run-graph table access goes through the run-store router, which selects the legacy or the new run-ops store per run instead of assuming one shared client. - The legacy run-ops client is now independently pointable, so legacy run data can be served from its own database (and replica) rather than the control-plane connection. - Run-graph writes go straight to the run-graph database instead of being forwarded through the control plane, and replication targets are split so runs in the new database still replicate to analytics without under-counting. - Read-through slots refuse the control-plane client, so a missing residency fails loudly instead of silently reading the wrong database. - Migration `20260710120000_drop_remaining_run_graph_seam_foreign_keys` drops the foreign keys that still crossed the run-graph / control-plane seam, which is what lets the two live in separate databases. The split stays off unless explicitly enabled and the two databases are confirmed physically distinct; startup fails closed otherwise. Verified by running the full dashboard end-to-end suite against both a single-database configuration and a three-database configuration (control plane, the new database, and a physically separate legacy database), with runs on both residencies. No misrouted reads in either configuration. |
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5ba8557a51 |
chore(webapp,core): remove the end-of-life v3 (engine V1) execution stack (#4236)
## Summary v3 (the engine that ran the SDK v3 era, internally `RunEngineVersion.V1`) is end-of-life. Following the removal of the v3 execution apps ([#4194](https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/pull/4194)) and the legacy dev websocket ([#4198](https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/pull/4198)), this removes the remaining v3 execution stack from the server. Clients still on v3 (an old SDK or CLI that has not upgraded) keep getting a clear "upgrade to v4" response. Triggers, batch triggers, reschedules, and deploys that resolve to v3 are rejected with a graceful 4xx pointing at the migration guide, never a 5xx, so a stale client cannot affect server health. Self-hosted instances still running v3 should stay on the 4.5.x release line until they migrate. ## What is removed - The MarQS queue and its shared/dev queue consumers. - The v3 socket.io namespaces (coordinator, provider, shared-queue) and the v3 run lifecycle services (attempt, checkpoint, and batch-resume). - The graphile-worker background job system; all live jobs already run on `@trigger.dev/redis-worker`. - The `DEPRECATE_V3_ENABLED` flag: v3 is now rejected unconditionally, so the flag is gone. - Unused v3 exports from `@trigger.dev/core` (the `v3/zodNamespace` subpath and the legacy socket message catalogs) and the now-dead MarQS environment variables. ## What stays The v4 engine is untouched. The graceful v3 rejection boundary stays, `determineEngineVersion` still detects a v3 project so it can reject it, and the batch service plus batch-completion worker stay for current clients. Live queue concurrency limits and metrics now read from the v4 run engine instead of MarQS, and a brand-new dev environment now defaults to v4. ## Dependency cleanup Removes webapp dependencies left unused by this change: `seedrandom` and `semver` (only the removed v3 code used them) plus a set that was already dead, their orphaned `@types` packages, and two dead files. Adds a `knip:deps` script and a `knip.json` config so unused dependencies can be found the same way going forward. |
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34b1a181c2 | fix: security release 2026-07-06 (#4199) | ||
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de65370fb9 |
feat(webapp): Directory Sync (SCIM) for Identity & Access (#4148)
Extend the SSO plugin contract for directory sync and apply membership effects from the accounts webhook worker: provision users in mapped groups (role from group mapping, else the org default role), deprovision on removal, and keep a sticky-removal tombstone so JIT never silently re-adds a removed user. JIT and Directory Sync coexist; roles default to Developer (the JIT default-role picker has no 'None'). Changing a group's role in the dashboard re-applies it to that group's current members immediately. The Directory Sync settings section (group→role mapping, external-domain + manual-membership policy, deferred Save) appears once a domain is verified — independent of SSO — gated by the hasSso flag. The settings page polls the whole page while entitled with override-aware drafts so in-progress edits are never clobbered. |
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84f3e1b39c |
feat(run-ops): webapp write path — trigger/batch minting, idempotency routing, run lifecycle (#4118)
## What Routes the webapp write path through the run-ops split seam: trigger/batch minting, idempotency-key resolution, and the run-lifecycle services now determine residency and dispatch writes to the correct store. - **Trigger & batch** (`runEngine/services/triggerTask.server.ts`, `batchTrigger.server.ts`, `createBatch.server.ts`, `streamBatchItems.server.ts`, `v3/services/batchTriggerV3.server.ts`): mint ids with the run-ops-aware minting and route creation/streaming through the store; batch children inherit the parent's residency. - **Idempotency** (`runEngine/concerns/idempotencyKeys.server.ts` + new `idempotencyResidency.server.ts`): idempotency-key lookup/dedup is residency-aware so a keyed retrigger resolves against the store that owns the original run. - **Run lifecycle services** (`createCheckpoint`, `createTaskRunAttempt`, `enqueueDelayedRun`, `expireEnqueuedRun`, `finalizeTaskRun`, `resumeBatchRun`, `cancelDevSessionRuns`, `executeTasksWaitingForDeploy`, `triggerFailedTask`): resolve their target run through the store rather than a fixed client. - **Reads that fan out from writes** (`runsRepository` + `clickhouseRunsRepository`, `BulkActionV2` + batch read-through, realtime `sessions`/`runReader`, alerts `deliverAlert`/`performTaskRunAlerts`): route through the read-through resolver. - `9535ae63d` — resolves the parent run through an injectable run store in `TriggerFailedTaskService`. - `bf8f7c881` — drops the "known-migrated" concept from write-path and read repos; residency is id-shape only. - `515b897ea` — self-defaults `resolveWaitpointThroughReadThrough` to the safe run-ops clients. ## Why PR6 of the run-ops split stack. This is the write-path counterpart to the read foundation in the previous PRs: with it in place, both reads and writes route through the seam. Additive when the split is disabled (id-shape resolution collapses to the control-plane client); behavior-changing on the minting, idempotency, and lifecycle paths when enabled. ## Tests Large new/expanded vitest suite under `apps/webapp/test/` and colocated service tests: trigger-task and batch-trigger store routing, residency inheritance, idempotency dedup residency + legacy-authority, bulk-action read routing, cancel-dev-session routing, alerts store routing, runs-repository read-through, realtime session/run-reader read-through and stream-registration routing, and the waitpoint read-through default. Testcontainers-backed; no mocks. ## Notes Draft, **stacked on #4117** (`runops/pr05-webapp-foundation`). Review that first; this diff is against it. Server-change / changeset note to be added at stack-assembly time. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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8465ac5ac3 |
feat(run-ops): webapp db topology, flags, and split-mode resolver wiring (#4117)
## What Wires the run-ops split into the webapp: database topology, environment flags, split-mode gating, and the control-plane resolver/cache layer that the run-store and run-engine seams from the previous PR plug into. - **DB topology & env** (`apps/webapp/app/db.server.ts`, `env.server.ts`, `entry.server.tsx`): adds the run-ops database clients/topology and the environment variables that configure and gate the split. - **runOpsMigration module** (new `apps/webapp/app/v3/runOpsMigration/`): the webapp-side machinery — `splitMode.server.ts`, `controlPlaneResolver.server.ts` + `controlPlaneCache.server.ts`, `readThrough.server.ts`, `crossSeamGuard.server.ts`, `distinctDbSentinel.server.ts`, id-minting helpers (`mintBatchFriendlyId`, `runOpsMintKind`, `resolveInheritedMintKind`), `runOpsCascadeCleanup.server.ts`, the split read gate, and route/unblock catalogs. - **Store/engine wiring** (`app/v3/runStore.server.ts`, `runEngine.server.ts`, `runEngineHandlers.server.ts` + new `runEngineHandlersShared.server.ts`): points the webapp's store/engine construction at the resolver, and factors shared handler logic out so both seams use one path. - **Read-path touch-ups**: `runtimeEnvironment.server.ts`, `eventRepository/index.server.ts`, `taskRunHeartbeatFailed.server.ts`, `engineVersion.server.ts` route their run/environment lookups read-through the resolver. - `413a94511` — interlocks split mode against the native realtime backend so the two aren't enabled in an incompatible combination (see `.server-changes/run-ops-split-realtime-interlock.md`). - `dc74c57fd` — drops the earlier "known-migrated" read layer; residency is determined by id-shape only. ## Why PR5 of the run-ops split stack. This is the webapp foundation layer: it stands up the DB topology, flags, and resolver/cache the rest of the stack depends on, and repoints webapp read paths through the resolver. Additive when the split is not enabled (existing single-DB behavior preserved behind flags); behavior-changing on the read-through paths and the realtime interlock. ## Tests New vitest coverage across `apps/webapp/test/` and colocated `*.server.test.ts` files: db topology, split mode, split read gate, cross-seam guard, mint cutover / flip latency, control-plane cache, control-plane resolver, distinct-db sentinel, read-through loaders (route loaders, run-detail loaders, `findEnvironmentFromRun`), and the run-engine handlers. Testcontainers-backed; no mocks. `pnpm-lock.yaml` synced for the two new webapp deps. ## Notes Draft, **stacked on #4116** (`runops/pr04-store-engine`). Review that first; this diff is against it. Server-change / changeset note to be added at stack-assembly time. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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fd4f02b2f8 |
fix(webapp): onboard new cloud orgs via plan selection; allow Free plan without GitHub verification (#4109)
## What & why Two related fixes to how new cloud organizations get onboarded onto the Free plan. ### 1. Route new cloud orgs through plan selection New cloud organizations were created already activated, so they skipped the plan-selection step and went straight to creating projects — which meant their plan and usage limits were never set up. They're now created deactivated and routed through plan selection, which activates them once a plan is chosen. Self-hosted installs have no plan-selection step, so they're activated immediately on creation and are unaffected. The `Organization.v3Enabled` field is renamed to `isActivated` to better describe what it now gates. It's mapped to the existing `v3Enabled` column, so there's no data migration — only a schema/code rename. ### 2. Allow selecting the Free plan without GitHub verification Choosing the Free plan no longer requires connecting and verifying a GitHub account. The plan is applied immediately when selected. This removes: - the "Connect to GitHub" dialog and the GitHub-verified badge from the plan picker - the account-rejected state - the now-unreachable GitHub-connect return routes ## Notes - These changes pair with the corresponding change in the billing service that applies the Free plan directly; they should be released together. ## Testing Verified locally end to end: a new cloud org is routed to plan selection, the Free plan applies in one click with no GitHub step, the org is activated, its usage allowance is provisioned, and it lands on the new-project page. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) |
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c7861be520 |
chore: activate no-unused-vars and import linters (#4096)
Once this is merged, oxlint is at a pretty sensible baseline. **Enable `no-unused-vars`, `typescript/consistent-type-imports`, and `import/no-duplicates` lint rules** Turns on three previously-disabled oxlint rules across the monorepo and fixes all violations: - **`no-unused-vars`** – enabled as an error with standard ignore patterns: unused function arguments are ignored by default (`args: "none"`), variables/caught errors/destructured array elements prefixed with `_` are allowed, and rest siblings are permitted. - **`typescript/consistent-type-imports`** – enforced as an error; all type-only imports now use the `import type` syntax. - **`import/no-duplicates`** – enforced as an error; duplicate import statements from the same module have been merged. The remaining commits clean up the violations found across the codebase: removing unused variables/imports/type aliases, adding `_` prefixes to intentionally unused bindings, fixing duplicate imports, and converting value imports to `import type` where appropriate. |
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bfa902bd18 |
chore: enable more linters (#4080)
Re-enables ~15 oxlint rules that were blanket-disabled before. |
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cd9d20cc99 |
fix(webapp): accept invites for orgs with many projects (#4043)
Invite acceptance could fail for cloud organizations with many projects because the whole flow ran inside a single transaction and did too much work before it completed. In larger orgs, that pushed the transaction past its timeout and blocked the invite from being accepted. This PR moves the expensive parts of invite acceptance out of the transaction, excludes deleted projects from environment setup, fixes error handling on /invites, and adds regression coverage for the failure cases. |
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c8d085a541 |
fix(webapp): clamp oversized toast messages and quiet expected pause errors (#4077)
## Summary Two robustness fixes in the dashboard's error handling, found while testing the billing-limit pause/resume flow. ## Toast cookie overflow Toast messages are flashed into the `__message` session cookie, which the session store rejects once the serialized cookie passes the browser's ~4KB limit. Any call site that flashes a raw caught error (a verbose database or validation message, for example) could turn a toast into a failed request. `setErrorMessage` / `setSuccessMessage` now clamp the message length, so a toast can never overflow the cookie. This protects every toast helper at once. ## Pause/resume reporting Resuming an environment that is paused by a billing limit is an expected, user-actionable state, but `PauseEnvironmentService` threw it, and the service's catch reports every throw at error level. It now returns that case as a failure result, so callers still surface the message to the user while genuine errors keep reporting. |
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b1987dc090 |
feat(webapp): billing limits — pause, reject, recovery, and settings UI (#3996)
## Summary Adds Billing Limits to the webapp. Customers can set a monthly spend cap. When usage crosses the limit, billable environments enter a grace period. If the limit is not resolved before grace expires, new triggers are rejected until the organization increases or removes the limit. |
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4fde283e76 |
chore: format and lint webapp also (#4056)
#3977 added formatting and linting everywhere else. This extends it to the webapp. |
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df78ef96d9 |
feat: multi dev branches (#4023)
Closes this feature request: [https://triggerdev.featurebase.app/p/isolated-dev-sessions-for-multiple-local-trigger-dev-instances](https://triggerdev.featurebase.app/p/isolated-dev-sessions-for-multiple-local-trigger-dev-instances) ### Feature notes: - CLI `trigger dev` works as before - `trigger dev --branch my-branch` to create a new branch and run against it. - `trigger dev archive --branch my-branch` to archive (or in webapp). - New webapp page to manage and archive dev branches, currently feature flagged. ### Implementation details: - No changes to data model, no backfill. `isBranchableEnvironment` column is ignored for dev branches, we use `parentEnvironmentId IS NULL` instead. - `x-trigger-branch` overloaded for preview and dev branches - New `TRIGGER_DEV_BRANCH` env var available locally. `TRIGGER_PREVIEW_BRANCH` overloaded for child runs. - Lots of new glue code to sanitise the branch checks. ### Rollout - Deploy webapp/API changes (all backwards compatible) - Manual tests on some orgs - Deploy docs, release CLI, flip feature flag for webapp feature ### NB - `api.v1.projects.$projectRef.environments.ts` will return `isBranchableEnvironment: true` for all dev environments. ### Prerequisites - [x] Typecheck will not pass until we make a new release of `@trigger.dev/platform` and bump it here |
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65c545da4e |
refactor(run-store,webapp,run-engine): route Postgres TaskRun reads through the run store (#3990)
## Summary Adds read methods to `RunStore` (`findRun`, `findRunOrThrow`, `findRuns`) and routes every Postgres read of `TaskRun` through them, mirroring how writes already go through the store. Behavior-preserving: each relocated read keeps its exact query, field selection, and database client (writer, replica, or transaction). This lets `TaskRun` reads be retargeted to a different backing store later without touching call sites. Stacked on #3981 (the write adapter); that PR is the base of this one. ## Scope In scope: the run engine, webapp services, presenters, and route loaders. Three reads that pulled `TaskRun` in through a parent model's relation `include` (alert delivery, batch results, attempt-dependency cancellation) are decomposed to fetch the run(s) through the store and stitch them back, since a relation include would not follow `TaskRun` to a new table. Left reading the existing table (out of scope): the legacy MarQS paths, the legacy trigger idempotency read, and one raw-SQL recovery script (commented for revisiting at cutover). ## Notes Reads default to the read replica; callers pass the writer or a transaction client wherever the original read did, so writer-vs-replica behavior is unchanged. |
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e98a547e6c | feat(sso): SAML/OIDC single sign-on (#3911) | ||
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c97d246197 |
feat(webapp): sync new orgs + users to Attio CRM on signup (#3896)
Pushes new organizations and users into the Attio CRM at signup time, for Customer Success (TRI-10431). - Orgs → Attio `workspaces`, users → Attio `users`, keyed on Attio's built-in unique `workspace_id` / `user_id` so writes are idempotent upserts. - Runs on the common Redis worker (not inline), so a slow or unavailable Attio never blocks the signup path; failures retry (3 attempts). - Hooks: user-created (alongside the existing Loops call) and org-created (`createOrganization`). - Gated behind `ATTIO_API_KEY`, no key means the sync is skipped entirely, so OSS / self-hosted installs are unaffected. Only creation is covered here (the record "shell"); spend, runs, plan changes, churn, and role/relationship linking are populated by the scheduled full sync, tracked separately. **Deploy note:** requires an Attio API key set as `ATTIO_API_KEY` in the webapp env, with scopes **Records (read-write)** + **Object Configuration (read)**, the assert/upsert endpoint reads object config to resolve the matching attribute. Without the key the sync no-ops. --------- Co-authored-by: Matt Aitken <matt@mattaitken.com> Co-authored-by: devin-ai-integration[bot] <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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5740955357 |
feat(webapp): enforce RBAC permissions on run, prompt, member, and billing routes (#3948)
## Summary Several dashboard routes performed actions a restricted role should not be able to do (cancel or replay runs, manage prompt versions, invite and manage members, manage billing) without any permission check. This adds role-based permission enforcement to those routes, and disables the matching UI controls (with a tooltip) when the current role lacks permission. Covered actions: - Runs: cancel and replay (single, bulk create, bulk abort) - Prompts: create or edit override versions, and promote a version to current - Members: invite, resend invite, revoke invite - Billing: change plan, billing alerts, and the customer portal ## How Each affected route now goes through the `dashboardLoader` / `dashboardAction` route builders with an `authorization` block declaring the required permission (or a per-intent check where one route handles several intents). Existing tenancy and data-scoping queries are untouched; this only layers permission checks on top. The UI follows disable-don't-hide: controls stay visible but disabled with a "You don't have permission to ..." tooltip. Two reusable pieces support this: `checkPermissions(ability, checks)` turns a set of checks into a boolean map a loader returns to the client, and `PermissionButton` / `PermissionLink` disable the underlying control and show a tooltip when a permission flag is false. ## Behaviour No change in the default configuration: permissions are permissive, so every control stays enabled and every route behaves as before. The checks only take effect when an RBAC plugin is installed. This also makes role assignment on invite-accept non-fatal, so a failure there cannot block joining an org. Verified with `pnpm run typecheck --filter webapp`; `checkPermissions` has unit tests. |
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cf4aa7e918 |
fix(webapp): Vercel env var sync rejecting batches containing only reserved keys (#3966)
Fix Vercel onboarding wizard to properly filter out reserved TRIGGER_ env vars |
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f9d57d3bd5 |
feat(webapp): add a new backend for the realtime runs feed (#3864)
## Summary Adds a second backend for the realtime runs feed (`useRealtimeRun`, `subscribeToRunsWithTag`, `subscribeToBatch`), built to stay healthy when a single busy environment has many subscribers watching many runs at once. It is gated behind a feature flag with the existing backend as the default, so nothing changes for users until it is enabled per environment. ## Design A run change is published once, as a small self-describing record, to a single per-environment channel. Every feed is then a predicate over that one stream rather than owning a channel: - A per-instance router indexes the currently-held feeds by run, tag, and batch. When a run changes it hydrates the affected rows once and serializes them once, then fans the result to every matching feed. One hot shared tag watched by many subscribers costs a single database query and serialize, not one per subscriber. - Feeds that don't match a change are never woken, wake delivery per environment is coalesced on a leading edge (250ms default) so a burst of changes costs one wake, and cold reads coalesce onto a single short-TTL-cached resolve. - An admission gate bounds how many cold ClickHouse resolves run concurrently, so a mass reconnect across many distinct filters queues instead of stampeding the database. - Changes that land while a client is between long-polls are delivered on its next poll instead of waiting for the periodic backstop: each environment buffers its recent change records, subscriptions linger briefly after the last feed closes, and a newly-armed poll replays exactly the connection's gap. - The per-connection replay cursors behind that are shared across instances via Redis (a single timestamp each), so a poll landing on a different instance behind the load balancer still reads the connection's true gap instead of falling back to a cold resolve. Cursor reads have a bounded deadline and degrade to the cold-read path on any Redis trouble. - Tag subscriptions with multiple tags match runs carrying all of the tags, mirroring the existing backend's filter semantics, and live long-polls hold for about 20 seconds to match its cadence. - The per-environment channel supports Redis Cluster sharded pub/sub, so the wake path scales horizontally across shards by environment. - The backend reports its health through OpenTelemetry metrics (delivery lag, poll resolution paths, backstop outcomes, replay and cursor-store activity), with a provisioned Grafana dashboard for local development. Everything is behind the feature flag and tunable via env vars; the existing backend remains the default. |
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774a9793e3 |
fix(webapp): paginate shared Vercel env var fetch in onboarding + pull (#3879)
Closes #3850 <img width="1709" height="1115" alt="Screenshot 2026-06-09 at 18 44 40" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/edc1f091-0937-403d-a6e9-9d9477e77ed0" /> |
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2fbac48e0d |
feat(webapp): prompt to clear TRIGGER_VERSION on disabling Vercel atomic deployments (#3666)
- Ask user if they want to remove TRIGGER_VERSION when they disable atomic deployments, and explain what is the situation if they leave it as it is - Install TRIGGER_SECRET keys as sensitive values in Vercel <img width="1136" height="714" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a7351da1-5b2a-44e5-acdd-d30c9359f3ed" /> <img width="1136" height="714" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e773ede2-74cb-438e-811c-338f678d2f7d" /> <img width="1136" height="714" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c7b235a8-e06d-48d3-ac28-c5c9aacc6069" /> |
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bff4b46b22 |
fix(webapp): log Google auth conflict as warn instead of error (#3627)
## Summary A "Google auth conflict" Sentry alert fires whenever a user signs in via Google whose Google account is linked to one user row but whose Google-provided email is now on a *different* user row. The handler in `apps/webapp/app/models/user.server.ts:236` already does the right thing — it returns the existing auth-linked user and skips the update path so neither row gets mutated — but it logs the situation with `logger.error`, which routes to Sentry as an exception and pages the on-call channel. There's no exception to chase here: the branch is the intended outcome for a known data shape (user changed their email on one account after originally signing up via Google on another). Downgrading the call to `logger.warn` keeps the diagnostic record in our logs (with all the same context fields — email, both user IDs, authIdentifier) but stops it firing the production error alert. ## Change - `logger.error` → `logger.warn` for the conflict branch in `findOrCreateGoogleUser`. Context payload is unchanged. ## Test plan - [x] Typecheck only — there's no behavioural change to test, the log level is the entire diff. |
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e4981d1b11 |
feat(webapp): consolidate auth path + add comprehensive auth tests (#3499)
## Summary
Consolidates the webapp's authentication and authorization into a small
set of route helpers, replacing the ad-hoc `requireUser` /
`requireUserId` / `authenticatedEnvironmentForAuthentication` calls
scattered across routes. Same security model, but the per-request flow
(authenticate → authorize → load) now lives in one place per route
family.
Introduces a plugin seam (`@trigger.dev/plugins`) that lets the cloud
build install a richer RBAC implementation without touching webapp code.
The OSS fallback keeps the pre-RBAC permissive behaviour intact, so
self-hosted deployments work unchanged.
Adds a comprehensive end-to-end auth test suite that didn't exist before
— 193 `it()` blocks (vitest reports ~199 after `it.each` expansion)
covering API key, PAT and JWT auth across the public API surface, plus
dashboard session auth for admin pages.
## Changes
### Plugin contract — `@trigger.dev/plugins`
`RoleBaseAccessController` interface authoritative for both OSS
(fallback) and cloud (enterprise plugin):
- `authenticateBearer(request, { allowJWT? })` — API-key / public-JWT
auth, returns env + ability
- `authenticateSession(request, { userId, organizationId?, projectId?
})` — dashboard auth, caller resolves `userId` from the session cookie
and passes it in (no `helpers.getSessionUserId` callback — decouples the
plugin host from session-cookie code)
- `authenticatePat(request, { organizationId?, projectId? })` — PAT
auth, returns identity + `lastAccessedAt` so the host can throttle the
per-request update
- `authenticateAuthorize*` variants for the auth-and-check-in-one-call
cases
- `isUsingPlugin(): Promise<boolean>` — capability flag for UI /
branching where plugin-present-ness matters; replaces the
sentinel-string coupling that had `personalAccessToken.server` matching
`"RBAC plugin not installed"` literally
### Dashboard auth (started, partial rollout)
Admin and settings pages migrated to a unified `dashboardLoader` /
`dashboardAction` helper that authenticates the session, runs an
authorization check, and exposes the result to the route. Other
dashboard routes still on the old pattern; remaining migration tracked
in TRI-8730.
Migrated routes:
- `admin.*` (14 admin / back-office / feature-flags / LLM-models /
notifications / orgs / concurrency pages)
- `_app.orgs.$organizationSlug.settings.team`
- `_app.orgs.$organizationSlug.settings.roles`
### API / realtime / engine auth (complete for the migrated families)
71 routes migrated to a unified `apiBuilder` that centralizes Bearer /
PAT / Public-JWT authentication and applies the per-route authorization
check before the handler runs. Includes:
- `api.v1.*` and `api.v2.*` and `api.v3.*` — tasks, runs, batches,
queues, prompts, deployments, query, sessions, waitpoints, packets,
workers, idempotency keys
- `realtime.v1.*` — runs, batches, sessions, streams
- `engine.v1.*` — dev / worker-action protocols
29 routes still on the legacy `authenticateApiRequest*` helpers —
tracked as a post-deploy follow-up in TRI-9228.
Multi-resource auth direction is now explicit at the call site via
`anyResource(...)` (OR) and `everyResource(...)` (AND). Bare arrays no
longer typecheck — fixes a class of bug where a JWT scoped to one
resource could implicitly access others under OR semantics.
PAT auth path consolidated: was three DB queries per request (legacy
`authenticateApiRequestWithPersonalAccessToken` findFirst +
`rbac.authenticatePat` join + `lastAccessedAt` update). Now one query in
the steady state — plugin returns `lastAccessedAt`, host smart-skips the
update via JS-side throttle when fresh.
Side effect: action aliases preserved historic JWT scope semantics where
the new model is stricter (e.g. a `write:tasks` JWT now also satisfies
`trigger` / `batchTrigger` / `update` actions on the same resource —
matched at the auth boundary, not in the route handler).
### Backwards-compat fixes
The strict-match model regressed several real-world JWT shapes. Each
preserved via explicit `anyResource(...)` entries in the route's authz
block:
- **Batch retrieve routes** (`api.v1.batches.$batchId`, `api.v2.*`,
`realtime.v1.batches.*`) accept `read:runs` JWTs again (pre-RBAC
literal-match superScope behaviour)
- **Runs list routes** (`api.v1.runs`, `realtime.v1.runs`) accept
type-level `read:tasks` / `read:tags` on unfiltered queries (matched the
legacy `Object.keys` iteration semantic)
- **PAT/OAT auth shape** normalized through `toAuthenticated` so all
auth methods return the same slim `AuthenticatedEnvironment` (was:
API-key returned the slim shape but PAT/OAT returned raw Prisma
`Decimal` / no `orgMember`)
- **Scope `:` preservation** in resource ids — `read:tags:env:staging`
now correctly identifies the tag id as `env:staging`, not `env`
### Slim `AuthenticatedEnvironment`
Extracted to `@trigger.dev/core/v3/auth/environment` — a structural
shape independent of `@trigger.dev/database`. The plugin contract
returns this; webapp consumers import from there; the cloud plugin
(Drizzle) returns the same shape without Prisma's `Decimal` class
leaking into the public surface. Lets internal-packages (run-engine,
etc.) refer to `AuthenticatedEnvironment` without pulling Prisma in.
### Auth test suite (new — `*.e2e.full.test.ts`)
193 e2e tests run against a real spawned webapp + Postgres (no mocks).
Coverage matrix:
- **API key auth** — read / write / trigger / batchTrigger / deploy
actions across runs, batches, deployments, prompts, queues, query,
sessions, input-streams, waitpoints, tasks, idempotency keys; multi-key
resources (a run carries batch / tag / task identifiers — auth must
accept any matching scope)
- **Personal Access Token auth** — comprehensive matrix: scope match,
scope mismatch, missing scope, expired token, malformed token
- **Public JWT auth** — sub-vs-URL environment resolution, expired JWTs,
signature verification, scope checking, otu (one-time-use) token
semantics, branch-environment signing-key fallback
- **Dashboard session auth** — admin-only pages reject non-admins;
per-action gating
- **Cross-cutting edge cases** — revoked API key grace window, JWT
cross-environment isolation, MissingResource branch behaviour
### Hygiene cleanups
- Deleted dead `app/services/authorization.server.ts` (legacy
`checkAuthorization` + types — no live consumers post-migration) and its
orphaned test
- Dropped the never-populated `scopes` field from
`ApiAuthenticationResultSuccess`
- `scheduleEmail` moved out of `email.server.ts` into its own module —
breaks a `commonWorker → marqs/V1` import chain that was poisoning the
auth test graph
- OSS Roles page shows a deployment-aware empty state ("Roles aren't
available in this self-hosted deployment" vs the plan-upsell copy) via
`rbac.isUsingPlugin()`
- Team action handler: explicit per-intent ability gates
(`manage:billing` for purchase-seats, `manage:members` for set-role +
remove-member with self-leave carve-out)
### Cross-repo coordination
All public-package contract changes paired in `triggerdotdev/cloud#763`
(rbac-packages branch) — the enterprise plugin implements the same
`RoleBaseAccessController` interface against Drizzle.
## Test plan
- [x] `pnpm run typecheck --filter webapp` clean
- [x] `pnpm --filter webapp exec vitest run --config
vitest.e2e.full.config.ts` — 193/193 pass (requires Docker for
testcontainers)
- [x] Spot-check an authed API endpoint with a valid + invalid API key
against a local stack
- [x] Spot-check the migrated admin pages render and gate non-admins
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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f8ddb766fa | feat: Plain customer cards (#2933) | ||
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99dfee3a57 |
fix(webapp): honor RevokedApiKey grace window for public access tokens (#3464)
## Summary Follow-up to #3420. PATs (public access tokens) minted before an API key rotation 401'd immediately on the realtime stream endpoints, even though the rotation flow advertises a 24h overlap. This fixes the gap. ## Root cause PATs are JWTs signed with the env's `apiKey` at mint time. When that secret is rotated, `validatePublicJwtKey` (`apps/webapp/app/services/realtime/jwtAuth.server.ts`) only verifies the signature against `environment.parentEnvironment?.apiKey ?? environment.apiKey` — i.e. the env's *current* canonical key. Any PAT in the wild signed with the previous key fails signature verification → 401, even within the grace window. #3420 wired up the grace-window fallback in two places — `findEnvironmentByApiKey` (raw secret-key auth) and `api.v1.auth.jwt.ts` (signs new JWTs with the canonical key when minting from an old one) — but the *verify* path for already-issued PATs was never updated. In a typical app, `POST /api/v1/tasks/.../trigger` (Bearer secret) keeps working through rotation because that path has the fallback, but `GET /realtime/v1/streams/run_*/...` and `POST /realtime/v1/streams/run_*/input/...` 401 for runs that were already in flight when the rotation happened. ## Fix After the primary `validateJWT` against the env's current `apiKey`, fall back to non-expired `RevokedApiKey` rows for the signing env (parent env when the request is against a child) — but **only on the failure path**, so the hot success path is unchanged. Uses `$replica` to match the rest of the auth path. Symmetrical to the `findEnvironmentByApiKey` two-step from #3420. ## Changes - `apps/webapp/app/services/realtime/jwtAuth.server.ts` — `validateAgainstRevokedApiKeys` helper invoked only on `!result.ok` - `apps/webapp/app/models/runtimeEnvironment.server.ts` — `findEnvironmentById` also selects `parentEnvironment.id` so we can scope the revoked-keys lookup to the correct env ## Test plan E2E verified locally via curl against `GET /realtime/v1/runs/{runId}` (PAT-authenticated): - [x] Pre-rotation, PAT signed with K1 → **200** with run body - [x] Simulate rotation (insert `RevokedApiKey` row + flip env `apiKey` to K2 in a single transaction, mirroring `regenerateApiKey`) - [x] Same PAT (K1) within grace window → **200** with run body — fallback hits - [x] Fresh PAT signed with K2 → **200** — current key still works - [x] Set `RevokedApiKey.expiresAt` to past → **401** — fallback finds no live row - [x] Bogus signature (no rotation) → **401** - [x] Cleanup verified: env `apiKey` restored, `RevokedApiKey` row deleted - [x] `pnpm run typecheck --filter webapp` passes |
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03e4d5fe31 |
feat(webapp,database): API key rotation grace period (#3420)
## Summary
Regenerating a RuntimeEnvironment API key no longer immediately
invalidates the previous one. Rotation is now overlap-based: the old key
keeps working for 24 hours so customers can roll it out in their env
vars without downtime, then stops working.
## Design
- **New `RevokedApiKey` table** (one row per revocation). Holds the
archived `apiKey`, a FK to the env, an `expiresAt`, and a `createdAt`.
Indexed on `apiKey` (high-cardinality equality — single-row hits) and on
`runtimeEnvironmentId`.
- **`regenerateApiKey` wraps both writes in a single `$transaction`:**
insert a `RevokedApiKey` with `expiresAt = now + 24h`, update the env
with the new `apiKey`/`pkApiKey`.
- **`findEnvironmentByApiKey` does a two-step lookup:** primary
unique-index hit on `RuntimeEnvironment.apiKey` first; on miss,
`RevokedApiKey.findFirst({ apiKey, expiresAt: { gt: now } })` with an
`include: { runtimeEnvironment }`. Two-step (not `OR`-join) keeps the
hot path identical to today and puts the fallback cost only on invalid
keys. Both lookups use `$replica`.
- **Admin endpoint** `POST /admin/api/v1/revoked-api-keys/:id` accepts
`{ expiresAt }` and updates the row. Setting to `now` ends the grace
window immediately; setting to the future extends it.
- **Modal copy** on the regenerate dialog updated — previously warned of
downtime, now explains the 24h overlap.
## Why a separate table instead of columns on `RuntimeEnvironment`
- Keeps the hot auth path's primary lookup unchanged — no
OR/nullable-apiKey semantics to reason about.
- Naturally supports multiple in-flight grace windows (regenerate twice
in a day → two old keys valid until their independent expiries).
- FK + cascade cleans up correctly when an env is deleted; nothing to
backfill.
## Test plan
Verified locally against hello-world with dev and prod env keys:
- [x] baseline — current key authenticates (`GET /api/v1/runs`) → `200`
- [x] regenerate via UI — DB shows old key in `RevokedApiKey` with
`expiresAt ≈ now+24h`, env has new key
- [x] grace window — both old and new keys → `200`; bogus key → `401`
- [x] admin endpoint: `expiresAt = now` → old key `401`
- [x] admin endpoint: `expiresAt = +1h` (after early-expire) → old key
`200` again
- [x] admin endpoint: `expiresAt = past` → old key `401`
- [x] admin 400 (invalid body), 404 (unknown id), 401 (missing/non-admin
PAT)
- [x] same flow exercised end-to-end on a PROD-typed env — behavior
identical
- [x] `pnpm run typecheck --filter webapp` passes
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79b6053e13 |
feat(server): add TaskIdentifier registry to replace expensive distinct query (#3368)
Replace the expensive DISTINCT query for task filter dropdowns with a dedicated TaskIdentifier registry table backed by Redis. Environments migrate automatically on their next deploy, with a transparent fallback to the legacy query for unmigrated environments. Also fixes duplicate dropdown entries when a task changes trigger source, and adds active/archived grouping for removed tasks. Moves BackgroundWorkerTask reads in the trigger hot path to the read replica. |
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ed0c3e4f38 |
fix: stop creating TaskRunTag records and join table entries during triggering (#3369)
The TaskRun.runTags string array already stores tag names, making the TaskRunTag M2M relation redundant write overhead. Remove createTags calls, connect: tags, and join table writes from both V1 and V2 trigger paths. Simplify the add-tags API to just push to runTags directly. |
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0977c56efe |
Errors (versions) (#3187)
- Added versions filtering on the Errors list and page - Added errors stacked bars to the graph on the individual error page --------- Co-authored-by: James Ritchie <james@trigger.dev> |