## Summary
Projects can create, inspect, expire, and revoke multiple API keys for
each environment. Plaintext values are shown only at creation; stored
credentials are hashed and the API keys page displays only an obfuscated
suffix afterward.
Self-hosted installations support full-access additional keys by
default. Authorization extensions can provide additional access presets
and optional task selection. Additional keys can also mint scoped public
access tokens through the Trigger.dev API without receiving the
environment signing key.
## Feature notes
- Only admin+ can create API keys (Developer can make in Development
branch).
- JWT self-signing will be a server call when used with new `_ak_` keys.
- JWTs with long expiry can keep working even with api key deleted (gets
priveleges from api key, signed with root key)
- Unfiltered session listings intentionally preserve the existing broad
task-read behavior. Filtered listings enforce task-level scopes for
every requested task.
- Buffered runs without a task identifier are not safely authorizable,
so cancel/replay requests fail closed rather than resolving an unscoped
run.
- Batch and waitpoint endpoints intentionally return server-minted,
narrowly scoped public tokens to all callers. These tokens have bounded
lifetimes and may remain valid until expiry after API-key revocation.
## Deployment notes
Deploy the management UI and public-token endpoint with new key creation
disabled. Enable creation for selected organizations after the
authentication path and released SDK have been verified, then expand
availability gradually.
Revoking an API key prevents new bearer requests and new token minting.
Public tokens already minted by that key remain valid until their own
expiration because they are signed by the environment signing key.
## TODO
- [x] Add "Created by" to the key table
- [x] Document that streamed batch ingestion is non-atomic and may
partially accept items before a validation or authorization error.
## Follow-ups
- [x] Add an organization-level feature flag for the API key management
UI and creation action.
- [x] Document rollout ordering: enable additional-key lookup before
enabling issuance.
- [x] Add a system-wide gate that can stop new key issuance without
disabling authentication for existing keys.
- [x] Replace the generic SDK compatibility warning with the first
published compatible version. Old SDK will mint an unusable token if
given an `_ak_` key.
- [x] Add public documentation covering creation, storage, expiration,
revocation, SDK compatibility, and public-token lifetime behavior.
- [x] Add observability for key creation, revocation, policy preparation
failures, and public-token mint failures.
- [ ] Exercise create, copy-once display, authenticate, mint, expire,
and revoke flows end to end before broad enablement.
## Summary
Environment API keys backed by the additional-key table can authenticate
API requests using their stored effective scopes. Revoked and expired
keys are rejected, branch environments retain their existing routing
behavior, and last-used timestamps are updated on a throttled
best-effort basis.
## Design
API route builders receive the resolved ability and reject restricted
keys on routes without an authorization declaration. Existing
deployment, environment variable, queue, run, task, batch, session, and
waitpoint routes declare the resources they access.
Trigger and batch responses return server-signed public access tokens,
so additional keys never need access to the environment signing secret.
Root-key rotation also keeps public tokens valid for the existing grace
window.
## Feature notes
- Root environment keys remain unrestricted for backward compatibility.
Additional keys enforce their persisted scopes and fail closed on routes
without an authorization declaration.
- Machine-key requests never exchange one credential for another.
Additional keys cannot retrieve the root key, and rotated root keys are
not upgraded
during their grace window.
- Public JWT validation remains host-owned, while installed RBAC plugins
continue to supply root-key abilities.
- Unfiltered session and run listings preserve existing broad task-read
behavior. Filtered requests enforce the supplied task identifiers.
- Related-run summaries remain embedded in run retrieval for API
compatibility. Retrieving or mutating a related run independently still
requires
permission for that run.
- Queue management authorizes at collection scope, matching the queue
permissions currently issued.
- Batch responses deliberately include server-signed public access
tokens for all clients. Selected-task credentials continue using their
original
credential for per-item authorization.
- Two-phase batches authorize declared task identifiers before creation
and authorize every streamed item. Streaming paths that cannot declare
the
complete task set remain fail closed.
- Authentication telemetry records successful credential resolution
separately from subsequent resource-authorization failures.
- API keys are high-entropy random tokens. SHA-256 is intentionally used
for deterministic indexed lookup, not password hashing.
## Deployment notes
The schema migration must be present before this code is deployed.
Because bearer resolution runs on every authenticated request, deploy
the resolver with additional-key lookup disabled, verify root-key and
public-token parity, then enable lookup before any additional keys can
be issued.
The multi-task authorization tightening changes the result for narrowly
scoped tokens that request tasks outside their grants. Observe
would-deny results before enforcing that check. Request-idempotency keys
are also newly isolated by environment and task, so a retry crossing the
deployment boundary may execute once more before old cache entries
expire.
## Follow-ups
- [x] Add a system-wide kill switch for additional-key lookup, defaulted
off for the initial deployment.
- [x] Add authentication observability by credential kind, result,
latency, and lookup path without recording credential values.
- [ ] ~Add would-deny observability and an independent enforcement
switch for multi-task authorization.~
- [ ] ~Add an independent switch for server-issued batch tokens while
root-key parity is verified.~
- [ ] Confirm every API route reachable by a restricted key has an
explicit authorization declaration or intentionally fails closed.
- [x] Verify root-key rotation, revoked-key grace, and public-token
validation through each bearer resolver path.
Chris Arderne