Attacks that require injecting attacker-chosen cookies into the victim's
browser (e.g. OIDC login CSRF / session fixation via a forged login-flow
-state cookie) are out of scope: SQLPage assumes its origin cookie jar is
writable only by the user agent.
* docs: warn that static serving follows symlinks under web_root
Operators control web_root contents, so a symlink there is a trusted
deployment artifact. Clarify that SQLPage follows such symlinks during
static file serving, meaning a symlink under web_root pointing to
reserved/private files (sqlpage/ config, dotfiles) or to files outside
web_root would make those targets publicly reachable.
Note added to SECURITY.md (Out of Scope), cross-referenced from the
web_root row in configuration.md and an Unreleased CHANGELOG entry.
* Update web_root description for clarity