高然
94fe1bb563
Keep a single OSEP-0018 mention in each file header as a topic marker; remove the per-test / per-step R-* tag noise from comments, docstrings, skip reasons and workflow step names.
185 lines
7.7 KiB
Bash
185 lines
7.7 KiB
Bash
#!/bin/bash
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# Copyright 2026 Alibaba Group Holding Ltd.
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#
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# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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# You may obtain a copy of the License at
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#
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# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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#
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# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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# limitations under the License.
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# Runs the server-path hardening E2E (execd-as-init, OSEP-0018) against a local
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# Docker-bridge server with runtime.execd_run_as_init = true. The hardened
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# isolation TOML (hardening + landlock) is injected into every sandbox via
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# a config-level bind mount + EXECD_ISOLATION_CONFIG, so the whole
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# server -> sandbox -> execd path runs with the floor on.
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#
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# Phase 1: the floor works end to end (reduced caps/seccomp/NNP, env strip,
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# landlock enforcement, capabilities endpoint).
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# Phase 2: fail-open degradation — same server with CAP_SETPCAP dropped from
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# the container ceiling; cap_drop must report degraded while the
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# rest of the floor stays active.
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# Phase 3: custom-policy overrides (R-q) — a [seccomp] deny override +
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# keep_capabilities=["CAP_NET_RAW"]; the ceiling keeps NET_RAW so
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# the ambient raise can succeed.
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# Phase 4: EXECD_INIT <-> TOML drift pin (R-s) — the hardened TOML with
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# execd_run_as_init = false; the endpoint must report init_mode=none
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# and degrade the enabled layers.
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# Phase 5: default-off pin (R-m) — plain server, no isolation TOML, init off;
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# the endpoint must report init_mode=none with every layer disabled
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# and the workload must be unaffected (no floor applied).
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#
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# Usage: bash scripts/python-execd-hardening-e2e.sh
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set -euxo pipefail
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REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)"
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SERVER_PID=""
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cleanup() {
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if [ -n "${SERVER_PID}" ]; then
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kill "${SERVER_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true
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wait "${SERVER_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true
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fi
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}
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trap cleanup EXIT
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run_server() {
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cd server
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export OPENSANDBOX_INSECURE_SERVER=YES
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uv sync
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uv run python -m opensandbox_server.main > server.log 2>&1 &
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SERVER_PID=$!
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cd "${REPO_ROOT}"
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sleep 10
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}
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stop_server() {
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if [ -n "${SERVER_PID}" ]; then
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kill "${SERVER_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true
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wait "${SERVER_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true
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SERVER_PID=""
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sleep 2
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fi
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}
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run_pytest() {
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local selector="$1"
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cd "${REPO_ROOT}/tests/python"
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uv sync --all-extras --refresh
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uv run pytest tests/test_execd_hardening_e2e.py -v -k "${selector}"
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cd "${REPO_ROOT}"
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}
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Images + host workspace + hardened TOML.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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docker build -f components/execd/Dockerfile -t opensandbox/execd:local "${REPO_ROOT}"
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docker pull opensandbox/code-interpreter:${TAG:-latest}
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# The workload has no CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE under the floor, so the host-side
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# workspace dir must be fully accessible to the container uid. The hardened
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# TOML is injected via a config-level bind mount (the server does not stage
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# isolation configs from the execd image).
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mkdir -p /tmp/opensandbox-e2e/workspace /tmp/opensandbox-e2e/logs
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chmod 0777 /tmp/opensandbox-e2e/workspace
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cp components/execd/configs/isolation.hardened.toml /tmp/opensandbox-e2e/isolation.hardened.toml
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cp components/execd/configs/isolation.custom.toml /tmp/opensandbox-e2e/isolation.custom.toml
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echo "-------- EXECD HARDENING E2E test logs for execd --------" > /tmp/opensandbox-e2e/logs/execd.log
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write_server_config() {
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local drop_capabilities="$1"
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local toml_file="${2:-isolation.hardened.toml}"
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local run_as_init="${3:-true}"
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local inject_toml="${4:-true}"
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local sandbox_env_line=""
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local toml_bind_line=""
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if [ "${inject_toml}" = "true" ]; then
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sandbox_env_line='sandbox_env = { EXECD_ISOLATION_CONFIG = "/etc/opensandbox/isolation.toml" }'
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toml_bind_line=" \"/tmp/opensandbox-e2e/${toml_file}:/etc/opensandbox/isolation.toml\","
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fi
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cat <<EOF > ~/.sandbox.toml
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[server]
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host = "127.0.0.1"
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port = 8080
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api_key = ""
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[log]
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level = "INFO"
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[runtime]
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type = "docker"
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execd_image = "opensandbox/execd:local"
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execd_run_as_init = ${run_as_init}
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[egress]
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image = "opensandbox/egress:local"
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mode = "dns+nft"
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[docker]
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network_mode = "bridge"
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# The container baseline must not mask the launcher's own floor: with
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# no_new_privileges=true (the server default) or Docker's default seccomp
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# profile, a launcher regression would still show NoNewPrivs=1/Seccomp=2
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# in the workload. Unset both so the observed values can only come from
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# the opensandbox-launcher.
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no_new_privileges = false
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seccomp_profile = "unconfined"
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${sandbox_env_line}
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sandbox_binds = [
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"/tmp/opensandbox-e2e/workspace:/workspace",
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${toml_bind_line}
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]
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drop_capabilities = ${drop_capabilities}
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[storage]
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allowed_host_paths = ["/tmp/opensandbox-e2e"]
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EOF
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}
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Phase 1: the floor applies end to end (default ceiling keeps CAP_SETPCAP).
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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write_server_config '["AUDIT_WRITE", "MKNOD", "NET_ADMIN", "NET_RAW", "SYS_ADMIN", "SYS_MODULE", "SYS_PTRACE", "SYS_TIME", "SYS_TTY_CONFIG"]'
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run_server
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run_pytest "TestHardeningE2E or TestIsolatedSessionHardeningE2E"
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stop_server
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Phase 2: degradation — CAP_SETPCAP missing from the ceiling.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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write_server_config '["AUDIT_WRITE", "MKNOD", "NET_ADMIN", "NET_RAW", "SYS_ADMIN", "SYS_MODULE", "SYS_PTRACE", "SYS_TIME", "SYS_TTY_CONFIG", "SETPCAP"]'
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run_server
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OPENSANDBOX_HARDENING_DEGRADATION=true run_pytest "TestHardeningDegradationE2E"
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stop_server
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Phase 3: custom-policy overrides (R-q) — [seccomp] deny + keep_capabilities.
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# The ceiling must KEEP CAP_NET_RAW (not in the drop list) so the launcher's
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# ambient raise can succeed; the custom TOML replaces the hardened one.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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write_server_config '["AUDIT_WRITE", "MKNOD", "NET_ADMIN", "SYS_ADMIN", "SYS_MODULE", "SYS_PTRACE", "SYS_TIME", "SYS_TTY_CONFIG"]' isolation.custom.toml
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run_server
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run_pytest "TestHardeningCustomPolicyE2E"
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stop_server
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Phase 4: EXECD_INIT <-> TOML drift (R-s) — hardened TOML with init off.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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write_server_config '["AUDIT_WRITE", "MKNOD", "NET_ADMIN", "NET_RAW", "SYS_ADMIN", "SYS_MODULE", "SYS_PTRACE", "SYS_TIME", "SYS_TTY_CONFIG"]' isolation.hardened.toml false
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run_server
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OPENSANDBOX_HARDENING_DRIFT=true run_pytest "TestHardeningDriftE2E"
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stop_server
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Phase 5: default-off pin (R-m) — plain server, no TOML, init off. The
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# endpoint must report init_mode=none with every layer disabled, and the
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# workload must be unaffected (no floor applied).
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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write_server_config '["AUDIT_WRITE", "MKNOD", "NET_ADMIN", "NET_RAW", "SYS_ADMIN", "SYS_MODULE", "SYS_PTRACE", "SYS_TIME", "SYS_TTY_CONFIG"]' isolation.hardened.toml false false
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run_server
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OPENSANDBOX_HARDENING_DEFAULT_OFF=true run_pytest "TestHardeningDefaultOffE2E"
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stop_server
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echo "Execd hardening E2E PASSED (phase 1: floor, phase 2: degradation, phase 3: custom policy, phase 4: drift, phase 5: default-off)"
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