# Agent Fleet Agent Fleet is the local-first control plane for durable multi-worker runs. It is **not** a separate execution engine: a fleet worker is a headless `codewhale exec` run that the fleet launches and tracks durably. See [AGENT_RUNTIME.md](AGENT_RUNTIME.md) for how sub-agents, `exec`, and the fleet converge on one durable runtime. In product language, a user may still "open a sub-agent"; in architecture language, durable nested work should be a fleet-backed worker with a role. Use Fleet rather than short-lived `agent` fanout whenever the work needs retry, sleep/restart survival, remote execution, receipts, or a ledgered audit trail. The initial CLI surface is: For a guided start-to-monitor walkthrough that combines Fleet task specs with Workflow authoring, see [Fleet + Workflow Tutorial](FLEET_WORKFLOW_TUTORIAL.md). ```sh codewhale fleet init codewhale fleet run tasks.json --max-workers 4 codewhale fleet status codewhale fleet inspect codewhale fleet logs codewhale fleet artifacts codewhale fleet interrupt codewhale fleet restart codewhale fleet resume codewhale fleet stop --all ``` `codewhale fleet resume ` is the restart-recovery verb: it replays the ledger, reconciles any in-flight lease whose worker stopped heartbeating (retrying within the task's budget, else failing and escalating per the alert policy), and prints the post-resume status. It launches no new work and is idempotent, so it is safe to run after a manager exit, laptop sleep, or runtime restart. Fleet state is stored under the workspace in `.codewhale/fleet.jsonl`. Worker logs and adapter logs are stored under `.codewhale/fleet/` and `.codewhale/fleet-host/`. ### Interactive and persistent status `/fleet status` and `codewhale fleet status` are the **same** command on two surfaces. Both read the durable `.codewhale/fleet.jsonl` ledger for the workspace, through one shared control-plane contract, and both report the same verb id (`fleet.status`), read-vs-write authority, persistence scope, and receipt. When the workspace has no ledger they say so with a typed reason (`no_fleet_ledger`) instead of rendering an empty-looking "all clear" — and neither creates the ledger as a side effect of reading it. The current interactive session's sub-agents are a **different set**, and now have their own name: - `/fleet workers` (or `/subagents`, or `n`) shows sub-agents attached to the current TUI session. It does not read the persistent ledger. - `/fleet list|status|interrupt|resume` and `codewhale fleet list|status|interrupt|resume` act on the durable ledger. - `codewhale fleet restart ` is CLI-only: it re-leases the task and then drives the manager loop to completion. `/fleet restart` does not silently do a smaller thing — it reports `surface_not_supported` and names the CLI command. Before v0.9.2, `/fleet status` showed session sub-agents. That reading is gone; `/fleet workers` replaces it. The contract behind this — descriptors, availability reasons, exact-identity targets, receipts, typed unknowns, and bounds — is documented in [`docs/COMMAND_CONTROL_PLANE.md`](COMMAND_CONTROL_PLANE.md). ## Authoring agent profiles (`/fleet setup`) `/fleet setup` (also `/fleet setup edit` / `new`) opens an in-TUI wizard for authoring a reusable agent-team profile. Bare `/fleet` and the `roster`/`roles`/`profiles`/`party` aliases open the roster (the saved profiles). `/fleet workers` opens the current-session worker view; `/subagents` is a compatibility shortcut for that view. For durable run history, use `/fleet status` or the shell command `codewhale fleet status` described above — they are the same command. The wizard is progressive: you make one focused choice at a time — a **role**, then a **model** (`inherit`, or a concrete model from *any configured provider*, not only the one the parent session is currently using), then a **thinking tier** (`inherit`, `off`, `low`, `medium`, `high`, `max`, or `auto`) — and then review the full posture (route, thinking, permissions, tools, scope, and review policy) before doing anything. On Review, press **`s`** to choose where the profile lives: - **Project** (default) writes `.codewhale/agents/.toml` and can travel with this repository. - **Personal** writes `$CODEWHALE_HOME/agents/.toml` and is available in every repository on this machine. A project profile with the same id still overrides the personal profile for that project. Profile scope controls where a role definition is reusable; it does not widen the authority of a running operation. To coordinate several nearby repositories, start Codewhale from their shared parent directory so that parent is the workspace. Explicit trusted external paths or Full Access can still change what tools may reach; workers inherit the active trust and permission posture, never the profile's storage scope. Picking a concrete model pins its provider explicitly: the saved profile records both `model` and `provider` fields, so the route it names doesn't depend on whichever provider happens to be active when the profile is later loaded. Pressing **Enter** ("start") on the review step previews the exact starter profile TOML inline on that same screen; nothing is written until you save it. The `provider` field may be a built-in provider id such as `openrouter` or a user-named OpenAI-compatible provider configured under `[providers.]` such as `lm-studio`; the launch path preserves that id and fails closed if the provider is not configured. When a provider is configured, the review step also offers model-assisted drafting behind an explicit preview-before-save gate: - Press **`m`** to have your first configured model draft the profile. The draft arrives sanitized and bounded — permissions stay at the **fleet floor** (no shell, no trust, approval required) regardless of what the model proposes. - **Drafting is not saving.** The exact rendered TOML preview renders inline on the review step (not in a separate scrollable viewer), so nothing is saved until you press **`g`** or **Enter** to save (or press `m` again to redraft). Saving writes the profile to the project or personal scope shown in the preview. ## Naming: Modes, Workflow, and Fleet These names describe different layers, not competing systems. Plan and Act are the everyday work modes. Operate accepts ordinary messages and keeps the parent's normal tool surface under the same approval, sandbox, shell, ask-rule, and repository protections as Act. It prefers background Fleet workers for independent, parallel, isolated, or long-running work, but does not require a worker for every executable step. Workflow is an optional orchestration overlay for work that needs ordering, gates, shared budgets, replay, or deterministic fan-in. The short public vocabulary is: - **Fleet** = who does the work: the configured workers, roles, models, hosts, and trust boundaries. - **Workflow** = what order the work follows: phases, gates, budgets, replay, and fan-in. - **Lane** = one running Workflow instance and its live progress. - **Runtime** = where and how a Lane executes: local or remote process, provider route, sandbox, and API boundary. - **Workflow** is the repeatable plan and user-facing orchestration overlay: a script/IR that decides which phases and agents run next, keeps intermediate results out of the main conversation, and can be inspected or rerun. A Workflow run should have a visible progress view and a clear active header state instead of feeling like a hidden background task. - **Fleet** is the durable sub-agent configuration and execution substrate: slots, profiles, per-slot models, tool posture, local/SSH hosts, trust policy, leases, heartbeats, logs, receipts, and status APIs. - **High fan-out** is a behavior of a Workflow run, not a separate system: when a phase needs many workers at once, Workflow dispatches them as a Fleet-backed run (durable workers, receipts, goal re-dispatch) rather than reviving prompt-only sub-agent fanout. - **Fan-in is explicit:** when the user needs one combined result, an owner aggregates, verifies, and synthesizes the worker receipts. Independent tasks may finish separately; dispatch is never presented as completion. UI guidance: keep the main transcript calm. A Workflow run should appear as a compact progress card plus work-bar rows (the strip above the transcript, or a side rail) with phase names, worker counts, receipts, and nested indentation for child workers. Use the whale mark sparingly as an active header/status signal; avoid repeating emoji-heavy rows for every worker. ## Exact Fleets and the Reasoning Router An exact Fleet freezes the provider, model, reasoning policy, and permission ceiling of every worker before a Workflow starts. Save it as `fleets/.toml` in the workspace or under `$CODEWHALE_HOME`. Models cannot replace those assignments at runtime: ```toml name = "release" schema = "exact" schema_revision = 1 reasoning_router = "luna-low" [[members]] id = "implementer" role = "builder" provider = "zai" model = "glm-5.2" reasoning = "auto" permissions = "read_write" [[members]] id = "advice" role = "consultant" provider = "openai" model = "gpt-5.6" reasoning = "high" permissions = "read_only" ``` The optional Reasoning Router is a reusable service, not a Fleet member. Save one profile at `routers/.toml` in either search root and reference it from any number of Fleets: ```toml name = "luna-low" schema = "reasoning_router" schema_revision = 1 provider = "openai" model = "gpt-5.6-luna" call_reasoning = "low" ``` At runtime it may choose only the reasoning tier for an already-frozen worker route. It cannot change the worker, provider, model, role, tools, or permissions. The Router call itself is capped at `off` or `low`; more expensive values are rejected. A manually selected worker reasoning tier makes no Router call. Route and reasoning receipts name the worker model and, when used, the Router's exact provider/model so the operator can see which model did which job. If the same bare Router or Fleet name exists in both roots, qualify it as `workspace/` or `codewhale_home/` instead of relying on shadowing. Each member's `permissions` preset is a **ceiling**, never a grant: it is intersected with the live session posture, so a `read_write` member inside a read-only session runs read-only. The intersection becomes the child's real tool envelope — `permissions = "none"` leaves it with no tools at all, and a member without a network tool loses every reaching network surface — `web.run`, `fetch_url`, `web_search`, `github`, the `mcp*` families, and the reaching `rlm` actions — rather than merely being refused at call time. The one deliberate exception is the canonical `Web` family's `search`/`fetch` actions: they are the read-only web surface a read-only member is entitled to (parity with an ordinary scout), so a network-denied member keeps exactly `Web {search, fetch}`. It stays read-only in fact, not just in name: a URL-addressed `fetch` is refused at dispatch, and nothing else on the surface is granted. A member that cannot write loses the mutating file tools, and — when it kept `shell = "full"` so it can run checks — the raw shell as well, keeping the bounded verification tools (`run_tests`, `run_verifiers`) it exists for: an arbitrary shell command mutates a workspace just as surely as `write_file`, so leaving it would make `write = false` untrue. That verification surface is bounded only in its *default* form, so the unbounded arguments go with the shell: a write-denied member may run the built-in gates, but not `run_verifiers` with an explicit `commands` array or `run_tests` with a raw `args` string, both of which spawn operator-supplied programs and are the raw shell by another name. Two of these denials are narrower than a tool name, because two tools reach past their name. `rlm` loads a `url` by calling the fetch tool *inside the process*, under its own name, and `rlm`'s `eval` action runs Python against a live kernel — sockets and filesystem both. So the family is denied **per action**, not wholesale: - **No network tool** removes `rlm_open` and `rlm_eval`, by the legacy alias and by the `rlm {action: ...}` spelling alike. This is deliberately narrower than the capability it protects: `rlm_open` picks its source from *input fields* (`file_path`, `content`, `url`, `session_object`), not from the action name, and the action-policy seam resolves names rather than field shapes — it cannot prove a source is local before the tool runs. Rather than leave a URL-shaped hole, a network-denied member loses RLM loading entirely, **including the purely local `file_path` form**, and keeps only the bounded metadata actions (`session_objects`, `configure`, `close`). - **No write** removes `rlm_eval` only. Loading a large local file into a kernel and reading it is analysis, not mutation, so the rest of the family stays. Beyond those names, a network-denied member is refused at call time whenever any tool is handed a URL-bearing field (`url`, `urls`, `endpoint`, `target`, …) holding an `http`/`https`/`ws`/`wss`/`ftp` address. A URL appearing in file *content* or a search pattern is data, not a destination, and is untouched. A member's `role` picks the worker posture (and system prompt) when that role already fits inside the ceiling — `reviewer`, `verifier`, `consultant`, `planner` — and a domain-specific role such as `auditor` falls back to the narrowest posture the ceiling allows. Tasks cannot override any of it: `model`, `thinking`, `subagent_type`, `allowed_tools`, and `write_authority` are rejected on an exact Fleet rather than silently ignored. Reasoning receipts record the requested tier *and* the tier the provider was actually asked for. Those differ whenever a route cannot express the requested one — CodeWhale's route normalizer sends `high` for a requested `low` on most routes, and Z.AI's GLM routes express only thinking on/off — so the receipt reports the real request rather than the label that was selected. The value a call actually carries is spelled by that route's own normalizer, not by the tier label: an OpenAI Codex route is asked for `xhigh`, not `max`, and cannot be asked for `off` at all. A receipt also keeps a member's **semantic role** and its **permission posture** apart. `member_role` is what the operator named and what gates key on; `posture_role` (present only when it differs) is the built-in tool surface the clamped ceiling permits — so a member named `auditor` running under the `scout` posture is displayed as `auditor` and enforced as `scout`, and neither fact is substituted for the other. A Workflow start fails closed on anything decidable locally: an unresolvable provider or model, a missing credential, a client that cannot be built for a member's route, or an `auto` member with no usable Reasoning Router. Per-task validation that the spawn boundary would refuse anyway — notably a write-capable member with no declared `write_roots`/`exact_files`/`coordination_contracts` — is checked before the Router is called, so an invalid task never spends a routing request. If a spawn fails *after* a Router decision, the receipt is still recorded: the tokens were spent, and any cross-provider disclosure already happened. ## Manager-owned Workflow fan-in When parallel work must return one combined answer, use a manager-owned Workflow instead of a flat `agent` fan-out: 1. **Cast one manager** (operator or workflow orchestrator). 2. **Fan out** child tasks through `workflow` (`task()`, `parallel()`, `pipeline()`, `phase()`) or a single manager session that owns the children. 3. **Wait** for child receipts or completion events. 4. **Aggregate and verify** load-bearing claims before treating them as facts. 5. **Synthesize** one result the operator can depend on. Raw `agent` fan-out is appropriate only for independent, fire-and-forget work where no single fan-in result is required. If results must be merged, compared, or verified, route through `workflow` so the manager owns fan-in. ## Workflow on Fleet The intended high-capability path is agent-authored. When the main agent decides a task needs more durable coordination than turn-by-turn sub-agent calls, it drafts a Workflow script/IR, presents the run plan according to the active permission mode, and the runtime compiles it into typed Fleet work. Fleet remains the sub-agent config surface. It owns slot count, role profiles, saved route pins or inheritance, tool posture, launch concurrency, and the ledger. Workflow owns only the orchestration plan: branch, sequence, loop, expand, review, and reduce decisions. The workflow script must not get direct shell, filesystem, network, provider-secret, cancellation, or TUI authority; workers perform real work as `codewhale exec` processes. Default Workflow-to-Fleet validation is intentionally bounded: - 1,000 total worker agents per Workflow run; - 16 live worker agents at once; larger populations queue (block) on the host's per-run concurrency gate until a live slot frees, then route through Fleet; - 5 recursive Fleet rings as the hard ceiling (default user configuration: 2); - bounded loops only (`max_iterations` required); - bounded dynamic expansion only (`max_children` plus a template required). These are population limits, not a demand to launch everything at once. A 1,000-agent Workflow should still drain through the configured Fleet worker pool. Recommended model layouts, such as a DeepSeek Pro orchestrator with Flash workers in the first ring and cheaper workers farther out, are presets only. Every slot can inherit the active model or carry an explicit model override. Inheritance is literal: the model you select in `/model` is the **operator** (the pinned first row in `/fleet roster`), and any worker whose task spec and roster profile pin no model runs on that session model. Task-level `model` and profile `model` overrides still win; route receipts record which source applied (`task.model`, `agent_profile.model`, or `run.model`). The setup UI should render this as an expanding grid: an orchestrator plus a small number of visible sub-agent slots, with Right/Enter drilling into a slot's next recursive ring rather than trying to show the whole tree at once. ## Task Spec `codewhale fleet run` accepts JSON or TOML. A minimal JSON spec: ```json { "name": "local smoke", "tasks": [ { "id": "lint", "name": "Lint", "instructions": "Run the lint check and report failures.", "expected_artifacts": ["log"] } ] } ``` Workers are optional. If omitted, Codewhale creates local worker slots up to `--max-workers`. Task specs are typed in Rust and keep verification data separate from worker transcripts. A task can declare: - `id`, `name`, `description`, `objective`, and `instructions` - `worker` role, tool profile, tools, and required capabilities - `workspace` root, required files, writable paths, and environment allowlist - `input_files`, extra `context`, `budget`, `timeout_seconds`, and `retry_policy` - `expected_artifacts`, `scorer`, `tags`, and free-form `metadata` Workers write bounded artifact files under `.codewhale/fleet/` and ledger only the artifact refs: kind, path, checksum, MIME type, and size. Receipts record `pass`, `fail`, `partial`, `skip`, or `timeout`; failed receipts may also mark the source as `transport`, `task`, or `verifier`. `codewhale fleet status` surfaces those failure-source counts separately. Deterministic built-in scorers are `exit_code`, `file_exists`, `regex_match`, and `json_path`. Specs may also declare `command`, `code_whale_verifier_prompt`, or `manual`; those record a partial receipt until an explicit verifier pass completes. ### Using Role Presets Tasks can reference a role name, and the fleet manager fills in defaults from the role registry. Built-in roles (`smoke-runner`, `reviewer`, `builder`, `read-only`) are always available; define your own in `[fleet.roles]`. ```json { "name": "smoke check", "tasks": [ { "id": "lint", "name": "Lint check", "instructions": "Run lint and report failures.", "worker": { "role": "smoke-runner" }, "expected_artifacts": ["log"] } ] } ``` The task inherits the role's tool profile, budget, and timeout. You can override any field in the task spec: ```json { "id": "deep-review", "name": "Deep review", "instructions": "Review the entire crate for soundness issues.", "worker": { "role": "reviewer", "tools": ["cargo", "rg", "git"], "capabilities": ["rust"] }, "input_files": ["crates/**/*.rs"], "budget": { "max_tokens": 32000 }, "expected_artifacts": ["log", "report"], "scorer": { "kind": "regex_match", "path": ".codewhale/fleet/report.md", "pattern": "finding|all clear" } } ``` ### Multi-Task Run Example A single fleet run can dispatch several independent tasks in parallel: ```json { "name": "CI gate", "tasks": [ { "id": "check", "name": "Compile check", "instructions": "Run cargo check --workspace and report errors.", "worker": { "role": "builder" }, "expected_artifacts": ["log"], "scorer": { "kind": "exit_code" } }, { "id": "clippy", "name": "Clippy lint", "instructions": "Run cargo clippy --workspace and report warnings.", "worker": { "role": "reviewer", "tools": ["cargo", "cargo-clippy"] }, "expected_artifacts": ["log"], "scorer": { "kind": "exit_code" } }, { "id": "security", "name": "Secret audit", "instructions": "Search for plaintext secrets and report any matches.", "worker": { "role": "read-only", "tools": ["rg"] }, "input_files": ["crates/**/*.rs"], "expected_artifacts": ["log", "report"], "retry_policy": { "max_attempts": 1 } } ] } ``` ## Alerts Fleet alerting is disabled by default. A caller must supply an enabled alert config before anything is sent. Routes match typed fleet event classes, not log strings: - `stale` - `restart_exhausted` - `needs_human` - `budget_exceeded` - `verifier_failed` - `run_completed` Adapter config stores environment variable names, not secret values. Send-time code resolves those names from the environment or a future secrets provider. Ledger records store only audit labels such as `slack`, `webhook`, or `pagerduty`; task specs persisted in the ledger redact webhook URLs and routing keys. Example alert config shape: ```json { "enabled": true, "dry_run": true, "routes": [ { "events": ["stale", "restart_exhausted", "verifier_failed"], "adapter": "ops-slack" }, { "events": ["restart_exhausted"], "adapter": "pager" } ], "adapters": { "ops-slack": { "kind": "slack", "webhook_env": "CODEWHALE_FLEET_SLACK_WEBHOOK", "channel": "#codewhale-fleet" }, "pager": { "kind": "pager_duty", "routing_key_env": "CODEWHALE_FLEET_PAGERDUTY_ROUTING_KEY", "severity": "critical" } } } ``` Use dry-run to inspect a redacted adapter payload without sending: ```sh codewhale fleet alert-dry-run \ --event stale \ --run-id fleet-demo \ --worker-id fleet-demo-local-1 \ --task-id release-triage \ --reason "worker heartbeat stale since 2026-06-13T02:00:00Z" \ --adapter slack ``` The payload includes the run id, worker id, task id, status, short reason, and safe inspection commands such as `codewhale fleet status` and `codewhale fleet inspect `. Endpoints, webhook secrets, and PagerDuty routing keys are shown as ``. ## Status Surfaces `codewhale fleet status` shows compact counts for queued, running, completed, partial, failed, restarted, escalated, cancelled, stale, and verifier/transport failure sources. `inspect` shows the worker state plus the current task objective, role, host, heartbeat, latest event, artifact refs, latest error, and alert state. `logs` prints bounded log artifact contents, and `artifacts` lists artifact refs without embedding large payloads. The Runtime API exposes the same ledger-backed projection behind the existing runtime auth middleware: ```text GET /v1/fleet/runs GET /v1/fleet/runs/{run_id} GET /v1/fleet/runs/{run_id}/workers GET /v1/fleet/workers/{worker_id} POST /v1/fleet/workers/{worker_id}/interrupt POST /v1/fleet/workers/{worker_id}/restart POST /v1/fleet/runs/{run_id}/stop ``` Action endpoints call the same manager controls as the CLI and record their decisions in the fleet ledger. ## Manager-Agent Runbook Manager agents should treat Fleet operations as typed, ledgered control-plane work. Start with `codewhale fleet status`, then inspect one run or worker with `codewhale fleet inspect `, `logs`, and `artifacts`. Use direct reads of `.codewhale/fleet.jsonl`, host logs, or remote files only when the typed CLI/API surface cannot provide the required evidence. Classify the worker before taking action: - `transient failure`: stale heartbeat, host timeout, interrupted transport, retryable provider/network error, or an adapter status that can plausibly recover without changing the task. - `task failure`: the worker completed but produced an incorrect result, domain failure, missing required artifact, or explicit task-level error. - `verifier failure`: the worker result exists, but the scorer/verifier failed, timed out, or disagrees with the receipt. - `needs-human`: missing authority, secret request, destructive operation, repeated restart exhaustion, ambiguous product decision, or conflicting evidence that the manager cannot resolve from typed artifacts. Choose one typed action: - Restart a worker only when the failure is transient, retry budget remains, the task is idempotent or retry-safe, and no permission or secret boundary is involved: `codewhale fleet restart `. - Interrupt or stop only when the current task is unsafe to continue or the operator explicitly asks for cancellation: `codewhale fleet interrupt ` or `codewhale fleet stop --all`. - Do not restart pure task failures by default; preserve artifacts and hand the receipt to the task owner unless the task spec says retrying can produce new evidence. - For verifier failures, inspect scorer inputs and artifact refs first. If the verifier cannot be corrected through typed fleet actions, escalate for human review. - For `needs-human`, draft an escalation instead of sending it unless alert config explicitly authorizes sending. Safe Slack or PagerDuty draft: ```text Codewhale fleet needs attention Run: Worker: Task: Classification: Reason: Latest typed evidence: codewhale fleet inspect ; codewhale fleet artifacts Safe log excerpt: <3 lines max or "see artifact "> Requested decision: ``` Post-run summaries should include the run id, workers checked, classification, typed action taken or drafted, expected ledger effect, artifact refs reviewed, and next owner. Keep summaries bounded; link artifact refs instead of copying full logs or transcripts. The bundled `fleet-manager` skill mirrors this runbook for manager agents. It is a first-party system skill and should be discoverable through the normal skill registry after system skills are installed or refreshed. ## Host Adapters The host adapter boundary supports local child processes and explicit SSH workers. Adapters expose the same operations: start, read status, read bounded logs, interrupt, restart, stop, and cleanup. Local workers run as child processes with stdin closed and stdout/stderr written to bounded fleet host logs. They inherit only a small safe base environment such as `PATH` and explicitly allowlisted variables. SSH workers run through the system `ssh` client with `BatchMode=yes` and a bounded connect timeout. Remote environment variables are sent with OpenSSH `SendEnv`; values are not embedded in the local ssh argv or fleet logs. Example SSH worker spec: ```json { "id": "builder-1", "name": "Builder 1", "host": { "kind": "ssh", "host": "builder.example.com", "user": "codewhale", "port": 22, "identity": "~/.ssh/codewhale_fleet", "working_directory": "/srv/codewhale/work", "env_allowlist": ["CODEWHALE_PROFILE"], "codewhale_binary": "/usr/local/bin/codewhale" }, "capabilities": ["local", "linux", "tests"], "max_concurrent_tasks": 1 } ``` Defaults are intentionally conservative: - no hosted control plane or cloud provisioning is enabled; - SSH requires an explicit host, working directory, and Codewhale binary path; - secret-like environment names such as `TOKEN`, `SECRET`, `PASSWORD`, `API_KEY`, and `PRIVATE_KEY` are rejected from adapter allowlists; - secrets should remain in Codewhale config providers or remote host config, not in task instructions, argv, or fleet logs. ## Security and Trust Boundaries Agent Fleet enforces a trust-level model that separates workers into four tiers. The trust level determines what a worker can access (secrets, network, workspace writes) and how it must prove its identity before being granted those privileges. ### Trust Levels | Level | Access | Requires | |-------|--------|----------| | `sandbox` | No network, no secrets, writes only to `.codewhale/fleet/` | Nothing — default for new workers | | `local` | Workspace reads, gated writes, configured secrets | Local process (same uid) | | `remote-verified` | Network access, bounded capability grants, configured secrets | SSH host-key verification or equivalent attestation | | `operator` | Full access to all secrets, unrestricted writes, any action | Operator-owned machine | The default trust level is `sandbox`. Operators must explicitly raise trust for SSH or container workers through the security policy. ### Security Policy A fleet run may carry an optional `security_policy` block that defines the default trust level, which secrets workers may resolve, what capabilities are granted, and a ceiling on the maximum trust level: ```json { "security_policy": { "default_trust_level": "sandbox", "allowed_secrets": [ {"key": "GH_TOKEN", "source": "env"}, {"key": "CODEWHALE_API_KEY", "source": "keyring"} ], "capability_grants": [ { "capability": "network", "scope": "github.com", "reason": "PR review needs GitHub API access" } ], "max_trust_level": "remote_verified", "require_identity_verification": true } } ``` When a run has no explicit `security_policy`, workers inherit conservative defaults: `sandbox` trust, no secrets, no capability grants, and no identity verification requirement. ### Secret References Secrets are never stored as plaintext in task specs, alert configs, or worker definitions. Instead, every secret is a `FleetSecretRef` — a key name plus an optional source hint that tells the fleet manager where to resolve the value: ```json {"key": "GH_TOKEN", "source": "env"} ``` Supported sources: - `"env"` — resolve from a process environment variable - `"keyring"` — resolve from the OS keyring (macOS Keychain, Windows Credential Manager, Linux Secret Service) - `"file"` — resolve from `~/.codewhale/secrets/` - absent — try all sources in default order (store first, then env) Secret refs are redacted in logs and ledger entries: ``. ### Worker Authentication Workers authenticate to the fleet manager using one of three methods: - **None** — local workers sharing the same uid (default) - **SSH key** — with optional host-key fingerprint pinning and known-hosts verification. The `host_key_fingerprint` field (SHA256:...) pins the expected server key, preventing MITM attacks on first connection. - **Token** — a bearer token resolved from a `FleetSecretRef`, useful for remote workers behind a fleet proxy. - **mTLS** — mutual TLS with a client certificate and a secret-backed private key. SSH workers should always set `host_key_fingerprint` in production: ```json { "id": "builder-1", "name": "Builder 1", "trust_level": "remote_verified", "host": { "kind": "ssh", "host": "builder.example.com", "user": "codewhale", "port": 22, "identity": "~/.ssh/codewhale_fleet", "host_key_fingerprint": "SHA256:aLGqZo1M6c...", "known_hosts": "~/.ssh/known_hosts", "working_directory": "/srv/codewhale/work", "env_allowlist": ["CODEWHALE_PROFILE"], "codewhale_binary": "/usr/local/bin/codewhale" }, "capabilities": ["local", "linux", "tests"], "max_concurrent_tasks": 1 } ``` ### Alert Channel Secrets Alert channels (Slack, generic webhook, PagerDuty) use `FleetAlertEndpoint` instead of raw URLs. The webhook URL can be provided inline for non-sensitive endpoints, or as a secret reference: ```json { "kind": "slack", "webhook": { "url_ref": {"key": "CODEWHALE_FLEET_SLACK_WEBHOOK", "source": "env"}, "secret_ref": {"key": "CODEWHALE_FLEET_SLACK_SIGNING_SECRET", "source": "keyring"} } } ``` The `secret_ref` field provides an optional HMAC secret for webhook payload signing, never stored in plaintext. ### Config File The `[fleet]` table in `config.toml` sets global trust policy defaults: ```toml [fleet] default_trust_level = "sandbox" require_identity_verification = true max_trust_level = "operator" [fleet.exec] # Recursion depth shares ONE axis with standalone sub-agents — a fleet worker # IS a headless sub-agent. 0 blocks child agents (the root worker still runs); # 3 is the default; explicit config clamps to the shared safety ceiling. max_spawn_depth = 3 ``` These defaults apply to fleet runs that don't carry their own `security_policy`. Per-run policies always override the config defaults. ### Capability Grants Capability grants are additive, scoped permissions that authorize specific actions. By default, workers get no grants (least privilege). Common grants: - `"network"` with scope `"github.com"` — allow outbound HTTP to GitHub - `"git-push"` — allow `git push` to remotes - `"provider-secrets"` — allow accessing provider API keys - `"release"` — allow release-related operations (tagging, publishing) - `"workspace-write"` with scope `"crates/tui/**"` — allow writes within a path ### Environment Sanitization The host adapter layer enforces environment sanitization at worker start: - Only `HOME`, `PATH`, and platform-specific vars (`SYSTEMROOT`, `COMSPEC`) are injected into worker processes by default - Environment allowlists reject any key containing `SECRET`, `TOKEN`, `PASSWORD`, `PASSWD`, `API_KEY`, `CREDENTIAL`, or `PRIVATE_KEY` - SSH workers only send explicitly allowlisted variables via OpenSSH `SendEnv` - Secret values are never embedded in worker argv, task instructions, or fleet logs — only secret refs appear, and they are always redacted