fix: block path traversal in Agent Builder file tools

Constrain resolved file paths to the project root so the write, read, and
delete tools cannot escape it via `..` segments or absolute paths.

Change-Id: I3881c230fbc48cda1bca8a75b1e822eecccb934c

src/google/adk/cli/built_in_agents/utils/resolve_root_directory.py

@@ -42,33 +42,43 @@ def resolve_file_path(
     working_directory: Working directory to use as base (defaults to cwd)
 
   Returns:
-    Resolved absolute Path object
+    Resolved absolute Path object, guaranteed to be within the root directory.
+
+  Raises:
+    ValueError: If ``file_path`` resolves outside the root directory, e.g. via
+      ``..`` traversal or an absolute path pointing outside the root.
   """
   normalized_path = sanitize_generated_file_path(file_path)
   file_path_obj = Path(normalized_path)
 
-  # If already absolute, use as-is
-  if file_path_obj.is_absolute():
-    return file_path_obj
-
   # Get root directory from session state, default to "./"
   root_directory = "./"
   if session_state and "root_directory" in session_state:
     root_directory = session_state["root_directory"]
 
-  # Use the same resolution logic as the main function
   root_path_obj = Path(root_directory)
-
   if root_path_obj.is_absolute():
     resolved_root = root_path_obj
+  elif working_directory:
+    resolved_root = Path(working_directory) / root_directory
   else:
-    if working_directory:
-      resolved_root = Path(working_directory) / root_directory
-    else:
-      resolved_root = Path(os.getcwd()) / root_directory
+    resolved_root = Path(os.getcwd()) / root_directory
+  resolved_root = resolved_root.resolve()
 
-  # Resolve file path relative to root directory
-  return resolved_root / file_path_obj
+  if file_path_obj.is_absolute():
+    candidate = file_path_obj.resolve()
+  else:
+    candidate = (resolved_root / file_path_obj).resolve()
+
+  # Keep the resolved path within the root to block path-traversal escapes.
+  try:
+    candidate.relative_to(resolved_root)
+  except ValueError as exc:
+    raise ValueError(
+        f"File path {file_path!r} resolves outside the root directory"
+        f" {resolved_root}."
+    ) from exc
+  return candidate
 
 
 def resolve_file_paths(

tests/unittests/cli/test_adk_web_server_import_isolation.py

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+# Copyright 2026 Google LLC
+#
+# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+# You may obtain a copy of the License at
+#
+#     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+#
+# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+# limitations under the License.
+
+"""Import-isolation guard for adk_web_server.
+
+Importing ``adk_web_server`` must not eagerly pull in the Agent Builder agent
+stack. Doing so reaches ``google.adk.agents`` at import time and breaks
+downstream consumers that import ``adk_web_server`` while ``google.adk.agents``
+is still initializing.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import subprocess
+import sys
+
+
+def test_importing_adk_web_server_does_not_import_agent_builder():
+  # Run in a fresh interpreter so the check is not polluted by modules that
+  # other tests already imported into sys.modules.
+  code = (
+      "import google.adk.cli.adk_web_server\n"
+      "import sys\n"
+      "forbidden = [\n"
+      "    'google.adk.cli.built_in_agents.agent',\n"
+      "    'google.adk.cli.built_in_agents.adk_agent_builder_assistant',\n"
+      "]\n"
+      "loaded = [name for name in forbidden if name in sys.modules]\n"
+      "assert not loaded, loaded\n"
+  )
+
+  result = subprocess.run(
+      [sys.executable, "-c", code],
+      capture_output=True,
+      text=True,
+      check=False,
+  )
+
+  assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr

tests/unittests/cli/test_resolve_root_directory.py

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+# Copyright 2026 Google LLC
+#
+# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+# You may obtain a copy of the License at
+#
+#     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+#
+# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+# limitations under the License.
+
+"""Path-traversal containment tests for Agent Builder file tools."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+from unittest import mock
+
+from google.adk.cli.built_in_agents.tools.delete_files import delete_files
+from google.adk.cli.built_in_agents.tools.read_files import read_files
+from google.adk.cli.built_in_agents.tools.write_files import write_files
+from google.adk.cli.built_in_agents.utils.resolve_root_directory import resolve_file_path
+import pytest
+
+
+def _tool_context(root: Path) -> mock.MagicMock:
+  tool_context = mock.MagicMock()
+  tool_context._invocation_context.session.state = {"root_directory": str(root)}
+  return tool_context
+
+
+def test_resolve_file_path_allows_path_within_root(tmp_path):
+  resolved = resolve_file_path(
+      "sub/dir/file.txt", {"root_directory": str(tmp_path)}
+  )
+  assert resolved == (tmp_path / "sub" / "dir" / "file.txt").resolve()
+
+
+def test_resolve_file_path_allows_dot(tmp_path):
+  resolved = resolve_file_path(".", {"root_directory": str(tmp_path)})
+  assert resolved == tmp_path.resolve()
+
+
+def test_resolve_file_path_allows_interior_dotdot_within_root(tmp_path):
+  resolved = resolve_file_path(
+      "sub/../file.txt", {"root_directory": str(tmp_path)}
+  )
+  assert resolved == (tmp_path / "file.txt").resolve()
+
+
+def test_resolve_file_path_allows_absolute_within_root(tmp_path):
+  target = tmp_path / "nested" / "ok.txt"
+  resolved = resolve_file_path(str(target), {"root_directory": str(tmp_path)})
+  assert resolved == target.resolve()
+
+
+def test_resolve_file_path_rejects_relative_traversal(tmp_path):
+  with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+    resolve_file_path("../../escape.txt", {"root_directory": str(tmp_path)})
+
+
+def test_resolve_file_path_rejects_absolute_outside_root(tmp_path):
+  with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+    resolve_file_path("/etc/passwd", {"root_directory": str(tmp_path)})
+
+
+async def test_write_files_blocks_relative_traversal(
+    tmp_path, tmp_path_factory
+):
+  outside = tmp_path_factory.mktemp("outside")
+  payload = os.path.relpath(outside / "pwned.txt", tmp_path)
+
+  result = await write_files(
+      files={payload: "PWNED"}, tool_context=_tool_context(tmp_path)
+  )
+
+  assert not result["success"]
+  assert not (outside / "pwned.txt").exists()
+
+
+async def test_write_files_blocks_absolute_outside_root(
+    tmp_path, tmp_path_factory
+):
+  outside = tmp_path_factory.mktemp("outside")
+  target = outside / "abs.txt"
+
+  result = await write_files(
+      files={str(target): "PWNED"}, tool_context=_tool_context(tmp_path)
+  )
+
+  assert not result["success"]
+  assert not target.exists()
+
+
+async def test_write_files_allows_path_within_root(tmp_path):
+  result = await write_files(
+      files={"sub/ok.txt": "hello"}, tool_context=_tool_context(tmp_path)
+  )
+
+  assert result["success"]
+  assert (tmp_path / "sub" / "ok.txt").read_text() == "hello"
+
+
+async def test_read_files_blocks_relative_traversal(tmp_path, tmp_path_factory):
+  outside = tmp_path_factory.mktemp("outside")
+  secret = outside / "secret.txt"
+  secret.write_text("TOKEN=abc")
+  payload = os.path.relpath(secret, tmp_path)
+
+  result = await read_files(
+      file_paths=[payload], tool_context=_tool_context(tmp_path)
+  )
+
+  assert not result["success"]
+  assert all(
+      "TOKEN=abc" not in info.get("content", "")
+      for info in result["files"].values()
+  )
+
+
+async def test_delete_files_blocks_relative_traversal(
+    tmp_path, tmp_path_factory
+):
+  outside = tmp_path_factory.mktemp("outside")
+  victim = outside / "victim.txt"
+  victim.write_text("bye")
+  payload = os.path.relpath(victim, tmp_path)
+
+  result = await delete_files(
+      file_paths=[payload],
+      tool_context=_tool_context(tmp_path),
+      confirm_deletion=True,
+  )
+
+  assert not result["success"]
+  assert victim.exists()