8ce77e3c16
* feat(oauth): add stdio OAuth 2.1 stdio login Introduce internal/oauth, a self-contained library that performs the user-facing GitHub OAuth login the stdio server uses to obtain a token without a pre-provisioned PAT. It is independent of MCP: client concerns (elicitation) sit behind the Prompter interface so the flows are testable without a live session. What it provides: - Authorization-code + PKCE flow with a local loopback callback server, state/CSRF validation, and XSS-safe result pages. - Device-authorization flow as a fallback (headless, containers). - A Manager that selects the most secure available channel (browser auto-open -> URL elicitation -> last-resort user action), runs a single flow at a time, and exposes a refreshing token source. Both GitHub OAuth Apps and GitHub Apps are supported without special casing: the token is modeled as an x/oauth2 refreshing TokenSource, so expiring GitHub App user tokens are renewed transparently (the gap that made a stored-token approach silently die after ~8h). When a client lacks secure URL elicitation and the flow falls back to a tool-response message, the message advises the user that their agent/CLI/ IDE does not appear to support URL elicitation and suggests requesting it for improved security. Tests exercise real protocol behavior against an httptest GitHub stand-in: PKCE challenge/verifier, GitHub App refresh-on-expiry, device polling, URL elicitation, declined prompts, the last-resort action with advisory, and single-flight concurrency. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(oauth): reap browser launcher and keep native callback on loopback Address code review: - openBrowser: reap the launcher process asynchronously so it does not linger as a zombie for the lifetime of the server. - listenCallback: take an explicit bindAll flag and bind to all interfaces only inside a container (where the published port arrives via eth0). A native run, even with a fixed callback port, now stays on 127.0.0.1 instead of 0.0.0.0. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(oauth): fail fast when a fixed callback port is unavailable A fixed --oauth-callback-port is registered with the OAuth app and chosen deliberately, so a bind failure means another process holds the port and could intercept the authorization redirect. Treat that as fatal instead of silently downgrading to the device flow, which would mask the conflict. Also warn, when binding the callback inside a container, that the listener is on all interfaces and should be published to loopback only so the authorization code is not exposed on the container network. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(oauth): surface refresh failures, bound refresh, prefer device flow when headless Addresses pre-merge review of the OAuth stdio core: - Log a one-time warning when token refresh fails instead of silently returning an empty access token, so a forced re-login isn't a surprise. - Bound each background token refresh with a 30s HTTP client timeout so a stalled GitHub token endpoint can't block tool calls indefinitely. - On a headless host (no display server) with a random callback port, fall back to the device-code flow — the only channel reachable from a browser on another machine — instead of dead-ending on an unreachable localhost redirect. A generic browser-open failure still offers the manual URL. - Mark the callback bind failure with a sentinel so the fixed-port-busy fatal path can't misreport an unrelated error as a port conflict. - Export NormalizeHost so callers can recognize the default github.com host (consumed by the build-time baked-in credential guard). Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(oauth): wire stdio OAuth 2.1 login into the server (2/4) (#2710) * feat(oauth): wire stdio OAuth 2.1 login into the server Connect the internal/oauth core library to the stdio MCP server so users can authenticate with an OAuth App or GitHub App client ID instead of a static personal access token. - BearerAuthTransport gains a TokenProvider that is consulted per request, letting the lazily-acquired, auto-refreshing OAuth token take effect without rebuilding the client. - createGitHubClients uses BearerAuthTransport (and skips go-github's WithAuthToken, which would pin a static token) when a TokenProvider is set. - RunStdioServer starts without a token and installs receiving middleware that runs the authorization flow on the first tool call, surfacing the auth URL or device code via elicitation (or a tool result as a fallback). - Tool filtering uses the requested OAuth scopes; the default supported set hides nothing, while a narrower --oauth-scopes both narrows the grant and filters tools accordingly. - A sessionPrompter adapts the MCP server session to oauth.Prompter, keeping the authorization URL off the model's context. - New stdio flags: --oauth-client-id/-client-secret/-scopes/-callback-port. This is stdio-only and deliberately does not touch MCP-HTTP auth. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(oauth): address review — omit empty bearer header, guard token/oauth - BearerAuthTransport omits the Authorization header entirely when the token is empty (pre-authorization) rather than sending an empty "Bearer " value. - RunStdioServer rejects the ambiguous combination of a static Token and an OAuthManager up front, enforcing the documented mutual exclusivity. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(oauth): clarify SupportedScopes is the stdio default and tool filter Document that stdio OAuth login requests these scopes by default and then filters the exposed tools to the scopes actually granted, so a tool whose required scope is absent from this list is hidden under default OAuth even though a PAT carrying that scope would expose it. Keep the list in sync with tool scope requirements when scopes change. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Distinguish undeliverable auth prompts from user declines An elicitation prompt that the client cannot deliver (a transport or protocol failure) was treated the same as a user actively declining: any display error cancelled the flow. That conflated a system failure with a deliberate "no", so a client that advertised URL elicitation but failed to deliver it would hard-fail the login instead of degrading. Add an ErrPromptUnavailable sentinel alongside ErrPromptDeclined and have the MCP adapter return it when Elicit fails at the transport level. The manager now falls back to the manual user-action channel on an undeliverable prompt (keeping the background flow alive so the user can still authorize out of band), while a genuine decline still aborts. A context-cancelled prompt is checked first so an ending flow is never misread as a transport failure. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * build(oauth): bake in default OAuth credentials for official releases (3/4) (#2711) * build(oauth): bake in default OAuth credentials via build-time ldflags Inject the public OAuth client credentials (stored as the OAUTH_CLIENT_ID and OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET repo secrets) at build time via -ldflags so official binaries and images ship a working default app for zero-config login. Security relies on PKCE, not on the secret. Local/dev builds leave the values empty and continue to require an explicit token or --oauth-client-id. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(oauth): recognize github.com host aliases for the baked-in client Match the default host via oauth.NormalizeHost instead of only an empty host string, so an explicit GITHUB_HOST=github.com (or api.github.com) still counts as the default and keeps zero-config baked-in login working. GHES and ghe.com users continue to bring their own --oauth-client-id. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(oauth): document stdio OAuth login; make PAT optional in install config (#2717) Add a dedicated Local Server OAuth Login guide (docs/oauth-login.md) covering the PKCE/device flows, display channels and the URL-elicitation security advisory, scope-based tool filtering, the fixed-port Docker recipe and its loopback/port-safety behavior, bringing your own OAuth or GitHub App, and the GitHub Enterprise Server / ghe.com requirement to register an app on that host (custom --gh-host directs login at that instance's authorization server). Reflect that the local server now logs in with OAuth by default on github.com: - README: make the stdio Docker install badges OAuth-first (fixed callback port 8085 published to loopback), drop the PAT prompt, and reframe the PAT as an optional alternative with a pointer to the new guide. - server.json: make GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN optional and publish the OAuth callback port so the registry default works without a token. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
158 lines
4.8 KiB
Go
158 lines
4.8 KiB
Go
package oauth
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import (
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"context"
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"embed"
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"fmt"
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"html/template"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"time"
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)
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//go:embed templates/*.html
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var templateFS embed.FS
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var (
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errorTemplate = template.Must(template.ParseFS(templateFS, "templates/error.html"))
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successTemplate = template.Must(template.ParseFS(templateFS, "templates/success.html"))
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)
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// callbackResult is delivered by the callback server once the browser redirect
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// arrives. Exactly one of code or err is set.
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type callbackResult struct {
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code string
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err error
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}
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// callbackServer is a short-lived local HTTP server that captures the
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// authorization code from the OAuth redirect.
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type callbackServer struct {
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server *http.Server
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listener net.Listener
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redirect string
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results chan callbackResult
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}
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// listenCallback binds the local callback listener.
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//
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// It binds to loopback (127.0.0.1) by default so the callback server is never
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// exposed on other interfaces. bindAll is set only inside a container, where
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// Docker's published-port DNAT delivers traffic to the container's eth0 rather
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// than to loopback; host-side exposure is still constrained by the publish
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// (e.g. -p 127.0.0.1:8085:8085). A native run — even with a fixed port — stays
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// on loopback.
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func listenCallback(port int, bindAll bool) (net.Listener, error) {
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host := "127.0.0.1"
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if bindAll {
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host = "0.0.0.0"
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}
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addr := fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", host, port)
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listener, err := net.Listen("tcp", addr)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("starting callback listener on %s: %w", addr, err)
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}
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return listener, nil
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}
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// newCallbackServer starts a callback server on listener that validates state
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// and reports the result on a buffered channel. The redirect URI always uses
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// localhost so it matches the value registered on the OAuth/GitHub App.
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func newCallbackServer(listener net.Listener, expectedState string) *callbackServer {
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cs := &callbackServer{
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server: &http.Server{ReadHeaderTimeout: 10 * time.Second}, // ReadHeaderTimeout guards against Slowloris.
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listener: listener,
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redirect: fmt.Sprintf("http://localhost:%d/callback", listener.Addr().(*net.TCPAddr).Port),
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results: make(chan callbackResult, 1),
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}
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cs.server.Handler = cs.handler(expectedState)
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go func() {
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if err := cs.server.Serve(listener); err != nil && err != http.ErrServerClosed {
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cs.report(callbackResult{err: fmt.Errorf("callback server: %w", err)})
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}
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}()
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return cs
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}
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// handler renders the callback endpoint. It reports the outcome exactly once and
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// always shows the user a friendly page.
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func (cs *callbackServer) handler(expectedState string) http.Handler {
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mux := http.NewServeMux()
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mux.HandleFunc("/callback", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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q := r.URL.Query()
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if errCode := q.Get("error"); errCode != "" {
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msg := errCode
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if desc := q.Get("error_description"); desc != "" {
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msg = fmt.Sprintf("%s: %s", errCode, desc)
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}
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cs.report(callbackResult{err: fmt.Errorf("authorization failed: %s", msg)})
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renderError(w, msg)
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return
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}
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if q.Get("state") != expectedState {
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cs.report(callbackResult{err: fmt.Errorf("state mismatch (possible CSRF)")})
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renderError(w, "state mismatch")
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return
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}
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code := q.Get("code")
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if code == "" {
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cs.report(callbackResult{err: fmt.Errorf("no authorization code in callback")})
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renderError(w, "no authorization code received")
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return
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}
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cs.report(callbackResult{code: code})
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renderSuccess(w)
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})
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return mux
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}
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// report delivers the first outcome and drops later ones (the channel is
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// buffered for one; subsequent redirect retries must not block the handler).
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func (cs *callbackServer) report(res callbackResult) {
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select {
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case cs.results <- res:
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default:
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}
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}
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// wait blocks for the callback outcome or ctx cancellation, then shuts the
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// server down. It is safe to call once per server.
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func (cs *callbackServer) wait(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
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defer cs.close()
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select {
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case res := <-cs.results:
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return res.code, res.err
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case <-ctx.Done():
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return "", ctx.Err()
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}
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}
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func (cs *callbackServer) close() {
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shutdownCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Second)
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defer cancel()
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_ = cs.server.Shutdown(shutdownCtx)
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_ = cs.listener.Close()
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}
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func renderSuccess(w http.ResponseWriter) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
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if err := successTemplate.Execute(w, nil); err != nil {
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http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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}
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}
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// renderError shows the failure page. html/template auto-escapes msg, so a
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// hostile error_description cannot inject markup.
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func renderError(w http.ResponseWriter, msg string) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
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if err := errorTemplate.Execute(w, struct{ ErrorMessage string }{ErrorMessage: msg}); err != nil {
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http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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}
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}
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