The v0.10.3 release failed its `verify` gate:
--- Auditing: scan-...--manifest.json ---
BLOCKED: Unauthorized URL in binary: https://github.com/DeusData
BLOCKED: Unauthorized URL in binary: https://deusdata.github.io/...
=== BINARY STRING AUDIT FAILED ===
The blocked URLs are OURS — the .mcpb bundle manifest's own homepage and
documentation fields.
security-strings.sh already knows that URL and dangerous-command auditing are
"designed for compiled artifacts" and skips them for text, keeping the
credential and base64 audits that are universally meaningful. Its detection
just had no case for JSON: `file` reports "JSON data", which matched none of
the shell-script/ASCII-text patterns, so a manifest was audited as if it were a
compiled binary. An MCP manifest is exactly the shape that misfires — it
carries project URLs by design, and a `command` field by specification.
This is the first release to ship .mcpb bundles, which is why it surfaced now:
it is the first time a manifest reached the scanned object set. The bundles
were noted as end-to-end unproven until a stable release; this is that proof
doing its job.
Two changes:
- Classify structured-text artifacts by extension FIRST (.json/.yaml/.toml/
.md/...), then by `file` type with JSON/XML added. The extension check also
covers hosts without file(1), where the existing `command -v` guard silently
left every artifact classified as binary.
- Allow-list our own org root and documentation site, so a compiled binary
embedding the docs link (the graph UI does) passes on its own merits rather
than relying on the text exemption.
Tests: the manifest case, plus a control proving the exemption is narrow — the
credential audit still runs on structured text. The existing negative control
(an unauthorized URL in a real binary is still BLOCKED) is unchanged and still
passes, so the binary audit is not weakened.
Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com>
Martin Vogel
673e523879