Files
deusdata--codebase-memory-mcp/tests/test_diagnostics.c
Martin Vogel 0baddf7887 daemon: permanent lifecycle, daemon-backed CLI/hooks, real-Windows hardening, long-path launcher transactions
Daemon lifecycle and Windows correctness, verified on a real Windows 11
ARM64 VM through the maintained test-infrastructure/vm drivers, plus the
macOS and Linux arm64 suites and the container lint gate.

Daemon lifecycle:

- daemon start/stop/status subcommands. `daemon start` launches a
  PERMANENT daemon (spawn shape is byte-exact argv; survives idle
  periods and session ends) and reports an already-active daemon
  instead of failing. Permanence is honored at every stop latch:
  last-committed-client disconnect, host initial-client window,
  coordinator release, and application final-session close — a
  permanent daemon also keeps admitting new sessions after its last
  one closes.
- daemon stop refuses while sessions are active and lists the blocking
  peers (pid/role) that must finish first; an idle daemon drains
  through the activation-shutdown machinery with the ACK ordered after
  connection interrupts. A second stop is idempotent. The wire ops are
  no-cohort first-frame requests with peer fingerprint authentication,
  so stop/status never conflict with an exact-build admission gate.
- One-shot CLI commands now execute through the daemon (index workers
  keep their local supervised path). A cold CLI run that had to spawn a
  temporary daemon prints a hint that `daemon start` removes the
  per-command startup tax; a warm daemon is recycled silently.
- Hooks are connect-only fail-open: with no daemon present the hook
  emits a visible, rate-limited notice (Claude-dialect systemMessage
  plus stderr for other dialects) and always exits 0 — augmentation is
  never allowed to block the caller's tool use.
- Version skew: a newer-build client automatically drains an
  older-build permanent daemon (strict semantic-version triples only;
  dev builds never auto-drain) and the build-conflict message names
  `cbm daemon stop` as the manual escape hatch.

Windows IPC/runtime (real-VM verified):

- ipc(win): persistent pending overlapped ConnectNamedPipe. The accept
  path used to destroy its listening pipe instance on every 20 ms poll
  timeout; a client attaching in the teardown window was severed or left
  on an orphaned pipe object whose HELLO no server handle could ever
  read, absorbing the connect until the client's own timeout expired.
  The pending connect now survives poll timeouts and nothing is
  destroyed while a client could be attaching.
- ipc(win): drain-before-close for final responses. Closing a named-pipe
  server handle can discard a just-sent response before the peer reads
  it (POSIX stream sockets never lose buffered data on close). A bounded
  cbm_daemon_ipc_connection_drain (read-until-peer-EOF; no-op on POSIX,
  immediate on interrupted connections) now precedes close in
  runtime_worker_finish and runtime_reject_inline, so hello-conflict,
  capacity and disconnect acknowledgements reliably reach the peer.
- runtime: CLOSE_INTENT wire frame. A Windows named-pipe client has no
  transport half-close, so close_begin now announces departure with an
  explicit frame (ordered after APPLICATION_CANCEL, before the local
  interrupt); the server releases the client's admission on receipt
  instead of waiting for the handle to close. Admission-drop timing is
  now identical to POSIX shutdown() semantics on every platform.
- runtime(win): client close cancellation. close_begin serializes with
  request publication under the send lock, best-effort sends the active
  token's APPLICATION_CANCEL frame, then interrupts local I/O; the
  server cancels MCP/subprocess work promptly. Contract tests accept
  both correct outcomes (interrupted transport or decoded CANCELLED).
- runtime: activation acknowledgement ordering. The activation ACK is
  the requester's license to act on "snapshotted and draining", so every
  connection interrupt is now initiated before the ACK is sent; a
  session could previously get one more request serviced after the
  requester observed the ACK.
- service(win): deadline-bounded private-file prepare. The conflict-log
  prepare retry loop (100 x Sleep(2), which rounds up to the ~16 ms
  timer granularity) burned ~1.6 s against permanently obstructed paths,
  stalling hello rejections past the client's timeout. The retry budget
  is now a 250 ms deadline; transient share collisions still retry.
- subprocess(win): cmd.exe /C payload encoder quotes metacharacters
  correctly (root cause of the git-on-Windows failure cluster).
- watcher: SHA-256 buffer sizing (CBM_SZ_64 -> CBM_SZ_128) and a native
  Windows stop/unwatch cancellation test with exact-image verification.
- httpd: send_all writes in bounded 64 KiB slices. A single giant
  nonblocking send() on Windows is absorbed wholesale into AFD kernel
  buffering regardless of SO_SNDBUF, so send deadlines and interrupts
  could never engage against a slow peer (and the full payload was
  pinned in nonpaged pool). Slicing restores a deterministic
  backpressure point; a test hook pins SO_SNDBUF for the deadline and
  interrupt tests.
- ui/http: shutdown lifecycle — interrupt checks, response-wide send
  deadline, explicit connection states, refusal to free a server while
  a listener-owned connection is active.

Windows long-path support:

- Central path-aware wide conversion (canonicalize via GetFullPathNameW
  and prepend the extended-length prefix for absolute paths >=240) at
  the compat chokepoints (cbm_fopen/compat_fs/mkstemp/mkdtemp), sqlite
  store opens, and the daemon build-fingerprint/log paths. Deep managed
  installs (a 64-hex generation directory routinely exceeds MAX_PATH)
  now index, stage and activate correctly.
- activation transaction: its own file APIs and the component-walking
  ancestry validators now operate in the extended-length namespace;
  the launcher path is canonicalized (and prefixed when deep) once at
  entry so every downstream exact-string comparison stays
  form-consistent.
- Executable self-resolution uses the wide APIs (GetModuleFileNameW,
  GetFileAttributesW) so non-ASCII install paths survive argv[0]
  resolution.

Windows launcher install/uninstall transaction:

- FileRenameInfoEx names are NUL-terminated in an over-allocated
  buffer. FileNameLength governs per the contract, but filter drivers
  read FileName as NUL-terminated and appended adjacent heap bytes to
  created names — a flaky, garbage-suffixed rename target. Both the CLI
  and the launcher rename helpers are fixed.
- Uninstall retires state via rename-aside (.cbm ->
  .cbm-retired-v1-<tag>-<pid>) with the retired tag shortened to 16 hex
  chars so the bare rename target stays under the FileRenameInfoEx
  NT-conversion ceiling at guard depths; 64 bits still uniquely
  identify the generation.
- When the running launcher's mapped generation backings pin .cbm
  against rename, the backings are relocated to activation-<pid>-N
  .retired tombstones beside the install (a mapped image may be renamed,
  never deleted; the launcher's liveness-guarded sweep reclaims stale
  tombstones). Every relocation is recorded, and a FAILED uninstall
  reverses the moves after restoring .cbm — via MoveFileExW with
  extended-length paths on both arguments, since the deep generation
  target is beyond the handle-based rename's bare-path reach — so a
  restored install keeps its generation backings and stays runnable.
- After a committed uninstall the retired tree's backings are relocated
  out so the tree is shallow enough for the detached cleanup's rd, and
  the cleanup's working directory strips the extended-length prefix
  (CreateProcessW lpCurrentDirectory silently ignores prefixed paths).
- Files created under Administrators-default-owner directories
  (CopyFileW destinations, CREATE_NEW tombstones, probe directories)
  are explicitly owner-stamped so the exact-owner validators hold on
  runner images; guard fixtures stamp hand-built trees the same way.

Diagnostics, tests and infra:

- diagnostics: discovery is now an always-delivered JSON control record
  (new cbm_log_control) that survives CBM_LOG_LEVEL suppression and
  paths containing spaces; placement honors $TMPDIR with /tmp fallback
  via a diagnostics-local helper; the soak parser reads the JSON record;
  documented in docs/CONFIGURATION.md. Red-first coverage for suppressed
  log levels, TMPDIR-with-spaces, and native Windows output-contract
  assertions.
- tests(win): daemon_ipc/daemon_frontend fixtures now build endpoint
  parents with production-shaped ancestry (LocalAppData on Windows, via
  th_secure_runtime_parent_new) — the runtime ancestry validation
  correctly refuses temp roots whose ancestors grant mutation rights to
  Authenticated Users (C:/msys64/tmp, GitHub-runner work dirs) — and
  drive the documented startup-owner publication flow before reading
  generation-bound endpoint addresses. This turns the 26 Windows
  failures previously visible in CI's full-test job green without
  weakening any validation.
- tests(win): the launcher guard covers the full permanent-launcher
  contract including failed-uninstall restore and immediate reinstall
  after uninstall; new daemon lifecycle and reworked hook-augment
  guards run the start/recycle/stop flow end to end.
- tests: CBM_SKIP_PERF is now actually consumed by the test runner
  (it was set by CI but never read, so perf suites ran everywhere);
  four throughput/bench suites are classified as perf, the heavy
  store_arch suite moved to the slow-timeout tier, and two
  wall-clock-sensitive assertions were rewritten as invariant checks
  with coarse hang-detector backstops.
- build/test infra: build-dir safety contract, UI dev-proxy security
  contract, soak daemon-recovery contract, path-safety helper, the
  Windows VM worktree-sync contract wired into scripts/test.sh, and
  vm/win.sh guards building its clean embedded-UI product in an
  isolated BUILD_DIR so it cannot clobber the incremental test build.
  provision-windows.sh now installs Node.js for the guards UI build.

Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com>
2026-07-21 15:32:15 +02:00

587 lines
21 KiB
C

/*
* test_diagnostics.c — Security and lifecycle guards for the optional
* periodic diagnostics writer.
*/
#include "test_framework.h"
#include "../src/foundation/compat.h"
#include "../src/foundation/compat_fs.h"
#include "../src/foundation/diagnostics.h"
#include "../src/foundation/log.h"
#include "../src/foundation/platform.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#ifdef _WIN32
#include <windows.h>
#include <aclapi.h>
#include <process.h>
#define getpid _getpid
#else
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#endif
typedef struct {
char directory[1024];
char snapshot[1024];
char trajectory[1024];
} diagnostics_paths_t;
static void diagnostics_wait_ms(unsigned int milliseconds) {
struct timespec delay = {
.tv_sec = (time_t)(milliseconds / 1000U),
.tv_nsec = (long)((milliseconds % 1000U) * 1000000U),
};
(void)cbm_nanosleep(&delay, NULL);
}
#ifndef _WIN32
static bool diagnostics_file_equals(const char *path, const char *expected) {
char contents[128] = "";
FILE *file = cbm_fopen(path, "rb");
if (!file) {
return false;
}
size_t length = fread(contents, 1, sizeof(contents) - 1, file);
bool closed = fclose(file) == 0;
contents[length] = '\0';
return closed && strcmp(contents, expected) == 0;
}
#endif
static bool diagnostics_capture_paths(diagnostics_paths_t *paths) {
return cbm_diag_test_copy_paths(paths->directory, sizeof(paths->directory), paths->snapshot,
sizeof(paths->snapshot), paths->trajectory,
sizeof(paths->trajectory));
}
static bool diagnostics_wait_for_file(const char *path, unsigned int timeout_ms) {
uint64_t deadline = cbm_now_ms() + timeout_ms;
while (cbm_now_ms() < deadline) {
if (cbm_file_exists(path)) {
return true;
}
diagnostics_wait_ms(10);
}
return cbm_file_exists(path);
}
static char *diagnostics_read_file(const char *path) {
FILE *file = cbm_fopen(path, "rb");
if (!file || fseek(file, 0, SEEK_END) != 0) {
if (file) {
(void)fclose(file);
}
return NULL;
}
long length = ftell(file);
if (length < 0 || fseek(file, 0, SEEK_SET) != 0) {
(void)fclose(file);
return NULL;
}
char *contents = malloc((size_t)length + 1);
if (!contents) {
(void)fclose(file);
return NULL;
}
size_t read_length = fread(contents, 1, (size_t)length, file);
bool closed = fclose(file) == 0;
bool complete = read_length == (size_t)length && closed;
contents[read_length] = '\0';
if (!complete) {
free(contents);
return NULL;
}
return contents;
}
static void diagnostics_cleanup_outputs(const diagnostics_paths_t *paths) {
char temporary[1100];
char rotated[1100];
if (snprintf(temporary, sizeof(temporary), "%s.tmp", paths->snapshot) > 0) {
(void)cbm_unlink(temporary);
}
if (snprintf(rotated, sizeof(rotated), "%s.1", paths->trajectory) > 0) {
(void)cbm_unlink(rotated);
}
(void)cbm_unlink(paths->snapshot);
(void)cbm_unlink(paths->trajectory);
(void)cbm_rmdir(paths->directory);
}
#ifndef _WIN32
TEST(diagnostics_rejects_predictable_tmp_symlinks) {
char snapshot_link[256];
char trajectory_link[256];
char snapshot_target[256];
char trajectory_target[256];
const char *snapshot_seed = "snapshot sentinel\n";
const char *trajectory_seed = "trajectory sentinel\n";
int pid = (int)getpid();
ASSERT_LT(
snprintf(snapshot_link, sizeof(snapshot_link), "/tmp/cbm-diagnostics-%d.json.tmp", pid),
(int)sizeof(snapshot_link));
ASSERT_LT(
snprintf(trajectory_link, sizeof(trajectory_link), "/tmp/cbm-diagnostics-%d.ndjson", pid),
(int)sizeof(trajectory_link));
ASSERT_LT(snprintf(snapshot_target, sizeof(snapshot_target),
"/tmp/cbm-diagnostics-snapshot-sentinel-%d", pid),
(int)sizeof(snapshot_target));
ASSERT_LT(snprintf(trajectory_target, sizeof(trajectory_target),
"/tmp/cbm-diagnostics-trajectory-sentinel-%d", pid),
(int)sizeof(trajectory_target));
(void)cbm_unlink(snapshot_link);
(void)cbm_unlink(trajectory_link);
(void)cbm_unlink(snapshot_target);
(void)cbm_unlink(trajectory_target);
FILE *snapshot = cbm_fopen(snapshot_target, "wb");
ASSERT_NOT_NULL(snapshot);
ASSERT_GTE(fputs(snapshot_seed, snapshot), 0);
ASSERT_EQ(fclose(snapshot), 0);
FILE *trajectory = cbm_fopen(trajectory_target, "wb");
ASSERT_NOT_NULL(trajectory);
ASSERT_GTE(fputs(trajectory_seed, trajectory), 0);
ASSERT_EQ(fclose(trajectory), 0);
ASSERT_EQ(symlink(snapshot_target, snapshot_link), 0);
ASSERT_EQ(symlink(trajectory_target, trajectory_link), 0);
ASSERT_EQ(cbm_setenv("CBM_DIAGNOSTICS", "1", 1), 0);
ASSERT_TRUE(cbm_diag_start());
diagnostics_paths_t outputs;
bool captured = diagnostics_capture_paths(&outputs);
bool emitted = captured && diagnostics_wait_for_file(outputs.snapshot, 1000);
cbm_diag_stop();
ASSERT_EQ(cbm_unsetenv("CBM_DIAGNOSTICS"), 0);
bool snapshot_untouched = diagnostics_file_equals(snapshot_target, snapshot_seed);
bool trajectory_untouched = diagnostics_file_equals(trajectory_target, trajectory_seed);
(void)cbm_unlink(snapshot_link);
(void)cbm_unlink(trajectory_link);
(void)cbm_unlink(snapshot_target);
(void)cbm_unlink(trajectory_target);
if (captured) {
diagnostics_cleanup_outputs(&outputs);
}
ASSERT_TRUE(captured);
ASSERT_TRUE(emitted);
ASSERT_TRUE(snapshot_untouched);
ASSERT_TRUE(trajectory_untouched);
PASS();
}
#endif
TEST(diagnostics_stop_interrupts_periodic_wait) {
char legacy_snapshot[256];
char legacy_trajectory[256];
int pid = (int)getpid();
ASSERT_LT(snprintf(legacy_snapshot, sizeof(legacy_snapshot), "%s/cbm-diagnostics-%d.json",
cbm_tmpdir(), pid),
(int)sizeof(legacy_snapshot));
ASSERT_LT(snprintf(legacy_trajectory, sizeof(legacy_trajectory), "%s/cbm-diagnostics-%d.ndjson",
cbm_tmpdir(), pid),
(int)sizeof(legacy_trajectory));
(void)cbm_unlink(legacy_snapshot);
(void)cbm_unlink(legacy_trajectory);
ASSERT_EQ(cbm_setenv("CBM_DIAGNOSTICS", "1", 1), 0);
ASSERT_TRUE(cbm_diag_start());
diagnostics_paths_t outputs;
bool captured = diagnostics_capture_paths(&outputs);
/* A visible snapshot proves the writer has reached its periodic wait. */
bool emitted = captured && diagnostics_wait_for_file(outputs.snapshot, 1000);
uint64_t started_ms = cbm_now_ms();
cbm_diag_stop();
uint64_t elapsed_ms = cbm_now_ms() - started_ms;
ASSERT_EQ(cbm_unsetenv("CBM_DIAGNOSTICS"), 0);
(void)cbm_unlink(legacy_snapshot);
(void)cbm_unlink(legacy_trajectory);
if (captured) {
diagnostics_cleanup_outputs(&outputs);
}
ASSERT_TRUE(captured);
ASSERT_TRUE(emitted);
ASSERT_LT(elapsed_ms, UINT64_C(1000));
PASS();
}
#ifndef _WIN32
TEST(diagnostics_outputs_are_owner_private_regular_files) {
ASSERT_EQ(cbm_setenv("CBM_DIAGNOSTICS", "1", 1), 0);
ASSERT_TRUE(cbm_diag_start());
diagnostics_paths_t outputs;
bool captured = diagnostics_capture_paths(&outputs);
bool snapshot_emitted = captured && diagnostics_wait_for_file(outputs.snapshot, 1000);
bool trajectory_emitted = captured && diagnostics_wait_for_file(outputs.trajectory, 1000);
struct stat directory_state;
struct stat snapshot_state;
struct stat trajectory_state;
bool secure = captured && snapshot_emitted && trajectory_emitted &&
lstat(outputs.directory, &directory_state) == 0 &&
S_ISDIR(directory_state.st_mode) && directory_state.st_uid == geteuid() &&
(directory_state.st_mode & 07777) == 0700 &&
lstat(outputs.snapshot, &snapshot_state) == 0 &&
S_ISREG(snapshot_state.st_mode) && snapshot_state.st_uid == geteuid() &&
snapshot_state.st_nlink == 1 && (snapshot_state.st_mode & 07777) == 0600 &&
lstat(outputs.trajectory, &trajectory_state) == 0 &&
S_ISREG(trajectory_state.st_mode) && trajectory_state.st_uid == geteuid() &&
trajectory_state.st_nlink == 1 && (trajectory_state.st_mode & 07777) == 0600;
cbm_diag_stop();
ASSERT_EQ(cbm_unsetenv("CBM_DIAGNOSTICS"), 0);
if (captured) {
diagnostics_cleanup_outputs(&outputs);
}
ASSERT_TRUE(secure);
PASS();
}
#endif
TEST(diagnostics_stalled_writer_cannot_retain_shutdown) {
cbm_diag_test_hold_writer(true);
ASSERT_EQ(cbm_setenv("CBM_DIAGNOSTICS", "1", 1), 0);
if (!cbm_diag_start()) {
cbm_diag_test_hold_writer(false);
(void)cbm_unsetenv("CBM_DIAGNOSTICS");
FAIL("failed to start held diagnostics writer");
}
diagnostics_paths_t outputs;
bool captured = diagnostics_capture_paths(&outputs);
uint64_t reach_deadline = cbm_now_ms() + 1000;
while (!cbm_diag_test_writer_reached() && cbm_now_ms() < reach_deadline) {
diagnostics_wait_ms(10);
}
bool reached = cbm_diag_test_writer_reached();
if (!captured || !reached) {
cbm_diag_test_hold_writer(false);
cbm_diag_stop();
(void)cbm_unsetenv("CBM_DIAGNOSTICS");
if (captured) {
diagnostics_cleanup_outputs(&outputs);
}
FAIL("diagnostics writer did not reach the held I/O boundary");
}
uint64_t started_ms = cbm_now_ms();
cbm_diag_stop();
uint64_t elapsed_ms = cbm_now_ms() - started_ms;
bool abandoned = cbm_diag_test_abandoned();
cbm_diag_test_hold_writer(false);
bool reset = false;
uint64_t reset_deadline = cbm_now_ms() + 1000;
while (!reset && cbm_now_ms() < reset_deadline) {
reset = cbm_diag_test_reset_abandoned();
if (!reset) {
diagnostics_wait_ms(10);
}
}
(void)cbm_unsetenv("CBM_DIAGNOSTICS");
diagnostics_cleanup_outputs(&outputs);
ASSERT_LT(elapsed_ms, UINT64_C(1500));
ASSERT_TRUE(abandoned);
ASSERT_TRUE(reset);
PASS();
}
TEST(diagnostics_soak_discovers_daemon_emitted_paths) {
char *script = diagnostics_read_file("scripts/soak-test.sh");
ASSERT_NOT_NULL(script);
bool parses_start_event = strstr(script, "\"event\":\"diagnostics.start\"") != NULL;
bool isolates_daemon = strstr(script, "CBM_CACHE_DIR=\"$SOAK_CACHE_DIR_VALUE\"") != NULL;
bool legacy_predictable_path = strstr(script, "/tmp/cbm-diagnostics-${SERVER_PID}") != NULL;
free(script);
ASSERT_TRUE(parses_start_event);
ASSERT_TRUE(isolates_daemon);
ASSERT_FALSE(legacy_predictable_path);
PASS();
}
/* ── Discovery record contract ───────────────────────────────────────── */
static char diagnostics_discovery_line[2048];
static int diagnostics_discovery_records;
static void diagnostics_discovery_sink(const char *line) {
if (!line || !strstr(line, "\"event\":\"diagnostics.start\"")) {
return;
}
diagnostics_discovery_records++;
(void)snprintf(diagnostics_discovery_line, sizeof(diagnostics_discovery_line), "%s", line);
}
static bool diagnostics_discovery_value(const char *key, char *out, size_t out_size) {
char marker[64];
if (snprintf(marker, sizeof(marker), "\"%s\":\"", key) >= (int)sizeof(marker)) {
return false;
}
const char *cursor = strstr(diagnostics_discovery_line, marker);
if (!cursor) {
return false;
}
cursor += strlen(marker);
size_t used = 0;
while (*cursor && *cursor != '"' && used + 1 < out_size) {
if (*cursor == '\\' && cursor[1] != '\0') {
cursor++;
char decoded = *cursor;
if (decoded == 'n') {
decoded = '\n';
} else if (decoded == 't') {
decoded = '\t';
} else if (decoded == 'r') {
decoded = '\r';
}
out[used++] = decoded;
cursor++;
continue;
}
out[used++] = *cursor++;
}
out[used] = '\0';
return *cursor == '"';
}
TEST(diagnostics_discovery_record_survives_suppressed_log_level) {
diagnostics_discovery_records = 0;
diagnostics_discovery_line[0] = '\0';
cbm_log_set_level(CBM_LOG_NONE);
cbm_log_set_sink_ex(diagnostics_discovery_sink, CBM_LOG_SINK_REPLACE);
ASSERT_EQ(cbm_setenv("CBM_DIAGNOSTICS", "1", 1), 0);
bool started = cbm_diag_start();
diagnostics_paths_t outputs;
bool captured = started && diagnostics_capture_paths(&outputs);
cbm_diag_stop();
(void)cbm_unsetenv("CBM_DIAGNOSTICS");
cbm_log_set_sink(NULL);
cbm_log_set_level(CBM_LOG_INFO);
char recorded_snapshot[1024] = "";
char recorded_trajectory[1024] = "";
bool decoded =
diagnostics_discovery_value("snapshot", recorded_snapshot, sizeof(recorded_snapshot)) &&
diagnostics_discovery_value("trajectory", recorded_trajectory,
sizeof(recorded_trajectory));
if (captured) {
diagnostics_cleanup_outputs(&outputs);
}
ASSERT_TRUE(started);
ASSERT_TRUE(captured);
/* Exactly one discovery record, delivered despite CBM_LOG_LEVEL=none, and
* its decoded paths are byte-exact against the writer's own paths. */
ASSERT_EQ(diagnostics_discovery_records, 1);
ASSERT_TRUE(decoded);
ASSERT_EQ(strcmp(recorded_snapshot, outputs.snapshot), 0);
ASSERT_EQ(strcmp(recorded_trajectory, outputs.trajectory), 0);
PASS();
}
#ifndef _WIN32
TEST(diagnostics_placement_honors_tmpdir_with_spaces) {
char saved_tmpdir[1024] = "";
const char *current_tmpdir = getenv("TMPDIR");
bool had_tmpdir = current_tmpdir != NULL;
if (had_tmpdir) {
ASSERT_LT(snprintf(saved_tmpdir, sizeof(saved_tmpdir), "%s", current_tmpdir),
(int)sizeof(saved_tmpdir));
}
char base[256];
ASSERT_LT(snprintf(base, sizeof(base), "/tmp/cbm diag spaces %d", (int)getpid()),
(int)sizeof(base));
(void)cbm_rmdir(base);
ASSERT_EQ(mkdir(base, 0700), 0);
ASSERT_EQ(cbm_setenv("TMPDIR", base, 1), 0);
diagnostics_discovery_records = 0;
diagnostics_discovery_line[0] = '\0';
cbm_log_set_sink_ex(diagnostics_discovery_sink, CBM_LOG_SINK_REPLACE);
ASSERT_EQ(cbm_setenv("CBM_DIAGNOSTICS", "1", 1), 0);
bool started = cbm_diag_start();
diagnostics_paths_t outputs;
bool captured = started && diagnostics_capture_paths(&outputs);
bool emitted = captured && diagnostics_wait_for_file(outputs.snapshot, 1000);
cbm_diag_stop();
(void)cbm_unsetenv("CBM_DIAGNOSTICS");
cbm_log_set_sink(NULL);
if (had_tmpdir) {
(void)cbm_setenv("TMPDIR", saved_tmpdir, 1);
} else {
(void)cbm_unsetenv("TMPDIR");
}
char recorded[1024] = "";
bool decoded = diagnostics_discovery_value("snapshot", recorded, sizeof(recorded));
bool under_base = captured && strncmp(outputs.directory, base, strlen(base)) == 0;
if (captured) {
diagnostics_cleanup_outputs(&outputs);
}
(void)cbm_rmdir(base);
ASSERT_TRUE(started);
ASSERT_TRUE(captured);
ASSERT_TRUE(emitted);
/* The documented contract: honor $TMPDIR (with /tmp fallback), and the
* discovery record must round-trip a path containing spaces exactly. */
ASSERT_TRUE(under_base);
ASSERT_TRUE(decoded);
ASSERT_EQ(strcmp(recorded, outputs.snapshot), 0);
PASS();
}
#endif
#ifdef _WIN32
static wchar_t *diagnostics_windows_utf8_to_wide(const char *value) {
int needed = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, MB_ERR_INVALID_CHARS, value, -1, NULL, 0);
wchar_t *wide = needed > 0 ? calloc((size_t)needed, sizeof(*wide)) : NULL;
if (!wide || MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, MB_ERR_INVALID_CHARS, value, -1, wide, needed) <= 0) {
free(wide);
return NULL;
}
return wide;
}
static bool diagnostics_windows_current_user_sid(void **information_out, PSID *sid_out) {
*information_out = NULL;
*sid_out = NULL;
HANDLE token = NULL;
if (!OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &token)) {
return false;
}
DWORD needed = 0;
(void)GetTokenInformation(token, TokenUser, NULL, 0, &needed);
void *information = needed > 0 ? calloc(1, needed) : NULL;
bool ok =
information && GetTokenInformation(token, TokenUser, information, needed, &needed) != 0;
(void)CloseHandle(token);
if (!ok) {
free(information);
return false;
}
PSID sid = ((TOKEN_USER *)information)->User.Sid;
if (!sid || !IsValidSid(sid)) {
free(information);
return false;
}
*information_out = information;
*sid_out = sid;
return true;
}
/* Owner is the current user AND the protected DACL grants access to that
* owner alone — the Windows equivalent of the POSIX 0700/0600 assertions. */
static bool diagnostics_windows_path_owner_private(const char *path, bool directory) {
void *user_information = NULL;
PSID user_sid = NULL;
wchar_t *wide_path = diagnostics_windows_utf8_to_wide(path);
DWORD flags = FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT | (directory ? FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS : 0);
HANDLE handle = wide_path
? CreateFileW(wide_path, READ_CONTROL,
FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, NULL,
OPEN_EXISTING, flags, NULL)
: INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
PSID owner = NULL;
PACL dacl = NULL;
PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR descriptor = NULL;
SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_CONTROL control = 0;
DWORD revision = 0;
bool ok = handle != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE &&
diagnostics_windows_current_user_sid(&user_information, &user_sid) &&
GetSecurityInfo(handle, SE_FILE_OBJECT,
OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION | DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION, &owner, NULL,
&dacl, NULL, &descriptor) == ERROR_SUCCESS &&
owner && IsValidSid(owner) && EqualSid(owner, user_sid) &&
GetSecurityDescriptorControl(descriptor, &control, &revision) != 0 &&
(control & SE_DACL_PROTECTED) != 0 && dacl && dacl->AceCount == 1;
if (ok) {
void *ace = NULL;
ok = GetAce(dacl, 0, &ace) != 0 &&
((ACE_HEADER *)ace)->AceType == ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE &&
EqualSid((PSID)&((ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE *)ace)->SidStart, user_sid);
}
if (descriptor) {
(void)LocalFree(descriptor);
}
if (handle != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
(void)CloseHandle(handle);
}
free(wide_path);
free(user_information);
return ok;
}
static bool diagnostics_windows_output_contract(const char *path) {
/* Mirrors production's diag_win_handle_valid: files are secured by their
* owner-private parent directory; the file itself must be a plain local
* regular file — no reparse, no extra links. Owner/DACL are asserted on
* the directory, where the security boundary actually lives (file owners
* follow the machine's default-owner policy, e.g. Administrators on
* GitHub-runner-class images). */
wchar_t *wide_path = diagnostics_windows_utf8_to_wide(path);
HANDLE handle = wide_path
? CreateFileW(wide_path, GENERIC_READ,
FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, NULL,
OPEN_EXISTING, FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT, NULL)
: INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
BY_HANDLE_FILE_INFORMATION information;
bool ok = handle != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE && GetFileType(handle) == FILE_TYPE_DISK &&
GetFileInformationByHandle(handle, &information) != 0 &&
(information.dwFileAttributes &
(FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY | FILE_ATTRIBUTE_REPARSE_POINT)) == 0 &&
information.nNumberOfLinks == 1;
if (handle != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
(void)CloseHandle(handle);
}
free(wide_path);
return ok;
}
TEST(diagnostics_outputs_are_owner_private_windows) {
ASSERT_EQ(cbm_setenv("CBM_DIAGNOSTICS", "1", 1), 0);
ASSERT_TRUE(cbm_diag_start());
diagnostics_paths_t outputs;
bool captured = diagnostics_capture_paths(&outputs);
bool snapshot_emitted = captured && diagnostics_wait_for_file(outputs.snapshot, 1000);
bool trajectory_emitted = captured && diagnostics_wait_for_file(outputs.trajectory, 1000);
bool secure = captured && snapshot_emitted && trajectory_emitted &&
diagnostics_windows_path_owner_private(outputs.directory, true) &&
diagnostics_windows_output_contract(outputs.snapshot) &&
diagnostics_windows_output_contract(outputs.trajectory);
cbm_diag_stop();
ASSERT_EQ(cbm_unsetenv("CBM_DIAGNOSTICS"), 0);
if (captured) {
diagnostics_cleanup_outputs(&outputs);
}
ASSERT_TRUE(secure);
PASS();
}
#endif
SUITE(diagnostics) {
#ifndef _WIN32
RUN_TEST(diagnostics_rejects_predictable_tmp_symlinks);
#endif
RUN_TEST(diagnostics_stop_interrupts_periodic_wait);
#ifndef _WIN32
RUN_TEST(diagnostics_outputs_are_owner_private_regular_files);
RUN_TEST(diagnostics_placement_honors_tmpdir_with_spaces);
#endif
#ifdef _WIN32
RUN_TEST(diagnostics_outputs_are_owner_private_windows);
#endif
RUN_TEST(diagnostics_discovery_record_survives_suppressed_log_level);
RUN_TEST(diagnostics_stalled_writer_cannot_retain_shutdown);
RUN_TEST(diagnostics_soak_discovers_daemon_emitted_paths);
}