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deusdata--codebase-memory-mcp/scripts/ci/check-binary-composition.sh
2026-08-13 19:16:19 +02:00

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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# check-binary-composition.sh — release gate: assert what must NOT be inside a
# shipped artifact.
#
# Microsoft Defender's ML classifier flagged the v0.9.1-rc.1 binaries. The
# hardening pass that followed removed capability or opaque asset bytes — an
# executable stack, an in-process updater, test-only environment seams,
# embedded integration programs, and the in-image frontend bundle. Each of
# those regresses invisibly: one restored #include, one Makefile source-list
# edit, one revived call site, and nothing else in CI notices — the binary just
# quietly restores capability or opaque bytes that this hardening boundary is
# intended to exclude. Their removal reduces attack surface and makes release
# contents independently inspectable; it does not establish which feature, if
# any, caused an opaque third-party ML verdict.
#
# This script is the proof that each removal stayed removed. It asserts only
# NEGATIVE properties (needle absent), plus one canary string we know ships,
# because an absence check aimed at the wrong file — a compressed artifact, a
# stub, a truncated download — would otherwise pass vacuously and read green.
# A missing tool is a hard error for the same reason: a skipped assertion must
# never look like a satisfied one.
#
# Usage: scripts/ci/check-binary-composition.sh <binary-or-dir>...
# Directories are scanned recursively; format (ELF / Mach-O / PE) is detected
# per file from its magic bytes and each assertion runs where it is
# meaningful. Exit 0 = every assertion passed, 1 = at least one failed,
# 2 = usage error, missing tool, or nothing checkable was found (a vacuous
# run is a failure, not a pass).
set -euo pipefail
case "${1:-}" in
-h | --help)
sed -n '2,25p' "$0" | sed 's/^# \{0,1\}//'
exit 0
;;
esac
# ── Needles ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Every needle below was grep-verified against the tree it comes from: it
# exists ONLY in the code the assertion is about, so a hit means that code is
# linked in, not that some unrelated string happens to look similar.
# S6: worker/Windows test seams read these env vars. A release binary that
# still honours them lets any process on the box steer the indexer's child
# processes and file placement. Their absence is a release-security boundary;
# no claim is made about whether a third-party classifier weighs them.
SEAM_NEEDLES=(
'CBM_TEST_WORKER_DESCENDANT_PID_FILE'
'CBM_TEST_CRASH_ON'
'CBM_TEST_HANG_ON'
)
# The in-process updater combined network download with replacement of its own
# executable. That dual-use behavior is no longer needed in the daemon; updates
# now run from install.sh out-of-process. These four needles cover both halves
# of what was removed:
# the download base URL, the checksum URL built on top of it, the GitHub API
# release query of the daemon's background version check, and that request's
# Accept header (which survives even if the URL is ever assembled at runtime).
UPDATER_NEEDLES=(
'releases/latest/download'
'api.github.com/repos'
'releases/latest'
'Accept: application/vnd.github+json'
)
# SQLite loadable extensions = arbitrary code execution through a database
# file. The amalgamation is built with SQLITE_OMIT_LOAD_EXTENSION; if that ever
# drops out, dlopen()/LoadLibrary() re-enters the store layer.
# NOTE: the stripped release candidate can erase non-exported symbol names, so
# the two API names are not a sufficient proof on their own. The dlopen error
# text still works after stripping — it is compiled in only with the feature.
# When the unstripped candidate is inspected, the symbol checks are stronger.
SQLITE_LOADEXT_NEEDLES=(
'sqlite3_load_extension'
'sqlite3_enable_load_extension'
'unable to open shared library ['
)
# The standard artifact must not contain the UI's HTTP server at all: an
# unauthenticated localhost listener plus a process enumerator is unnecessary
# capability in the standard composition. Needles are split across
# both UI translation units and are independent of each other, so a refactor of
# any single one cannot silently disarm the assertion:
# 'HTTP/1.1 %d %s' httpd.c response-status writer
# 'Request Header Fields Too Large' httpd.c status-text table
# '/api/ui-config', '/api/processes' http_server.c route dispatch
# 'ps -eo …' / '[c]odebase-memory-mcp' the popen() process enumerator's
# shell pipeline, both halves
# Verified unique to src/ui/ across src/, vendored/ and internal/ — the only
# other occurrences in the repo are tests/test_httpd.c and scripts/, neither of
# which is ever linked into a release binary.
UI_HTTP_NEEDLES=(
'HTTP/1.1 %d %s'
'Request Header Fields Too Large'
'/api/ui-config'
'/api/processes'
'ps -eo pid,pcpu,rss,etime,comm'
'[c]odebase-memory-mcp'
)
# Canary: proves the needle scan can actually see this file's strings. Without
# it, handing the gate a gzip, a stub or a 0-byte file would pass every
# absence assertion. 168+ occurrences in a real artifact, 0 in anything else.
CANARY_NEEDLE='codebase-memory-mcp'
# ── Args ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
TARGETS=()
for arg in "$@"; do
case "$arg" in
-*)
echo "FAIL: unknown flag $arg (see --help)" >&2
exit 2
;;
*) TARGETS+=("$arg") ;;
esac
done
if [ "${#TARGETS[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "FAIL: no binaries or directories given (see --help)" >&2
exit 2
fi
# ── ELF program-header reader ───────────────────────────────────────
# Resolved lazily: a Windows/macOS-only run must not fail for want of readelf,
# but an ELF in scope with no reader available must fail loudly (exit 2) rather
# than skip the executable-stack assertion.
ELF_READER=''
ELF_READER_KIND=''
resolve_elf_reader() {
[ -n "$ELF_READER" ] && return 0
for cand in readelf llvm-readelf /opt/homebrew/opt/llvm/bin/llvm-readelf \
/usr/local/opt/llvm/bin/llvm-readelf; do
if command -v "$cand" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
ELF_READER="$cand"
ELF_READER_KIND=readelf
return 0
fi
done
for cand in objdump llvm-objdump /opt/homebrew/opt/llvm/bin/llvm-objdump; do
if command -v "$cand" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
ELF_READER="$cand"
ELF_READER_KIND=objdump
return 0
fi
done
return 1
}
# Echoes the GNU_STACK flag field ("RWE", "RW", "rwx", "rw-"), empty if the
# header is absent or unparseable.
exec_load_bytes() {
# Total size of PT_LOAD segments carrying the execute bit. With
# -z separate-code the executable segment holds only code; without it the
# linker merges .rodata in, so this number balloons to nearly the whole file.
case "$ELF_READER_KIND" in
readelf)
# NOT strtonum(): that is a gawk extension, and CI's awk is mawk, where
# it is undefined -- the sum would silently be 0 and this gate would
# pass vacuously on exactly the artifacts it exists to catch. Emit the
# hex MemSiz fields and convert in the shell.
total=0
for hex in $("$ELF_READER" -lW "$1" 2>/dev/null |
awk '/^ LOAD/ && $0 ~ /R E/ { print $6 }'); do
total=$((total + 16#${hex#0x}))
done
echo "$total"
;;
objdump)
echo unsupported
;;
esac
}
gnu_stack_flags() {
case "$ELF_READER_KIND" in
readelf)
"$ELF_READER" -lW "$1" 2>/dev/null |
awk '/GNU_STACK/ { print $(NF - 1); exit }'
;;
objdump)
# objdump -p prints " STACK off ..." and the flags on the next line.
"$ELF_READER" -p "$1" 2>/dev/null |
awk '/STACK off/ { getline
for (i = 1; i <= NF; i++)
if ($i == "flags") { print $(i + 1); exit } }'
;;
esac
}
# ── Reporting ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# PASS and FAIL both go to stdout so the per-assertion sequence stays in order
# in a CI log (stderr would interleave nondeterministically); only the final
# verdict is echoed to stderr, which is what a failed step's tail shows.
pass_count=0
fail_count=0
FAILURES=()
report() { # verdict, assertion-id, file-token, message
printf '%-4s %-22s %s: %s\n' "$1" "$2" "$3" "$4"
if [ "$1" = FAIL ]; then
fail_count=$((fail_count + 1))
FAILURES+=("$2 $3: $4")
else
pass_count=$((pass_count + 1))
fi
}
assert_absent() { # file, token, assertion-id, needle
if LC_ALL=C grep -a -q -F -e "$4" "$1"; then
report FAIL "$3" "$2" "'$4' is PRESENT (must not ship)"
else
report PASS "$3" "$2" "'$4' absent"
fi
}
assert_present() { # file, token, assertion-id, needle, why-pass, why-fail
if LC_ALL=C grep -a -q -F -e "$4" "$1"; then
report PASS "$3" "$2" "'$4' present ($5)"
else
report FAIL "$3" "$2" "'$4' is MISSING — $6"
fi
}
# ── Per-file checks ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
detect_format() { # file → elf | macho | pe | other
magic=$(LC_ALL=C od -An -N4 -tx1 "$1" 2>/dev/null | tr -d ' \n')
case "$magic" in
7f454c46) echo elf ;;
cffaedfe | cefaedfe | feedface | feedfacf | cafebabe | bebafeca) echo macho ;;
4d5a*) echo pe ;;
*) echo other ;;
esac
}
checked_files=0
skipped_files=0
check_file() {
file="$1"
# Two path components: the binary is literally named
# "codebase-memory-mcp", so the parent directory disambiguates the log.
token=$(printf '%s' "$file" | awk -F/ '{ if (NF > 1) print $(NF - 1) "/" $NF; else print $NF }')
fmt=$(detect_format "$file")
if [ "$fmt" = other ]; then
printf 'skip %-22s %s: not an ELF/Mach-O/PE binary\n' '-' "$token"
skipped_files=$((skipped_files + 1))
return 0
fi
printf '\n── %s [%s] ──\n' "$token" "$fmt"
checked_files=$((checked_files + 1))
# A0 — anti-vacuity canary; every assertion below is an absence check.
assert_present "$file" "$token" A0-canary "$CANARY_NEEDLE" \
'the needle scan can read this file' \
'this is not one of our artifacts, or its strings are unreadable (packed/compressed/truncated) — every absence assertion below would pass vacuously'
# A1 — executable stack (ELF only). Every Linux artifact of v0.9.1-rc.1
# shipped GNU_STACK RWE. A writable+executable stack is unnecessary here
# and weakens exploit mitigations, independently of any scanner verdict.
if [ "$fmt" = elf ]; then
if ! resolve_elf_reader; then
echo "FAIL: no readelf/llvm-readelf/objdump available; cannot assert" \
"the non-executable stack for $token — refusing to skip it" >&2
exit 2
fi
flags=$(gnu_stack_flags "$file")
# readelf spells the flags "RWE"/"RW", objdump "rwx"/"rw-" — match both.
case "$flags" in
'')
report FAIL A1-noexec-stack "$token" \
"no GNU_STACK program header found ($ELF_READER) — without PT_GNU_STACK the loader may fall back to READ_IMPLIES_EXEC"
;;
*E* | *X* | *e* | *x*)
report FAIL A1-noexec-stack "$token" \
"GNU_STACK is $flags — the stack is EXECUTABLE (link with -z noexecstack; check .S/asm objects for a missing .note.GNU-stack)"
;;
*)
report PASS A1-noexec-stack "$token" "GNU_STACK is $flags (no execute bit)"
;;
esac
else
printf 'n/a %-22s %s: executable-stack check is ELF-only\n' A1-noexec-stack "$token"
fi
# A1b — read-only DATA must not live in the executable mapping. GNU ld
# enables -z separate-code by default on x86-64 but NOT on aarch64, so the
# arm64 binaries shipped ONE R E PT_LOAD spanning the whole image: 259 MB of
# tree-sitter parse tables mapped executable while amd64 mapped the same
# bytes R only. Section flags said A, not AX -- the kernel applies SEGMENT
# permissions, so section flags were never the control. Heuristic on
# purpose: if executable segments cover most of the file, .rodata is in them.
if [ "$fmt" = elf ]; then
exec_bytes=$(exec_load_bytes "$file")
file_bytes=$(wc -c < "$file" | tr -d ' ')
if [ "$exec_bytes" = unsupported ]; then
printf 'n/a %-22s %s: %s cannot report segment sizes\n' \
A1b-rodata-noexec "$token" "$ELF_READER_KIND"
elif [ "${exec_bytes:-0}" -gt 0 ] && [ "$file_bytes" -gt 0 ] &&
[ $((exec_bytes * 100 / file_bytes)) -gt 60 ]; then
report FAIL A1b-rodata-noexec "$token" \
"executable PT_LOAD segments cover $((exec_bytes * 100 / file_bytes))% of the file ($exec_bytes/$file_bytes bytes) — read-only data is mapped executable (link with -z separate-code)"
else
report PASS A1b-rodata-noexec "$token" \
"executable PT_LOAD segments cover $((exec_bytes * 100 / file_bytes))% of the file (read-only data is outside them)"
fi
else
printf 'n/a %-22s %s: segment-permission check is ELF-only\n' A1b-rodata-noexec "$token"
fi
# A2 — test-only seams.
for needle in "${SEAM_NEEDLES[@]}"; do
assert_absent "$file" "$token" A2-no-test-seams "$needle"
done
# Sweep for seams nobody thought to pin: a new CBM_TEST_* env var added to
# production code lands here on its first release, not on the next audit.
# One narrowly validated seam remains in Windows release artifacts by
# decision: WINDOWS_USER_PATH_RUN_ID redirects the artifact smoke away from
# the tester's actual user PATH. Crash/hang injectors are test-build-only and
# are explicitly forbidden above. Anything else is novel and fails.
seam_allowed='CBM_TEST_WINDOWS_USER_PATH_RUN_ID'
seam_unexpected=''
for found in $(LC_ALL=C grep -a -o -E 'CBM_TEST_[A-Za-z0-9_]+' "$file" 2>/dev/null |
sort -u || true); do
case " $seam_allowed " in
*" $found "*) ;;
*) seam_unexpected="$seam_unexpected $found" ;;
esac
done
if [ -n "$seam_unexpected" ]; then
report FAIL A2-no-test-seams "$token" \
"unexpected CBM_TEST_* seam(s):$seam_unexpected (allowlist: $seam_allowed)"
else
report PASS A2-no-test-seams "$token" 'no CBM_TEST_* seams beyond the smoke allowlist'
fi
# A3 — updater/release URLs.
for needle in "${UPDATER_NEEDLES[@]}"; do
assert_absent "$file" "$token" A3-no-updater-urls "$needle"
done
# A4 — SQLite loadable-extension surface.
for needle in "${SQLITE_LOADEXT_NEEDLES[@]}"; do
assert_absent "$file" "$token" A4-no-sqlite-loadext "$needle"
done
# Positive control for A4: the symbol needles can be absent on a stripped
# candidate even when the feature is compiled in, so that candidate's
# absence assertion can pass vacuously. SQLite's own compile-option table names
# every OMIT_* it was built with — when that table is present (it ships
# unless SQLITE_OMIT_COMPILEOPTION_DIAGS is set) it proves the omission
# positively rather than by absence.
if LC_ALL=C grep -a -q -F -e 'sqlite_compileoption_get' "$file"; then
assert_present "$file" "$token" A4-no-sqlite-loadext 'OMIT_LOAD_EXTENSION' \
'sqlite reports SQLITE_OMIT_LOAD_EXTENSION' \
'sqlite was NOT built with SQLITE_OMIT_LOAD_EXTENSION, so the dlopen()/LoadLibrary() extension loader is linked in'
else
printf 'n/a %-22s %s: %s\n' A4-no-sqlite-loadext "$token" \
"sqlite compile-option table absent; A4 rests on absence needles only"
fi
# A5 — UI/HTTP subsystem. One composition ships and it serves the graph UI
# from embedded assets, so the HTTP server belongs here by construction.
# CBM_CHECK_UI_ABSENT=1 still enforces absence for any future headless build.
if [ "${CBM_CHECK_UI_ABSENT:-0}" = "1" ]; then
for needle in "${UI_HTTP_NEEDLES[@]}"; do
assert_absent "$file" "$token" A5-no-ui-http "$needle"
done
else
printf 'n/a %-22s %s: UI-capable artifact, HTTP server ships here by design\n' \
A5-no-ui-http "$token"
fi
}
# ── Walk the targets ────────────────────────────────────────────────
for target in "${TARGETS[@]}"; do
if [ -d "$target" ]; then
# "! -type d" rather than "-type f": a symlinked or otherwise unusual
# artifact must produce a visible skip line, never vanish from the run.
# sort keeps the report order stable across platforms (find order is not).
while IFS= read -r f; do
[ -n "$f" ] && check_file "$f"
done <<EOF
$(find "$target" ! -type d | LC_ALL=C sort)
EOF
elif [ -f "$target" ]; then
check_file "$target"
else
echo "FAIL: $target is neither a file nor a directory" >&2
exit 2
fi
done
printf '\n'
if [ "$checked_files" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "FAIL: no ELF/Mach-O/PE binary found in the given targets ($skipped_files file(s) skipped)" >&2
echo " a gate that checked nothing is not a green gate" >&2
exit 2
fi
if [ "$fail_count" -ne 0 ]; then
echo "BINARY COMPOSITION GATE FAILED: $fail_count assertion(s) over $checked_files binary/binaries" >&2
for f in "${FAILURES[@]}"; do
echo " - $f" >&2
done
exit 1
fi
echo "BINARY COMPOSITION OK: $pass_count assertion(s) passed over $checked_files binary/binaries"