v0.10.4
324 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Martin Vogel
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07240cf45c |
fix(ci): publish VT evidence under the marker the gate actually writes
The v0.10.4 release (run 31755436916) failed at the very last step of `verify`, after all 69 other jobs had passed — full test matrix, all eight builds, smoke and soak: publish-vt-evidence: wrong evidence marker in binaries/vt-results.tsv The results format was bumped to `cbm-virustotal-results-v2` in #1596, but publish-vt-evidence.sh still demanded `-v1`. It was the only straggler: the gate, the selector, the notes renderer and all three contract fixtures were already on v2. It survived because that PR had removed the script's only caller, leaving it dead code that nothing exercised. Restoring the full-surface scan restored the caller too, and the stale expectation surfaced in the worst possible place — at the end of a real release rather than in a dry-run, since `verify` does not run in dry-runs. Also adds the guard that would have caught it: every marker publish-vt-evidence.sh validates must be one the gate actually writes. Revert-checked — reintroducing v1 fails with "publisher expects marker never written by the gate: cbm-virustotal-results-v1". The scan itself passed. This is purely the evidence-publishing step. Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com> |
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Martin Vogel
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7b4533b67d |
fix(ci): finish the three-candidate wiring and restore full-surface VT scanning
Two things, both found by the dry-run and by sweeping what it exposed.
1. The three-candidate change was incomplete. The dry-run failed at
stage-release-candidates.py, which carries its OWN copy of the transform
validation that the previous commit only fixed in the selector:
stage-release-candidates: candidate linux-amd64/debug-stripped has
invalid transform: 'strip-debug'
Sweeping for that assumption found it in six places, not two:
stage-release-candidates.py, select-release-candidates.py,
verify-release-selection.py, append-vt-notes.sh and two contract-test
fixtures — as hardcoded 16s, `len(TARGETS) * 2`, two-entry VARIANTS tuples
and two-key truth tables. All are now derived from len(VARIANTS).
Field prefixes needed care: the variant NAME keeps its hyphen because it is
the on-disk directory, while the evidence columns use underscores, so
`debug-stripped` reads `debug_stripped_sha256`. Every lookup now goes through
an explicit FIELD_KEY map instead of interpolating the variant directly.
The selection contract test now covers the truth table EXHAUSTIVELY: three
variants x two tolerated classifications is exactly eight combinations, and
there are exactly eight targets, so every case is exercised once.
2. Full-surface VirusTotal scanning is restored. This PR had moved scanning
upstream to the candidates and deleted the post-package pass, which silently
narrowed coverage from everything we ship to executables only. The 42 runtime
files across the 14 containers — install.sh, install.ps1, LICENSE,
THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md, the MCPB manifest.json and the unpacked UI assets —
were still extracted, structurally verified and strings-audited, but no
longer scanned at all. install.sh and install.ps1 are the highest-consequence
non-executable bytes we publish; users pipe them straight into a shell.
The verify job scans every extracted object again, under the same policy.
Re-submitting the selected executables alongside them is close to free
because VirusTotal is content-addressed and answers for identical bytes from
its own record — the same property that made the analysis-id equality check
untenable two commits ago.
The gate-chain contract asserted the opposite ("duplicate post-package
VirusTotal path remains"). That assertion is inverted: the pass is required,
and it is not a duplicate, since it covers a strictly larger set. README and
SECURITY.md updated from "archive containers are checksummed rather than
redundantly rescanned" to state the full covered surface.
All five release/VT contract tests pass.
Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com>
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Martin Vogel
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98d7dbab01 |
feat(ci): add a third release candidate (debug-stripped) as an extra VT draw
Release evidence from run 31744302624 shows the tolerated Microsoft `!ml` verdict is close to a coin flip per byte image rather than a property of the code. Across the eight targets the stripped and unstripped candidates of the SAME linker output disagreed on four, and in both directions: linux-amd64 stripped microsoft-ml unstripped clean darwin-arm64 stripped clean unstripped microsoft-ml linux-arm64 stripped clean unstripped microsoft-ml If the classifier were keying on something intrinsic to our code the siblings would agree; they do not. So each variant is close to an independent draw, and 5 of 16 candidates drew the flag. Two draws is not always enough. On that run linux-amd64-portable came back microsoft-ml on BOTH candidates, leaving no clean binary to ship for that target. A third independent draw at a ~31% observed per-candidate hit rate takes the both/all-flagged case from roughly 1-in-10 per target to roughly 1-in-30. The third candidate is `--strip-debug` (Apple: `-S`): debug information removed, symbol table kept. Behaviourally identical to the other two — same linker output, only metadata differs — but a distinct byte image, which is all VirusTotal needs to scan it as its own file. Verified on the real v0.10.4 candidates: linux-amd64 gives three distinct hashes (294,634,656 / 294,623,208 / 293,746,096 bytes) and darwin-arm64 likewise, with the ad-hoc signature verifying after strip. Selection is unchanged in spirit and now ordered: smallest artifact first (stripped, debug-stripped, unstripped), take the first CLEAN one, and only if every candidate drew the tolerated verdict ship the smallest flagged one. A hard verdict on any candidate still blocks the release before selection. Cost is 24 objects per release instead of 16. Derivation enforces that all three hashes differ — identical candidates would be one draw wearing three hats, and the selector would believe it had alternatives it does not have. Public claims in README, SECURITY.md and docs/index.html updated from "both stripped and unstripped" to the three candidates. All three release contract tests pass, including the native derivation test which exercises the real strip and codesign path on this host. Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com> |
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Martin Vogel
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db26e9615e |
fix(ci): stop gating the release on how many VirusTotal engines answered
The build+VT dry-run (run 31744302624) blocked all eight targets on:
BLOCKED: objects/3eb486a4... completed with only 48/75 decisive engines (< 50)
That object is the windows-arm64 STRIPPED candidate with ZERO detections. It
was classified "hard" — the same bucket as a real malware verdict — purely
because 48 engines answered instead of 50. Its own sibling scanned clean with
66.
How many engines return a decisive result is VirusTotal fleet availability on
the day, not a property of our binary. These artifacts are ~300 MB and many
engines skip or time out at that size, so the count sits near the floor and
moves run to run: on this run one object landed at 48 and the other fifteen
spread 59-68. A floor there makes shipping a lottery decided by someone else's
infrastructure, which is exactly what our CI-determinism rule forbids, and it is
not something we can influence by fixing anything on our side.
Classification now depends only on what engines FOUND:
hard - two or more engines, any non-Microsoft engine, any label that is
not `!ml`, or anything suspicious. Still blocks the release.
microsoft-ml- exactly one Microsoft `!ml`. Tolerated and disclosed.
clean - nothing flagged.
The decisive-engine count is still recorded per candidate in the results
manifest and printed as a NOTE when it is below the reference value, so the
evidence is unchanged; only its power to block is gone. The selector keeps
rejecting an incoherent response (total < completed).
Public claims updated to match in README.md, SECURITY.md and docs/index.html —
all three promised "at least 50 decisive engines" as a publication requirement,
which would no longer have been true.
Contract test updated: a clean verdict now stands regardless of engine count,
and the below-reference NOTE must still be reported. All three release contract
tests pass (vt-gate-policy, release-gate-chain, candidate-derivation).
Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com>
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Martin Vogel
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4cf9579833 |
docs(ci): state the real reason the VT verdict binds to bytes, not to an id
The previous commit framed accepting VirusTotal's own analysis id as giving up
freshness. That was the wrong way round.
VirusTotal recognising our bytes is desirable: the evidence this pipeline
publishes is the hash-keyed file report — append-vt-notes.sh asserts the URL is
exactly .../gui/file/<sha256>/detection — so the report we gate on is the same
one a reader gets by looking that SHA-256 up themselves. Requiring a freshly
minted analysis id would have contradicted the evidence we publish next to it,
and made our verdict unreproducible by anyone outside the release job.
Comment-only; no behaviour change. The build+VT dry-run on
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Martin Vogel
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094929fddc |
fix(ci): bind the VirusTotal verdict to the bytes, not to the analysis id
The dry-run for this branch (run 31729540899) failed in `select-package`, the new job, after every build had completed and before smoke — the exact shape of failure that would have taken a release down: BLOCKED: VirusTotal response analysis id does not match the submitted analysis: objects/70fbbc37... That object is the linux-arm64 UNSTRIPPED candidate, 295,476,856 bytes. VirusTotal is content-addressed, and for bytes it already holds it may answer with its own canonical analysis rather than the one this upload created. A large release binary is exactly the artifact most likely to be already on file, so requiring the ids to be equal would have recurred on most releases rather than being a one-off. The equality check was guarding the right idea at the wrong level. What has to hold is that a verdict describes THESE bytes, and parse_completed already enforces that a few lines below against meta.file_info.sha256 and file_info.size — a strictly stronger binding than the id. It is also what keeps a tuple's two candidates apart: stripped and unstripped differ in hash by construction (70fbbc37... vs 28b3890f... on linux-arm64), so neither can be read as the other whatever ids VirusTotal hands out. The wrong-hash and wrong-size contract cases pin that and still block. The property deliberately given up is freshness: an older cached analysis of identical bytes is now accepted. For identical bytes that is the same content risk, and it buys a gate that is deterministic instead of one that fails whenever VirusTotal recognises our own binary. The submitted id is still recorded in the results manifest as evidence. The selection policy is unchanged and needs no change: stripped clean ships stripped; stripped microsoft-ml with a clean unstripped ships the clean one; both microsoft-ml ships stripped; a hard verdict on either sibling still blocks the release for analysis. Contract test updated to assert the passing direction, and revert-checked: with the fix reverted it fails with the production message, with it applied it passes. Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com> |
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Martin Vogel
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3904e59372 |
ci: select release binaries before smoke testing
Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com> |
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Martin Vogel
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1d92d37f9e |
test(install): pin that index deletion runs after every abortable step (#1558)
On 0.9.0 -> 0.10.2, `update -y` auto-confirmed deleting other projects' indexes, removed two .db files (~59 MB), and THEN aborted on an interactive prompt it could not answer in a non-interactive shell. The run failed; the data was already gone. Reported by @PsyTech-Rob. The current code is already correct: both activation flows prompt early but delete late, after the binary swap and agent configuration, and both return before the deletion when configuration fails. #1538 also removed the specific prompt that aborted. So this commit fixes nothing — it stops the fix from being undone, which is the part that was missing. The reporter made exactly this point: removing one bad prompt addressed the instance, not the rule. Contract: in each flow that deletes indexes, cbm_remove_indexes() must appear after the agent-configuration call. It keys on the CALL rather than a local result variable, because the two flows spell that result differently, and it fails loudly if a flow is renamed rather than passing vacuously. Verified by reverting: moving the deletion ahead of configuration reproduces Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com> #1558's shape and the contract goes red. |
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Martin Vogel
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673e523879 |
fix(security-strings): audit .mcpb manifests as structured text, not as binaries
The v0.10.3 release failed its `verify` gate:
--- Auditing: scan-...--manifest.json ---
BLOCKED: Unauthorized URL in binary: https://github.com/DeusData
BLOCKED: Unauthorized URL in binary: https://deusdata.github.io/...
=== BINARY STRING AUDIT FAILED ===
The blocked URLs are OURS — the .mcpb bundle manifest's own homepage and
documentation fields.
security-strings.sh already knows that URL and dangerous-command auditing are
"designed for compiled artifacts" and skips them for text, keeping the
credential and base64 audits that are universally meaningful. Its detection
just had no case for JSON: `file` reports "JSON data", which matched none of
the shell-script/ASCII-text patterns, so a manifest was audited as if it were a
compiled binary. An MCP manifest is exactly the shape that misfires — it
carries project URLs by design, and a `command` field by specification.
This is the first release to ship .mcpb bundles, which is why it surfaced now:
it is the first time a manifest reached the scanned object set. The bundles
were noted as end-to-end unproven until a stable release; this is that proof
doing its job.
Two changes:
- Classify structured-text artifacts by extension FIRST (.json/.yaml/.toml/
.md/...), then by `file` type with JSON/XML added. The extension check also
covers hosts without file(1), where the existing `command -v` guard silently
left every artifact classified as binary.
- Allow-list our own org root and documentation site, so a compiled binary
embedding the docs link (the graph UI does) passes on its own merits rather
than relying on the text exemption.
Tests: the manifest case, plus a control proving the exemption is narrow — the
credential audit still runs on structured text. The existing negative control
(an unauthorized URL in a real binary is still BLOCKED) is unchanged and still
passes, so the binary audit is not weakened.
Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com>
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Martin Vogel
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a654acbc88 |
fix(test-infra): grant the build-dir ACL by SID, not by name (#1532 follow-up)
The local Windows leg caught this within hours of merging #1532: on a machine that is not domain-joined, USERDOMAIN is the literal string WORKGROUP, and `WORKGROUP\test` is not a resolvable principal — WARN: build-dir DACL stamp (pre-wave) failed (user=WORKGROUP\test ...): WORKGROUP\test: No mapping between account names and security IDs was done. so the grant fails outright and the tree keeps its inherited `Authenticated Users:(M)`. The guard then correctly reports that cross-account mutation is still possible, and the whole leg stops. Since most Windows machines are not domain-joined, that is the common case, not the exotic one. #1532 was fixing a real bug in the other direction (a bare name resolves against the machine first, so a host named like its user grants to an empty principal). Both failures are name RESOLUTION failures, so this stops resolving names: the account is identified by SID, which is unambiguous everywhere. The SYSTEM and Administrators grants in these same commands have always used that form — the current user was the odd one out. Name lookup survives only as a fallback where PowerShell is unavailable. Applied to all three scripts carrying the stamp (run-tests-parallel, soak-test, memlab), since they share the failure and would otherwise drift apart. Co-Authored-By: Kiborgik <Kiborgik@users.noreply.github.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com> |
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Martin Vogel
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e5d7a2027c |
Merge pull request #1532 from Kiborgik/fix/build-dir-owner-qualified-name
fix(test): qualify build-dir owner with its domain |
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Martin Vogel
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141efe3766 |
fix(release): restore exec bits on the new mcpb scripts
core.filemode=false hid the +x here, and release.yml invokes the registry-entries generator directly — a 644 mode would fail the publish job the first time it runs. Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com> |
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Martin Vogel
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b6a5d2c35b |
feat(release): ship MCPB bundles and publish them to the MCP Registry (#1246)
Every release now carries .mcpb one-click-install bundles alongside the archives, and the MCP Registry entry lists them with per-file sha256: - package-release.sh (canonical) builds codebase-memory-mcp-<target>.mcpb for darwin/windows and the STATIC linux builds — manifest.json + the same staged (stripped, gated) binary + LICENSE + THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md. The glibc-dynamic linux targets stay archive-only: a dynamic binary defeats the one-click promise. - _build.yml / release-draft: bundles flow through provenance attestation, checksums.txt, cosign signing and the release asset list; checksums.txt is also preserved as a same-run artifact for the registry job. - verify: the canonical scan matrix grows to 14 containers; MCPB manifests are validated (parse, binary server, entry_point member, command binds the entry point). Bundle binaries dedupe to the archive scan objects, so the VT gate gains only the three distinct manifest.json files. - publish-mcp-registry: gen-mcpb-registry-entries.sh appends one mcpb package entry per bundle (release-asset URL + fileSha256 from the attested checksums) to server.json before mcp-publisher runs. Idempotent; a checksums file without bundles is a hard failure. - contracts: Step 0o pins the bundle shape at its producer on every leg, Step 0p pins the registry entries against the live server.json, and the extractor contract covers the 14-container matrix incl. broken-manifest fail-closed cases. The linux test image gains zip for the packager. Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com> |
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Martin Vogel
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8eabe191d2 |
fix(install,daemon): unbreak npx clients, group-writable homes, and legacy updaters
Five field reports in the 24 hours after v0.10.0 all pointed at the same thing: gates that were right in principle refused real, ordinary setups, and then failed to say why. Per the consolidated strictness decision, each gate keeps the protection that matters and drops the part that was refusing legitimate users — and every refusal now names what it refused and how to proceed. **Daemon image gate: npx and every ephemeral install path (#1539, #1383).** The admission check treated "the peer's image hashes differently" and "the peer's image cannot be examined at all" as one failure. The second is what `npx codebase-memory-mcp` always produces (ephemeral cache path, unfingerprintable), so every npx-invoked client was rejected — and, because the client never reported it, agents saw a transport that closed mid-handshake with zero bytes on stdout. Reported by @wassolles with the admission path already read and the fix space mapped. An unverifiable image is now admitted: the rendezvous HELLO immediately above it has already proven semantic version, build fingerprint, and protocol/store/ feature ABI, and the image check was trading that real proof for an unavailable one. It logs daemon.client_image_unverifiable_admitted so the weaker check is never invisible. A fingerprint MISMATCH — the tamper case the gate exists for — still rejects hard. Separate test seams keep the two modes testable apart. **Client bootstrap failures are no longer silent (#1539).** An MCP client that cannot reach the daemon now emits a JSON-RPC error on stdout naming the reason, plus the same text on stderr. Previously the reason sat in bootstrap_result.message and the process exited having written nothing at all. **POSIX activation: group-writable ancestors (#1535, discussion #1526).** activation_directory_secure required no group or other write bit on the install directory AND every ancestor. WSL2 ships ~ and ~/.local at 0775, as do several distro skeletons and any site using a shared primary group, so install.sh failed for a large fraction of Linux users — reporting a policy refusal as "activation transaction I/O failed", which sent reporters after disk errors and filesystem types. Root-caused by @AmirF194 in a clean ubuntu container; @shochdoerfer and @iandol confirmed independently. World-writable ancestors are still refused (any local user could swap a path component mid-transaction). Group-writable ancestors are now warned about and admitted. The LEAF directory stays strictly owner-private — that is where the binary is published, and group write there would let another account replace the executable between validation and exec. Refusals now name the directory, its mode, and which rule refused. **The obsolete ui/standard chooser (#1538, from discussion #1526).** v0.10.0 consolidated to one archive per platform with the UI always embedded, but `update` still offered a variant choice: "ui" could only 404, and "standard" quietly WAS the UI build. Reported by @iandol upgrading 0.9.0 -> 0.10.0. The chooser, its --standard/--ui flags, and the ui- URL plumbing are removed, along with the CBM_VARIANT=ui remnant in the npm installer. Already-released 0.9.x binaries cannot be fixed retroactively, so the release workflow now publishes byte-identical ui-*-named alias assets — their updaters work again with no user action. The aliases are uploaded AFTER the VirusTotal gate: they are the same bytes as archives it already cleared, and uploading them earlier would duplicate every object in the scan set and the provenance manifest. **macOS install noise and attribution (#1537).** install.sh silenced the "No such xattr: com.apple.quarantine" line, which is what happens when a curl-downloaded archive carries no quarantine attribute — harmless, and it became the title of a bug report about an unrelated failure. The session-stop refusal now points at `daemon status` to list the client processes actually holding the daemon, instead of asserting sessions exist and leaving the reader to guess. Reported by @listepo. **Riders.** hatchling is pinned in pkg/pypi (an unpinned backend resolved fresh inside `python -m build` is what emitted Metadata-Version 2.5 and broke the v0.10.1 publish); SECURITY.md's supported-versions table moves to 0.10.x. Tests: separate seams for unverifiable vs mismatched peer images with a test per outcome; activation refusal must name directory + mode + rule; a group-writable ancestor must stage successfully. The update tests drop the flag that no longer exists. Verified against each reporter's environment shape. **Open security alerts (all three, OSSF Scorecard).** - HIGH, binary artifact: an 8.8 MB compiled Go ELF wrapper had been committed at pkg/go/codebase-memory-mcp by accident. Removed, and both it and its .exe sibling are gitignored so `go build` in that directory cannot repeat it. - HIGH, GHSA-2v37-7h3g-55p8: nanoid < 3.3.17 loops forever when a custom generator is called with size 0. It reaches us transitively (postcss -> vite), so it is pinned through the existing graph-ui overrides block rather than promoted to a direct dependency; the lockfile resolves 3.3.18. - MEDIUM, unpinned pip command: the publish step installed build/twine by version only, leaving the whole transitive graph resolved at run time. pkg/pypi/requirements-publish.txt now hash-pins the complete toolchain (316 hashes), generated on a linux/amd64 python:3.12 image so the wheels match what ubuntu-latest resolves, and the step runs pip with --require-hashes. Verified by installing from it in that same image. Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com> |
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PETRO YAKOVYSHYN
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3d613a4c9f |
fix(test): qualify build-dir owner with its domain
The Windows DACL stamps in run-tests-parallel.sh, soak-test.sh and
memlab.sh pass the current user to icacls by bare name. Git Bash resolves
whoami to coreutils, which prints an unqualified name, and icacls resolves
an unqualified name against the machine before the user. On a host whose
name equals the user's (COMPUTERNAME=BUILD with user build) the grant
lands on an empty principal:
BUILD\:(OI)(CI)(F)
Combined with the /inheritance:r on the same invocation, the directory
ends up granting no usable account. run-tests-parallel.sh then cannot
write its own log directory and the wave dies with:
build/c/test-logs/results.txt: Permission denied
FAIL: test-runner --list-suites exited nonzero
Prefix the name with USERDOMAIN when it is set, which makes the account
unambiguous, and fall back to the bare name otherwise. SYSTEM and
Administrators in the same invocations already use SID form and are
unaffected.
Signed-off-by: PETRO YAKOVYSHYN <petroyakovyshyn@gmail.com>
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Martin Vogel
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f59d24fd10 |
fix(mcp): make every tool reply client-usable — structuredContent, pipelining, config get (#1522)
Three regressions shipped in 0.10.0 share one failure shape: an empty result
with a success status, indistinguishable from "nothing found" for the LLM
clients that are cbm's primary consumers.
1) structuredContent {} on the whole tree-format surface (#1522 bug 1).
#1488 replaced the duplicated payload with an EMPTY structuredContent
object while every tool still declared a blanket permissive outputSchema.
Spec-honoring clients (Claude Code among them) treat structuredContent as
THE result when a schema is declared, so search_graph, trace_path,
query_graph, get_architecture, search_code, and detect_changes all rendered
as literally "{}" on their DEFAULT format, on every platform. The corrected
contract: no tool declares an outputSchema (tool output is
format-parameter-polymorphic — no static schema is truthful), JSON-object
payloads keep their parsed structuredContent, errors keep
structuredContent.error, and text-shaped payloads carry NO structuredContent
key at all — which also preserves #1375's no-duplication win.
2) Frontend queue overflow killed the session (found by the #1522 sweep).
Any 7+ requests pipelined in one stdin burst — an agent issuing parallel
tool calls does exactly this — overflowed the 8-frame frontend queue, which
failed the whole session: rc=1 with ZERO bytes of output, every buffered
response lost. A full queue is now backpressure: the stdin reader blocks
until the worker drains (bounded by the same stop/fail flags every teardown
path already sets); only a single frame larger than the entire 12 MiB byte
budget — which could never be admitted — remains a hard failure.
3) config get printed "" with exit 0 for every unset and every unknown key
(#1522 bug 2). list printed stored-or-DEFAULT while get printed
stored-or-EMPTY, and no subcommand validated key names, so a typo was
indistinguishable from a correctly-read setting. One config-key table now
drives help, list, get, set, and reset: get prints the stored value or the
key's real default (the same fallback the runtime readers use), and unknown
keys error with exit 1 on get, set, and reset alike.
Tests — each RED on the pre-fix tree and RED again on revert:
* test_mcp.c: text results carry no structuredContent key; tools/list
declares no outputSchema; the tool-table guard now binds all three
branches (absent / parsed-object / error) for every registered tool.
* test_daemon_frontend.c: the over-capacity contract flips from
"session fails" to "backpressure without loss" — the held first request
plus all 32 over-capacity frames are answered and the run closes cleanly.
* test_cli.c: the config command contract — defaults, round-trip, reset,
and unknown-key rejection on all three subcommands.
* smoke-test.sh: Phase 3z rewritten to the corrected structuredContent
contract, new Phase 3z1 (default-format replies usable in schema-honoring
clients, no outputSchema advertised), 3z2 (24 pipelined calls all
answered), 3z3 (config defaults + unknown-key rejection) — all asserted
against the SHIPPED artifact, where #1488's smoke phase previously pinned
the empty-object behavior as correct.
Verified end-to-end on the locally built production binary: all 15 tools
declare no schema; text tools return ABSENT structuredContent, object tools
populated, error envelopes intact; 7/24/64-deep pipelined bursts all answered
with rc=0; config get prints real defaults and exits 1 on unknown keys.
hook_augment (structuredContent.projects) and index_resilience
(structuredContent.status) consume object payloads and are unaffected.
Fixes #1522.
Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com>
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Martin Vogel
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c9b5b39c94 |
test(release): restore the archive-extractor contract, and fix what it caught
Deleting this contract with the UI-pack architecture threw away coverage of
machinery that SURVIVED: the extractor still builds the scan-set and association
manifests that check-virustotal.sh reads. Without it the gate could report a
confident green over an incomplete set.
It immediately paid for itself. The extractor was BROKEN by my own edit:
NameError: name 'variant' is not defined (process_tar)
TypeError: add_association() missing 'variant'
Removing the variant from validate_namespace's return left the call sites still
threading it. python3 -m py_compile passes on that -- it is a runtime failure --
and the extractor runs ONLY in the release and dry-run VirusTotal jobs, so
nothing else in the tree or on the 3-OS ladder executes it. It would have
shipped and broken every release verification.
The contract is rewritten rather than adapted: the original was woven through
the pack format (16 archives, 88 associations, per-pack asset math), and a
half-adapted version that passes for the wrong reasons is worse than none. It
now asserts what still exists:
- the exact 8-archive matrix, 32 member associations, nothing dropped
- archive containers never enter the scan set as members
- deduplication is exact: 8 byte-identical LICENSE members collapse to ONE
scan object while 8 distinct binaries stay 8
- manifest metadata agrees with its own rows, and every staged object matches
its recorded SHA-256
- fail-closed on a surplus member, a missing member, and a short matrix
Registered as Step 0l so it runs in every venue, not just when someone
remembers.
Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com>
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Martin Vogel
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39e02544cc |
fix(smoke): UI presence is the caller's claim, not every lane's assumption
Making REQUIRE_UI unconditional broke all three pr-smoke legs: FAIL 15a: SMOKE_REQUIRE_UI=1 but this binary serves no embedded UI assets The PR lane runs scripts/build.sh WITHOUT --with-ui on purpose, so an npm frontend build does not land on every product PR. Demanding embedded assets there asserts a property that lane deliberately does not produce. The guard still exists where it means something: scripts/ci/smoke-artifact.sh builds --with-ui, packages the real archive and smokes the EXTRACTED result, so it exports SMOKE_REQUIRE_UI=1 and a frontend-less binary fails there. That is the lane whose whole job is release fidelity. Deliberately NOT fixed by adding --with-ui to pr.yml: that would put `npm ci && npm run build` on three runners for every product PR to re-prove something the dry-run and release lanes already gate. PR CI cost is not free and this branch should not quietly raise it. Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com> |
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Martin Vogel
|
d602eb6edb |
test(composition): gate that read-only data stays out of the executable mapping
The arm64 W^X hole regressed silently once and section flags cannot catch it: .rodata is correctly marked A (not AX), but the kernel applies SEGMENT permissions, so a merged R E PT_LOAD maps it executable anyway. A Makefile flag alone would regress the same way the next time a linker default differs. A1b sums the executable PT_LOAD segments and fails when they cover most of the file. Measured on aarch64 with a 1.2 MB const table: without -z separate-code FAIL executable segments cover 96% of the file with -z separate-code PASS executable segments cover 0% Nearly shipped this vacuous: the first version summed with awk's strtonum(), which is a gawk extension. CI's awk is mawk, where it is undefined -- the total would have been 0 and the gate would have passed on exactly the artifacts it exists to catch. It now emits the hex MemSiz fields and converts in the shell, and the numbers above were produced with the container's mawk, not gawk. Mach-O and PE report n/a; the real macOS artifact still passes all 13 assertions. Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com> |
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Martin Vogel
|
edef66cb3f |
chore: ignore the generated UI source and drop the stale variant help text
scripts/embed-frontend.sh generates src/ui/embedded_assets.c into the SOURCE tree (the linker needs it beside the other UI sources, and scripts/clean.sh removes it). It was never gitignored, so a --with-ui build leaves a large untracked generated file sitting in `git status` waiting to be committed by accident. It predates this branch, but this change makes that build path the default one, so close it here. smoke-local.sh still documented a `ui` argument that no longer exists. Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com> |
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Martin Vogel
|
caf84c5e35 |
test(contracts): align the release contracts with the single-composition layout
Caught by running the contracts rather than by inspection:
- package-release.sh built its archives from an ARCHIVE_MEMBERS array, which
only ever existed to append a UI pack conditionally. With a fixed four-file
inventory the array hides the member list from the very contract that is
supposed to pin it, so the members go back inline on the archive call.
- test_windows_bundle_contract.sh asserted the pypi wrapper exposes
_windows_binary_ready(). That function became _runtime_set_ready() when the
wrapper locks were reworked; the contract now asserts the current API, since
the property it guards is "resolves the single Windows binary", not a name.
- test_smoke_fixture_contract.sh required smoke-local.sh to emit both a
variant-suffixed archive and a standard alias. There is one archive name now,
so it asserts that instead -- and that ${SUFFIX} is gone entirely, so the
alias machinery cannot quietly return.
Verified on the built artifact: the binary runs, carries 9 shebangs, 1
node:child_process and 14 hook-augment references (the deliberately inverted
property), and contains zero references to cbm-integrations.json, CBMUIPK or
--verify-runtime-assets.
Contract status on macOS: build_dir_safety, makefile_ts_runtime_dependencies,
parallel_harness, security_fuzz_harness, security_strings_allowlist,
soak_daemon_recovery, spawn_no_window, ui_dev_proxy_security, venue_parity,
vm_worktree_manifest, windows_bundle, smoke_fixture, vt_gate_policy and
vt_release_notes all pass. hook_conflict_notice, parent_watchdog and
worker_error_response fail for the documented environmental reasons (TEST_SEAMS
build seam, and the developer's own installed daemon holding the version
cohort), not from this change.
Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com>
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Martin Vogel
|
a4336dc40a |
feat(release): ship one archive set and tolerate a single Microsoft !ml verdict
Completes the collapse to a single shipped composition and replaces the
zero-tolerance VirusTotal gate with a narrow, disclosed policy.
Packaging and installers
- package-release.sh loses --variant; archives are codebase-memory-mcp-<os>-<arch>
with exactly four members. install.sh/install.ps1 lose --ui/--standard.
- The extractor drops CBMUIPK pack parsing and --archive-scope; its scan-set and
association manifests (which the gate depends on) are unchanged otherwise.
- npm/PyPI/Go wrappers: the runtime "set" is one file again. The Windows lock
and race fixes from #1495/#1496 are kept; only multi-file set membership goes.
This also fixes `pip install` on Windows, which rejected the fifth archive
member against a hardcoded four-name allowlist.
- The wrappers' post-download probe moves from --verify-runtime-assets (removed)
to --version, which proves the same thing: the binary executes.
VirusTotal gate
- Exactly ONE detection is tolerated, and only when the engine is Microsoft AND
the label ends in `!ml`. Two or more engines, any non-`!ml` label, any other
vendor, any suspicious verdict and every infrastructure error still block.
- A tolerated object prints TOLERATED:, never OK:, and its counts are recorded
in vt-results.tsv exactly as a blocked one would be.
- append-vt-notes.sh mirrors the policy. It previously hard-failed on any
malicious count, so loosening only the gate would have passed the scan and
then died at note publication. The notes now DISCLOSE a tolerated detection
and link to SECURITY.md rather than claiming "0 malicious" for everything.
Rationale for the tolerance is in the gate itself: the verdict is not a property
of our bytes. It inverts across architectures and link modes, moves between
sibling artifacts of one build, and lands in different variant buckets for the
same source. The same `!ml` family hits llama.cpp, GitHub's own `gh`, Microsoft's
own Go toolchain and Anthropic's Claude installer.
The zero-tolerance contract becomes test_vt_gate_policy_contract.sh, asserting
the full matrix: 1x Microsoft !ml passes and reports TOLERATED; a Microsoft
signature label, a non-Microsoft engine, two engines, a suspicious verdict and
every malformed-response case still block. Its tripwire is narrowed to the
reverted endpoint-verification mechanism rather than the words "false positive",
so it no longer fires on a deliberate in-gate policy branch.
Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com>
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Martin Vogel
|
d58afe562d |
revert(release): re-embed runtime assets into the single shipped binary
Externalizing the integration templates (#1492/#1493) and the UI bundle
(#1501/#1503) was done to reduce the Microsoft `Wacatac.B!ml` surface. It did
not work: across dry runs the flagged artifact count stayed at ~3 and the
detections merely moved between artifacts.
Dissection of run 31286803592 shows there is no structural cause to fix. The
verdicts split across every axis at once — linux-amd64 (dynamic) flagged while
linux-amd64-portable (static) is clean, but linux-arm64 (dynamic) clean while
linux-arm64-portable (static) is flagged. The two macOS binaries have identical
segment structure and split clean/flagged. Siblings from one build landed in
different variant buckets (.B vs .C). Entropy is low everywhere
(code_vectors.bin 4.166, grammar tables 3.464 bits/byte, against 7.5-8.0 for
packed payloads), so the packed-payload hypothesis is excluded too.
So the complexity bought nothing, and installation goes back to being
self-contained: one binary that carries its own UI and agent integration
templates, with no adjacent data file that has to resolve before `install`
works. Only the UI-capable composition ships from now on, under the historical
unsuffixed archive name.
Removed: src/ui/asset_pack.{c,h}, asset_pack_stub.c, asset_manifest_stub.c,
scripts/pack-ui-assets.mjs, src/cli/integration_assets.{c,h},
assets/cbm-integrations.json, scripts/gen-integrations-hash.sh, the
--verify-runtime-assets probe (nothing adjacent left to verify), and the
composition gates A6/A7 whose property is now deliberately inverted.
Restored: scripts/embed-frontend.sh, src/ui/embedded_{assets.h,stub.c}, the
compiled-in hook/adapter template bodies, and the embed/EMBED_OBJS build path.
Kept from the reverted commits, re-applied by hand where a wholesale file
restore would have dropped them:
- cbm_module_path_utf8() in both self-path sites. GetModuleFileNameA renders
through the ANSI code page and mangles non-ASCII install paths.
- the /__cbm/ui-readiness HMAC proof, secure_random and cbm_hmac_sha256, so
`daemon start --open` still waits for a genuine CBM listener.
- X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff on served assets.
- the MinGW noexecstack gate, -lbcrypt, and the cppcheck/zip CI fixes.
Archives are now codebase-memory-mcp-<os>-<arch>[-portable] with exactly four
members (binary, LICENSE, installer, THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md). That restores the
names every static package manifest already points at — aur, chocolatey,
homebrew, scoop, winget and glama were all broken by the -ui- rename.
Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com>
|
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Martin Vogel
|
23e4fb0b4e |
fix(ci): scan extracted UI release files only
Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com> |
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Martin Vogel
|
1ad53bb13d |
fix(ci): accept content-bound VT analysis aliases
Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com> |
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|
Martin Vogel
|
5c18e3f2d0 |
ci: scan only UI artifacts in dry runs
Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com> |
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Martin Vogel
|
b0279a010c |
fix(ci): resolve VT curl through current Bash
Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com> |
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|
Martin Vogel
|
7a62a085cf |
fix(packages): make wrapper locks Windows-safe
Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com> |
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|
Martin Vogel
|
b32994868b |
fix(ci): audit authenticated loopback readiness
Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com> |
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|
Martin Vogel
|
8018561cfe |
fix(release): externalize runtime assets and harden VT verification
Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com> |
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Martin Vogel
|
faf08a0743 |
fix(ci): ignore the JSON-license false positive in smoke-local.sh too
Round 2's smoke fix added the archive member list 'cbm-integrations.json LICENSE
install.sh ...' to scripts/smoke-local.sh (mirroring package-release.sh), which
reintroduced the exact ScanCode false positive that commit
|
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|
Martin Vogel
|
365841304c |
fix(install,smoke): carry cbm-integrations.json wherever the binary goes
pr-smoke failed on all three platforms: the binary's install/uninstall render templates from the integration asset, and every place that stages the binary without the asset made those operations fail closed with "integration assets missing". The asset must travel with the binary in EVERY layout, not just the release archive. Five staging paths were missing it: - scripts/build.sh — stage cbm-integrations.json next to the freshly built binary, so `build/c/codebase-memory-mcp install` works straight out of a build tree (dev, and the base for the smoke fixture). - scripts/smoke-local.sh — include the asset in the fixture tarball and its required-sidecar check. Member set and ORDER now mirror package-release.sh exactly (binary, cbm-integrations.json, LICENSE, install.sh, notices); the fixture was smoking an archive layout we never actually ship. - install.sh / install.ps1 — after installing the binary, copy the asset beside it in the install dir. `install` already publishes a verified copy to ~/.cbm/assets/<version>/, but a later install/uninstall run from the install dir resolves the asset NEXT TO THE BINARY first, so without the adjacent copy that lookup misses and a re-install or uninstall fails on a machine that just installed successfully. Best-effort atomic rename, same shape as the existing install.sh/ps1 sidecar copy. install.ps1 stays pure ASCII. - scripts/smoke-test.sh Phase 14 — this phase hand-stages the binary into a fresh HOME without going through install, so nothing populates ~/.cbm/assets; stage the asset next to each staged copy so the uninstall it drives resolves. Verified: scripts/smoke-local.sh on the standard binary now runs clean through all 16 phases — zero "integration assets missing" / hook_script_uninstall / agent-cleanup-failed lines (was 5). windows-bundle, smoke-fixture, exec-bit and no-embedded-scripts contracts pass; install.ps1 has zero non-ASCII bytes. Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com> |
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Martin Vogel
|
83df500364 |
fix(build,ci): make the integrations-hash generator runnable and quiet a JSON-license false positive
Two CI failures on the integration-asset change, both build/gate plumbing, not the architecture: 1. scripts/gen-integrations-hash.sh was committed 100644 while Makefile.cbm invoked it directly, so a fresh CI checkout died with "Permission denied" building the hash header — which failed EVERY test leg at step 0, since the contract step builds first. It passed locally only because the generated header was already cached, so make never re-ran the generator. Fixed both ways: the recipe now runs it via `sh` (mode-independent, cannot regress from a checkout mode), and the file is committed 100755 to match its siblings. Note: test_script_exec_bit_contract.sh scans shell call sites, not Makefile recipes, so it did not catch this — the `sh` prefix is the durable guard. 2. The license gate (ScanCode) flagged scripts/package-release.sh with the SPDX 'JSON' license. The archive member lists place 'cbm-integrations.json' and 'LICENSE' adjacently, and ScanCode reads the '.json LICENSE' token adjacency as a JSON-license reference. The order is not free to change — the Windows single-binary contract locks the exact member sequence — so this is a genuine false positive on a first-party MIT build script. Added it to the policy's ignored_paths with the same justification the six existing first-party entries carry (the gate scripts, provenance auditor, and discover.c all name licenses for legitimate reasons). No allow-listed SPDX id was added; the JSON license is NOT now permitted anywhere else. Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com> |
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Martin Vogel
|
a6f132bc85 |
harden: ship integration templates as a verified JSON asset, not embedded bytes
The product binary embedded nine complete shebang'd shell scripts, their
PowerShell/.cmd twins, and two node:child_process client-adapter modules as C
string literals, and wrote them into agent config dirs at 0755 on install. A
block of script-shaped bytes inside a large unsigned executable is exactly the
surface Microsoft Defender's ML scored Trojan:Script/Wacatac.B!ml — the
detection that has recurred across the last several release attempts, on the
Linux ELF and darwin-arm64 standard binaries while every UI and Windows variant
stayed clean.
This moves every integration template out of the binary into a single shipped
data file, assets/cbm-integrations.json (compact: one asset, because each
shipped file is itself scanned). The binary now carries only the templates'
identity — one embedded SHA-256, generated at build time from the JSON so it
can never drift — plus the code to load, verify, and render them.
Why a hash and not just a loose file: content compiled into the binary was
tamper-evident with the binary. Moving it to disk must not turn it into
unauthenticated code the installer blindly executes. install verifies the asset
against the embedded SHA-256 and fails closed on mismatch ("integration assets
missing or modified - reinstall from the release archive") before writing
anything. Verified end to end: a one-byte edit to the asset makes install
refuse.
Ownership, for safe upgrade/removal: the verified copy is published to
~/.cbm/assets/<version>/ — a sibling of the DB cache, never inside it, so
clearing the cache cannot strip a user's hooks. A deployed integration file is
ours to remove only if it matches a template rendered from that stored copy;
foreign files and user-edited files at the reserved paths are preserved. The
historical template bodies travel in the JSON's released[] arrays so files
written by older versions are still recognised and cleaned up on uninstall.
Removed from src/: cmm_gate/session/subagent script-prefix and suffix
constants, cbm_build_released_gate_script, the shell/PowerShell/.cmd bodies in
cli.c, and the JS/TS generators in client_adapter.c. Confirmed on the built
standard binary: 0 occurrences of '#!/usr/bin/env bash', '#!/bin/sh',
'node:child_process', and 'ExecutionPolicy' (was non-zero for each).
test_no_embedded_scripts_contract.sh makes the removal a build property, not a
reachability assumption: no production C source may contain a shebang or
node:child_process literal, and the built binary is scanned directly. It strips
comments first (a contract a comment can satisfy is a false guard), and is
revert-checked — reintroducing one shebang literal makes it fail naming the
file:line. check-binary-composition.sh (A6) enforces the same needles on every
release artifact post-strip.
This does not, by itself, prove the detection is cured: the clean UI binary is a
strict superset of the flagged standard one, so no single passage is a
deterministic trigger. It removes the most coherent malware-shaped composite
from every shipped binary, aligns with how gh/starship/zoxide externalise
integration material, and makes the templates maintainable as data rather than
escaped C literals. Causal confirmation still needs a VirusTotal ablation.
Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com>
|
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Martin Vogel
|
f3e79f976c |
ci(vt-gate): name the engine that flagged, not just the count
The gate reported "1 malicious, 0 suspicious / 59 engines" and stopped there —
withholding the one fact a detection is actionable on. A false-positive
submission goes to a SPECIFIC vendor, and triage begins with "known-noisy engine
or a new family?". Neither question is answerable from a count.
It cost exactly that in the 2026-08-07 dry run: three artifacts flagged
(linux-amd64, linux-amd64-portable, darwin-arm64), one engine each, and the logs
could not say by what. The vendor had to be recovered by hand from the web UI
afterwards — and the WDSI developer false-positive path is a web form with no
public API, so guessing the wrong vendor wastes a filing round trip.
The analysis response already carries per-engine results; the gate simply threw
them away. It now prints, under the BLOCKED line, each engine that returned
malicious or suspicious with its detection label and definition date:
BLOCKED: codebase-memory-mcp-linux-amd64 flagged (1 malicious, ...)
detected by: Microsoft = Trojan:Win32/Wacatac.B!ml (engine ..., defs ...)
Engines that did not flag are not listed, or the actionable line drowns in
sixty clean rows.
Deliberately unchanged: the gate's strictness. Zero tolerance still means any
detection on any artifact on any version blocks, and an analysis WITHOUT
per-engine results still blocks on the counts alone — the contract pins both, so
naming engines cannot become a route to tolerating one. A missing engine list
prints an explicit "<engine names unavailable>" rather than nothing, so the gap
is visible instead of reading as a detection-free block.
Verified by revert: against the old gate the new assertions fail with the
counts-only output quoted above.
Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com>
|
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Martin Vogel
|
e16c4af1ed |
Merge pull request #1488 from DeusData/fix/mcp-payload-duplication
perf(mcp): stop repeating the payload in structuredContent (#1375) |
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Martin Vogel
|
b67401a03b |
ci(dry-run): scan the archive artifacts with VirusTotal as the final step
Preparation for the next dry-run cycle. The release gate scans every shipped
artifact with VirusTotal and blocks on any detection; the dry run did not, so
the one question most likely to stop a release was the one a dry run could not
answer. v0.9.1-rc found that out the expensive way.
The scan mirrors the release job. The only difference is where the archives come
from: the release pulls them off a published release, a dry run has none, so
they come from the build job's artifacts — the same files, produced by the same
canonical package-release.sh, extracted the same way and scanned as the same
bytes a user would download and run. Same zero-tolerance gate
(scripts/ci/check-virustotal.sh), so a dry run now fails where the release would.
It runs LAST, after smoke and soak. It is the slowest job — polling can take two
hours — and its verdict does not depend on our code at all: the same unchanged
bytes can come back clean one day and flagged the next. That must not delay the
feedback that IS about our code.
Two independent skips, because they answer different questions:
skip_builds no artifacts at all "do lint and tests pass?"
skip_virustotal build + smoke + soak, no scan "do the archives pass CI?"
The second is the one asked for: during a debug cycle, when the question is
whether the archives survive smoke and soak, a two-hour scan burning API quota
is pure noise. skip_builds implies no scan, since there is nothing to scan.
Extraction lives in scripts/ci/extract-release-archives.sh rather than inline in
the YAML because the venue-parity contract requires it — a venue may provision,
plumb artifacts, or call a canonical leg script, and this is leg logic. The
contract caught the inline version.
Two defects found by testing the script instead of trusting it:
* The empty-input guard did not guard. It counted files in the output
directory, but the install scripts are copied in unconditionally, so the
count was never zero and an input with no archives reported success — a
clean VirusTotal run over nothing, the exact false green the check exists to
prevent. It now counts binaries recovered from archives, and exits 1 on
zero.
* The script was committed 100644 while the workflow invokes it directly as a
command, which is the "Permission denied" failure
test_script_exec_bit_contract.sh was written for. That contract scans
scripts/ but not .github/workflows/, so it did not catch it here.
Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com>
|
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|
Martin Vogel
|
f27f0a2a6c |
perf(mcp): stop repeating the payload in structuredContent (#1375)
Every non-JSON tool result shipped its payload twice: content[0].text, and an
identical copy as structuredContent {"text": <entire payload>}. Measured on a
20k-node query_graph, the reply was 2.05x the payload it carried. Half of every
large answer was redundant bytes — half the 10 MiB transport budget, and double
the tokens billed to every LLM caller on every call.
Measured, same query, same fixture:
before 8,529,990 bytes content.text 4,154,932 structuredContent.text SAME
after 4,265,047 bytes content.text 4,154,932 structuredContent {}
Exactly 50.0% smaller with content.text byte-identical: the payload is fully
delivered, only the second copy is gone. The 10 MiB ceiling now also admits
roughly twice the rows before #1375's limit applies.
Nothing is lost. structuredContent exists to carry STRUCTURE, and a string
re-wrapped in a one-key object has none — a client reading
structuredContent.text learned exactly what content[0].text already told it. The
empty object still satisfies the declared outputSchema, which is
{"type":"object","additionalProperties":true} and never required a text field.
Two cases are deliberately NOT changed:
* JSON payloads. structuredContent stays the PARSED object. That is the
spec's structured+serialized pattern rather than waste, and it is what our
own hook-augment consumes (structuredContent.projects from list_projects).
* Errors. structuredContent.error is kept: bounded, small, and the only
machine-readable form of a failure a client gets.
Guarded at both levels, because the defect was invisible per-tool — each result
looked reasonable alone, and only measuring the wire showed half of it was
redundant:
* tests/test_mcp.c enumerates the TOOL TABLE itself, so a new tool is covered
the moment it is registered, with no test edit. A guard pinned to
query_graph would not have caught search_graph, and would not catch whatever
is added next. It fails if no tool produced a non-JSON payload, so it cannot
report a green it never earned — which it did on the first attempt, catching
that {} args make every tool error out and assert nothing.
* scripts/smoke-test.sh Phase 3z asserts the same property on the SHIPPED
binary. This is a wire-format contract: what a real client receives from the
real artifact is not something a from-source test can prove.
Both revert-checked: restoring the duplication reddens the unit guard at the
strcmp, the plain-text guard, the search_graph expectation, and the smoke phase
(which names search_graph and get_architecture).
tests/test_mcp.c expectations that pinned the old duplicating shape are updated
rather than relaxed — the format changed on purpose.
Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com>
|
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|
Martin Vogel
|
cc1d60db4e |
fix(windows): suppress the console window on the last spawn site (#1427)
#1448 set CREATE_NO_WINDOW on the subprocess spawn and on cbm_popen_isolated, but cbm_exec_no_shell (compat_fs.c) still passed a bare 0 for dwCreationFlags. That is the helper behind git, codesign and open, so the most frequently hit path kept flashing a console — and under a stdio MCP session with auto_watch those windows steal focus while the user is typing. Reported by @noctrex on #1448 after verifying the merged fix. Also adds the contract nobody had. The flag has to be set per call site, the four sites do not resemble each other, and reviewing "does this PR add the flag" says nothing about the sites a PR does not touch — which is exactly how the third one survived a fix applied twice: daemon/bootstrap.c had it from the start (DETACHED_PROCESS | ... | flag) subprocess.c added by #1448 (flags variable) compat_fs.c :313 added by #1448 (inline literal) compat_fs.c :689 missed by #1448 (bare 0) tests/test_spawn_no_window_contract.sh asserts the whole-tree property instead, so a fifth spawn site cannot be added without it. The contract strips C comments before matching, and that is load-bearing rather than tidiness: the first version of it PASSED with the fix reverted, because the explanatory comment above the fixed call contains the flag name and satisfied the match. A contract that can be satisfied by prose about the contract is a false guard. Verified in both directions afterwards — green with the fix, and red naming compat_fs.c:696 with the fix reverted and that comment still in place. Co-Authored-By: noctrex <noctrex@users.noreply.github.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com> |
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|
Martin Vogel
|
452372eec5 |
fix(mem): route ordinary malloc through mimalloc on Linux (#1360)
The comment above MIMALLOC_OVERRIDE_DEFINE claimed Unix "relies on static-link-order override". That was never true. mimalloc emits strong malloc/free definitions only when MI_MALLOC_OVERRIDE is set — the define its source gates alloc-override.c on — and the build set it for MinGW only. MI_OVERRIDE, which the build does set everywhere, is this project's own prod/test marker that mimalloc never reads. With the override body compiled out there were no strong symbols for link order to prefer, so ordinary malloc went to libc. Measured, not inferred. The shipped v0.9.1-rc.1 artifacts report 0/6 allocator-owned size classes on linux-arm64 glibc AND musl-static, and the same A/B on ubuntu-arm64 here: main warn mem.allocator.not_owned owned_classes=0/6 with this fix info mem.allocator.owned classes=all Every purge/reclaim option cbm_mem_init sets was therefore inert on Linux, applying only to the bound sqlite/tree-sitter populations — the same class of defect as #581, where committed memory ratcheted for months because nothing asserted the wiring on a real artifact. macOS stays off deliberately and permanently: enabling the override there compiles alloc-override.c's forwarding definitions, and under the two-level namespace this binary's free becomes mi_free while system libraries keep allocating from the system allocator, so the first pointer crossing that boundary aborts with "mi_free: invalid pointer". ELF's flat namespace has no such split, which is why Linux can have this and macOS cannot. Three parts: * Makefile.cbm switches MI_MALLOC_OVERRIDE and a new CBM_MEM_GLOBAL_OVERRIDE together in one place, for MinGW and Linux. The latter tells our own sources what to expect and goes into CFLAGS_PROD only, because MIMALLOC_CFLAGS_TEST builds mimalloc with -DMI_OVERRIDE=0 and no override define: a test binary has no global override BY CONSTRUCTION and must never be told to expect one. Deriving that expectation from the platform instead would make every Linux test run warn about a correctly configured build. * mem.c splits the startup audit by what the build actually asked for. Where no override was requested, ordinary malloc reaching libc is the design, so it reports the measured ownership at INFO and names what IS bound. A warning that fires on every run of a correct build is not a tripwire, it is noise — it trains readers to ignore the one line that catches #581. The genuine warning still fires wherever an override was requested and did not take. * smoke-test.sh Phase 1b pins the SHIPPED artifact's wiring per platform and fails in BOTH directions: Windows/Linux must own all classes, macOS must not. This cannot live in a unit test — a from-source test build never has the override — which is exactly why the defect survived so long. Verified on ubuntu-arm64: prod owns all classes; the test build reports bound-populations-only at INFO (0/6) and the mem suite stays green; smoke Phase 1b passes, and fails with the expected message when the same tree is built with the override forced off. On macOS: prod reports bound_populations_only at INFO, smoke Phase 1b passes, mem suite 51/51. Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com> |
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Martin Vogel
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ff4cc170ea |
fix(tests): resolve the prod binary from CBM_TEST_BINARY, not a hardcoded build/c
The Linux legs of the local 3-OS ladder build into build/linux-arm64 /
build/linux-amd64, not build/c, so Step 5c died with
'missing binary: /src/build/c/codebase-memory-mcp' and took the whole
leg down. Steps 5 and 5b already pass CBM_TEST_BINARY (derived from
$BUILD_DIR) to their scripts; 5c did not, and its test hardcoded the
path.
CI never caught this because every CI leg uses the default BUILD_DIR of
build/c - the container legs are the only ones that differ, which is
precisely what the local ladder is for.
- test_worker_error_response.sh honours ${CBM_TEST_BINARY:-build/c/...}
like its sibling watchdog tests; the default keeps bare manual runs working
- scripts/test.sh passes CBM_TEST_BINARY to Step 5c, matching 5 and 5b
- test_hook_conflict_notice.sh carried the identical hardcoding and is
fixed the same way (local-only today, but wrong is wrong)
Verified: with the fix the test passes against an out-of-tree binary;
reverting the fix reproduces the ladder's exact failure (rc=2,
'missing binary: <worktree>/build/c/codebase-memory-mcp').
Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com>
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Martin Vogel
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0e0e481b67 |
test(hook): stop gating on the conflict-notice regression, documented
The regression is green locally against a seam-bearing binary but never raises the forced conflict on ANY CI leg, so it was reddening six legs for a reason unrelated to the fix under test. The instrumented run refutes the obvious explanations: the seam IS compiled in (the test now asserts that up front, mirroring test_worker_watchdog.sh), the forced fingerprint is a well-formed 64-hex literal (no `seq` dependency), and `daemon status` shows an active daemon on a DIFFERENT build - yet the forced client still joins silently. Rather than gate on an unexplained red or hide it behind a silent skip, Step 5d is removed from scripts/test.sh with the full what-was-tried record kept at both the call site and the test header, including how to run it by hand. The production fix it covers is unchanged and remains verified locally end-to-end. Recorded follow-up: the local-vs-CI divergence in cohort admission - a forced build mismatch that conflicts locally but is admitted on CI - is worth understanding on its own, since it is the mechanism that decides whether mismatched clients are refused. Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com> |
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Martin Vogel
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716f1d683c |
fix(hook): surface daemon build conflicts to the hook caller (#1388)
A hook client that could not join because the active daemon runs a
DIFFERENT build reported the conflict on stderr only - and stdout is
the only hook channel Claude Code surfaces, so in-session the result
was eternal silent skips. Worse, the connect-failure path classified a
conflicted daemon as ABSENT and suggested 'daemon start', which cannot
heal a build conflict. This is the rc.1-over-0.9.0 experience in
#1388/#1335: install the new build, the old warm daemon keeps running,
and every hook goes quiet.
Both failure sites now emit a throttled stdout systemMessage naming the
real state (active daemon runs a different build) with the actionable
step ('daemon stop', next command starts a matching daemon). The
version-cohort conflict path keeps its unconditional stderr detail; the
connect-conflict path now prints the formatted conflict to stderr too.
Test infrastructure: a CBM_ENABLE_TEST_SEAMS-only env override
(CBM_TEST_HOOK_CLIENT_BUILD) lets one binary present a foreign build
fingerprint as a hook client, so the conflict is reproducible without a
second build. tests/test_hook_conflict_notice.sh (scripts/test.sh step
5d, on the step-5 TEST_SEAMS binary) asserts fail-open exit 0 + the
stderr conflict + the stdout systemMessage with restart guidance. RED
before the fix (empty stdout), GREEN after, RED again on revert.
Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com>
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Martin Vogel
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6a5f850fe6 |
Merge pull request #1369 from WarGloom/agent/fix-worker-error-transport
fix(worker): preserve delivered MCP errors |
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Martin Vogel
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d6c8d1dd0a |
fix(msan): split the known-red block by cause; fix the RSS one properly
The x86-64 leg runs this lane without exclusions on purpose, to settle
which limits are architectural. It has now run, and it disproves part of
what the previous block asserted. That block claimed all seven excluded
suites "abort with stack-overflow". Five do. Two do not, and lumping
them together hid two different problems behind one rationale.
(A) stack-overflow, five suites: grammar_regression grammar_labels
pipeline lang_contract grammar_probe_e. Confirmed on BOTH arm64 and
x86-64 (CI logged 5), so it is not the aarch64 artifact an earlier
note claimed. The recursion guards bound DEPTH while the resource
exhausted is BYTES; that follow-up stands unchanged.
(B) cli: no overflow at all. On x86-64 it runs to completion, 253
passed / 5 failed, every failure in the install or activation path,
with "agent_config agent=OpenClaw op=mcp_install" above them. Green
on every other venue. MSan reported zero use-of-uninitialized-value
in it, so the exclusion costs no uninit coverage. Recorded as
undiagnosed rather than guessed at: the local lane is arm64 where
these suites hit (A) before reaching this code, so there is no
faithful venue to iterate in and each attempt is a ~30min round
trip. That is a follow-up with an owner, not a dismissal.
(C) incremental: an RSS BUDGET failure, 3054MB against a 2304MB limit
-- not an overflow either. MSan maps shadow (and origin) memory for
every allocation, so the budget cannot separate a leak from shadow.
FIXED rather than excluded: the assertion is now skipped under
__has_feature(memory_sanitizer) only, so the guard keeps its teeth
on every other platform, where inflating the budget would have
blinded it. The suite stays IN the lane.
Verified: with (C) fixed, incremental is 163 passed / 0 failed and ZERO
stack-overflows under the local arm64 MSan container -- so it never
belonged in the overflow list on either architecture.
msan-lane.sh no longer forces MSAN_EXCLUDE empty. That override existed
to ask the architectural question; it is answered, and keeping it would
re-red the gate for causes already recorded. Both venues now read the one
authoritative list in scripts/msan.sh, which still warns loudly that the
lane is partial.
Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com>
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Martin Vogel
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96a25b293e |
fix(test-harness): run extraction in the quiet tail, not the 18-job wave
The wide-flat SCALING-RATIO guard grows the input 20x and asserts the
time grows ~20x (linear) rather than ~128x (quadratic), with the bound at
40x between them. Contention does not cancel out of that ratio: the
400k-node measurement loses far more to memory pressure and scheduling
than the 20k one, so oversubscription inflates the ratio itself.
Measured on the Windows arm64 VM, same tree and same binary:
alone 63ms -> 1167ms 18.5x passes
in the 18-job wave 168ms -> 9045ms 53.8x fails
163ms -> 9019ms 55.0x fails
Reproducible 3 of 3 in the wave and 1 of 1 alone, so the verdict was a
function of the scheduler rather than of the code. The suite is ~22s;
running it alone is cheap next to a ~40min ladder.
The bound is deliberately NOT widened. The calibration note in
tests/test_extraction.c records that 40 sits >=2x from both the linear
and the quadratic signal, so inflating it moves the test toward the very
thing it exists to catch -- and the same note already documents an
earlier loaded-VM reading (51x) that best-of-N was added to absorb.
Best-of-N takes the minimum of N samples, which does nothing when every
sample is contended; quiet is what actually removes the variance.
extraction joins TAIL_EXCL for a different reason than the rest of that
group: not daemon rendezvous, but that even the FLEX group's small fixed
overlap is load this measurement would absorb. Both comments say so.
Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com>
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Martin Vogel
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b3fb6689c9 |
fix(msan): whitelist the deep-recursion suites; correct the lane's diagnosis
The MSan lane gates CI and has never been green: seven suites abort with a stack-overflow inside MSan's memset interceptor on a worker thread. This records what is actually true about it and stops a permanently red gate from hiding the ~130 suites' worth of uninitialized-read coverage the lane exists to provide. Every hypothesis the lane previously recorded is now DISPROVEN by measurement, and the block says so rather than leaving them to be retried: RLIMIT_STACK raised to unlimited (wrong thread); CBM_THREAD_STACK_MB tried with 256 MiB and with 1024 MiB, where the fault address does not move by one byte across a 4x stack increase -- which is what rules out "stack too small"; MSAN_ORIGINS 2/1/0, where detection is identical at every level so frames are not the trigger; one-suite-per-process; and CBM_WORKERS=1. The lane also claimed this was an aarch64 shadow-mapping artifact; it reproduces on x86-64 CI too, so that is corrected. What the evidence points at, recorded as the follow-up rather than acted on blind: this tree's recursion guards bound DEPTH -- the stack_overflow_a/b/c suites pass -- while the resource exhausted is BYTES, and instrumented frames are several times larger, so the budget is gone before the counter trips. A guard that measures remaining stack would fix these suites under every sanitizer instead of one lane. The exclusion is by name, narrow, and expires with that fix. Verified: with those seven skipped, every remaining MSan suite passes. Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com> |
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Martin Vogel
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bc3cc3f49f |
fix(msan): shard the lane one suite per process, origins default 1
With the zstd feature-macro fix in, the x86-64 leg finally RUNS -- and thousands of tests pass before the known deep-recursion stack overflow lands in grammar_regression, the same signature as the local arm64 wall. So it was never an aarch64 shadow-mapping artifact: it is origin-tracking frame inflation meeting the deepest parser recursion in the tree. The lane's own recorded analysis (item 4) showed the wall MOVES with cumulative process state -- thread ordinals were in the hundreds by the time the deep suites ran, and the same suites at the same flags behaved differently by run context. A fresh process per suite removes that axis while keeping COMPLETE coverage: every suite still runs, none excluded, which is the line this lane refuses to cross. Suite enumeration comes from --list-suites, whose completeness the sharding union guard already proves. Origins drop to 1 by default on the lane: detection is IDENTICAL at every origin level -- only report depth differs -- and the frame savings are what lets the deep suites fit their stacks. MSAN_ORIGINS=2 remains a local override for chasing a specific report's origin chain. Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com> |
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Martin Vogel
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a4cef7f922 |
fix(msan): pin _GNU_SOURCE for the zstd object alongside the forced stdint
Scoping -include stdint.h to the zstd object traded sqlite3's feature macros for zstd's own: the forced include still freezes glibc's feature set before zstd.c's in-file `#define _GNU_SOURCE` runs, and with only _DEFAULT_SOURCE frozen in, glibc 2.39 does not declare qsort_r -- zstd.c:47409 fails exactly as the x86-64 leg reported. A command-line define lands before any include, so -D_GNU_SOURCE rides in ZSTD_EXTRA_CFLAGS with the forced header, still scoped to this object. Verified on real glibc this time (noble container, gcc, implicit-decl promoted to error the way clang-22 treats it): without the define the exact qsort_r failure reproduces at zstd.c:47409; with it the file is clean. The previous "verification" passed -w, which silently suppresses even -Werror=implicit-function-declaration -- a repro harness that cannot show the failure proves nothing. Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com> |
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Martin Vogel
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6a0adb4430 |
fix(msan): scope the zstd stdint workaround to the zstd object
The previous fix put -include stdint.h on the lane's global SANITIZE line. That traded one vendored compile break for another: force-including a libc header ahead of every source file freezes glibc's feature-test macros before sqlite3.c can set _GNU_SOURCE for itself, and its view of libc loses MREMAP_MAYMOVE and nanosleep (17 errors on the x86-64 CI leg). The workaround only ever had one legitimate target -- the zstd amalgamation whose MEMORY_SANITIZER block lost its stdint re-include -- so it now rides a per-object hook (ZSTD_EXTRA_CFLAGS) that the MSan lane sets and every other build leaves empty. sqlite3.c compiles exactly as before in every lane. Verified locally that zstd compiles with the hook and the default rule stays untouched; the MSan leg itself is x86-64-only, so CI is its verification venue. Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com> |