Commit Graph

5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Martin Vogel 8018561cfe fix(release): externalize runtime assets and harden VT verification
Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com>
2026-08-08 17:35:05 +02:00
Martin Vogel a3903caa0b feat(cli): expand agent integration coverage
Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com>
2026-07-13 01:50:02 +02:00
Martin Vogel 630bd40a90 Replace the graph-UI HTTP server with a first-party implementation
The web server behind the graph UI is now a purpose-built in-house
module (src/ui/httpd.c): localhost-only listener, strict HTTP/1.1
parsing with fixed request caps, a per-connection receive deadline,
and Connection: close semantics. http_server.c keeps the routing and
handlers, rewritten against the new transport API; the public server
API and main.c are unchanged. The previously vendored third-party
server is removed entirely.

Comes with a new 28-test transport + routing suite (tests/test_httpd.c)
covering parsing edge cases (strict CRLF, Content-Length limits, raw
path matching, percent-decode rules) and live-socket behavior (CORS
policy, RPC dispatch, receive deadline, clean shutdown). The security
audit scripts now check the new file layout and treat any network call
in vendored code as a failure.
2026-06-12 02:17:25 +02:00
Martin Vogel 894c04fc0e Fix cross-platform vector blob assembly and vendored security allowlist
- code_vectors_blob.S: preprocessor conditionals for macOS (Mach-O
  __DATA,__const + underscore prefix) vs Linux (ELF .rodata, no prefix)
- Makefile: use $(CC) -c instead of $(AS) to enable preprocessor on .S
- Add vendored/nomic to KNOWN_VENDORED security allowlist (pure int8
  vector data, zero executable code)
- Update vendored checksums
2026-04-06 12:54:13 +02:00
Martin Vogel cd1417427c Add 8-layer security test suite + hardening
Code-level defenses:
- cbm_validate_shell_arg(): reject shell metacharacters before popen/system
- SQLite authorizer: block ATTACH/DETACH at engine level
- CORS localhost-only origin reflection (replaces wildcard *)
- Path containment: realpath() check in get_code_snippet
- process-kill restricted to server-spawned PIDs
- SHA256 checksum verification in update command

Security audit scripts (8 layers):
- L1: Static allow-list for dangerous calls + URLs
- L2: Binary string audit (URLs, payloads, credentials)
- L3: Network egress monitoring via strace (Linux)
- L4: Install output path + content validation
- L5: Smoke test hardening (clean shutdown, residual procs)
- L6: Graph UI audit (external domains, CORS, binding)
- L7: MCP robustness (23 adversarial JSON-RPC payloads)
- L8: Vendored integrity (checksums + dangerous call scan)

CI: parallel security-static job (no build needed), binary
layers in smoke jobs per-platform. Cleanup of test fixture
dirs in clean.sh + .gitignore.
2026-03-20 18:19:15 +01:00