2 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Shane McCarron	dedd33d975	fix(install): respect $CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR in install/uninstall/update ... Route Claude Code config paths (skills, .mcp.json, .claude.json, settings.json, hook scripts) and agent detection through CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR-aware helpers, falling back to ~/.claude. Hook command strings written to settings.json keep the legacy tilde form when the env var is unset, so existing configs stay portable across HOME values. Prints a one-line migration nudge when CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR is set and a legacy ~/.claude tree still exists. Adds cli_detect_agents_finds_claude_via_env and isolates CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR in the existing detection tests so the runner env can't leak in. Distilled from #321 onto current main (adapts to the v0.7.0 non-blocking augmenter hook signature, which the original branch predated). Closes #320.	2026-05-30 15:22:37 +02:00
Martin Vogel	cd1417427c	Add 8-layer security test suite + hardening ... Code-level defenses: - cbm_validate_shell_arg(): reject shell metacharacters before popen/system - SQLite authorizer: block ATTACH/DETACH at engine level - CORS localhost-only origin reflection (replaces wildcard *) - Path containment: realpath() check in get_code_snippet - process-kill restricted to server-spawned PIDs - SHA256 checksum verification in update command Security audit scripts (8 layers): - L1: Static allow-list for dangerous calls + URLs - L2: Binary string audit (URLs, payloads, credentials) - L3: Network egress monitoring via strace (Linux) - L4: Install output path + content validation - L5: Smoke test hardening (clean shutdown, residual procs) - L6: Graph UI audit (external domains, CORS, binding) - L7: MCP robustness (23 adversarial JSON-RPC payloads) - L8: Vendored integrity (checksums + dangerous call scan) CI: parallel security-static job (no build needed), binary layers in smoke jobs per-platform. Cleanup of test fixture dirs in clean.sh + .gitignore.	2026-03-20 18:19:15 +01:00