diff --git a/.github/workflows/release.yml b/.github/workflows/release.yml
index 464d8f8a..0328e26a 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/release.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/release.yml
@@ -360,16 +360,18 @@ jobs:
       - name: Build PyPI distribution
         working-directory: pkg/pypi
         run: |
-          # Pin to specific versions (typosquatting / supply-chain mitigation).
-          # OSSF scorecard prefers --require-hashes, but that needs full
-          # transitive deps; version pinning is the practical compromise.
+          # Every byte of the publish toolchain is bound by hash: version pins
+          # alone still let a compromised index serve different content, and a
+          # bare `pip install` resolves the whole transitive graph at run time
+          # (OSSF Scorecard pinned-dependencies). requirements-publish.txt is
+          # generated on a linux/amd64 python:3.12 image — see its header for
+          # the exact regeneration command.
           #
-          # twine >= 7 is required: `python -m build` resolves the UNPINNED
-          # hatchling backend fresh in its isolated env, and current hatchling
-          # emits Metadata-Version 2.5, which twine 6.2.0 rejects as invalid
-          # ("'2.5' is not a valid metadata version" — the v0.10.1 failure).
-          # Verified locally: identical artifacts, 6.2.0 rejects / 7.0.0 passes.
-          python -m pip install --upgrade 'build==1.3.0' 'twine==7.0.0'
+          # twine must stay >= 7 and hatchling is pinned in pyproject.toml:
+          # `python -m build` resolves its backend fresh in an isolated env, and
+          # a hatchling emitting Metadata-Version 2.5 against twine 6.2.0 is
+          # what broke the v0.10.1 publish.
+          python -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements-publish.txt
           python -m build
           twine check dist/*
 
@@ -439,6 +441,16 @@ jobs:
     permissions:
       contents: write
     steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
+
+      # Legacy ui-* aliases so 0.9.x updaters stop 404ing (#1538). Runs after
+      # verify: same bytes as archives the VirusTotal gate already cleared, and
+      # publishing earlier would duplicate the scan set and provenance manifest.
+      - name: Publish legacy ui-* archive aliases
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+        run: scripts/ci/publish-legacy-aliases.sh "${{ inputs.version }}" "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY"
+
       - name: Un-draft GitHub release
         env:
           GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index 86a21806..83658c62 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -80,3 +80,9 @@ soak-results-query-leak/
 # scripts/soak-test.sh stay tracked.
 /soak*/
 /memlab-*
+
+# Compiled Go wrapper binary. `go build` in pkg/go drops the executable beside
+# its sources; one was committed by accident (8.8 MB ELF, flagged by OSSF
+# Scorecard as a binary artifact in source). Source only, never the build.
+/pkg/go/codebase-memory-mcp
+/pkg/go/codebase-memory-mcp.exe
diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md
index b7d08133..279dec00 100644
--- a/SECURITY.md
+++ b/SECURITY.md
@@ -288,8 +288,8 @@ for Linux ELF binaries, so it is not a complete answer either.
 
 | Version | Supported |
 |---------|-----------|
-| Latest `0.9.x` | Yes — security fixes land in the newest release |
-| < 0.9   | No — please upgrade to the latest release |
+| Latest `0.10.x` | Yes — security fixes land in the newest release |
+| < 0.10   | No — please upgrade to the latest release |
 
 Only the latest release is supported. Security fixes are shipped in a new
 patched release rather than backported to older versions; upgrading to the
diff --git a/graph-ui/package-lock.json b/graph-ui/package-lock.json
index 8c6ae46c..7768b039 100644
--- a/graph-ui/package-lock.json
+++ b/graph-ui/package-lock.json
@@ -5134,9 +5134,9 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/nanoid": {
-      "version": "3.3.16",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/nanoid/-/nanoid-3.3.16.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-bzlKTyNJ7+LdGIIwy8ijFpIqEQIvafahV7eYykJ8Cvh42EdJeODoJ6gUJXpQJvej1BddH8OqTXZNE/KfbWAu8Q==",
+      "version": "3.3.18",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/nanoid/-/nanoid-3.3.18.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-DTg4MJbGMWkfi6VZFdNt2/caMbQy4Ou+Op/hJQvGEWcnVfoA1QA+xzRKAzw9jD6+GVOOeYr/mIcuDSdug6F6+w==",
       "dev": true,
       "funding": [
         {
diff --git a/graph-ui/package.json b/graph-ui/package.json
index c2667999..b1aa3998 100644
--- a/graph-ui/package.json
+++ b/graph-ui/package.json
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
   },
   "overrides": {
     "form-data": ">=4.0.6",
-    "@babel/core": ">=7.29.6"
+    "@babel/core": ">=7.29.6",
+    "nanoid": "^3.3.17"
   }
 }
diff --git a/install.sh b/install.sh
index 3b99e735..aa48ac27 100755
--- a/install.sh
+++ b/install.sh
@@ -237,8 +237,13 @@ fi
 # macOS: fix signing
 if [ "$OS" = "darwin" ]; then
     echo "Fixing macOS code signing..."
-    xattr -d com.apple.quarantine "$DLBIN" 2>/dev/null || true
-    codesign --sign - --force "$DLBIN" 2>/dev/null || true
+    # A curl-downloaded archive usually carries no quarantine attribute at all,
+    # and xattr then prints "No such xattr: com.apple.quarantine" on stderr.
+    # That harmless line was read as the cause of an unrelated install failure
+    # and became a bug report's title (#1537) — silence it; nothing here is an
+    # error worth showing.
+    xattr -d com.apple.quarantine "$DLBIN" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+    codesign --sign - --force "$DLBIN" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
 fi
 
 # Verify the candidate before it requests account-wide maintenance. The
diff --git a/pkg/go/codebase-memory-mcp b/pkg/go/codebase-memory-mcp
deleted file mode 100644
index f8ea349b..00000000
Binary files a/pkg/go/codebase-memory-mcp and /dev/null differ
diff --git a/pkg/npm/README.md b/pkg/npm/README.md
index c64df22b..e6efc83a 100644
--- a/pkg/npm/README.md
+++ b/pkg/npm/README.md
@@ -15,11 +15,7 @@ High-quality parsing through [tree-sitter](https://tree-sitter.github.io/tree-si
 npm install -g codebase-memory-mcp
 ```
 
-The standard runtime set for your platform is downloaded automatically at install time. To select the UI runtime set and its verified frontend pack, set `CBM_VARIANT=ui` while installing and when invoking the wrapper:
-
-```bash
-CBM_VARIANT=ui npm install -g codebase-memory-mcp
-```
+The runtime set for your platform is downloaded automatically at install time. There is one composition per platform and the graph UI is always included — the former `CBM_VARIANT=ui` opt-in is obsolete.
 
 Then configure your coding agents:
 
diff --git a/pkg/npm/install.js b/pkg/npm/install.js
index 2c3ea9b6..9c86e933 100644
--- a/pkg/npm/install.js
+++ b/pkg/npm/install.js
@@ -580,14 +580,13 @@ async function main() {
   // dynamically links glibc 2.38+ and fails on older distros. macOS/Windows
   // have no such variant. Keep in sync with install.sh / pypi _cli.py / cli.c.
   const variant = platform === 'linux' ? '-portable' : '';
-  // Opt into the UI build (embedded graph visualization) with CBM_VARIANT=ui.
-  // Default is the standard (headless) build. Mirrors install.sh --ui.
-  const ui = (process.env.CBM_VARIANT || '').toLowerCase() === 'ui' ? 'ui-' : '';
-  const archive = `codebase-memory-mcp-${ui}${platform}-${arch}${variant}.${ext}`;
+  // No UI/standard split since v0.10.0: one archive per platform, graph UI
+  // always embedded. The old CBM_VARIANT=ui opt-in pointed at ui-* archives
+  // that no longer exist, so honoring it could only 404 (#1538).
+  const archive = `codebase-memory-mcp-${platform}-${arch}${variant}.${ext}`;
   const url = `https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/download/v${VERSION}/${archive}`;
 
-  const uiLabel = ui ? '(ui) ' : '';
-  process.stdout.write(`codebase-memory-mcp: downloading v${VERSION} ${uiLabel}for ${platform}/${arch}...\n`);
+  process.stdout.write(`codebase-memory-mcp: downloading v${VERSION} for ${platform}/${arch}...\n`);
 
   const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'cbm-install-'));
   const tmpArchive = path.join(tmpDir, `cbm.${ext}`);
diff --git a/pkg/pypi/README.md b/pkg/pypi/README.md
index f75af871..a2047d87 100644
--- a/pkg/pypi/README.md
+++ b/pkg/pypi/README.md
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ mcp-name: io.github.DeusData/codebase-memory-mcp
 
 **Fast code intelligence engine for AI coding agents.** Indexes an average repository in milliseconds, the Linux kernel (28M LOC) in 3 minutes. Answers structural queries in under 1ms.
 
-This Python wrapper downloads the selected `codebase-memory-mcp` runtime set from [GitHub Releases](https://github.com/DeusData/codebase-memory-mcp/releases) on first run and verifies it before publishing it in your OS cache directory. The standard set contains the native executable and authenticated integration asset; `CBM_VARIANT=ui` additionally selects the content-addressed UI pack.
+This Python wrapper downloads the selected `codebase-memory-mcp` runtime set from [GitHub Releases](https://github.com/DeusData/codebase-memory-mcp/releases) on first run and verifies it before publishing it in your OS cache directory. The set contains the native executable and authenticated integration asset, with the graph UI always embedded.
 
 ## Installation
 
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ pip install codebase-memory-mcp
 pipx install codebase-memory-mcp
 ```
 
-To use the UI variant, set `CBM_VARIANT=ui` when invoking the wrapper (and consistently for any package-managed update or reinstall).
+There is one composition per platform: the graph UI ships in every build, so no variant selection is needed.
 
 ## Usage
 
diff --git a/pkg/pypi/pyproject.toml b/pkg/pypi/pyproject.toml
index 18807810..38ad6ec6 100644
--- a/pkg/pypi/pyproject.toml
+++ b/pkg/pypi/pyproject.toml
@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
 [build-system]
-requires = ["hatchling"]
+# Pinned: `python -m build` resolves the backend fresh in an isolated env, so an
+# unpinned hatchling silently follows upstream. A hatchling release that began
+# emitting Metadata-Version 2.5 broke the v0.10.1 PyPI publish with pinned
+# twine 6.2.0 rejecting it — the whole toolchain must be pinned, not half of it.
+requires = ["hatchling==1.28.0"]
 build-backend = "hatchling.build"
 
 [project]
diff --git a/pkg/pypi/requirements-publish.txt b/pkg/pypi/requirements-publish.txt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6204a7d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pkg/pypi/requirements-publish.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,359 @@
+# Hash-pinned build toolchain for the PyPI publish step (OSSF Scorecard
+# pinned-dependencies: a pip command that resolves anything at run time is a
+# supply-chain hole, and version pins alone do not bind the artifact bytes).
+#
+# Regenerate on a linux/amd64 python:3.12 image so the hashes match the wheels
+# ubuntu-latest actually resolves:
+#
+#   docker run --rm --platform linux/amd64 python:3.12-slim sh -c "
+#     pip install -q pip-tools==7.5.1
+#     printf 'build==1.3.0\ntwine==7.0.0\n' > /tmp/req.in
+#     pip-compile --generate-hashes --allow-unsafe --quiet --output-file=- /tmp/req.in"
+#
+# twine must stay >= 7: hatchling emits Metadata-Version 2.5, which twine 6.2.0
+# rejects — that is what broke the v0.10.1 publish.
+build==1.3.0 \
+    --hash=sha256:698edd0ea270bde950f53aed21f3a0135672206f3911e0176261a31e0e07b397 \
+    --hash=sha256:7145f0b5061ba90a1500d60bd1b13ca0a8a4cebdd0cc16ed8adf1c0e739f43b4
+certifi==2026.7.22 \
+    --hash=sha256:62f22742b58a1a33014a2b6b706588a8d7e2a88ae7bd1a6ebe8c992928483775 \
+    --hash=sha256:741e2c3b351ddf169a738da9f2c048608ff7f2c5cc02f1ebc6b118bb090d5d55
+cffi==2.1.1 \
+    --hash=sha256:046bfc24911b37851ee1b51aab8bffe713d89c68c6a057b09484ce9fd5f69b4e \
+    --hash=sha256:06c72bb76605a4b0cd0aad6930b69d4baf7dd5d806cfc409b824191099700e66 \
+    --hash=sha256:0beceaabe56af686895136a2de78db54ecd8e4046b236b8fd6d6cb61389e9bf2 \
+    --hash=sha256:154852545011f779917b11c78db2358d095da62a9a172b78ad0a583ee5adc0d0 \
+    --hash=sha256:194cffa889098ced9976c3fc6340305e43f6303657d298da55366907c05c22d6 \
+    --hash=sha256:19ee6127ee34de7d83ce3d371ebc5ed91addbdcc39f9ab15ce4eb35a4e534971 \
+    --hash=sha256:1a18a57b58cfb21fc28d72e876acf10eaed67a1ed96226f92af4df681d571c4c \
+    --hash=sha256:1aa5645c30469b09530c4ebca77ebf8f17618293c58f8549cb1a543a50236e7d \
+    --hash=sha256:1dea0e4d7d4f11f619fe8c1d76caf49e24405b4b5743c0e3be16a500ecd930c9 \
+    --hash=sha256:208f941bb9d18e768138677f0a6d2ce01f590df56043dda1df1535ac57c88517 \
+    --hash=sha256:210019b6c7cf07f081b4c54635c8cf744377001350e29cc0f81c4377b4797735 \
+    --hash=sha256:246fa40ce8645a614ff682e0b70f37134e460eaf93a775e0cbe3cca585a67a80 \
+    --hash=sha256:25792eac27877609e7bb06d42ff88278a6624fff2ba9bbb523c09616b117e80f \
+    --hash=sha256:27350daa11d4f10c540e6e89dada4c54feb7256ad03e9a4dc075ebad7ba360d1 \
+    --hash=sha256:28907ab9bfb6aa13184cfc17c6b8e1023c5ab6fd7076d8c20a35e59fe04f8f29 \
+    --hash=sha256:2ae64be792b8966f2c69538199728b290e34726562896df1e5dc8ffd8d8188e8 \
+    --hash=sha256:31348097ff5bbe827ccc41795d4dd099d9f0625e7def00ee653c137a490c2a6c \
+    --hash=sha256:3143d81e29e1e20a9ce10901ec369012947876596f75a222235965f2b7ae832e \
+    --hash=sha256:3222ba5d678f80a030e6afbcc33dc1ae5cb45facabb61cee2c7016b8432fde48 \
+    --hash=sha256:3311ed60d36f83378794e1009ac6258bafbf81f7888b4caa7b35a521e3f95813 \
+    --hash=sha256:334644fbac4eff73d985a17a91226df55d0f394160c4cfb880e084c8f7161cac \
+    --hash=sha256:34e261f78cb6ceaaa36f42f2613f4380d94d9c759a9c73c769ee6e0247364632 \
+    --hash=sha256:363e05fa78e15116c3c32c210ee36884fd6b9afa6d440e47112c3bd511d64cb6 \
+    --hash=sha256:398aff33cee2767e3e781d2554c54bd0dff386bb437581e0d8011fde1a942ec1 \
+    --hash=sha256:3d22a20b1fb1632cc72c22f95f7b0d2961c3e1c235f245ba4c606c4771035659 \
+    --hash=sha256:42a494cee34437f05546455144f2b5d9ac09b1face62bcfce597d2e521066688 \
+    --hash=sha256:42e2f76b9455f5a9a844f770bf3e200ed3da0e15f5df3db9c31fe80b04b3d004 \
+    --hash=sha256:42f6930c31dc7f50732c9ae793c2786c7b6b044195967bbdde40bb9be81c4cc0 \
+    --hash=sha256:456a61fa52d579ebf9df2e9552ead5129855dbaff6c1e5a9b1bc408809bdc062 \
+    --hash=sha256:471cee653ae88de62096552e6d24ccb4a5adb8c8c9f10b5054d0122c15bf2779 \
+    --hash=sha256:49cbc70e6542d4ccccb936558d1064a8012541e78f821f955cff24e357776c94 \
+    --hash=sha256:4a7c934f7360e8cd64fe9efadcbd10c7c6364f531e432b9a4bf5ccbc9e0e8b50 \
+    --hash=sha256:4be96343e422f2dfcd12ab5c9f5aebe03f82f737c6bffeca6830b3875cb44aab \
+    --hash=sha256:4f42141fc14250de6dde5ee7ea4432be017252d91f19c5ad043c084cea629cac \
+    --hash=sha256:507a24c282e0f42f8ed737cf048572cbf580468da5555764a8331735e9c736b6 \
+    --hash=sha256:51b31d1c98274844cfd7838ce00bfc27c7423a4dc00fc0772fc3331c2cc90676 \
+    --hash=sha256:58acb8ab8e295e6c5ea12f888cbb13cf21511ef2a3303a23f4325c29d17fe5c1 \
+    --hash=sha256:5a59cc1c4442bc3d5c703bf720b51138d0bfc173618807c9ee2490a7541dd3d9 \
+    --hash=sha256:5bb4e7ea95dcd6a014a6fef62e62467d67d8e582326443f3d68e71d6320a9fcf \
+    --hash=sha256:5c58fe613dc5e5336357eff555824a314d8e43282600435c8d1cb6a7a2fedd13 \
+    --hash=sha256:5e7cecbaadb83884793e05828cee59b210b24583b9c7425d0ba6a754fe22eb4e \
+    --hash=sha256:616f097f2fe415bc92a247f02e11f634e1f9e9a83d327e3c915c15089c87869e \
+    --hash=sha256:63bbfd5ded17c4840ac07cd8f1c21ba9d9708141f840b324f422f41b207e3973 \
+    --hash=sha256:64faea20f4e2613363a1a9b9c7dd73058f3ecd00133a511e72ad7c511658f527 \
+    --hash=sha256:661c298b4821edebead0c91edd2b00374d67ad7c5a1f7a91d4442633b79d6a72 \
+    --hash=sha256:68e62fe11f30d5ca8289242866f0a5291402d8529ca2178ab8afc5c9694ae890 \
+    --hash=sha256:6a8dddef476fab96d066d578fc88526767b836ab5ab21754e1d5bf3879c31c7c \
+    --hash=sha256:6e192623c49c94421616a5778fba35cf0d5a8d000650c1967ef4448ee5cdd990 \
+    --hash=sha256:7225e4514edb64eb6740324353e0da0711954fd8d7da4576755b1c6e09b697cd \
+    --hash=sha256:75f80557d1389eddbd0de2681f6a390a0c5338c31ddaa821381c203fc3fd50d9 \
+    --hash=sha256:770de9db11e84213beec501cfcaa013b019820ca881e03344dea5844f7876d94 \
+    --hash=sha256:7750c6449dff7864bb9bb27ddfb0267756189201a3afc911d82b3caacd70dfc3 \
+    --hash=sha256:7bde5e4cc5c10140859842b9d383af292b22639a4dffb725314baf45968cef80 \
+    --hash=sha256:7ce713ace7c0e4520535b42b77eaa742c16dab813978064913e5a3cf82973b41 \
+    --hash=sha256:7da0c5eff80f0197f3b3d1232ec5a682a9325f4ae9016a78f5f5ca35f9ced1f5 \
+    --hash=sha256:7dbb61fe3a7699468030f71bbe5f8a0e326a151daa91beb11a6fc1f980c55e1c \
+    --hash=sha256:811bd1e21d32de12efca32393a0ab3f5133b54fce9bd44b8bd77ab07da14bf6a \
+    --hash=sha256:8ef53b2de9bcb9197d31854256575d59dbac0cba72ac627bb291ef5eceb74be4 \
+    --hash=sha256:937c0052c05a31ca1daf18de3158eed4dbfcb9cc107adbea227728d647be701e \
+    --hash=sha256:9d2055050ea716bd38b7f7f1579c275386646b4894c155a3e2f3cd62ed41b7c6 \
+    --hash=sha256:9f8d177621de5cb38ee3e731eda45d421db093ec0739f46a5594babda7987a98 \
+    --hash=sha256:a2d7755bef5a12ed488f4ef1f1b69ee9191d7396083b755a5d2295f6edb4768b \
+    --hash=sha256:a48d62ab9d6f4f98c983223a547af44be6ca3691074c31cecced6facd3ba2dc1 \
+    --hash=sha256:a4f00aa42f75d6e4595e8866e748cc1705adc0cddfeb2ca86d0d03993d63ba03 \
+    --hash=sha256:a6e721d4b0e45d5b65e87534470e67b18dcd092c83f68fba09f152b9cbc061af \
+    --hash=sha256:a730a083190634c65cca36ba5f489531576ebd79bcd5c8e172130f6453127231 \
+    --hash=sha256:a931079504ecc49efed7744c476a5c343a92fabf66dec2db95edb1b2fdc770e2 \
+    --hash=sha256:aa9511c62d14da7aacc9b4bf51f3f697a621e83b2d6919008243c3aad168eea3 \
+    --hash=sha256:ab36d55f9ed2d067327667c2fea18dda018eb628dd6347aa01dda6cf1f5d3836 \
+    --hash=sha256:ad2c86c495b899d862ea0f4b42891b8713a3bd45dd4105c7fd51c2a72f39f3a5 \
+    --hash=sha256:aeae0e330c9f6acd681f647d46cefd30c29f93e3392882e792e82080c9691399 \
+    --hash=sha256:b0431303acaea1089ad4b3e9ce4e6518193def1118d4073ca848635ee4ea2e96 \
+    --hash=sha256:b5bdfd1c873d4e093aabc0ca84c4ca6dbc4f752afb5c86f146d9742580c9da2e \
+    --hash=sha256:baed1e86cc735622097354b9d1281406caf42ff42a886d29faa8e8d1630333be \
+    --hash=sha256:c1453022f490d2459a11819d83ad1d586e9ff65a12ac3e705ffebd46d3685dcf \
+    --hash=sha256:c26608d2222fb1e94487e4a387d85f13eb55d5ed725cb25a0c589ac4ee60e7bc \
+    --hash=sha256:c7659f22557c5a0bc4855cd635f55edec690cc008a40768527762cb9fb263455 \
+    --hash=sha256:c8c69575568085ba0b1b10c0249d779a214aea6f6522e949a0fc9fb0fcb449d0 \
+    --hash=sha256:c8d2c9fd1f2d16f780d15127abb050d13d1a76c03a4bd87d7e4980e45e511e12 \
+    --hash=sha256:ca82be1a1d406ecfe1d25dc16cb33488e5a16bf4438c9fb590484ea29d92478b \
+    --hash=sha256:cc572dace3f60ef98d7b12ff411d20f5362feb31a0439eab0085bbfd349982d7 \
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+idna==3.18 \
+    --hash=sha256:7f952cbe720b688055e3f87de14f5c3e5fdaa8bc3928985c4077ca689de849a2 \
+    --hash=sha256:ffb385a7e039654cef1ab9ef32c6fafe283c0c0467bba1d9029738ce4a14a848
+jaraco-classes==3.4.0 \
+    --hash=sha256:47a024b51d0239c0dd8c8540c6c7f484be3b8fcf0b2d85c13825780d3b3f3acd \
+    --hash=sha256:f662826b6bed8cace05e7ff873ce0f9283b5c924470fe664fff1c2f00f581790
+jaraco-context==6.1.2 \
+    --hash=sha256:bf8150b79a2d5d91ae48629d8b427a8f7ba0e1097dd6202a9059f29a36379535 \
+    --hash=sha256:f1a6c9d391e661cc5b8d39861ff077a7dc24dc23833ccee564b234b81c82dfe3
+jaraco-functools==4.6.0 \
+    --hash=sha256:880c577ec9720b3a052d5bc611fb9f2269b3d87902ef42440df443b88e443280 \
+    --hash=sha256:99e3dc0060c5cbe8fcd1cdb36258e2a65ca40f1566b2033b12abb1bb44dd3c30
+jeepney==0.9.0 \
+    --hash=sha256:97e5714520c16fc0a45695e5365a2e11b81ea79bba796e26f9f1d178cb182683 \
+    --hash=sha256:cf0e9e845622b81e4a28df94c40345400256ec608d0e55bb8a3feaa9163f5732
+keyring==25.7.0 \
+    --hash=sha256:be4a0b195f149690c166e850609a477c532ddbfbaed96a404d4e43f8d5e2689f \
+    --hash=sha256:fe01bd85eb3f8fb3dd0405defdeac9a5b4f6f0439edbb3149577f244a2e8245b
+markdown-it-py==4.2.0 \
+    --hash=sha256:04a21681d6fbb623de53f6f364d352309d4094dd4194040a10fd51833e418d49 \
+    --hash=sha256:9f7ebbcd14fe59494226453aed97c1070d83f8d24b6fc3a3bcf9a38092641c4a
+mdurl==0.1.2 \
+    --hash=sha256:84008a41e51615a49fc9966191ff91509e3c40b939176e643fd50a5c2196b8f8 \
+    --hash=sha256:bb413d29f5eea38f31dd4754dd7377d4465116fb207585f97bf925588687c1ba
+more-itertools==11.1.0 \
+    --hash=sha256:48e8f4d9e7e5878571ecf6f2b4e57634f93cd474cc8cfbd2376f2d11b396e30d \
+    --hash=sha256:4b65538ae22f6fed0ce4874efd317463a7489796a0939fa66824dd542125a192
+nh3==0.3.6 \
+    --hash=sha256:082675ff87b9385ec430ffe6d5847ba7456cc39b73720cd4add472f9f4cffd56 \
+    --hash=sha256:2411e8c3cee81a1ddd62c2a5d50585c28aa5566d373ad1db92536b95ddb24ef2 \
+    --hash=sha256:25c733bee928530556b1db0ea46c52cf5aa686146e38e60a6fc7cb801ef91cec \
+    --hash=sha256:2f90d9a0cfdbee218994fdaaeeb5a0fde62d08f35e4eef0378ec1e2200172fd0 \
+    --hash=sha256:34d2b0d934156b87ee114f599a3ba9b8b9e17b5d79652ba3a13fa50903de965e \
+    --hash=sha256:36d06341bd501240d320f5942481ed5e6846136b666e1ba4faf802b78ebc875f \
+    --hash=sha256:43bc1ed3fa0716295fabee29ba42b2667e4a51d140b0a68e092170a765474fa6 \
+    --hash=sha256:44673b27010051ab5a5e438a86ec31bbda61d4a77d7e900af6b7be3037c1abae \
+    --hash=sha256:455469a29951edc92bc48b47ac2281c3f2609e6c4f6a047056449f8c2c23facf \
+    --hash=sha256:4713502748f564fee0633b37b3403783ce0a3af3a3d148ad91025a5bdadb7bc6 \
+    --hash=sha256:5276ef17bdba9ad8040575c74072008b13aae429436e9d0429e718bb5f90f4da \
+    --hash=sha256:597a8e843bea00b2eb5520658dc24a9bb032e7fc9e7c2c0c4cd29420220c9796 \
+    --hash=sha256:69bbb92865a693d909db3a700d3c01537533844d0948c1e9323561ce06ecda41 \
+    --hash=sha256:69f365963f63a1e9bff53bdbb3c542c7c2efed3e163c9d5d83a772a2ac468c21 \
+    --hash=sha256:82ca5bf427ad1b216b65ede1a2e2d87dc49bec417ceba0f297213107d3cd9d78 \
+    --hash=sha256:889932a97fb4abb6f95fef1914c0d269ebfb60011e67121c1163059b9449dbb4 \
+    --hash=sha256:905f877dc66dd7aea4a76e54bcb26acb5ff8216f720c0017ccf63e0e6035698e \
+    --hash=sha256:a43ebd7543555c3ac1bc353023d0794e75cb76f6f18f19c32e95441496c0cc25 \
+    --hash=sha256:d14bf7982e7a77c0c775634c29c07ce08b38a046df73e1c1f139b3e82f18a38e \
+    --hash=sha256:e196fa70c2ff2eb4de7d3df3108f8f358c1d69dff20d45b11f20a5aa227ffb6d \
+    --hash=sha256:e1b160831c9cdb06a6c79c2f9cdb11386602938f9af260d1c457a85add4f6f69 \
+    --hash=sha256:e6b7beece07525dc6e6b0fc2f104442de2ba328360ad00e50cbe2e1fd620447d \
+    --hash=sha256:edb2b4a1a27523e6cc7c417f8d21ce3d005243548b93e56b762b66b0c7f589f9 \
+    --hash=sha256:f2f14b7ae1fca99c4a66c981aac3974e7fbc1ca30a12673d223ae1df76680917 \
+    --hash=sha256:f338ac7d594c067679f1e99b4f5ec3906842979560f9d8f15d6bdfa39a353b10 \
+    --hash=sha256:f3736c9dd3d1856f80cd031715b84ca75cda2bbb1ac802c3da26bfce590838d7 \
+    --hash=sha256:f5ed5fe84aee7f39db95c214a7421bf0499fbf500fec6d86a4e29bfc37971438
+packaging==26.3 \
+    --hash=sha256:94edc256424af38762eb31306eed28beb9f0efc50a8837492c9d6fd6004aed79 \
+    --hash=sha256:d7193f7c8e4e93f444fde0262bf90af30e16fa0ad0ad44cb553c87339b23cd1c
+pycparser==3.0 \
+    --hash=sha256:600f49d217304a5902ac3c37e1281c9fe94e4d0489de643a9504c5cdfdfc6b29 \
+    --hash=sha256:b727414169a36b7d524c1c3e31839a521725078d7b2ff038656844266160a992
+pygments==2.20.0 \
+    --hash=sha256:6757cd03768053ff99f3039c1a36d6c0aa0b263438fcab17520b30a303a82b5f \
+    --hash=sha256:81a9e26dd42fd28a23a2d169d86d7ac03b46e2f8b59ed4698fb4785f946d0176
+pyproject-hooks==1.2.0 \
+    --hash=sha256:1e859bd5c40fae9448642dd871adf459e5e2084186e8d2c2a79a824c970da1f8 \
+    --hash=sha256:9e5c6bfa8dcc30091c74b0cf803c81fdd29d94f01992a7707bc97babb1141913
+readme-renderer==45.0 \
+    --hash=sha256:030a8fac74904f8fba11ad1bb6964e3f76e896dc7e5e71f16af190c9056696d1 \
+    --hash=sha256:3385ed220117104a2bceb4a9dac8c5fdf6d1f96890d7ea2a9c7174fd5c84091f
+requests==2.34.2 \
+    --hash=sha256:2a0d60c172f83ac6ab31e4554906c0f3b3588d37b5cb939b1c061f4907e278e0 \
+    --hash=sha256:f288924cae4e29463698d6d60bc6a4da69c89185ad1e0bcc4104f584e960b9ed
+requests-toolbelt==1.0.0 \
+    --hash=sha256:7681a0a3d047012b5bdc0ee37d7f8f07ebe76ab08caeccfc3921ce23c88d5bc6 \
+    --hash=sha256:cccfdd665f0a24fcf4726e690f65639d272bb0637b9b92dfd91a5568ccf6bd06
+rfc3986==2.0.0 \
+    --hash=sha256:50b1502b60e289cb37883f3dfd34532b8873c7de9f49bb546641ce9cbd256ebd \
+    --hash=sha256:97aacf9dbd4bfd829baad6e6309fa6573aaf1be3f6fa735c8ab05e46cecb261c
+rich==15.0.0 \
+    --hash=sha256:33bd4ef74232fb73fe9279a257718407f169c09b78a87ad3d296f548e27de0bb \
+    --hash=sha256:edd07a4824c6b40189fb7ac9bc4c52536e9780fbbfbddf6f1e2502c31b068c36
+secretstorage==3.5.0 \
+    --hash=sha256:0ce65888c0725fcb2c5bc0fdb8e5438eece02c523557ea40ce0703c266248137 \
+    --hash=sha256:f04b8e4689cbce351744d5537bf6b1329c6fc68f91fa666f60a380edddcd11be
+twine==7.0.0 \
+    --hash=sha256:85cdb29c518efef867360ae4acd4b0dfd61c8654a22fca08e6f8539f05022177 \
+    --hash=sha256:b854164df26db268af05f49aa5c0344b10e27a494343ff05b1e0bad3b135f5a7
+urllib3==2.7.0 \
+    --hash=sha256:231e0ec3b63ceb14667c67be60f2f2c40a518cb38b03af60abc813da26505f4c \
+    --hash=sha256:9fb4c81ebbb1ce9531cce37674bbc6f1360472bc18ca9a553ede278ef7276897
diff --git a/scripts/ci/publish-legacy-aliases.sh b/scripts/ci/publish-legacy-aliases.sh
new file mode 100755
index 00000000..07f0b398
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/ci/publish-legacy-aliases.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Publish byte-identical ui-*-named copies of the release archives.
+#
+# Every codebase-memory-mcp 0.9.x binary in the field asks for
+# codebase-memory-mcp-ui-<platform>.<ext> when its (now-removed) variant chooser
+# is answered "ui". v0.10.0 consolidated to a single archive per platform with
+# the UI always embedded, so that asset stopped existing and those updaters 404
+# with no path forward but a manual reinstall (#1538, discussion #1526).
+# Publishing the same bytes under the legacy names makes already-released
+# updaters work again with no action from the user.
+#
+# Runs AFTER the VirusTotal gate: the aliases are copies of archives the gate
+# already cleared, and uploading them earlier would duplicate every object in
+# the scan set and in the provenance manifest. They are likewise absent from
+# checksums.txt, which covers the canonical names current installers request.
+#
+# Usage: publish-legacy-aliases.sh <version-tag> <repository>
+set -euo pipefail
+
+VERSION="${1:?usage: publish-legacy-aliases.sh <version-tag> <repository>}"
+REPOSITORY="${2:?usage: publish-legacy-aliases.sh <version-tag> <repository>}"
+
+work="$(mktemp -d)"
+trap 'rm -rf "$work"' EXIT
+
+gh release download "$VERSION" --dir "$work" --repo "$REPOSITORY" \
+  --pattern 'codebase-memory-mcp-*.tar.gz' --pattern 'codebase-memory-mcp-*.zip'
+
+shopt -s nullglob
+aliases=()
+for archive in "$work"/codebase-memory-mcp-*; do
+  base="$(basename "$archive")"
+  case "$base" in
+  codebase-memory-mcp-ui-*) continue ;;
+  esac
+  alias_path="$work/${base/codebase-memory-mcp-/codebase-memory-mcp-ui-}"
+  cp -- "$archive" "$alias_path"
+  aliases+=("$alias_path")
+done
+
+if [ "${#aliases[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
+  echo "error: no canonical archives found to alias for $VERSION" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+gh release upload "$VERSION" "${aliases[@]}" --clobber --repo "$REPOSITORY"
+echo "published ${#aliases[@]} legacy alias asset(s) for $VERSION"
diff --git a/scripts/smoke-test.sh b/scripts/smoke-test.sh
index 90efe52d..53dc130a 100755
--- a/scripts/smoke-test.sh
+++ b/scripts/smoke-test.sh
@@ -1166,7 +1166,7 @@ if ! echo "$UNINSTALL_OUT" | grep -qi 'uninstall\|remov'; then
 fi
 echo "OK: uninstall --dry-run completed"
 
-# 6c: update --dry-run --standard -y
+# 6c: update --dry-run -y
 # The product binary never replaces itself on ANY platform. `update` is a
 # handoff: it prints the shipped install script's command and exits 0. An
 # in-process updater is structurally a downloader -- fetch archive, extract,
@@ -1178,7 +1178,7 @@ if [[ "$BINARY" == *.exe ]]; then
 else
   UPDATE_SCRIPT="install.sh"
 fi
-if ! UPDATE_OUT=$(run_dryrun_env "$BINARY" update --dry-run --standard -y 2>&1); then
+if ! UPDATE_OUT=$(run_dryrun_env "$BINARY" update --dry-run -y 2>&1); then
   echo "FAIL: update handoff exited non-zero"
   echo "$UPDATE_OUT"
   exit 1
@@ -3002,7 +3002,7 @@ echo "OK 9b-8: double uninstall doesn't crash"
 retire_account_daemon "9b-8-cleanup"
 smoke_rmtree "$DBL_HOME"
 
-# 9b-9: Non-interactive update without --standard/--ui should fail cleanly (not hang)
+# 9b-9: Non-interactive update must not hang (no variant prompt exists since #1538)
 if [ "$(uname -s)" != "MINGW64_NT" ] 2>/dev/null; then
   NONINT_OUT=$(echo "" | "$BINARY" update --dry-run 2>&1) || true
   if echo "$NONINT_OUT" | grep -qi 'terminal\|requires.*flag\|error'; then
@@ -3226,11 +3226,7 @@ if [ -n "${SMOKE_DOWNLOAD_URL:-}" ]; then
     'import json, os; print(json.dumps({"mcpServers":{"codebase-memory-mcp":{"command":os.environ["STALE_CMD"]}}}))' \
     > "$UPDATE_HOME/.claude.json"
 
-  # 14a: Run actual update command (detect variant from available archive)
-  UPDATE_VARIANT="--standard"
-  if curl --noproxy '*' -sf "$SMOKE_DOWNLOAD_URL/" 2>/dev/null | grep -q "ui-"; then
-    UPDATE_VARIANT="--ui"
-  fi
+  # 14a: Run actual update command (one composition ships — no variant flag)
   UPDATE_LOG=$(smoke_mktemp_file)
   # Hash the driver BEFORE the run and compare it against itself afterwards.
   # Comparing against "$BINARY" instead looks equivalent but is not: the POSIX
@@ -3238,7 +3234,7 @@ if [ -n "${SMOKE_DOWNLOAD_URL:-}" ]; then
   # is ever invoked and the assertion fires on a difference the fixture created.
   UPDATE_BIN_SHA_BEFORE=$(smoke_file_sha256 "$UPDATE_DRIVER")
   HOME="$UPDATE_HOME" CBM_DOWNLOAD_URL="$UPDATE_DOWNLOAD_URL" \
-    "$UPDATE_DRIVER" update $UPDATE_VARIANT -y > "$UPDATE_LOG" 2>&1
+    "$UPDATE_DRIVER" update -y > "$UPDATE_LOG" 2>&1
   UPDATE_RC=$?
   cat "$UPDATE_LOG"
 
@@ -3657,13 +3653,13 @@ UI_PID=$!
 UI_READY=0
 for _ in $(seq 1 150); do
   if ! kill -0 "$UI_PID" 2>/dev/null; then break; fi
-  if curl -sf "http://127.0.0.1:$UI_PORT/" -o /dev/null 2>/dev/null; then UI_READY=1; break; fi
+  if curl --noproxy '*' -sf "http://127.0.0.1:$UI_PORT/" -o /dev/null 2>/dev/null; then UI_READY=1; break; fi
   sleep 0.2
 done
 
 if [ "$UI_READY" -eq 1 ] || kill -0 "$UI_PID" 2>/dev/null; then
   # 15a: GET / returns 200 with HTML content
-  UI_BODY=$(curl -sf "http://127.0.0.1:$UI_PORT/" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
+  UI_BODY=$(curl --noproxy '*' -sf "http://127.0.0.1:$UI_PORT/" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
   if echo "$UI_BODY" | grep -qi "<html"; then
     echo "OK 15a: UI serves HTML at /"
   elif [ -z "$UI_BODY" ]; then
@@ -3679,7 +3675,7 @@ if [ "$UI_READY" -eq 1 ] || kill -0 "$UI_PID" 2>/dev/null; then
   # old probe POSTed an MCP initialize at /rpc, but the UI's /rpc speaks the
   # UI's own narrow query protocol, not MCP — the probe asserted a request
   # the endpoint never answered; protocol depth belongs to the UI guards.)
-  RPC_BODY=$(curl -sf "http://127.0.0.1:$UI_PORT/api/ui-config" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
+  RPC_BODY=$(curl --noproxy '*' -sf "http://127.0.0.1:$UI_PORT/api/ui-config" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
   if echo "$RPC_BODY" | grep -q "{"; then
     echo "OK 15b: /api/ui-config returns JSON"
   elif [ -z "$RPC_BODY" ]; then
diff --git a/src/cli/activation_transaction.c b/src/cli/activation_transaction.c
index 9ea1cfc6..d9af2185 100644
--- a/src/cli/activation_transaction.c
+++ b/src/cli/activation_transaction.c
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 /* Transactional binary activation. See activation_transaction.h. */
 #include "cli/activation_transaction.h"
+#include "foundation/log.h"
 #include "foundation/macos_acl.h"
 
 #include <errno.h>
@@ -106,6 +107,22 @@ static void activation_note_refusal(const char *predicate, unsigned long os_erro
                    g_activation_refusal_object ? g_activation_refusal_object : "");
 }
 
+#ifndef _WIN32
+/* A permission refusal has no errno to report — the syscall succeeded and the
+ * POLICY said no. Reporters spent hours chasing "I/O failed" for what was a
+ * mode bit (#1535), so these refusals carry the mode and the path instead of a
+ * fabricated OS error code. POSIX-only: the Windows validators refuse on ACL
+ * predicates and report through activation_note_refusal with a real OS error. */
+static void activation_note_refusal_detail(const char *predicate, const char *detail) {
+    if (g_activation_refusal_note[0] != '\0') {
+        return;
+    }
+    (void)snprintf(g_activation_refusal_note, sizeof(g_activation_refusal_note), "%s (%s)%s%s",
+                   predicate, detail, g_activation_refusal_object ? " at " : "",
+                   g_activation_refusal_object ? g_activation_refusal_object : "");
+}
+#endif
+
 const char *cbm_activation_transaction_refusal_note(void) {
     return g_activation_refusal_note;
 }
@@ -740,11 +757,25 @@ static char *activation_posix_walk_path(const char *directory) {
     return activation_string_copy(directory);
 }
 
+/* ANCESTOR policy (#1535). World-writable is still fatal: any local user could
+ * swap a path component mid-transaction. GROUP-writable is not — it is the
+ * default shape of ordinary home trees (WSL2 ships ~ and ~/.local at 0775, as
+ * do several distro skeletons and any site using a shared primary group), and
+ * refusing it made `install.sh` fail for a large fraction of Linux users with
+ * no actionable message. The group is a bounded, administratively-chosen set;
+ * the LEAF directory (below) stays strictly owner-private either way, so the
+ * binary itself is never left in a group-writable directory. Group-writable
+ * ancestors are warned about, out loud, rather than silently accepted. */
 static bool activation_posix_intermediate_secure(const struct stat *status) {
     bool trusted_owner = status->st_uid == 0 || status->st_uid == geteuid();
-    bool private_permissions = (status->st_mode & 0022) == 0;
+    bool world_writable = (status->st_mode & 0002) != 0;
     bool root_sticky = status->st_uid == 0 && (status->st_mode & S_ISVTX) != 0;
-    return S_ISDIR(status->st_mode) && trusted_owner && (private_permissions || root_sticky);
+    return S_ISDIR(status->st_mode) && trusted_owner && (!world_writable || root_sticky);
+}
+
+static bool activation_posix_intermediate_group_writable(const struct stat *status) {
+    bool root_sticky = status->st_uid == 0 && (status->st_mode & S_ISVTX) != 0;
+    return (status->st_mode & 0020) != 0 && !root_sticky;
 }
 
 static bool activation_directory_secure(const char *directory, int *directory_fd_out,
@@ -788,8 +819,23 @@ static bool activation_directory_secure(const char *directory, int *directory_fd
             while (*remaining == '/') {
                 remaining++;
             }
-            if (next_ok && *remaining && !activation_posix_intermediate_secure(&next_status)) {
-                next_ok = false;
+            if (next_ok && *remaining) {
+                if (!activation_posix_intermediate_secure(&next_status)) {
+                    char detail[64];
+                    (void)snprintf(detail, sizeof(detail), "mode %04o, uid %lu",
+                                   (unsigned)(next_status.st_mode & 07777),
+                                   (unsigned long)next_status.st_uid);
+                    g_activation_refusal_object = walk_path;
+                    activation_note_refusal_detail("ancestor_directory_world_writable", detail);
+                    g_activation_refusal_object = NULL;
+                    next_ok = false;
+                } else if (activation_posix_intermediate_group_writable(&next_status)) {
+                    char mode_text[16];
+                    (void)snprintf(mode_text, sizeof(mode_text), "%04o",
+                                   (unsigned)(next_status.st_mode & 07777));
+                    cbm_log_warn("activation.ancestor_group_writable", "path", walk_path, "mode",
+                                 mode_text);
+                }
             }
             if (next_ok) {
                 (void)close(descriptor);
@@ -807,9 +853,36 @@ static bool activation_directory_secure(const char *directory, int *directory_fd
         }
     }
     struct stat status;
-    ok = ok && fstat(descriptor, &status) == 0 && S_ISDIR(status.st_mode) &&
-         status.st_uid == geteuid() && (status.st_mode & 0022) == 0 &&
-         activation_posix_acl_empty(descriptor);
+    if (ok && fstat(descriptor, &status) == 0) {
+        /* LEAF policy: strictly owner-private. This is the directory the binary
+         * is published into, so group/other write here would let another
+         * account replace the executable between validation and exec. Unlike
+         * the ancestors above, this one is refused — but it now says exactly
+         * which directory and which mode (#1535), instead of surfacing as a
+         * generic I/O failure that sent reporters hunting phantom disk errors. */
+        bool is_dir = S_ISDIR(status.st_mode);
+        bool owned = status.st_uid == geteuid();
+        bool private_permissions = (status.st_mode & 0022) == 0;
+        if (!is_dir || !owned || !private_permissions) {
+            char detail[64];
+            (void)snprintf(detail, sizeof(detail), "mode %04o, uid %lu",
+                           (unsigned)(status.st_mode & 07777), (unsigned long)status.st_uid);
+            g_activation_refusal_object = directory;
+            activation_note_refusal_detail(!is_dir  ? "install_dir_not_a_directory"
+                                           : !owned ? "install_dir_not_owned_by_you"
+                                                    : "install_dir_group_or_world_writable",
+                                           detail);
+            g_activation_refusal_object = NULL;
+            ok = false;
+        } else if (!activation_posix_acl_empty(descriptor)) {
+            g_activation_refusal_object = directory;
+            activation_note_refusal_detail("install_dir_carries_extra_acl_entries", "posix acl");
+            g_activation_refusal_object = NULL;
+            ok = false;
+        }
+    } else {
+        ok = false;
+    }
     free(walk_path);
     if (!ok) {
         if (descriptor >= 0) {
diff --git a/src/cli/cli.c b/src/cli/cli.c
index 70ed44a1..010719a6 100644
--- a/src/cli/cli.c
+++ b/src/cli/cli.c
@@ -72,8 +72,6 @@ enum {
     MIN_ARGC_GET = 2,
     AUTO_YES = 1,
     AUTO_NO = -1,
-    VARIANT_A = 1,
-    VARIANT_B = 2,
     OCTAL_BASE = 8,
     CLI_ACTIVATION_DRAIN_TIMEOUT_MS = 15000,
     CLI_ACTIVATION_CONTROL_TIMEOUT_MS = 2000,
@@ -154,9 +152,17 @@ int cbm_cli_exit_status_after_maintenance(int exit_status, bool maintenance_canc
     return maintenance_cancelled && exit_status == EXIT_SUCCESS ? EXIT_FAILURE : exit_status;
 }
 
+/* #1537: the refusal is correct, but "sessions could not be stopped" gives the
+ * reader nothing to act on — which sessions? The daemon already knows every
+ * client pid and `daemon status` prints them, so name that remedy here rather
+ * than leaving people to guess (one reporter uninstalled first and still hit
+ * this, with no way to see what was holding on). */
 static const char CLI_ACTIVATION_REFUSED_MESSAGE[] =
     "error: active CBM sessions and operations could not be stopped safely; "
-    "no activation was committed.";
+    "no activation was committed.\n"
+    "error: run 'codebase-memory-mcp daemon status' to list the client "
+    "processes still holding the daemon (MCP servers started by your editor or "
+    "agent are the usual holders), close them, then retry.";
 static const char CLI_ACTIVATION_PARTIAL_MESSAGE[] =
     "error: activation stopped after one or more agent configuration or "
     "cleanup operations failed; the published/current executable was kept, "
@@ -11294,7 +11300,7 @@ static int extract_and_install_binary(extract_install_args_t args) {
  * covers the flow through the activation test seam. */
 /* Build the download URL for the update command. */
 static void build_update_url(char *url, int url_sz, const char *os, const char *arch,
-                             const char *ext, bool want_ui) {
+                             const char *ext) {
     char base_url_buf[CLI_BUF_512];
     const char *base_url =
         cbm_safe_getenv("CBM_DOWNLOAD_URL", base_url_buf, sizeof(base_url_buf), NULL);
@@ -11306,8 +11312,7 @@ static void build_update_url(char *url, int url_sz, const char *os, const char *
      * have no such variant. Keep in sync with install.sh / install.js / pypi
      * _cli.py. */
     const char *portable = (strcmp(os, "linux") == 0) ? "-portable" : "";
-    snprintf(url, url_sz, "%s/codebase-memory-mcp-%s%s-%s%s.%s", base_url, want_ui ? "ui-" : "", os,
-             arch, portable, ext);
+    snprintf(url, url_sz, "%s/codebase-memory-mcp-%s-%s%s.%s", base_url, os, arch, portable, ext);
 }
 
 /* Confirm index deletion before network I/O, but defer the deletion itself to
@@ -11340,8 +11345,8 @@ static int update_prepare_clear_indexes(const char *home, bool dry_run, bool *de
 
 /* Download and verify before disruption, then activate under daemon locks. */
 static int download_verify_install(const char *url, const char *ext, const char *os,
-                                   const char *arch, bool want_ui, const char *bin_dest,
-                                   const char *home, bool delete_indexes) {
+                                   const char *arch, const char *bin_dest, const char *home,
+                                   bool delete_indexes) {
     char tmp_archive[CLI_BUF_256];
     int archive_path_length =
         snprintf(tmp_archive, sizeof(tmp_archive), "%s/cbm-update-XXXXXX", cbm_tmpdir());
@@ -11372,8 +11377,8 @@ static int download_verify_install(const char *url, const char *ext, const char
     char archive_name[CLI_BUF_256];
     /* Must match build_update_url: linux uses the static "-portable" asset. */
     const char *portable = (strcmp(os, "linux") == 0) ? "-portable" : "";
-    snprintf(archive_name, sizeof(archive_name), "codebase-memory-mcp-%s%s-%s%s.%s",
-             want_ui ? "ui-" : "", os, arch, portable, ext);
+    snprintf(archive_name, sizeof(archive_name), "codebase-memory-mcp-%s-%s%s.%s", os, arch,
+             portable, ext);
     /* Fail closed: install only a positively-verified download. A mismatch,
      * a missing checksum entry, or an unavailable hash tool (crc != 0) all
      * abort rather than install an unverified binary. */
@@ -11396,34 +11401,6 @@ static int download_verify_install(const char *url, const char *ext, const char
     return 0;
 }
 
-/* Select update variant. Returns 0=standard, 1=ui, -1=error. */
-static int select_update_variant(int variant_flag) {
-    if (variant_flag == VARIANT_A) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-    if (variant_flag == VARIANT_B) {
-        return CLI_TRUE;
-    }
-#ifndef _WIN32
-    if (!isatty(fileno(stdin))) {
-        (void)fprintf(stderr, "error: variant selection requires a terminal. "
-                              "Use --standard or --ui flag.\n");
-        return CLI_ERR;
-    }
-#endif
-    printf("Which binary variant do you want?\n");
-    printf("  1) standard  — MCP server only\n");
-    printf("  2) ui        — MCP server + embedded graph visualization\n");
-    printf("Choose (1/2): ");
-    (void)fflush(stdout);
-    char choice[CLI_BUF_16];
-    if (!fgets(choice, sizeof(choice), stdin)) {
-        (void)fprintf(stderr, "error: failed to read input\n");
-        return CLI_ERR;
-    }
-    return (choice[0] == '2') ? CLI_TRUE : 0;
-}
-
 /* Case-insensitive prefix match (portable — no strncasecmp dependency). */
 static bool prefix_icase(const char *s, const char *prefix) {
     while (*prefix) {
@@ -11505,14 +11482,9 @@ int cbm_cmd_update(int argc, char **argv) {
 
     bool dry_run = false;
     bool force = false;
-    int variant_flag = 0; /* 0 = ask, 1 = standard, 2 = ui */
     for (int i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
         if (strcmp(argv[i], "--dry-run") == 0) {
             dry_run = true;
-        } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--standard") == 0) {
-            variant_flag = VARIANT_A;
-        } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--ui") == 0) {
-            variant_flag = VARIANT_B;
         } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--force") == 0) {
             force = true;
         } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "-y") != 0 && strcmp(argv[i], "--yes") != 0 &&
@@ -11546,7 +11518,6 @@ int cbm_cmd_update(int argc, char **argv) {
      * rejecting typos instead of silently accepting them. */
     (void)dry_run;
     (void)force;
-    (void)variant_flag;
 #endif
 #ifdef CBM_CLI_ENABLE_TEST_API
     if (g_cli_activation_test_ops_set) {
@@ -11602,7 +11573,8 @@ int cbm_cmd_update(int argc, char **argv) {
         }
         printf("It downloads the latest release, verifies its checksum, and replaces\n"
                "this binary in place. install.sh is idempotent, so re-running it IS\n"
-               "the update; pass --ui for the UI build.\n");
+               "the update. One build per platform — the graph UI is always\n"
+               "included.\n");
 #endif
         return 0;
     }
@@ -11631,26 +11603,17 @@ int cbm_cmd_update(int argc, char **argv) {
         return CLI_TRUE;
     }
 
-    /* Step 2: Determine variant */
-    int want_ui_rc = select_update_variant(variant_flag);
-    if (want_ui_rc < 0) {
-        return CLI_TRUE;
-    }
-    bool want_ui = (want_ui_rc == CLI_TRUE);
-    const char *variant = want_ui ? "ui-" : "";
-    const char *variant_label = want_ui ? "ui" : "standard";
-
     const char *os = detect_os();
     const char *arch = detect_arch();
     const char *ext = strcmp(os, "windows") == 0 ? "zip" : "tar.gz";
 
     char url[CLI_BUF_512];
-    build_update_url(url, sizeof(url), os, arch, ext, want_ui);
+    build_update_url(url, sizeof(url), os, arch, ext);
 
     if (dry_run) {
-        printf("\nWould download %s binary for %s/%s ...\n", variant_label, os, arch);
+        printf("\nWould download the binary for %s/%s ...\n", os, arch);
     } else {
-        printf("\nDownloading %s binary for %s/%s ...\n", variant_label, os, arch);
+        printf("\nDownloading the binary for %s/%s ...\n", os, arch);
     }
     printf("  %s\n", url);
 
@@ -11661,10 +11624,8 @@ int cbm_cmd_update(int argc, char **argv) {
 #else
         printf("  target: %s/.local/bin/codebase-memory-mcp\n", home);
 #endif
-        printf("  variant: %s\n", variant_label);
         printf("  os/arch: %s/%s\n", os, arch);
         printf("\nUpdate dry-run complete.\n");
-        (void)variant;
         return 0;
     }
 
@@ -11684,7 +11645,7 @@ int cbm_cmd_update(int argc, char **argv) {
         return CLI_TRUE;
     }
 
-    int rc = download_verify_install(url, ext, os, arch, want_ui, bin_dest, home, delete_indexes);
+    int rc = download_verify_install(url, ext, os, arch, bin_dest, home, delete_indexes);
     if (rc != 0) {
         return CLI_TRUE;
     }
@@ -11701,7 +11662,6 @@ int cbm_cmd_update(int argc, char **argv) {
     printf("automatically when you next use the MCP server.\n");
     printf("\nUpdate complete. Please restart your coding-agent sessions to "
            "properly take this into account.\n");
-    (void)variant;
     return 0;
 #endif /* CBM_CLI_ENABLE_TEST_API */
 }
diff --git a/src/daemon/runtime.c b/src/daemon/runtime.c
index bdbb2c56..e62b1c7d 100644
--- a/src/daemon/runtime.c
+++ b/src/daemon/runtime.c
@@ -28,6 +28,14 @@ static atomic_bool runtime_force_peer_image_unverified_seam;
 void cbm_daemon_runtime_force_peer_image_unverified_for_testing(bool force) {
     atomic_store(&runtime_force_peer_image_unverified_seam, force);
 }
+/* The two failure modes are NOT interchangeable and must be testable apart:
+ * an image that cannot be examined at all is admitted (the peer already proved
+ * build compatibility in the HELLO), while one that CAN be examined and differs
+ * is rejected. One seam per mode keeps each contract honest. */
+static atomic_bool runtime_force_peer_image_mismatch_seam;
+void cbm_daemon_runtime_force_peer_image_mismatch_for_testing(bool force) {
+    atomic_store(&runtime_force_peer_image_mismatch_seam, force);
+}
 #endif
 
 #ifdef _WIN32
@@ -1752,11 +1760,32 @@ static void *runtime_connection_worker(void *opaque) {
         peer_image_verified = false;
         peer_image_fingerprinted = false;
     }
+    if (atomic_load(&runtime_force_peer_image_mismatch_seam)) {
+        peer_image_verified = false;
+        peer_image_fingerprinted = true;
+    }
 #endif
+    /* Two different failures wear the same "unverified" flag, and treating them
+     * alike broke every ephemeral-path client (#1539/#1383):
+     *
+     *   fingerprint_mismatch — the peer's image WAS read and hashes differently
+     *     than the running daemon. That is the tamper/skew case the gate exists
+     *     for. Still rejected, hard.
+     *   image_unverifiable — the peer's image could not be examined at all
+     *     (ephemeral npx cache paths, ptrace_scope restrictions, sandboxed
+     *     hosts). Nothing was contradicted; we simply could not look. The peer
+     *     ALREADY proved semantic version, build fingerprint, protocol/store/
+     *     feature ABI and cache root in the HELLO exchange above — rejecting on
+     *     top of that traded a real compatibility proof for an unavailable one,
+     *     and made `npx codebase-memory-mcp` unusable with the daemon. Admit,
+     *     and say so out loud so the weaker check is never invisible. */
+    if (!peer_image_verified && !peer_image_fingerprinted) {
+        cbm_log_warn("daemon.client_image_unverifiable_admitted", "reason", "image_unverifiable",
+                     "basis", "rendezvous_hello_verified");
+        peer_image_verified = true;
+    }
     if (!peer_image_verified) {
-        const char *reason =
-            peer_image_fingerprinted ? "fingerprint_mismatch" : "image_unverifiable";
-        cbm_log_error("daemon.client_image_rejected", "reason", reason);
+        cbm_log_error("daemon.client_image_rejected", "reason", "fingerprint_mismatch");
         /* #1383: answer the peer before closing. An unanswered rejection is
          * indistinguishable from a slow cold start on the client side — the
          * caller sat on "pending" indefinitely with the reason visible only in
@@ -1765,10 +1794,9 @@ static void *runtime_connection_worker(void *opaque) {
          * peer; admission stays rejected either way. */
         runtime_result_rejected(&hello_result, "CBM daemon rejected this client's binary image");
         (void)snprintf(hello_result.message, sizeof(hello_result.message),
-                       "CBM daemon rejected this client: %s. The client binary must match the "
-                       "running daemon's build; close CBM sessions (or run 'daemon stop') and "
-                       "retry with one consistent install.",
-                       reason);
+                       "CBM daemon rejected this client: fingerprint_mismatch. The client binary "
+                       "must match the running daemon's build; close CBM sessions (or run "
+                       "'daemon stop') and retry with one consistent install.");
         (void)runtime_send_hello_response(worker->connection, &hello_result);
         runtime_worker_finish(worker);
         return NULL;
diff --git a/src/daemon/runtime.h b/src/daemon/runtime.h
index 31eb8d79..2fd81889 100644
--- a/src/daemon/runtime.h
+++ b/src/daemon/runtime.h
@@ -415,6 +415,10 @@ bool cbm_daemon_runtime_client_close(cbm_daemon_runtime_client_t *client, uint32
 /* #1383 test seam: force peer-image verification to fail so tests can exercise
  * the rejection-response path from the in-process harness. */
 void cbm_daemon_runtime_force_peer_image_unverified_for_testing(bool force);
+/* #1539 test seam: force the peer image to be FINGERPRINTABLE but different,
+ * i.e. the tamper case that must still be rejected after unverifiable images
+ * became admissible. */
+void cbm_daemon_runtime_force_peer_image_mismatch_for_testing(bool force);
 #endif
 
 #endif /* CBM_DAEMON_RUNTIME_H */
diff --git a/src/main.c b/src/main.c
index aff4adbb..574002b6 100644
--- a/src/main.c
+++ b/src/main.c
@@ -1442,6 +1442,45 @@ static bool main_semver_newer(const char *candidate, const char *active) {
     return false;
 }
 
+/* A client that cannot reach the daemon must SAY SO, in the caller's own
+ * protocol. An MCP client speaks JSON-RPC over stdout, and the old path
+ * returned EXIT_FAILURE having written nothing at all: agents saw a transport
+ * that closed mid-handshake and reported "Connection closed" with no cause,
+ * while the real reason (image rejection, startup timeout, conflict) sat in
+ * bootstrap_result.message and was dropped on the floor (#1539).
+ *
+ * stdout carries a JSON-RPC error object so the agent surfaces the reason;
+ * id is null because the failure precedes reading any request. stderr carries
+ * the same text for humans reading a terminal. */
+static void main_report_client_bootstrap_failure(cbm_daemon_process_role_t role,
+                                                 const cbm_daemon_bootstrap_result_t *result) {
+    const char *detail = (result && result->message[0])
+                             ? result->message
+                             : "CBM daemon connection failed before the session was established";
+    if (cbm_daemon_process_role_requires_client(role)) {
+        char escaped[CBM_DAEMON_CONFLICT_MESSAGE_SIZE * 2];
+        size_t out = 0;
+        for (size_t i = 0; detail[i] && out + 2 < sizeof(escaped); i++) {
+            unsigned char c = (unsigned char)detail[i];
+            if (c == '"' || c == '\\') {
+                escaped[out++] = '\\';
+                escaped[out++] = (char)c;
+            } else if (c < 0x20) {
+                escaped[out++] = ' ';
+            } else {
+                escaped[out++] = (char)c;
+            }
+        }
+        escaped[out] = '\0';
+        (void)fprintf(stdout,
+                      "{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":null,\"error\":{\"code\":-32001,"
+                      "\"message\":\"%s\"}}\n",
+                      escaped);
+        (void)fflush(stdout);
+    }
+    (void)fprintf(stderr, "codebase-memory-mcp: %s\n", detail);
+}
+
 /* Client bootstrap with the upgrade policy: a CONFLICT against a PERMANENT
  * daemon of a strictly OLDER release is resolved by draining that daemon
  * (the same authenticated path install/update use) and retrying once. A
@@ -2798,6 +2837,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) {
         main_client_bootstrap_with_upgrade(&bootstrap_config, &bootstrap_result);
     cbm_daemon_ipc_endpoint_free(endpoint);
     if (bootstrap_status != CBM_DAEMON_BOOTSTRAP_CONNECTED || !bootstrap_result.client) {
+        main_report_client_bootstrap_failure(role, &bootstrap_result);
         (void)main_version_cohort_close(&client_cohort_lease, &client_cohort_manager);
         return EXIT_FAILURE;
     }
diff --git a/tests/test_activation_transaction.c b/tests/test_activation_transaction.c
index c73ae3b8..b984145f 100644
--- a/tests/test_activation_transaction.c
+++ b/tests/test_activation_transaction.c
@@ -608,6 +608,68 @@ TEST(activation_transaction_rejects_cross_account_writable_target_directory) {
     PASS();
 }
 
+/* #1535: the refusal above is correct, but for a year it surfaced to users as
+ * "activation transaction I/O failed" — a policy decision wearing an I/O
+ * costume. Reporters chased disk errors and filesystem types for a mode bit.
+ * The refusal must name the directory, its mode, and which rule refused. */
+TEST(activation_transaction_permission_refusal_names_directory_and_mode) {
+#ifndef _WIN32
+    char directory[ACTIVATION_TEST_PATH_CAP];
+    char target[ACTIVATION_TEST_PATH_CAP];
+    ASSERT_TRUE(activation_test_fixture(directory));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(activation_test_path(target, directory, "cbm"));
+    /* Group-writable LEAF: still refused (the binary lands here), unlike a
+     * group-writable ancestor which is now only warned about. */
+    ASSERT_EQ(chmod(directory, 0775), 0);
+    cbm_activation_transaction_t *transaction = NULL;
+    ASSERT_EQ(cbm_activation_transaction_stage_bytes(target, "candidate", strlen("candidate"),
+                                                     &transaction),
+              CBM_ACTIVATION_TRANSACTION_IO);
+    ASSERT_NULL(transaction);
+
+    const char *note = cbm_activation_transaction_refusal_note();
+    ASSERT_NOT_NULL(note);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(note[0] != '\0');
+    /* WHICH rule refused, WHAT the mode was, and WHERE — all three, or the
+     * message is back to sending people after phantom disk failures. */
+    ASSERT_NOT_NULL(strstr(note, "install_dir_group_or_world_writable"));
+    ASSERT_NOT_NULL(strstr(note, "0775"));
+    ASSERT_NOT_NULL(strstr(note, directory));
+
+    ASSERT_EQ(chmod(directory, 0700), 0);
+    ASSERT_EQ(th_rmtree(directory), 0);
+#endif
+    PASS();
+}
+
+/* #1535: a group-writable ANCESTOR is the default shape of WSL2 and several
+ * distro home trees. Refusing it broke install.sh for a large fraction of Linux
+ * users; it is now warned about and admitted, while the leaf stays private. */
+TEST(activation_transaction_admits_group_writable_ancestor) {
+#ifndef _WIN32
+    char parent[ACTIVATION_TEST_PATH_CAP];
+    char child[ACTIVATION_TEST_PATH_CAP];
+    char target[ACTIVATION_TEST_PATH_CAP];
+    ASSERT_TRUE(activation_test_fixture(parent));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(activation_test_path(child, parent, "bin"));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(cbm_mkdir_p(child, 0700));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(activation_test_path(target, child, "cbm"));
+    ASSERT_EQ(chmod(parent, 0775), 0);
+
+    cbm_activation_transaction_t *transaction = NULL;
+    ASSERT_EQ(cbm_activation_transaction_stage_bytes(target, "candidate", strlen("candidate"),
+                                                     &transaction),
+              CBM_ACTIVATION_TRANSACTION_OK);
+    ASSERT_NOT_NULL(transaction);
+    (void)cbm_activation_transaction_rollback(transaction);
+    ASSERT_EQ(cbm_activation_transaction_close(&transaction), CBM_ACTIVATION_TRANSACTION_OK);
+
+    ASSERT_EQ(chmod(parent, 0700), 0);
+    ASSERT_EQ(th_rmtree(parent), 0);
+#endif
+    PASS();
+}
+
 TEST(activation_transaction_rejects_windows_callback_allow_directory_ace) {
 #ifdef _WIN32
     char directory[ACTIVATION_TEST_PATH_CAP];
@@ -1023,6 +1085,8 @@ SUITE(activation_transaction) {
     RUN_TEST(activation_transaction_removal_survives_transient_rename_locks);
 #endif
     RUN_TEST(activation_transaction_rejects_cross_account_writable_target_directory);
+    RUN_TEST(activation_transaction_permission_refusal_names_directory_and_mode);
+    RUN_TEST(activation_transaction_admits_group_writable_ancestor);
     RUN_TEST(activation_transaction_rejects_windows_callback_allow_directory_ace);
     RUN_TEST(activation_transaction_rejects_symlink_candidate_target_and_parent);
     RUN_TEST(activation_transaction_fails_closed_if_target_directory_is_replaced);
diff --git a/tests/test_cli.c b/tests/test_cli.c
index 076ee219..9baf9eae 100644
--- a/tests/test_cli.c
+++ b/tests/test_cli.c
@@ -1383,8 +1383,8 @@ TEST(cli_update_download_failure_does_not_quiesce_sessions) {
     };
     cbm_cli_activation_ops_t ops = cli_activation_fake_ops(&fake);
     cbm_cli_set_activation_ops_for_test(&ops);
-    char *argv[] = {"--force", "--standard", "--yes"};
-    int rc = cli_test_cmd_update(3, argv);
+    char *argv[] = {"--force", "--yes"};
+    int rc = cli_test_cmd_update(2, argv);
     cbm_cli_set_activation_ops_for_test(NULL);
     cbm_set_auto_answer_for_test(0);
 
@@ -1444,7 +1444,7 @@ TEST(cli_update_already_current_does_not_quiesce_sessions) {
     };
     cbm_cli_activation_ops_t ops = cli_activation_fake_ops(&fake);
     cbm_cli_set_activation_ops_for_test(&ops);
-    char *argv[] = {"--standard"};
+    char *argv[] = {"--yes"};
     int rc = fixture_ready ? cli_test_cmd_update(1, argv) : -1;
     cbm_cli_set_activation_ops_for_test(NULL);
 
@@ -1576,8 +1576,8 @@ TEST(cli_update_agent_configs_finish_before_guard_release) {
     };
     cbm_cli_activation_ops_t ops = cli_activation_fake_ops(&fake);
     cbm_cli_set_activation_ops_for_test(&ops);
-    char *argv[] = {"--force", "--standard"};
-    int rc = cli_test_cmd_update(2, argv);
+    char *argv[] = {"--force"};
+    int rc = cli_test_cmd_update(1, argv);
     cbm_cli_set_activation_ops_for_test(NULL);
 
     /* Re-run against a known old target while one independently detected agent
@@ -1599,7 +1599,7 @@ TEST(cli_update_agent_configs_finish_before_guard_release) {
     };
     cbm_cli_activation_ops_t failure_ops = cli_activation_fake_ops(&config_failure);
     cbm_cli_set_activation_ops_for_test(&failure_ops);
-    int config_failure_rc = cli_test_cmd_update(2, argv);
+    int config_failure_rc = cli_test_cmd_update(1, argv);
     cbm_cli_set_activation_ops_for_test(NULL);
     struct stat updated_status;
     bool replacement_kept = stat(bin_target, &updated_status) == 0 &&
@@ -1767,11 +1767,11 @@ TEST(cli_activation_guard_is_bypassed_for_dry_run_and_plan) {
     cbm_cli_set_activation_ops_for_test(&ops);
     char *install_dry[] = {"--force", "--dry-run"};
     char *install_plan[] = {"--force", "--plan"};
-    char *update_dry[] = {"--force", "--dry-run", "--standard"};
+    char *update_dry[] = {"--force", "--dry-run"};
     char *uninstall_dry[] = {"--dry-run", "--yes"};
     int install_dry_rc = cli_test_cmd_install(2, install_dry);
     int install_plan_rc = cli_test_cmd_install(2, install_plan);
-    int update_dry_rc = cli_test_cmd_update(3, update_dry);
+    int update_dry_rc = cli_test_cmd_update(2, update_dry);
     int uninstall_dry_rc = cli_test_cmd_uninstall(2, uninstall_dry);
     cbm_cli_set_activation_ops_for_test(NULL);
     cbm_set_auto_answer_for_test(0);
diff --git a/tests/test_daemon_runtime.c b/tests/test_daemon_runtime.c
index c97c5ad1..5f41d914 100644
--- a/tests/test_daemon_runtime.c
+++ b/tests/test_daemon_runtime.c
@@ -1850,7 +1850,10 @@ TEST(daemon_runtime_exact_hello_issues_connection_bound_identity) {
  * silently dropped. The old path logged daemon.client_image_rejected and
  * finished the worker without sending a hello response, so the client sat on
  * "pending" indefinitely - indistinguishable from a slow cold start - with the
- * reason visible only in the daemon log. */
+ * reason visible only in the daemon log.
+ *
+ * The rejection is now scoped to fingerprint_mismatch (see #1539 below), so
+ * this drives the seam that keeps a peer image readable but DIFFERENT. */
 TEST(daemon_runtime_image_rejection_reaches_client_issue1383) {
     cbm_daemon_build_identity_t identity =
         runtime_test_identity("2.4.0", runtime_test_self_build());
@@ -1859,6 +1862,40 @@ TEST(daemon_runtime_image_rejection_reaches_client_issue1383) {
     cbm_daemon_runtime_connect_result_t result = {0};
     cbm_daemon_runtime_client_t *client = NULL;
 
+    cbm_daemon_runtime_force_peer_image_mismatch_for_testing(true);
+    if (started) {
+        client = cbm_daemon_runtime_client_connect(fixture.endpoint, &identity,
+                                                   RUNTIME_TEST_TIMEOUT_MS, &result);
+    }
+    cbm_daemon_runtime_force_peer_image_mismatch_for_testing(false);
+
+    bool rejected_with_reason = client == NULL &&
+                                result.status == CBM_DAEMON_RUNTIME_CONNECT_REJECTED &&
+                                strstr(result.message, "fingerprint_mismatch") != NULL;
+    if (client) {
+        (void)cbm_daemon_runtime_client_close(client, RUNTIME_TEST_TIMEOUT_MS);
+    }
+    runtime_test_fixture_finish(&fixture);
+
+    ASSERT_TRUE(started);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(rejected_with_reason);
+    PASS();
+}
+
+/* #1539: a peer whose image cannot be EXAMINED is not a peer that failed a
+ * check — it is a peer we could not look at. Every `npx codebase-memory-mcp`
+ * invocation lands here (ephemeral cache path, unfingerprintable), and the old
+ * gate rejected all of them: the MCP client saw a 30 s wait and zero bytes.
+ * The HELLO exchange that already succeeded proves version, build fingerprint
+ * and ABI compatibility, so admission is the honest outcome. */
+TEST(daemon_runtime_unverifiable_image_is_admitted_issue1539) {
+    cbm_daemon_build_identity_t identity =
+        runtime_test_identity("2.4.0", runtime_test_self_build());
+    runtime_test_fixture_t fixture;
+    bool started = runtime_test_fixture_start(&fixture, "image-unverifiable", &identity);
+    cbm_daemon_runtime_connect_result_t result = {0};
+    cbm_daemon_runtime_client_t *client = NULL;
+
     cbm_daemon_runtime_force_peer_image_unverified_for_testing(true);
     if (started) {
         client = cbm_daemon_runtime_client_connect(fixture.endpoint, &identity,
@@ -1866,16 +1903,14 @@ TEST(daemon_runtime_image_rejection_reaches_client_issue1383) {
     }
     cbm_daemon_runtime_force_peer_image_unverified_for_testing(false);
 
-    bool rejected_with_reason = client == NULL &&
-                                result.status == CBM_DAEMON_RUNTIME_CONNECT_REJECTED &&
-                                strstr(result.message, "image_unverifiable") != NULL;
+    bool admitted = client != NULL && result.status == CBM_DAEMON_RUNTIME_CONNECT_ACCEPTED;
     if (client) {
-        (void)cbm_daemon_runtime_client_close(client, RUNTIME_TEST_TIMEOUT_MS);
+        admitted = cbm_daemon_runtime_client_close(client, RUNTIME_TEST_TIMEOUT_MS) && admitted;
     }
     runtime_test_fixture_finish(&fixture);
 
     ASSERT_TRUE(started);
-    ASSERT_TRUE(rejected_with_reason);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(admitted);
     PASS();
 }
 
@@ -4720,6 +4755,7 @@ SUITE(daemon_runtime) {
     RUN_TEST(daemon_runtime_rendezvous_layout_is_frozen_and_detailed_abi_independent);
     RUN_TEST(daemon_runtime_exact_hello_issues_connection_bound_identity);
     RUN_TEST(daemon_runtime_image_rejection_reaches_client_issue1383);
+    RUN_TEST(daemon_runtime_unverifiable_image_is_admitted_issue1539);
     RUN_TEST(daemon_runtime_unexpected_frame_payload_is_freed_once);
     RUN_TEST(daemon_runtime_activation_rejects_forged_and_malformed_without_stop);
     RUN_TEST(daemon_runtime_activation_ack_snapshots_then_interrupts_all_clients);
diff --git a/tests/test_daemon_smoke.py b/tests/test_daemon_smoke.py
index ebde8a77..93ab933a 100644
--- a/tests/test_daemon_smoke.py
+++ b/tests/test_daemon_smoke.py
@@ -2135,7 +2135,7 @@ def main():
                 activation_log,
                 "activation-update",
                 "update",
-                ["update", "--force", "--standard", "--yes"],
+                ["update", "--force", "--yes"],
                 active_fingerprint,
             )
             check(
diff --git a/tests/test_smoke_fixture_contract.sh b/tests/test_smoke_fixture_contract.sh
index b202f967..ce66848f 100755
--- a/tests/test_smoke_fixture_contract.sh
+++ b/tests/test_smoke_fixture_contract.sh
@@ -311,9 +311,25 @@ require(
     and "& $args[1]" not in smoke_test,
     "Windows Phase 13 must execute install.ps1 directly with native paths",
 )
+# A count cannot tell "we still have four curls" from "every curl is safe" — it
+# passed while a loopback UI probe carried no --noproxy at all, which is the
+# exact failure this rule exists to prevent (an ambient http_proxy makes a
+# 127.0.0.1 request leave the machine). Assert the property on every invocation
+# instead, so adding or removing a curl cannot silently satisfy the rule.
+unproxied_curls = [
+    line.strip()
+    for line in smoke_test.splitlines()
+    # An invocation starts a command: line start, or after ; & | ( or `if`/`then`
+    # etc. Mentions inside echo/comment strings are not invocations.
+    if re.search(r"(?:^|[;&|(]|\b(?:if|then|else|do|not)\s)\s*curl\s", line)
+    and not line.lstrip().startswith("#")
+    and not re.search(r"echo\s", line.split("curl")[0])
+    and "--noproxy" not in line
+]
 require(
-    smoke_test.count("--noproxy '*'") >= 4,
-    "all loopback release-fixture curl requests must bypass ambient proxies",
+    not unproxied_curls,
+    "every curl in the smoke fixture must bypass ambient proxies (--noproxy '*'): "
+    + "; ".join(unproxied_curls[:3]),
 )
 require(
     "/tmp/cbm-curl12a.err" not in smoke_test
diff --git a/tests/windows/test_windows_update_handoff.py b/tests/windows/test_windows_update_handoff.py
index b0b36a6f..6a925c29 100644
--- a/tests/windows/test_windows_update_handoff.py
+++ b/tests/windows/test_windows_update_handoff.py
@@ -116,9 +116,9 @@ def assert_update_hands_off_to_install_script(source, env, work):
     # of the just-written image inflates process load time, and the handoff
     # itself is a fast STATELESS local print (no daemon IPC, no download) whose
     # timing is what this guard measures. The warm-up behaves identically.
-    run([binary, "update", "--yes", "--standard"], command_env, timeout=20)
+    run([binary, "update", "--yes"], command_env, timeout=20)
     started = time.monotonic()
-    result = run([binary, "update", "--yes", "--standard"], command_env, timeout=20)
+    result = run([binary, "update", "--yes"], command_env, timeout=20)
     elapsed = time.monotonic() - started
     diagnostic = output_text(result)
     lowered = diagnostic.lower()
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ def assert_update_does_not_drain_active_session(source, env, cache, work):
         command = copy_binary(source, work / "update-session-command")
         command_env = dict(env)
         command_env["CBM_DOWNLOAD_URL"] = "https://127.0.0.1:1"
-        result = run([command, "update", "--yes", "--standard"], command_env, timeout=20)
+        result = run([command, "update", "--yes"], command_env, timeout=20)
         require(
             result.returncode == 0,
             "update exited %s beside a live session: %s"