fix(codex): detect ChatGPT auth from id_token claims so wrap/init emit requires_openai_auth (#3212)

Fixes #3206.

## The report

`headroom wrap codex` / `init codex` write a provider block without
`requires_openai_auth = true`. Codex then attaches **no `Authorization`
header**, and every request through the proxy 401s:

```
unexpected status 401 Unauthorized: Missing bearer or basic authentication in header
```

Silently — `headroom doctor` reported green throughout. The reporter
lost ~15h of scheduled Codex automation before bisecting it.

## Not the fix the issue suggested

The issue proposes adding the line unconditionally. **That would
re-break API-key users**, which is the regression `requires_openai_auth`
was made conditional for in the first place (#406) — the flag forces
Codex to demand an OpenAI OAuth login.

All three writers (install provider-scope, `init codex`, `wrap codex`)
*already* call `codex_uses_chatgpt_auth()` and emit the key when it
returns True. **The bug is in the detection, not the writers.**

## Root cause

`codex_uses_chatgpt_auth` recognised two shapes:

1. `auth_mode == "chatgpt"`
2. a top-level `tokens.account_id`

Newer Codex can write an `auth.json` with **neither** — the account
identity lives only in the `id_token` claims, under
`https://api.openai.com/auth.chatgpt_account_id`. That config reads as
API-key mode, the flag is omitted, and every request 401s.

Verified against a real `auth.json`: the JWT claim carries the *same*
account id as the top-level key, so it is a faithful signal for the
shape that lacks it.

## Fix

A third detection tier, consulted only when the first two are absent:

| Shape | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| `auth_mode = "chatgpt"` | True | True |
| legacy `tokens.account_id` | True | True |
| **only the `id_token` claim** | **False** ← the bug | **True** |
| `auth_mode = "apikey"` + ChatGPT id_token | False | **False** (#406
stays closed) |
| API key, no tokens | False | False |
| id_token without the claim / malformed / blank id | False | False |

The payload is **decoded, not verified**. It is a local file the user
already owns, and the result only chooses which key we write into their
own `config.toml` — nothing is authenticated or authorised on the
strength of it. An API-key user has no ChatGPT id_token, so this cannot
resurrect #406, and an explicit `auth_mode` still wins outright (pinned
by test).

## Doctor stops reporting a false green

This failure is invisible from every other signal — proxy up, provider
block present. So the codex check now WARNs when the config is routed,
the user is on ChatGPT auth, **and** the block lacks the flag, naming
the re-run that repairs it.

It only runs when the flag is already missing, and the keyring fallback
it can reach is bounded by an existing 3s timeout, so `doctor` stays
fast. API-key users are never nagged.

## Existing configs

Self-healing — all three writers strip and regenerate the managed block
on every run, so re-running `wrap`/`init` emits the key now that
detection is correct. No separate migration needed.

## Testing

99 passing across the two suites. Confirmed **discriminating**: 3 of the
new tests fail against unfixed source and pass after —

- `test_chatgpt_auth_detected_from_id_token_claims_alone`
- `test_provider_block_emits_requires_openai_auth_for_the_new_shape`
-
`TestCodexRouting::test_chatgpt_auth_without_requires_openai_auth_warns`

plus explicit coverage for the #406 guard, malformed tokens, blank
account ids, and the API-key-not-nagged case.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-authored-by: Tejas Chopra <tejas@Tejass-MacBook-Pro.local>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Tejas Chopra
2026-08-22 15:29:54 -07:00
committed by GitHub
parent 8f3e33a00e
commit 2f81fa5931
4 changed files with 221 additions and 1 deletions
+30
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@@ -433,9 +433,39 @@ def check_codex_routing(config_path: Path, port: int) -> CheckResult:
summary=f"routed to port {match.group(1)}, but doctor probed port {port}",
hint=f"re-run with: headroom doctor --port {match.group(1)}",
)
# Routed, but Codex may still attach no credentials. A ChatGPT-OAuth user
# needs `requires_openai_auth = true` in the provider block or Codex sends
# no Authorization header at all and every request 401s with "Missing
# bearer" (#3206). That failure is invisible from here -- the proxy is up,
# the block is present -- so this check is the only place it can surface.
if _codex_block_missing_openai_auth(text, config_path):
return CheckResult(
name=name,
status=WARN,
summary="routed, but Codex will send no Authorization (missing requires_openai_auth)",
hint="re-run: headroom wrap codex (or headroom init codex) to rewrite the block",
)
return CheckResult(name=name, status=PASS, summary=f"routed ({config_path})")
def _codex_block_missing_openai_auth(text: str, config_path: Path) -> bool:
"""ChatGPT-OAuth Codex routed without ``requires_openai_auth`` (#3206)."""
start = text.find("[model_providers.headroom]")
if start == -1:
return False
rest = text[start + len("[model_providers.headroom]") :]
end = rest.find("\n[")
block = rest if end == -1 else rest[:end]
if "requires_openai_auth" in block:
return False
try:
from headroom.providers.codex.install import codex_uses_chatgpt_auth
return codex_uses_chatgpt_auth(config_path.parent / "auth.json")
except Exception: # pragma: no cover - never let a doctor check crash
return False
def check_shell_env(environ: Mapping[str, str], port: int) -> CheckResult:
"""Is the *current shell* pointed at the proxy for ad-hoc runs?"""
name = "shell env"
+40 -1
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@@ -2,11 +2,13 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import json
import os
import re
import subprocess
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any
try:
import tomllib
@@ -99,10 +101,47 @@ def codex_uses_chatgpt_auth(auth_path: Path) -> bool:
tokens = data.get("tokens")
if isinstance(tokens, dict):
account_id = tokens.get("account_id")
return isinstance(account_id, str) and bool(account_id.strip())
if isinstance(account_id, str) and account_id.strip():
return True
return _id_token_carries_chatgpt_account(tokens.get("id_token"))
return False
def _id_token_carries_chatgpt_account(raw: Any) -> bool:
"""Whether an ``id_token`` carries the ChatGPT account claim (#3206).
Newer Codex releases can write an ``auth.json`` with neither ``auth_mode``
nor a top-level ``tokens.account_id``; the account identity lives only in
the ``id_token`` claims. Those configs then read as API-key mode, so
``requires_openai_auth`` is omitted, Codex attaches no Authorization
header, and every request 401s with "Missing bearer".
The payload is decoded, not verified. This is a local config file the user
already owns, and the result only decides which key we write into their own
``config.toml`` -- nothing is authenticated or authorised on the strength
of it. An API-key user has no ChatGPT id_token, so this cannot resurrect
the forced-OAuth-login regression in #406.
"""
if not isinstance(raw, str):
return False
parts = raw.split(".")
if len(parts) != 3:
return False
payload = parts[1]
payload += "=" * (-len(payload) % 4)
try:
claims = json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(payload.encode("ascii")))
except Exception:
return False
if not isinstance(claims, dict):
return False
auth_claim = claims.get("https://api.openai.com/auth")
if not isinstance(auth_claim, dict):
return False
account_id = auth_claim.get("chatgpt_account_id")
return isinstance(account_id, str) and bool(account_id.strip())
def build_provider_section(
*,
port: int,
+50
View File
@@ -488,6 +488,56 @@ class TestCodexRouting:
path.write_bytes(b"\xff\xfe garbage \x00")
assert check_codex_routing(path, 8787).status == WARN
# -- requires_openai_auth (#3206) ------------------------------------
# Codex attaches no Authorization header to a custom provider unless the
# block carries requires_openai_auth. A ChatGPT-OAuth user then 401s on
# every request with "Missing bearer" while doctor reported green -- the
# reason one report went 15h before anyone could see the cause.
@staticmethod
def _routed(tmp_path, *, requires_auth: bool):
path = tmp_path / "config.toml"
block = (
"[model_providers.headroom]\n"
'base_url = "http://127.0.0.1:8787/v1"\n'
"supports_websockets = true\n"
)
if requires_auth:
block += "requires_openai_auth = true\n"
path.write_text(block, encoding="utf-8")
return path
@staticmethod
def _chatgpt_auth(tmp_path):
(tmp_path / "auth.json").write_text('{"auth_mode": "chatgpt"}', encoding="utf-8")
def test_chatgpt_auth_without_requires_openai_auth_warns(self, tmp_path):
path = self._routed(tmp_path, requires_auth=False)
self._chatgpt_auth(tmp_path)
result = check_codex_routing(path, 8787)
assert result.status == WARN
assert "Authorization" in result.summary
def test_chatgpt_auth_with_requires_openai_auth_passes(self, tmp_path):
path = self._routed(tmp_path, requires_auth=True)
self._chatgpt_auth(tmp_path)
assert check_codex_routing(path, 8787).status == PASS
def test_api_key_user_without_requires_openai_auth_still_passes(self, tmp_path):
"""API-key users must not be nagged -- the flag would break them (#406)."""
path = self._routed(tmp_path, requires_auth=False)
(tmp_path / "auth.json").write_text('{"OPENAI_API_KEY": "sk-test"}', encoding="utf-8")
assert check_codex_routing(path, 8787).status == PASS
def test_no_auth_json_does_not_warn(self, tmp_path):
path = self._routed(tmp_path, requires_auth=False)
assert check_codex_routing(path, 8787).status == PASS
class TestShellEnv:
def test_unset_warns(self):
+101
View File
@@ -85,3 +85,104 @@ def test_codex_provider_section_supports_custom_markers() -> None:
assert section.endswith("# --- end ---\n")
assert 'base_url = "http://127.0.0.1:9100/v1"' in section
assert 'env_key = "OPENAI_API_KEY"' not in section
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# ChatGPT-auth detection from the id_token claims (#3206)
#
# Newer Codex releases can write an auth.json with neither `auth_mode` nor a
# top-level `tokens.account_id`; the account identity lives only in the
# id_token claims. Those configs read as API-key mode, so requires_openai_auth
# is omitted, Codex attaches no Authorization header, and every request 401s
# with "Missing bearer" -- silently, with doctor reporting green.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _unsigned_jwt(claims: dict[str, object]) -> str:
import base64
import json as _json
def seg(raw: bytes) -> str:
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw).decode("ascii").rstrip("=")
header = seg(b'{"alg":"none"}')
payload = seg(_json.dumps(claims).encode("utf-8"))
return ".".join((header, payload, "sig"))
_CHATGPT_CLAIMS: dict[str, object] = {
"https://api.openai.com/auth": {
"chatgpt_account_id": "1a155430-5551-47f4-9c7b-aeab7983f24a",
"chatgpt_plan_type": "pro",
}
}
def _write_auth(tmp_path, document: dict[str, object]): # noqa: ANN001, ANN202
import json as _json
path = tmp_path / "auth.json"
path.write_text(_json.dumps(document), encoding="utf-8")
return path
def test_chatgpt_auth_detected_from_id_token_claims_alone(tmp_path) -> None:
"""The #3206 shape: no auth_mode, no tokens.account_id, only the JWT."""
path = _write_auth(tmp_path, {"tokens": {"id_token": _unsigned_jwt(_CHATGPT_CLAIMS)}})
assert codex_uses_chatgpt_auth(path) is True
def test_explicit_api_key_mode_still_wins_over_a_chatgpt_id_token(tmp_path) -> None:
"""Guards the #406 regression: API-key users must not get forced OAuth."""
path = _write_auth(
tmp_path,
{"auth_mode": "apikey", "tokens": {"id_token": _unsigned_jwt(_CHATGPT_CLAIMS)}},
)
assert codex_uses_chatgpt_auth(path) is False
def test_api_key_config_without_tokens_is_not_chatgpt(tmp_path) -> None:
path = _write_auth(tmp_path, {"OPENAI_API_KEY": "sk-test"})
assert codex_uses_chatgpt_auth(path) is False
def test_id_token_without_the_chatgpt_claim_is_not_chatgpt(tmp_path) -> None:
path = _write_auth(tmp_path, {"tokens": {"id_token": _unsigned_jwt({"sub": "user"})}})
assert codex_uses_chatgpt_auth(path) is False
def test_malformed_id_token_is_not_chatgpt(tmp_path) -> None:
for bogus in ("not-a-jwt", "a.b", "a.!!!not-base64!!!.c", ""):
path = _write_auth(tmp_path, {"tokens": {"id_token": bogus}})
assert codex_uses_chatgpt_auth(path) is False, bogus
def test_blank_chatgpt_account_id_is_not_chatgpt(tmp_path) -> None:
claims = {"https://api.openai.com/auth": {"chatgpt_account_id": " "}}
path = _write_auth(tmp_path, {"tokens": {"id_token": _unsigned_jwt(claims)}})
assert codex_uses_chatgpt_auth(path) is False
def test_legacy_account_id_still_detected(tmp_path) -> None:
path = _write_auth(tmp_path, {"tokens": {"account_id": "acct-123"}})
assert codex_uses_chatgpt_auth(path) is True
def test_provider_block_emits_requires_openai_auth_for_the_new_shape(tmp_path) -> None:
"""End of the chain: the JWT-only shape must produce the key Codex needs."""
path = _write_auth(tmp_path, {"tokens": {"id_token": _unsigned_jwt(_CHATGPT_CLAIMS)}})
block = build_provider_section(
port=8787,
name="Headroom",
include_markers=False,
requires_openai_auth=codex_uses_chatgpt_auth(path),
)
assert "requires_openai_auth = true" in block